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Preface
Developing methods for ensuring the secure exchange of information is one of the
oldest occupations in history. With the revolution in Information Technology, the
need for securing information and the variety of methods that have been devel-
oped to do it has expanded rapidly. Much of the technology that forms the basis
for many of the techniques used today was originally conceived for use in military
communications and has since found a place in a wide range of industrial and com-
mercial sectors. This has led to the development of certain industry standards that
are compounded in specific data processing algorithms together with the protocols
and procedures that are adopted in order to implement them. These standards are
of course continually scrutinized for their effectiveness and undergo improvements
and/or changes as required. Further, different standards have, for a variety of his-
torical reasons, been developed for particular market sectors. For example, DES
(Data Encryption Standard) was originally developed in the early 1970s and in 1976
was selected by the Federal Information Processing Standard for use in the USA.
Since that time, DES has had widespread use internationally and was upgraded to
triple DES or DES3 in the 1990s (essentially, but not literally, a triple encryption
version of DES in order to compensate for the relatively low key length associated
with the original DES).
Information security manifests itself in a variety of ways according to the sit-
uation and requirement. However, in general, it deals with such issues relating to
confidentiality, data integrity, access control, identification, authentication and au-
thorization. There are a number of practical applications that critically depend on
information security measures which include private messaging (encrypting email
attachments, for example), financial transactions and a host of online services. All
such applications relating to information security require the study of specific mathe-
matical techniques and the design of computational methods which are compounded
in the study of cryptography. This includes, not only the design of new approaches,
but continual analysis with regard to validating the strengths and weaknesses of a
cryptographic algorithm and the way in which it is implemented in practice.
Cryptology is the study of systems that typically originate from a considera-
tion of the ideal circumstances under which secure information exchange is to take
place. It involves the study of cryptographic systems but also the possible processes
that might be introduced for breaking the output of such systems - cryptanalysis.
This includes the introduction of formal mathematical methods for the design of a
cryptosystem and for estimating its theoretical level of security. However, in reality,
a cryptosystem often forms just a part of a complex infrastructure involving users
that are prone to levels of both stupidity and brilliance that can not be formally
classified. Hence the mathematical strength of a cryptographic algorithm is a nec-
essary but not a sufficient requirement for a system to be acceptably secure. In
the ideal case, the cryptographic strength of an algorithm and/or implementation
method can be checked by means of proving its resistance to various kinds of known
attacks. However, in practice, this does not mean that the algorithm and/or its
specific application is secure because other unknown attacks may exist. For this
reason, the security of a cryptosystem is often based on knowledge of its working
legacy and the confidence level that a community has acquired from its continual use
over many years often due to various up-grades, additions and modifications as have
been considered necessary. Thus, modern systems for securing information exchange
are often based to a large degree on past legacies associated with the performance
of relatively well established techniques.
There is a large range of many excellent books, scientific and engineering jour-
nals, conferences and a wealth of general information now available with regard to
information security. Different commercial products and software packages are avail-
able from a diverse range of companies and in such a competitive environment, it is
often difficult to evaluate the merits of one system over another. However, the large
majority of these systems and methods have a common origin or at least a common
theme. This book has been written to introduce the reader to a new theme in infor-
mation security, namely, the role of chaos in cryptography. Chapter 1 provides an
overview of encryption with a focus on the use if Chaos for this purpose. In Chap-
ter 2 provides an overview of some basic digital signal processing algorithms which
is provides a ‘link’ between data encryption and its application in communications
systems. This chapter also provides details of some algorithms that are used later
on in this work. Chapter 3 provides an overview of data encryption algorithms and
standards and includes information on example encryption systems and industries.
Finally, Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion on encryption using deterministic
chaos focusing on the design of algorithms that yield high entropy ciphers and utilize
many different Iteration Function Systems.
Irrespective of the method of encryption that is adopted, all encrypted informa-
tion raises a ‘flag’ to the possible importance of the information that it conveys.
For this reason it is of significant value if encrypted information can be hidden in
some way in other data types in order to disguise the fact that it exists. This is
known as Steganography and the latter half of this book focuses on the mathematical
models, algorithms and applications associated with a range of different approaches
to hiding information in digital signals and images. After providing an introduction
to the principles of Information Hiding and Digital Watermarking given in Chapter
5, the material considers methods for watermarking digital signals based on Chirp
Coding and Fractal Modulation as described in Chapter 6.
An overview of digital image watermarking is given in Chapter 7 and in Chapter
8, methods of information hiding and Steganography are addressed in which the
image is encrypted by diffusion with a noise field to produce a ciphertext - an en-
crypted watermark. A cover image (covertext) is then introduced into which the
ciphertext is embedded. The watermark image is recovered by removing the cover-
text and then correlating the output with the original (key dependent) noise source.
This approach provides the user with a method of hiding ciphertexts (the scrambled
image) in a host image before transmission of the data. In this sense, it provides
a steganographic approach to cryptology in which the ciphertext is not apparent
during an intercept. Decryption is based on knowledge of the key and access to
the host image. In terms of watermarking a digital image, the method provides a
way of embedding information in a host image which can be used to authenticate
that it has come from a identifiable source, a method that is relatively insensitive to
lossy compression, making it well suited to digital image transmission. The methods
considered represent a generic solution for undertaking covert cryptology.
With regard to hard copy document authentication, the use of diffusion and con-
fusion using a covertext is not robust. The reason for this is that the registration
of pixels associated with a covertext can not be assured when the composite image
is printed and scanned. We therefore consider a diffusion only approach to docu-
ment authentication which is robust to a wide variety of attacks including geometric
attacks, drawing, crumpling, and print/scan attacks. This is because the process
of diffusion (i.e. the convolution of information) is compatible with the physical
principles of an imaging system and the theory of image formation and thus, with
image capture devices (digital cameras and scanners, for example) that, by default,
conform to the ‘physics’ of optical image formation. The diffusion of plaintext (in
this case, an image) with a noise field (the cipher) has a synergy with the encryp-
tion of plaintext using a cipher and an XOR operation (when both the plaintext
and cipher are represented by binary streams). However, decryption of a convolved
image (deconvolution) is not as simple as XORing the ciphertext with the appropri-
ate cipher. Here, we consider an approach which is based on pre-conditioning the
original cipher in such a way that decryption (de-diffusion) can be undertaken by
correlating the ciphertext with the cipher. If a maximum entropy cipher is used that
is uniformly distributed, then the Power Spectral Desnity Function (PSDF) of the
output is determined by the PSDF of the plaintext (image). If the image is based on
naturally occurring objects which are roughly of a self-affine type, then the PSDF
may tend to scale according to a random fractal power law. In other words, the
diffusion of self-affine images with white noise will generate output images that are,
in effect, random fractal images with fractal-type textures. In this sense, the use of
white noise diffusion for document authentication is based on using texture maps
which are either fully or partially statistically self-affine. Either way, the outputs
considered for document authentication are based on printing textures of a type that
are determined by the spectral characteristics of the plaintext which can be applied
by using low resolution Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) printers and scanners.
This is the subject of Chapter 9.
The material presented in this book is primarily based on two sources: (i) a
series of lecture notes and supplementary teaching and learning materials developed
by the author for delivery at post-graduate level and continuous professional devel-
opment programmes; (ii) research undertaken by the author and associate research
students. Much of this research has focused on aspects of information security
that has had direct commercial potential and, in most cases, has been sponsored
by industry, including companies co-founded established by the author. Thus, al-
though this text concentrates on a range of academic issues concerning the appli-
cation of chaos to cryptology, for example, it also attempts to illustrate how this
application has generated commercially realizable products that are relatively new
to the market. This includes the systems such as CrypsticTM and StegoCryptTM
which are registered as ‘Technologies to License’ at Dublin Institute of Technology
- http://www.dit.ie/hothouse/
It is hoped that the information within this work is sufficiently complete and
descriptive for both the theoretician who wishes to understand the issues involved,
and the practitioner who wishes to apply the techniques. There are certain inevitable
limitations, however, imposed on the reader by the conventional static design of
textbooks. However, as more and more material is being made available on the
Internet it has been possible to collate a series of current links to other relevant
resources and applications. This allows potentially easy access to other individuals
who are using similar techniques. For this reason many of the references provided
consist of an appropriate conventional citation, a url or both.
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1 Introduction
The quest for inventing innovative techniques which allow only authorised users to
transfer information that is impervious to attack by others has, and continues to
be, an essential requirement in the communications industry. This requirement is
based on the importance of keeping certain information secure, obvious examples
being military communications and financial transactions, the former example being
a common theme in the history and development of cryptology [1].
The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) revolution associated
with the latter part of the Twentieth Century has brought about a number of signifi-
cant changes in the way we operate on a routine basis. One of the most significant of
these changes is the impact ICT has had upon basic human activities such as decision
making, information processing and knowledge management. Business communities
and government organisations rely heavily on exchanging, sharing and processing
information to assist them in making a variety of strategic decisions and a wide
range of security infrastructures have been established to help protect and preserve
the integrity of information flowing across different channels.
At a government level, knowledge of public opinion allows politicians to react
rapidly in their policies or programmes (at least in those cases where the infrastruc-
ture of society is based on democratic principles). In the commercial sector, ‘know
how’ contributes considerably to company market value because information is a
primary competitive advantage. Information is now a key factor in decision making
for all organisations, whatever their size and complexity, and is arguably the most
important asset of an organisation. The data transferred between different locations
and recipients can therefore become vulnerable to being intercepted and altered by
a capable and interested eavesdropper, and information exchange through the ap-
plication of a secure infrastructure has, therefore, become an essential component in
all forms of knowledge management. In other words, ‘knowledge is power’ and since
all power must be contained, it is necessary to provide continuous improvements to
securing communications in order to maintain parity with the pace and growth of
ICT in general (e.g. [2] - [6]). This work focuses on the applications of chaos to
cryptology and to information hiding and provides examples of how this application
can yield new technologies for secure information exchange.
1.1 Cryptology and Chaos
Cryptography is the study of mathematical and computational techniques related
to aspects of information security (e.g. [7]-[9]). The word is derived from the Greek
Kryptos, meaning hidden, and is related to disciplines such Cryptanalysis and Cryp-
tology. Cryptanalysis is the art of breaking cryptosystems by developing techniques
for the retrieval of information from encrypted data [10]. Cryptology is the science
that underpins cryptography and cryptanalysis and can include a broad range of
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mathematical concepts, computational algorithms and technologies. In other words,
cryptology is a multi-disciplinary subject that covers a wide spectrum of different
disciplines and increasingly involves using a range of engineering concepts and tech-
nologies through the innovation associated with term ‘technology transfer’. Figure 1
shows some example subject areas associated with modern cryptology [11]. These
include areas such as Synergetics, which is an interdisciplinary science explaining the
formation and self-organization of patterns and structures in non-equilibrium open
systems and Semiotics, which is the study of signs and symbols, both individually
and grouped in sign systems including the study of how meaning is constructed and
understood.
Cryptology is often concerned with the application of formal mathematical tech-
niques to design a cryptosystem and to estimate its theoretical security. This can
include the use of formal methods for the design of security software which should
ideally be a ‘safety critical system’ [12]. Although the mathematically defined and
provable strength of a cryptographic algorithm or cryptosystem is necessary, it is
not a sufficient requirement for a system to be acceptably secure. This is because
it is difficult to estimate the security of a cryptosystem in any formal sense when
it is implemented in the field under conditions that can not always be predicted
and thus, simulated. The security associated with a cryptosystem can be checked
only by means of proving its resistance to various kinds of known attack that are
likely to be implemented. However, in practice, this does not mean that the system
is secure since other attacks may exist that are not included in simulated or test
conditions. The reason for this is that humans possess a broad range of abilities
from unbelievable ineptitude to astonishing brilliance which can not be formalised
in a mathematical sense or on a case by case basis.
The practical realities associated with Cryptology are indicative of the fact that
‘Security is a process, not a product’ [13]. Whatever the sophistication of the security
product (e.g. the encryption and/or key exchange algorithm(s), for example), unless
the user adheres strictly to the procedures and protocols designed for its use, the
‘product’ can be severely compromised.
A good example of this is the use of the Enigma [14] cipher by Germany during
the Second World War. It was not just the ‘intelligence’ of the ‘code breakers’ at
Bletchley Park in England that allowed the allies to break many of the Enigma codes
but the ‘irresponsibility’ and, in many cases, the sheer stupidity of the way in which
the system was used by the German armed and intelligence services at the time. The
basic mechanism for the Enigma cipher, which had been developed as early as 1923
by Artur Schubius for securing financial transactions, was well known to the allies
(thanks to the efforts of the Polish Cipher Office at Poznan in the 1930s) and the
distribution of some 10,000 similar machines (with relatively minor modifications)
to the German army, navy and air force was a disaster waiting to happen. The
solution would have been to design a brand new encryption engine or better still, a
range of different encryption engines given the technology of the time, and use the
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Figure 1: Example subject areas that contribute to developments in modern Cryp-
tology [11].
Enigma machine to propagate disinformation. Indeed, some of the new encryption
engines introduced by the Germans towards the end of the Second World War were
not broken by the allies.
These historically intriguing insights are easy to contemplate with hindsight, but
they can also help to focus on the methodologies associated with developing new
technologies for knowledge management which is a focus of the material considered
in this work. Here, we explore the use of deterministic chaos for designing ciphers
that are composed of many different pseudo chaotic number generating algorithms -
Meta-encryption-engines. This multi-algorithmic or Meta-engine approach provides
a way of designing an unlimited class of encryption engines as opposed to designing
a single encryption engine that is operated by changing the key(s) - which for some
systems, public key system in particular, involves the use of prime numbers. There
are of course a number of disadvantages to this approach which are discussed later
on but it is worth stating at this point, that the principal purpose for exploring the
application of deterministic chaos in cryptography is:
• the non-reliance of such systems on the use of prime numbers which place cer-
tain limits on the characteristics and arithmetic associated with an encryption
algorithm;
• the unlimited number of chaos based algorithms that can be, quite literally,
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invented to produce a meta-encryption engine.
1.2 Playing the Game for the Game’s Sake
In a game such as chess, for example, there is no such thing as a perfect game other
than the game itself, at least, for chess enthusiasts. Such games are based on a set
of pre-defined rules. All games of this type are intrinsically dynamic processes; they
change according to the game plans perceived to be in the mind of opponent; plans
that are themselves in a constant state of flux. Real games were first conceived in
terms of organized systems by the French Mathematician Emile Borel in the early
1920s. This idea was developed further by the Hungarian Born mathematician, John
Von Neumann in his theory of games developed in the 1940s [15]. These are the
sort of games that humans play and are not necesserily based on a set of pre-defined
rules. These are games where the game itself is an intrinsically dynamic process,
forever evolving according to the games perceived to be in the mind of opponent;
games that are themselves in a constant state of flux.
If there can be such a thing as a ‘golden rule’ for games, dynamic or otherwise,
then it is: never underestimate the enemy ! This includes appreciating that a clever
invention or tactic or both could have been anticipated by the opponent or have been
developed and implemented a priori. Good security processes are based on prod-
ucts, procedures and protocols that are dynamic and the security industry is best
composed of individuals that, like great chess players, have two things in common:
• a detailed and near-photographic memory of previous games they have played
(won and lost);
• a completely detached and analytical view of these games and above all, a
cynical attitude with regard to their value.
With regard to the issue of ‘playing the game for the game’s sake’, information
security is best undertaken by changing the characteristics of the game itself, i.e.
not to play the game for the game’s sake. This approach needs to realized within
the context that gaming is valid at many scales, from the socio-political arena to
the level of technical innovation and theoretical detail. Further, the nature of the
games play is such that there is usually an intrinsic self-similarity associated with
the framework in which the games are played, i.e. the games are scale invariant (e.g.
[16] and [17]).
Some of the most innovative ideas in information security with regard to changing
the ‘game’ are the simplest. For example, after the Second World War, as the cold
war developed, although the USSR did not have complete knowledge of the code
breaking activities of the other allies (the British and Americans in particular), it
was well known that the code breaking activities had been based on information
retrieved by intercepting wireless-based communications (i.e. wireless encrypted
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Morse code). For the USSR the answer was simple. They used land lines until they
felt confident of their own wireless-based cryptosystems. This was not an elegant
solution but it was simple and highly effective and literally kept NATO in the dark
for decades to come with many attempts being made by the western powers to
physically intercept or tap the USSR ‘land-lines’ with little if any success.
It is an irony that as society becomes more and more ‘open and transparent’
with regard to information in general, including information on how to construct
and break industry standard encryption technology [18], so it becomes increasingly
difficult to implement secure policies for the protection of that society. This is due,
not only to the increased technical awareness, knowledge and abilities of the younger
generations, but is also a product of the social engineering implemented after the
Second World War where deference to authority has slowly but surely ebbed away.
This has led to radical changes in social- and geo-politics world wide.
One of the most significant of these geo-political changes has been the collapse
of the USSR. Referred to by Vladimir Putin as one of the worst social disasters of
the twentieth century, the end of the Cold War, which provided stability based on
mutually assured destruction, has caused significant changes in the characteristics
of world politics. An important aspect of the new political game now being played
includes a new approach to education which has been introduced as a counterbalance
to the growing technical competence of the younger generation. The rationale for
this is as follows: it is arguable that one of the principal causes for the collapse
of the USSR was the high level of education that it provided for its citizens which
was initially established for ideaological reasons. Coupled with the fact that Soviet
citizens did not live with personal debts, this led to the population being able to
contemplate intelligently the nature of the society they were living in and questioning
its modus operandi. This is reflected in a comment made by Mikhail Gorbachev
when he stated that he was the premier of one of the best educated countries in the
world but where its citizens could only ‘discuss life in the kitchen’. Understanding
the reasons behind this collapse has generated a new era in which education is
playing a central role. While education is being made available to a larger spectrum
of the population, it is being accomplished in such a way that the output is far
less enquiring than in previous generations and in significantly greater debt, thus
preventing a repeat of the fundamental mistake made by the USSR. This is reflected
in the use of ICT in which education is based on the execution of existing systems
but not on providing in-depth knowledge on how to create them and improve upon
them.
1.3 Knowledge Management
With regard to information security and knowledge management in general, there
are some basic concepts that are easy to grasp and sometimes tend to get lost in
the detail. The first of these is that the recipient of any encrypted message must
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have some form of a priori knowledge on the method (the algorithm for example)
and the operational conditions (e.g. the key) used to encrypt a message. Otherwise,
the recipient is in no better ‘state of preparation’ than the potential attacker. The
conventional approach is to keep this a priori information to a minimum but in such
a way that it is critical to the decryption process. Another important reality is that
in an attack, if the information transmitted is not deciphered in good time, then it
may become redundant. Coupled with the fact that an attack usually has to focus
on a particular criterion (a specific algorithm for example), one way to enhance
the security of a communications channel is to continually change the encryption
algorithm and/or process offered by the technology currently available.
Another approach to knowledge management is to disguise or camouflage the
encrypted message in what would appear to be ‘innocent’ or ‘insignificant’ data such
as a digital photograph of a holiday snap-shot, a music file or both, for example1.
This is known as Steganography [19]-[21]. Further, the information security products
themselves should be introduced and ‘organised’ in such a way as to reflect their
apparent insignificance in terms of both public awareness and financial reward. This
is of course contrary to the dissemination of many encryption systems, a process that
is commonly perceived as being necessary for business development through the
establishment of a commercial organisation, international patents, distribution of
marketing material, elaborate and sophisticated websites, authoritative statements
on the strength of a system to impress customers, publications and so on. Thus, a
relatively simple but often effective way of maintaining security with regard to the
use of an encryption system is to not tell anyone about it. The effect of this can
be enhanced by publishing other systems and products that are designed to mislead
the potential attacker. In this sense, ICT security products should be treated in the
same way as many organisations treat a breach of security, i.e. not to publish the
breach in order to avoid embarrassment and loss of faith by the client base.
1.3.1 Keeping it Quiet
A classic mistake (of historical importance) of not ‘keeping it quiet’, in particular, not
maintaining ‘silent warfare’ [22], was made by Winston Churchill when he published
his analysis of World War I. In his book The World Crisis 1911-1918 published in
1923, he stated that the British had deciphered the German Naval codes for much
of the war as a result of the Russians salvaging a code book from the small cruiser
Magdeburg that had ran aground off Estonia on August 27, 1914. The code book
was passed on to Churchill who was, at the time, the First Sea Lord. This helped
the British maintain their defences with regard to the German navy before and after
the Battle of Jutland in May, 1916. The German navy became impotent and forced
the Germans to turn their attention to unrestricted submarine warfare. In turn,
1By encoding the encrypted message in the least significant bit or bit-pair of the host data, for
example.
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this led to an event (the sinking on May 7, 1915 of the Lusitania, torpedoed by a
German submarine, the U-20) that galvanized American opinion against Germany
and played a key role in the United States’ later entry into World War I on April
17, 1917 and the defeat of Germany [23], [24].
Figure 2: A military grade Enigma cipher (left), the three cipher rotors (centre) and
a photograph of Marian Rejewski who invented the Bomba kryptologiczna, the basis
for the deciphering machines constructed at Bletchley Park.
Churchill’s publication did not go unnoticed by the German military between
the First and Second World wars. Consequently significant efforts were made to
develop new encryption devices for military communications. This resulted in the
famous Enigma machine, named after Sir Edward Elgar’s masterpiece, the Enigma
Variations [25]. This was an electro-mechanical machine about the size of a portable
typewriter (see Figure 39), with a standard keyboard, three (Figure 39) and later,
four interchangeable rotors, and a number of plug connectors. The rotors and plugs
offered 200 quintillion permutations. The machine could be used without difficulty
by semi-skilled operators under the most extreme battle conditions. The rotor set-
tings could be changed daily or several times a day according to the number of
messages transmitted, after which the rotors returned to their original setting. The
interest in cryptology by Germany that was undoubtedly stimulated by Churchill’s
indiscretions included establishing a specialist cipher school in Berlin. Ironically, it
was at this school that some of the Polish mathematicians were trained who later
worked for the Polish Cipher Office, opened in utmost secrecy at Poznan in 1930
[26], [27]. In January 1929, the Dean of the Department of Mathematics, Professor
Zdzislaw Krygowski from the University of Poznan, provided a list of his best grad-
uates to start working at this office. One of these graduates was the brilliant young
logician, Marian Rejewski (see Figure 39) who pioneered the design of the Bomba
kryptologiczna, an electro-mechanical device used for eliminating combinations that
had not been used to encrypt a message with the Enigma cipher [28]. However,
the design of the Bomba kryptologiczna was only made possible through the Poles
gaining access to the Enigma machine and obtaining knowledge of its mechanism
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without alerting the Germans to their activities. In modern terms, this is equivalent
to obtaining information on the type of encryption algorithm used in a cryptosystem.
The Bomba kryptologiczna helped the Poles to decipher some 100,000 Enigma
messages from as early January 1933 to September 1939 including details associated
with the remilitarization of the Rhine Province, Anschluss of Austria and seizure
of the Sudetenland. It was Rejewski’s original work that formed the basis for de-
signing the advanced electro-mechanical and later, the electronic decipher machines
(including ‘Colossus’ - the world’s first programmable computer) constructed and
utilized at Bletchley Park between 1943 and 1945 [29], [30].
After the Second World War, Winston Churchill made sure that he did not
repeat his mistake, and what he referred to as his ‘Ultra-secret’ - the code breaking
activities undertaken at Station X in Bletchley Park, England - was ordered by
him to be closed down and the technology destroyed soon after the end of the
war. Further, Churchill never referred to his Ultra-secret in any of his publications
after the war. Those personnel who worked at Bletchley Park were required to
maintain their silence for some fifty years afterwards and some of the activities at
Bletchley Park remain classified to this day. Bletchley park is now a museum which
includes a reconstruction of ‘Colossus’ (see Figure 43) undertaken in the mid-1990s.
However, the type of work undertaken there in the early 1940s continues in many
organisations throughout the world such as the Government Communications Head
Quarters (GCHQ) based at Cheltenham in England [31] where a range of ‘code
making’ and ‘code breaking’ activities continue to be developed.
With regard to the issue of ‘keeping it quiet’ there is one last intriguing and
historically important issue which relates to a British approach for managing the
users of encryption systems and the systems themselves after the end of the Second
World War in the late 1940s and 1950s2, an approach that has come to dominate the
management of encryption systems by authorities world wide. As the British army
advanced into west Germany, many thousands of Enigma machines were captured
and stock-piled. An issue arose as to what to do with them. Two options were
available: (i) to destroy them; (ii) to make good use of them. The latter decision was
taken. Coupled with a ‘spin’ on the quality of German war technology, many Enigma
machines were sold on to various governments in order for the British to gather
intelligence based at the new Government Central Headquarters in Cheltenham.
However, the ‘key’ to this deception was to maintain a critical silence on the work
of Cheltenham. This is the ‘real reason’ as to why the activities of ‘Station X’ based
at Bletchley Park, England, had to remain secrete for such a significant length of
time.
Although encryption technologies have improved radically since the development
of Enigma, the management of these technologies has not. The broad strategy is
2Based on comments made by Dr S Singh - http://www.simonsingh.net/ - at a Keynote Address,
‘The Science of Secrecy’, 20th Irish Signals and Systems Conference, University College Dublin, June
10th - 11th, 2009.
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to encourage the use of an encryption standard (including key management) that
is known and preferably designed by the very authorities whose principal job is to
gather intelligence associated with communications traffic that has been encrypted
using the same encryption standard. This strategy has become a central theme in
the management of encryption systems world wide. It is a strategy that can only be
fully compromised through the development of novel encryption methods that do
not conform to a ‘standard’.
The historical example given above clearly illustrates the importance of main-
taining a level of secrecy when undertaking cryptographic activities. It also demon-
strates the importance of not publishing new algorithms, a principle that is at odds
with the academic community; namely, that the security of a cryptosystem should
not depend upon algorithm secrecy. However, this has to be balanced with regard
to the dissemination of information in order to advance a concept through peer re-
view, national and international collaboration. Taken to an extreme, the secrecy
factor can produce a psychological imbalance that is detrimental to progress. Some
individuals like to use confidential information to enhance their status. In business,
this often leads to issues over the signing of Non-Disclosure Agreements or NDAs,
for example, leading to delays that are of little value, especially when it turns out
that there is nothing worth disclosing. Thus, the whole issue of ‘keeping it quiet’
has to be implemented in a way that is balanced, such that confidentiality does not
lead to stagnation in the technical development of a cryptosystem. However, used
correctly and through the appropriate personality, issues over confidentiality coupled
with the ‘feel important’ factor can be used to good effect in the dissemination of
disinformation.
Figure 3: The Colossus Mark II computer (left) design by T Flowers at the Post
Office Research Station was first installed at Bletchley Park in June 1944. The
machine - which was, in effect, the world’s first electronic digital computer - was
reconstructed at Bletchley Park in the mid-1990’s (right).
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1.3.2 Home-Spun Systems Development
The public development of information security technology is one of the most inter-
esting challenges for state control over the ‘information society’. As more and more
members of the younger generation become increasingly IT literate, it is inevitable
that a larger body of perfectly able minds will become aware of the fact that cryp-
tology is not as difficult as they have been led to believe. As with information itself,
the days when cryptology was in the hands of a select few with impressive academic
credentials and/or luxury civil service careers are over and cryptosystems can now
be developed by those with a diverse portfolio of backgrounds which does not neces-
sarily include a University education. This is reflected in the fact that after the Cold
War, the UK Ministry of Defense, for example, developed a strategy for developing
products driven by commercially available systems. This Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
or COTS approach to defence technology has led directly to the downsizing of the
UK scientific Civil Service which, during the cold war, was a major source of scientific
and technical innovation.
The average graduate of today can rapidly develop the ability to write an encryp-
tion system which, although relatively simple, possibly trivial and ill-informed, can,
by the very nature of its non-compliance to international standards, provide surpris-
ingly good security. This can lead to problems with the control and management
of information when increasingly more individuals, groups, companies, agencies and
nation states decide that they can ‘go it alone’ and do it themselves. While each
home grown encryption system may be relatively weak, compared to those that have
had expert development over many years, have been well financed and been tested
against the very best of attack strategies, the proliferation of such systems is itself
a source of significant difficulty for any authority whose role is to monitor commu-
nications traffic in a way that is timely and cost effective. This is why governments
worldwide are constantly attempting to control the use and exploitation of new
encryption methods in the commercial sector3. It also explains the importance of
international encryption standards in terms of both public perception and free mar-
ket exploitation. Government and other controlling authorities like to preside over a
situation in which everybody else is confidently reliant for their information security
on products that have been developed by the very authorities that encourage their
use, a use that is covertly ‘diffused’ into the ‘information society’ through various le-
gitimate business ventures coupled with all the usual commercial sophistication and
investment portfolios. Analysis of this type can lead to a range of unsubstantiated
conspiracy theories, but it only by thinking through such possible scenarios, that
new concepts in information management, some of which may be of practical value,
are evolved. The proliferation of stand-alone encryption systems that are designed
3For example, the introduction of legislation concerning the decryption of massages by a com-
pany client through enforcement of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act, 2000 - See
Appendix A.
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and used by informed individuals is not only possible but inevitable, an inevitability
that is guided by the principle that if you want to know what you are eating then
you should cook it yourself. Security issues of this type have become the single most
important agenda for future government policy on information technology, especially
when such systems have been ‘homespun’ by those who have learned to fully respect
that they should, in the words of Shakespeare, ‘Neither a borrower, nor a lender
be’4.
1.3.3 Disinformation
Disinformation is used to tempt the enemy into believing certain kinds of informa-
tion. The information may not be true or contain aspects that are designed to cause
the enemy to react in an identifiable way that provides a strategic advantage [32],
[33]. Camouflage, for example, is a simple example of disinformation [34]. This
includes techniques for transforming encrypted data into forms that resemble the
environments through which an encrypted message is to be sent. At a more sophis-
ticated level, disinformation can include encrypted messages that are created with
the sole purpose of being broken in order to reveal information that the enemy will
react to by design.
Disinformation includes arranging events and processes that are designed to pro-
tect against an enemy acquiring knowledge of a successful encryption technology
and/or a successful attack strategy. A historically significant example of this in-
volved the Battle of Crete which began on the morning of 20 May 1941 when Nazi
Germany launched an airborne invasion of Crete under the code-name Unternehmen
Merkur (operation mercury) [35]. During the next day, through miscommunication
and the failure of commanders to grasp the situation, the Maleme airfield in western
Crete fell to the Germans which enabled them to fly in heavy reinforcements and
overwhelm the Allied forces. This battle was unique in two respects: it was the
first airborne invasion in history 5; it was the first time the Allies made significant
use of their ability to read Enigma codes. The British had known for some weeks
prior to the invasion of Crete that an invasion was likely because of the work being
undertaken at Bletchley Park. They faced a problem because of this. If Crete was
reinforced in order to repel the invasion then Germany would suspect that their en-
crypted communications were being compromised. But this would also be the case if
the British and other Allied troops stationed on Crete were evacuated. The decision
was, therefore, taken by Churchill to let the German invasion proceed with success
but not without giving the invaders a ‘bloody nose’. Indeed, in light of the heavy
casualties suffered by the parachutists, Hitler forbade further airborne operations
and Crete was dubbed ‘the graveyard of the German parachutists’. The graveyard
4From William Shakespeare’s play, Hamlet.
5Illustrating the potential of paratroopers and so initiating the Allied development of their own
airborne divisions.
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for German, British, Greek and Allied soldiers alike was not a product of a fight
over desirable and strategically important territory (at least for the British). It was
a product of the need to secure Churchill’s ‘Ultra-secret’. In other words, the Allied
efforts to repulse the German invasion of Crete was, in reality, a form of disinfor-
mation, designed to secure a secret that was, in the bigger picture, more important
than the estimated 16,800 dead and wounded that the battle cost.
1.3.4 Plausible Deniability
Deniable encryption allows an encrypted message to be decrypted in such a way that
different and plausible plaintexts can be obtained using different keys [36]. The idea
is to make it impossible for an attacker to prove the existence of the real message,
a message that requires a specific key. This approach provides the user with a
solution to the ‘gun to the head problem’ as it allows the sender to have plausible
deniability if compelled to give up the encryption key. There are a range of different
methods that can be designed to implement such a scheme. For example, a single
ciphertext can be generated that is composed of randomised segments or blocks
of data which correlate to blocks of different plaintexts encrypted using different
keys. A further key is then required to assemble the appropriate blocks in order
to generate the desired decrypt. This approach, however, leads to ciphertext files
that are significantly larger than the plaintexts they contain. On the other hand,
a ciphertext file should not necessarily be the same size as the plaintext file and
padding out the plaintext before encryption can be used to increase the entropy of
the ciphertext (see Chapter 3).
Other methods used for deniable encryption involve establishing a number of
abstract ‘layers’ that are decrypted to yield different plaintexts for different keys.
Some of these layers are designed to include so-called ‘chaff layers’. These are layers
that are composed of random data which provide the owner of the data to have
plausible deniability of the existence of layers containing the real ciphertext data.
The user can store ‘decoy files’ on one or more layers while denying the existence
of others, identifying the existence of chaff layers as required. The layers are based
on file systems that are typically stored in a single directory consisting of files with
filenames that are either randomised (in the case where they belong to chaff layers),
or are based on strings that identify cryptographic data, the timestamps of all files
being randomized throughout.
1.3.5 Obfuscation
In a standard computing (windows) environment, a simple form of camouflage can
be implemented by renaming files to be of a different type; for example, storing
an encrypted data file as a .exe or .dll file. Some cryptosystems output files with
identifiable extensions such as .enc which can then be simply filtered by a firewall.
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Another example includes renaming files in order to access data and/or execute an
encryption engine. For example, by storing an executable file as a .dll (dynamic link
library) file (which has a similar structure to a .exe file) in a directory full of real
.dll files associated with some complex applications package, the encryption engine
can be obfuscated, especially if it has a name that is similar to the environment of
files in which it is placed. By renaming the file back to its ‘former self’, execution
of cryptosystem can be undertaken in the usual way.
1.3.6 Steganographic Encryption
It is arguable that disinformation should, where possible, be used in conjunction with
the exchange of encrypted information which has been camouflaged using stegano-
graphic techniques for hiding the ciphertext. For example, suppose that it had
been assumed by Germany that the Enigma ciphers were being compromised by the
British during the Second World War. Clearly, it would have been strategically ad-
vantageous for Germany to propagate disinformation using Enigma. If, in addition,
‘real information’ had been encrypted differently and the ciphertexts camouflaged
using broadcasts through the German home radio service, for example, then the out-
come of the war could have been very different. The use of new encryption methods
coupled with camouflage and disinformation, all of which are dynamic processes,
provides a model that, while not always of practical value, is strategically compre-
hensive and has only rarely been fully realised. Nevertheless, some of the techniques
that have been developed and are reported in this work are the result of an attempt
to realise this model.
1.4 Substitution Ciphers
Encryption processes generally fall into two principal classes [37]. The first is based
on substituting each element of the plaintext with another letter which is known as
a substitution cipher. The second is based on shifting each letter of the plaintext
into a new position; this is known as a transposition cipher.
Suppose we introduce a simple numerical equivalence scheme where A = 0, B =
1, ..., Z = 25. Then the following plaintext:
THE CAT SAT ON THE MAT
becomes
19 7 4 2 0 19 18 0 19 14 13 19 7 4 12 0 19
Now suppose we generate an array of user defined numbers which can be any value
between 0 and 25 inclusively, e.g.
5 2 1 0 1 3 9 3 10 4 4 11 7 6 8 0 14
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This array represents the cipher. Adding the two integer arrays, we get
24 9 5 2 1 22 1 3 3 18 17 4 14 10 20 0 7
Note that if the addition exceeds 25, then the result is wrapped around (e.g. 19+14=7),
i.e. the output is taken to be the modulo of 26. Converting the integer array above
back into letters, we obtain the following ciphertext
YJF CBW BDD SR EOK UAH
To decrypt the above ciphertext, we are required to have knowledge of the cipher. In
this example, the cipher has been constructed by hand for illustrative purposes only.
In practice, a random number generating algorithm or a chaotic number generating
algorithm can be used to produce an array of numbers that are unique with regard
to some initial value that is used to ‘drive’ the algorithm. Such algorithms are
examples of one-way functions [38], [39]. These are functions that produce outputs
from which the input cannot be derived, i.e. the function is not invertible and the
initial value cannot be derived from the random number array. In cryptography, the
initial value or initial condition defines a ‘key’. Such algorithms typically involve an
iterative process of the type [4]
cn+1 = f(cn)
where the key is determined by the numerical value of c0. The function f must,
ideally, be designed to output a random stream of integer (or floating point) numbers
that have statistical properties suited to applications in cryptography. The principal
properties are that cn+1 should not be predictable from cn and that the cipher
c = (c1, c2, ..., cn, ...)
should have a maximum information entropy measure - a measure on lack of infor-
mation about the exact state of c, i.e. the values of the elements of this array. The
latter condition dictates that the (discrete) Probability Density Function (PDF) of
c is uniform.
The numerical equivalence scheme used above is based on assigning values be-
tween 0 and 25 to the letters A-Z and does not include a number for the spaces
between the words. It is for this reason that the example given above has grouped
the numbers together in order to reflect the individual words of the plaintext. In
practice, (i.e. for computer based applications) we use the ASCII (American Stan-
dard Code for Information Interchange) to convert plaintext in to an array of num-
bers (although any code can, in principle, be used). For conventional 7-bit ASCII
conversion, the range of numbers is between 0 and 127 as given in Table 1.
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DEC BIN CHAR DEC BIN CHAR DEC BIN CHAR
0 0000000 null 43 0101011 + 86 1010110 V
1 0000001 suh 44 0101100 , 87 1010111 W
2 0000010 stx 45 0101101 - 88 1011000 X
3 0000011 etx 46 0101110 . 89 1011001 Y
4 0000100 eot 47 0101111 / 90 1011010 Z
5 0000101 enq 48 0110000 0 91 1011011 [
6 0000110 ack 49 0110001 1 92 1011100 &
7 0000111 bel 50 0110010 2 93 1011101 ]
8 0001000 bs 51 0110011 3 94 1011110 ∧
9 0001001 ht 52 0110100 4 95 1011111
12 0001010 lf 53 0110101 5 96 1100000 ‘
11 0001011 vt 54 0110110 6 97 1100001 a
12 0001100 ff 55 0110111 7 98 1100010 b
13 0001101 cr 56 0111000 8 99 1100011 c
14 0001110 so 57 0111001 9 100 1100100 d
15 0001111 si 58 0111010 : 101 1100101 e
16 0010000 dle 59 0111011 ; 102 1100110 f
17 0010001 dc1 60 0111100 < 103 1100111 g
18 0010010 dc2 61 0111101 = 104 1101000 h
19 0010011 dc3 62 0111110 > 105 1101001 i
20 0010100 dc4 63 0111111 ? 106 1101010 j
21 0010101 nak 64 1000000 @ 107 1101011 k
22 0010110 syn 65 1000001 A 108 1101100 l
23 0010111 etb 66 1000010 B 109 1101101 m
24 0011000 can 67 1000011 C 110 1101110 n
25 0011001 em 68 1000100 D 111 1101111 o
26 0011010 sub 69 1000101 E 112 1110000 p
27 0011011 esc 70 1000110 F 113 1110001 q
28 0011100 fs 71 1000111 G 114 1110010 r
29 0011101 gs 72 1001000 H 115 1110011 s
30 0011110 rs 73 1001001 I 116 1110100 t
31 0011111 us 74 1001010 J 117 1110101 u
32 0100000 sp 75 1001011 K 118 1110110 v
33 0100001 ! 76 1001100 L 119 1110111 w
34 0100010 ” 77 1001101 M 120 1111000 x
35 0100011 # 78 1001110 N 121 1111001 y
36 0100100 $ 79 1001111 O 122 1111010 z
37 0100101 % 80 1010000 P 123 1111011 {
38 0100110 & 81 1010001 Q 124 1111100 |
39 0100111 ’ 82 1010010 R 125 1111101 }
40 0101000 ( 83 1010011 S 126 1111110 ∼
41 0101001 ) 84 1010100 T 127 1111111 del
42 0101010 * 85 1010101 U
Table 1: ASCII table giving decimal integer (DEC) and binary (BIN) representations
of a character (CHAR).
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1.5 Example Substitution Ciphers
1.5.1 The Caesar cipher
The Caesar cipher is named after Julius Caesar and is based on shifting each letter
of a message to another position in the alphabet. Caesar is reported to have used
this cipher with a shift of three to protect messages of military significance. In his
book The Life of Julius Caesar, Seutonius states that:
If he had anything confidential to say, he wrote it in cipher, that is, by so changing
the order of the letters of the alphabet that not a word could be made out. If anyone
wishes to decipher these, and get at their meaning, he must substitute the fourth
letter of the alphabet, namely D, for A, and so with the others.
The cipher is simple to compute by aligning two alphabets. The ciphertext al-
phabet is the plaintext alphabet shifted left or right by a fixed number of positions -
the shift parameter. This parameter is the key to the encryption/decryption process.
For example, with a shift parameter of 3, the plaintext alphabet is
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
and the cipher alphabet is
DEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABC
Thus A transforms to D, B transforms E and so on and the plaintext
HAIL CAESAR DICTATOR FOR LIFE
transforms to
KDLO FDHVDU GLFWDWRU IRU OLIH
The encryption method can be represented using modular arithmetic by first trans-
forming the letters into numbers, according to the scheme, A = 0, B = 1,..., Z = 25.
Encryption of a letter L by a shifting key K is given by
EK(x) = (L+K)MOD(26)
and decryption by
DK(x) = (L−K)MOD(26)
where MOD denotes the operation such that if L+K and L−K are not in the range 0-
25, we subtract or add 26 respectively. The shifting key remains the same throughout
the message and thus, the cipher is known as a monoalphabetic substitution cipher.
The cipher can be easily broken using a brute force attack by applying different
values of K (from 1-26). A frequency analysis (i.e. analysis of the histogram of
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the ciphertext) can be used to find the value of K. This is because the ciphertext
histogram is a shifted version of the plaintext histogram. Frequency analysis is the
practice of decrypting a message by counting the frequency of ciphertext letters, and
equating it to the letter frequency of normal text. For instance, if P occurred most in
a ciphertext whose plaintext is in English, we can expect that P corresponded to E,
because E is the most frequently used letter in English. When an ASCII code is used
(at least for Indo-European languages) the histogram of the plaintext is dominated
by a peak which represents the most likely numerical value to occur in the plaintext.
For a 7-bit ASCII code, this value is 32 which is the ASCII code for a space. In
other words, the frequency of occurrence of a space in an Indo-European language
is greater than any other character. Hence, by observing the shift of this peak value
from 32 to K, the key is simply recovered. An obvious approach to overcoming this
weakness is to applying different and arbitrary values of K at arbitrarily defined
locations X of the plaintext. This provides a polyalphabetic substitution cipher
and is an example of using a non-stationary process to encrypt where the key is
composed of the value pairs (K1, X1), (K2, X2), .....
1.5.2 The Vigene`re Cipher
Based on a publication in 1585 by Blaise de Vigene`re, the Vigene`re cipher is based
on applying a number of Caesar ciphers in sequence with different shift values to
produce a polyalphabetic cipher. A typical systematic way of doing this is to use
an alphabetic (Vigene`re) table which consists of the alphabet written out 26 times
in different rows where each alphabet is shifted cyclically to the left relative to the
previous alphabet. This is equivalent to producing 26 Caesar ciphers as illustated in
the Table 2. Having constructed a Vigene`re table, the encryption process is based
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
A ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
B BCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZA
C CDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZAB
D DEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABC
E EFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCD
F FGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDE
...
...
Table 2: A Vigene`re table consisting of the alphabet written out 26 times in different
rows where each alphabet is shifted cyclically to the left relative to the previous
alphabet - equivalent to producing 26 Caesar ciphers.
on a cipher obtained using a different alphabet from one of the rows which depends
on a repeating keyword. For example, consider the plaintext:
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HILTERS ONLY GOT ONE BALL
We then choose a key which is as long as the plaintext ignoring spaces. This can be
done by, for example, choosing a simple password and repeating it until it matches
the length of the plaintext, for example. Suppose we choose the password ADOLPH,
then the key becomes
ADOLPHA DOLP HAD OLP HADO
Using the Vigene`re table, the first letter of the plaintext, H, is enciphered using the
alphabet in row A, which is the first letter of the key. This is done by looking at
the letter in row H and column A of the Vigene`re table, namely H. Similarly, for the
second letter of the plaintext, the second letter of the key is used; the letter at row
I and column D is L. The rest of the plaintext is enciphered in a similar fashion to
yield
Plaintext: HILTERS ONLY GOT ONE BALL
Key: ADOLPHA DOLP HAD OLP HADO
Ciphertext: HLHWTYS RBWN NOW CYT IAOZ
Decryption is performed by finding the position of the ciphertext letter in a row
of the table, and then taking the label of the column in which it appears as the
plaintext. For example, in row A, the ciphertext H appears in column H, which is
taken as the first plaintext letter. The second letter is decrypted by looking up L in
row D of the table which occurs in column I and so on. We can express the process
algebraically using a number association in which the letters A, B, ..., Z are taken
to be the numbers 0, 1, ..., 25 respectively, with modulo 26 addition, i.e.
Ci = (Pi +Ki)MOD(26)
for encryption of the plaintext array Pi to the ciphertext array Ci using the key Ki
and
Pi = (Ci −Ki)MOD(26)
for decryption.
Compared to the monoalphabetic Caesar cipher, the Vigene`re cipher, like all
polyalphabetic ciphers cannot easily be broken using statistical analysis, i.e. inter-
preting the histogram of the ciphertext. For example, the letter E can be enciphered
as any of several letters in the alphabet at different points in the message thus de-
feating the simple frequency analysis associated with a Caesar cipher. The critical
weakness in the Vigene`re cipher is the relatively short and repeated nature of its
key. If a cryptanalyst discovers the key’s length then the cipher text can be treated
as a series of different Caesar ciphers, which individually are trivially broken.
The example given above is based on the construction of key through the repe-
tition of a short password. Key repetition of any type is a source of major weakness
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in the construction of a cipher. In some cases, use of the Enigma cipher was based
on key repetition. The rotor and plug board settings for a given day and usually
at a set time (i.e. the key for the message(s) yet to be sent) were communicated
by radio transmission using standard Morse code (as were the encrypted messages).
This transmission was sometimes repeated in order to give the recipient(s) multi-
ple opportunity to receive the key without ambiguity. For a period of time, the
transmission was repeated three times, although this was reduced to just twice later
on. Worse still, in some rare but important cases, the passwords were composed of
simple names, e.g. the name of some operators’ girlfriends. Thus, in many cases,
a simple password consisting of an identifiable name was transmitted two or three
times sequentially leading to near perfect temporal correlation of the initial commu-
nication. This was a phenomenally irresponsible way of using the Enigma cipher.
In today’s environment it is like choosing the name of your girlfriend as a password
for your personal computer, shouting it out a number of times to your colleagues
in an open plan office and then wondering why everyone seems to know something
about your private parts! This example of key repetition illustrates how relatively
easy it was for the British war time intelligence services to decipher some Enigma
encrypted messages.
There are some obvious improvements to the Vigene`re cipher that can be easily
introduced. The first is to produce a key that is not based on repeating a simple
password. The second is to use a Vigene`re table in which the rows are randomly
permutated. We can think of the table as being an example of an encryption algo-
rithm which can be made publicly accessible. The problem is then how to exchange
the key to the recipient of the encrypted messages without this vital information
being compromised.
1.5.3 The Vernam Cipher
The Vernam cipher is an example, to use modern terminology, of a stream cipher.
Originally patented in 1919, it is based on using a numerical representation of the
plaintext to produce a data field, i.e. a number stream. A random or pseudorandom
stream consisting of data of the same type is then generated and combined with
plaintext to produce the ciphertext. If we consider the plaintext to be a stream of
decimal integers obtained using the ASCII code, for example, then we can consider
each number to be an element of the vector p say. If the output of a pseudorandom
number generator is also taken to be given by a stream of decimal integers, then we
can construct the random array vector n say. The ciphertext is then given by
c = p + n
The simple addition of a random number stream to the plaintext array is an example
of ‘confusion’. It is equivalent to adding noise to an input signal. The question then
remains as to what type of noise is best for cryptography and what type of algorithms
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should be used for the generation of this noise, i.e. what is the best method of
undertaking the process of confusion. This is discussed further in Chapter 3. The
process of adding a random number array to the plaintext array will, of course,
cause some elements of the output to exceed the maximum value associated with
the numerical code used for the plaintext. In the case of a 7-bit ASCII code, we can
constrain the magnitude of the output by introducing modulo 127 so that
ci = (pi + ni)MOD(127)
Based on this result, we consider the following example using Table 1
Plaintext:
Attack at 03:00am.
DEC ASCII code Cipher Addition MOD(127)
65 5 70 70
116 0 116 116
116 66 182 55
97 1 98 98
99 8 107 107
107 6 113 113
32 13 45 45
97 27 124 124
116 67 183 56
32 31 63 63
48 9 57 57
51 16 67 67
58 17 75 75
48 19 67 67
48 10 58 58
97 18 115 115
109 2 111 111
46 9 55 55
Ciphertext:
Ft7bkq-|8?9CKC:so7
Clearly to decrypt this ciphertext, we are required to use the same numerical scheme
(i.e. 7-bit ASCII code) and to have access to the same cipher which is subtracted
from the ciphertext to produce the plaintext using modulo 127.
Instead of adding/subtracting decimal integers, another approach is to use a
binary representation of the plaintext and cipher (denoted by p and n say). The
binary representation of these arrays produces a bit stream. Encryption is then
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undertaken using a XOR operation (denoted by ⊕) so that
c = p⊕ n
Decryption is then undertaken using the operation
n⊕ c = n⊕ p⊕ n = p
Repeating the example above and using Table 1 but with 8-bits rather than 7-bits6,
we have
Plaintext:
Attack at 03:00am.
8-bit ASCII code 8-bit cipher XOR
01000001 00000101 01000100
01110100 00000000 01110100
01110100 01000010 00110110
01100001 00000001 01100000
01100011 00001000 01101011
01101011 00000110 01101101
00100000 00001101 00101101
01100001 00011011 01111010
01110100 01000011 00110111
00100000 00011111 00011111
00110000 00001001 00111001
00110011 00010000 00100011
00111010 00010001 00101011
00110000 00001001 00111001
00110000 00001010 00111010
01100001 00010010 01110011
01101101 10000000 01101111
00101110 00001001 00100111
Ciphertext:
Dt6‘km-z7&9#+9:so’
Conversion of plaintext to ciphertext using substitution with pseudorandom data
generated by a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)
provides an effective stream cipher. The RC4 algorithm is an example of a Vernam
(stream) cipher that is widely used on the Internet.
68-bits are used to produce compatibility with the binary representation of the cipher which
requires a minimum of 8-bits for the range of numbers given.
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1.5.4 The One Time Pad
If a cipher stream is truly random (i.e. with no statistical bias) and is used once
and only once to send one and only one massage, then the encryption method is the
known as a One Time Pad (OTP) [4], [6]. The OTP is a theoretically unbreakable
method of encryption where the plaintext is combined with a random number stream
of the same length. It is a symmetric system but, critically, it depends on the key
being used once and only once. Even though the method is secure, it is not popular,
mainly because of its drawback with regard to the multiple key exchange sessions
which are required to implement it in practice, since the key cannot be used more
than once. Thus, in practice, the vulnerability of an OTP is not in the transmission
of the ciphertext but in the key exchange mechanism that is used. One solution to
this problem is to use a plaintext dependent key generator, i.e. to generate a key
directly from the plaintext that is to be encrypted. The problem is then how to
transmit the key, one solution being to send it with the ciphertext by embedding it
in the ciphertext data.
1.6 Transposition Ciphers
A transposition cipher changes the order in which characters arise in a plaintext
[7], [8]. A bijective function is used on the characters’ positions to encrypt and an
inverse function to decrypt. A function f from a set X to a set Y is said to be
bijective if for every y in Y there is exactly one x in X such that y = f(x). In other
words, f is bijective if there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the sets.
A typical approach to designing a transposition cipher is to use a so called
Columnar transposition. Consider the plaintext
THE CAT SAT ON THE MAT
and the keyword
TIGER
which is converted into a numerical array by the alphabetical order in which the
letters occur (i.e. 53214). We consider a set of columns that depend on the length
of the keyword that is used and write the plaintext into the resulting grid; thus
53214
THE C
AT SA
T ON
THE M
AT
The columns are then written out in the numerical order associated with the key-
word, i.e.
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SN E OE HT HTCA M TATTA
If a keyword is chosen that has multiple occurrences of a letter, then we can consider
two approaches:
• the letters are treated as if they are the next letter in alphabetical order, e.g.
the keyword MAXIMUS yields a numeric keystring of 3172465.
• recurrent keyword letters are numbered identically, e.g. the keyword MAX-
IMUS yields the numerical keystring 3162354. This is the basis for the Myszkowski
transposition cipher in which plaintext columns with unique keystring num-
bers are transcribed down each column and those with recurring numbers are
transcribed left to right.
A single transposition cipher can be attacked by guessing column lengths, writing
the message out in its columns (but in the wrong order, as the key is not yet
known), and then looking for possible word associations. To increase its strength,
the columnar transposition can be applied twice where the same key is used in
each case or two different keys are used - double encryption. There are, as usual, a
number of variations that can be applied to this method. Further, a random number
generator can be used to produce the numerical array that controls the order in which
the columns are used, the keyword being used as the initial condition, for example.
1.6.1 Anagramming
Because transposition does not affect the frequency distribution of a plaintext, sta-
tistical analysis is an obvious way for a cryptanalysis to launch an attack. If the
ciphertext exhibits a frequency distribution very similar to plaintext, it is most likely
the result of transposition or a poorly designed substitution cipher. Upon concluding
that a transposition cipher has been applied, the ciphertext can be attacked by ana-
gramming. Anagramming is based on shifting partitioned sections of the ciphertext
and looking for sections that look like anagrams of English words and then solving
the anagrams. Once such anagrams have been found, they reveal information about
the transposition pattern and can consequently be extended. Simple transposition
ciphers have the property that if a key is tried that is very close to the correct key,
then it can reveal sections of legible plaintext interspersed by scrambled data. Con-
sequently such ciphers are vulnerable to optimum seeking algorithms such as genetic
algorithms.
1.6.2 Fractionation and Diffusion
The weaknesses associated with both substitution and transposition ciphers used
separately can be overcome by combining the two. For example, a ciphertext gen-
erated through a substitution cipher can then be transposed. Anagramming the
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transposition cipher is then invalid because of the substitution process applied a
priori. This combination approach is particularly powerful if combined with frac-
tionation. Fractionation is one way of generating diffusion in a cipher, which in
terms of plaintexts is designed to ensure that, at least on a statistical basis, similar
plaintexts do not result in similar ciphertexts even when encrypted using the same
key.
Fractionation is a pre-process in which each plaintext symbol is divided into a
number of ciphertext symbols. For example, if the plaintext alphabet is written out
in a grid, then every letter in the plaintext can be replaced by its grid co-ordinates.
This is the rationale associated with the use of the Polybius square
1 2 3 4 5
1 A B C D E
2 F G H I J
3 K L M N O
4 P Q R S T
5 U V W X Y
where the word CHESS can be represented by the ‘coordinates’ number stream
1323154444. Originally conceived by Polybius in Ancient Greece as a method for
telegraphy, in cryptography, the square (which can be of any size in order to accom-
modate alphabets and characters sets of different lengths) can be used to fractionate.
Another method of fractionation is to simply convert the message to Morse code,
with a symbol for spaces as well as dots and dashes. When fractionated plaintexts
are transposed, the components of individual letters become widely separated in
the message. This achieves a greater level of diffusion, a process whose physical
equivalence is discussed in Chapter 3. Note that the transposition process can be
implemented by replacing each component of the plaintext with a binary represen-
tation using the ASCII code which is also used to convert the new binary string into
the corresponding ASCII characters. This process can be iterated in binary form to
further strengthen the ciphertext. The disadvantage of combination ciphers, frac-
tionation and further variations on a theme is that they are usually computationally
intensive and error prone compared to simpler ciphers. Such ciphers are of histor-
ical interest, when computational methods for generating random and/or chaotic
numbers was not possible, and many modern encryption techniques are substitution
based in which the computational effort is focused on producing cryptographically
secure ciphers - pseudorandom number streams or as discussed in this work, pseudo
chaotic number streams.
1.7 Example Transposition Ciphers
1.7.1 The Bifid Cipher
Consider the following 5 x 5 Polybius square with a randomised alphabet
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1 2 3 4 5
1 B G W K Z
2 Q P N D S
3 I O A X E
4 F C L U M
5 T H Y V R
which is the ‘key’ to the following encryption processes in which we consider the
plaintext TRANSPOSITION. Coordinate convention is undertaken where the coor-
dinates are written below each letter, thus,
T R A N S P O S I T I O N
5 5 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 5 3 3 2
1 5 3 3 5 2 2 5 1 1 1 2 3
and then output on a row by row basis:
55322232353321533522511123
By dividing this integer stream up into coordinate pairs, the ciphertext can be
generated using the same Polybius square key, i.e.
55 32 22 32 35 33 21 53 35 22 51 11 23
R 0 P O E A Q Y E P T B N
Note that each ciphertext character depends on two plaintext characters and hence,
the Bifid cipher is a digraphic cipher. To decrypt, the procedure is simply reversed.
With regard to longer messages, block encryption is used. As with all block encryp-
tion techniques, the plaintext is first broken up into blocks of either fixed or random
length. Each block is then encrypted separately. For random block encryption, an
algorithm/key is used that randomises the length of each block.
1.7.2 The Trifid Cipher
The Trifid cipher is based on the principles of the Bifid cipher but instead of using
a two dimensional grid we consider a three dimensional grid. Three coordinates are
assigned to each letter or symbol to form the key. Thus, consider a 3 × 3 × 3 = 27
cube where
A 111 F 112 N 113
I 121 U 122 V 123
G 131 K 132 O 133
L 211 D 212 T 213
Q 221 R 222 J 223
B 231 H 232 Y 233
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M 311 S 312 X 313
E 321 P 322 W 323
C 331 Z 332
The plaintext transposition now becomes
T R A N S P O S I T I O N
2 2 1 1 3 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 1
3 2 1 3 2 2 3 2 1 3 1 3 3
giving the number stream
221133131211112111231212313213223213133
which, converting into triplets gives the ciphertext
221 133 131 211 112 111 231 212 313 213 223 213 133
Q O G L F A B D X T J T O
The method can of course be extended to higher dimensions. Further each dimension
can be used to represent one bit in the binary representation of a symbol as given
in Table 2. In other words, the principles associated with using Bifid and Trifid
encryption can be applied in binary form using a scrambled 7-bit ASCII table which
forms the key to the encryption/decryption process.
1.8 Basic Concepts
Irrespective of the wealth of computational techniques that can be invented to en-
crypt data, there are some basic concepts that are a common theme in modern
cryptography. The application of these concepts typically involves the use of ran-
dom number generators and/or the use of algorithms that originally evolved for
the generation of random number streams, algorithms that are dominated by two
fundamental and interrelated themes [4], [5], [6]:
• the use of modular arithmetic;
• the application of prime numbers.
The application of prime numbers is absolutely fundamental to a large range of
encryption processes and international standards such as PKI (Public Key Infras-
tructure) details of which are discussed in Chapter 2.
Using a traditional paradigm, we consider the problem of how Alice (A) and
Bob (B) can pass a message to and from each other without it being compromised
or ‘attacked’ by an intercept. As illustrated in Figure 44, we consider a simple box
and combination lock scenario. Alice and Bob can write a message, place it in the
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Figure 4: Alice and Bob can place a message in a box which can be secured using a
combination lock and sent via a public network - the postal service, for example.
box, lock the box and then send it through an open ‘channel’ - the postal services,
for example. In cryptography, the strength of the box is analogous to the strength
of the cipher. If the box is ‘weak’ enough to be opened by brute force, then the
strength of the lock is relatively insignificant. This is analogous to a cipher whose
statistical properties are poor, i.e. whose PDF is narrow and whose information
entropy is relatively low, with a similar value to the plaintext - see Chapter 3. The
strength of the lock is analogous to the strength of the key in a real cryptographic
system. This includes the size of the combination number which is equivalent to the
length of the key that is used. Clearly a four rotor combination lock as illustrated
in Figure 44 represents a very weak key since the number of ordered combinations
required to attempt a brute force attack to open the lock are relatively low, i.e. for a
4-digit combination lock where each rotor has ten digits 0-9, the number of possible
combinations is 10,000 (including 0000). However, the box-and-lock paradigm being
used here is for illustrative purposes only.
1.8.1 Symmetric Encryption
Symmetric encryption is the simplest and most obvious approach to Alice and Bob
sending their messages. Alice and Bob agree on a combination number a priori. Alice
writes a message, puts it in the box, locks it and sends it off. Upon receipt, Bob
unlocks the box using the combination number that has been agreed and recovers
the message. Similarly, Bob can send a message to Alice using exactly the same
approach or ‘protocol’. Since this protocol is exactly the same for Alice and Bob it
has a symmetry and thus, encryption methods that adopt this protocol are referred
to as symmetric encryption methods. Given that the box and the lock have been
designed to be strong, the principal weakness associated with this method is its
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vulnerability to attack if a third party obtains the combination number at the point
when Alice and Bob invent it and agree upon it. Thus, the principal problem in
symmetric encryption is how Alice and Bob exchange the key. Irrespective of how
strong the cipher and key are, unless the key exchange problem can be solved in
an appropriate and a practicable way, symmetric encryption always suffers from the
same fundamental problem - key exchange!
If E denotes the encryption algorithm that is used which depends upon a key K
to encrypt plaintext P , then we can consider the ciphertext C to be given by
C = EK(P )
Decryption can then be denoted by the equation
P = EK(C)
Note that it is possible to encrypt a number of times using different keys K1,K2, ...
with the same encryption algorithm to give a double encrypted cipher text
C = EK2(EK1(P ))
or a triple encrypted ciphertext
C = EK3(EK2(EK1(P )))
Decryption, is then undertaken using the same keys in the reverse order to which
they have been applied, i.e.
P = EK1(EK2(EK3(C)))
Symmetric encryption systems, which are also referred to as shared secret sys-
tems or private key systems, are usually significantly easier to use than systems
that employ different protocols (such as asymmetric encryption). However, the re-
quirements and methods associated with key exchange sometimes make symmetric
system difficult to use. Examples of symmetric encryption systems include the Dig-
ital Encryption Standard DES and DES3 (essentially, but not literally, the Digital
Encryption Standard with triple encryption) and the Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES). Symmetric systems are commonly used in many banking and other
financial institutes and in some military applications. A well known historical ex-
ample of a symmetric encryption engine, originally designed for securing financial
transactions and later used for military communications was the Enigma used by
the German military during World War II.
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1.8.2 Asymmetric Encryption
Instead of Alice and Bob agreeing on a combination number a priori, suppose that
Alice sets her lock to open with a combination number known only to her. If Bob
then wishes to send Alice a message, he can make a request for her to send him
an open lock. Bob can then write his message, place it in the box which is then
locked and sent on to Alice. Alice can then unlock the box and recover the message
using the combination number known only to her. The point here is that Bob does
not need to know the combination number, he only needs to receive an open lock
from Alice. Of course Bob can undertake exactly the same procedure in order to
receive a message from Alice. Clearly, the processes that are undertaken by Alice
and Bob in order to send and receive a single message are not the same. The protocol
is asymmetric and we refer to encryption systems that use this protocol as being
asymmetric. Note that Alice could use this protocol to receive messages from any
number of senders provided they can get access to one of her open locks. This can
be achieved by Alice distributing many such locks as required.
One of the principal weaknesses of this approach relates to the lock being ob-
tained by a third party whose interest is in sending bogus or disinformation to Alice.
The problem for Alice is to find a way of validating that a message sent from Bob
(or anyone else who is entitled to send messages to her) is genuine, i.e. that the
message is authentic. Thus, data authentication becomes of particular importance
when implementing asymmetric encryption systems.
Asymmetric encryption relies on both parties having two keys. The first key
(the public key) is shared publicly. The second key is private, and is kept secret.
When working with asymmetric cryptography, the message is encrypted using the
recipients’ public key. The recipient then decrypts the message using the private
key. Because asymmetric ciphers tend to be computationally intensive (compared
to symmetric encryption), they are usually used in combination with symmetric
systems to implement public key cryptography. Asymmetric encryption is often used
to transfer a session key rather than information proper - plaintext. This session key
is then used to encrypt information using a symmetric encryption system. This gives
the key exchange benefits of asymmetric encryption with the speed of symmetric
encryption. A well known example of asymmetric encryption - also known as public
key cryptography - is the RSA algorithm which is discussed in Chapter 2. This
algorithm uses specific prime numbers (from which the private and public keys are
composed) in order to realize the protocol. To provide users which such prime
numbers, an infrastructure needs to be established by a third party whose ‘business’
is to distribute the public/private key pairs. This infrastructure is known as the
Public Key Infrastructure or PKI. The use of a public key is convenient for those
who wish to communicate with more than one individual and is thus, a many-to-
one protocol that avoids multiple key-exchange. On the other hand, a public key
provides a basis for cryptanalysis. Given that C = EK(P ) where K is the public key,
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the analyst can guess P and check the answer by comparing C with the intercepted
ciphertext, a guess that is made easier if it is based on a known Crib - i.e. information
that can be assumed to be a likely component of the plaintext. Public key algorithms
are therefore often designed to resist chosen-plaintext attack. Nevertheless, analysis
of public key and asymmetric systems in general, reveals that the level of security
is not as significant as that which can be achieved using a well-designed symmetric
system. One obvious and fundamental issue relates to the third party responsible for
the PKI and how much trust should be assumed, especially with regard to legislation
concerning issues associated with the use of encrypted material, e.g. the Regulation
of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act - See Appendix A.
1.8.3 Three-Way Pass Protocol
The three-way pass protocol, at first sight, provides a solution to the weaknesses
associated with symmetric and asymmetric encryption. Suppose that Alice writes a
message, puts it in the box, locks the box with a lock whose combination number is
known only to her and sends it onto Bob. Upon receipt Bob cannot open the box,
so Bob locks the box with another lock whose combination number is known only to
himself and sends it back to Alice. Upon receipt, Alice can remove her lock and send
the box back to Bob (secured with his lock only) who is then able to remove his lock
and recover the message. Note that by using this protocol, Alice and Bob do not
need to agree upon a combination number; this avoids the weakness of symmetric
encryption. Further, Alice and Bob do not need to send each other open locks which
is a weakness of asymmetric encryption.
The problem with this protocol relates to the fact that it requires the message
(secured in the locked box) to be exchanged three times. To explain this, suppose
we have plaintext in the form of an ASCII-value array p[i] say. Alice generates
a cipher n1[i] using some appropriate strength random number generator and an
initial condition based on some long integer - the key. Let the ciphertext c[i] be
generated by adding the cipher to the plaintext (process of confusion), i.e.
c1[i] = p[i] + n1[i]
which is transmitted to Bob. This is a substitution-based encryption process and is
equivalent to Alice securing the message in the box with her lock - the first pass.
Bob generates a new cipher n2[i] using the same (or possibly a different) random
number generator with a different key and generates the ciphertext
c2[i] = c1[i] + n2[i] = p[i] + n1[i] + n2[i]
which is transmitted back to Alice - the second pass. Alice now uses her cipher to
generate
c3[i] = c2[i]− n1[i] = p[i] + n2[i]
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which is equivalent to her taking off her lock from the box and sending the result
back to Bob - the third pass. Bob then uses his cipher to recover the message, i.e.
c3[i]− n2[i] = p[i].
However, suppose that the cipher texts c1, c2 and c3 are intercepted, then the plain-
text array can be recovered since
p[i] = c3[i] + c1[i]− c2[i].
This is the case for any encryption process that is commutative and associative. For
example, if the arrays are considered to be bit streams and the encryption process
undertaken using the XOR process (denoted by ⊕), then
c1 = n1 ⊕ p
c2 = n2 ⊕ c1 = n2 ⊕ n1 ⊕ p
c3 = n1 ⊕ c2 = n2 ⊕ p
and
c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c3 = p
This is because for any bit stream a, b and c
a⊕ a⊕ b = b
and because the XOR operation is both commutative and associative i.e.
a⊕ b = b⊕ a
and
a⊕ (b⊕ c) = (a⊕ b)⊕ c
These properties are equivalent to the fact that when Alice receives the box at the
second pass with both locks on it, she can, in principle, remove the locks in any
order. If, however, she had to remove Bob’s lock before her own, then the protocol
would become redundant.
1.8.4 Public-Private Key Encryption
Public-Private Key Encryption [40], [41] is fundamentally asymmetric and in terms
of the box and combination-lock paradigm is based on considering a lock which
has two combinations, one to open the lock and another to lock it. The second
constraint is the essential feature because one of the basic assumptions in the use
of combination locks is that they can be locked irrespective of the rotor positions.
Thus, after writing a message, Alice uses one of Bob’s specially designed locks to lock
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the box using a combination number that is unique to Bob but is openly accessible
to Alice and others who want to send Bob a message. This combination number
is equivalent to the public key. Upon reception, Bob can open the lock using a
combination number that is known only to himself - equivalent to a private key.
However, to design such a lock, there must be some mechanical ‘property’ linking the
combination numbers required to first lock it and then unlock it. It is this property
that is the principal vulnerability associated with public/private key encryption,
a property that is concerned with certain precise and exact relationships that are
unique to the use of prime numbers and their applications with regard to generating
pseudorandom number streams and stochastic functions in general [42]. This is
discussed further in Chapter 2.
1.9 Cryptanalysis
Any cryptographic system must be able to withstand cryptanalysis [43]. Crypt-
analysis methods depend critically on the encryption techniques which have been
developed and are, therefore, subject to delays in publication. Cryptanalysts work
on ‘attacks’ to try and break a cryptosystem. In many cases, the cryptanalysts are
aware of the algorithm used and will attempt to break the algorithm in order to
compromise the keys or gain access to the actual plaintext. It is worth noting that
even though a number of algorithms are freely published, this does not in any way
mean that they are the most secure. Most government institutions and the mili-
tary do not reveal the type of algorithm used in the design of a cryptosystem. The
rationale for this is that, if we find it difficult to break a code with knowledge of
the algorithm then how difficult is it to break a code if the algorithm is unknown?
On the other hand, within the academic community, security in terms of algorithm
secrecy is not considered to be of high merit and publication of the algorithm(s) is
always recommended. It remains to be understood whether this is a misconception
within the academic world (due in part to the innocence associated with academic
culture) or a covertly induced government policy (by those who are less innocent!).
For example, in 2003, it was reported that the Americans had broken ciphers used
by the Iranian intelligence services. What was not mentioned, was the fact that the
Iranian ciphers were based on systems purchased indirectly from the USA and thus,
based on USA designed algorithms [44].
The ‘known algorithm’ approach originally comes from the work of Auguste Ker-
chhoff. Kerchhoff’s Principle states that: A cryptosystem should be secure even if
everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. This principle was
reformulated by Claude Shannon as the enemy knows the system and is widely em-
braced by cryptographers worldwide. In accordance with the Kerchhoff-Shannon
principle, the majority of civilian cryptosystems make use of publicly known algo-
rithms. The principle is that of ‘security through transparency’ in which open-source
software is considered to be inherently more secure than closed-source software. On
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this basis there are several methods by which a system can be attacked where, in
each case, it is assumed that the cryptanalyst has full knowledge of the algorithm(s)
used.
1.9.1 Basic Attacks
We provide a brief overview of the basic attack strategies associated with cryptanal-
ysis.
Ciphertext-only Attack is where the cryptanalyst has a ciphertext of several
messages at their disposal. All messages are assumed to have been encrypted using
the same algorithm. The challenge for the cryptanalyst is to try and recover the
plaintext from these messages. Clearly a cryptanalyst will be in a valuable position
if they can recover the actual keys used for encryption.
Known-plaintext Attack makes the task of the cryptanalysis simpler because,
in this case, access is available to both the plaintext and the corresponding cipher-
text. It is then necessary to deduce the key used for encrypting the messages, or
design an algorithm to decrypt any new messages encrypted with the same key.
Chosen-plaintext Attack involves the cryptanalyst possessing both the plain-
text and the ciphertext. In addition, the analyst has the ability to encrypt plaintext
and see the ciphertext produced. This provides a powerful tool from which the keys
can be deduced.
Adaptive-chosen-plaintext Attack is an improved version of the chosen-plaintext
attack. In this version, the cryptanalyst has the ability to modify the results based
on the previous encryption. This version allows the cryptanalyst to choose a smaller
block for encryption.
Chosen-ciphertext Attack can be applied when the cryptanalyst has access to
several decrypted texts. In addition, the cryptanalyst is able to use the text and
pass it though a ‘black box’ for an attempted decrypt. The cryptanalyst has to
guess the keys in order to use this method which is performed on an iterative basis
(for different keys), until a decrypt is obtained.
Chosen-key Attack is based on some knowledge on the relationship between dif-
ferent keys and is not of practical significance except in special circumstances.
Rubber-hose Cryptanalysis is based on the use of human factors such as black-
mail and physical threat for example. It is often a very powerful attack and some-
times very effective.
1 INTRODUCTION 41
Differential Cryptanalysis is a more general form of cryptanalysis. It is the study
of how differences in an input can affect differences in the output. This method of
attack is usually based on a chosen plaintext, meaning that the attacker must be
able to obtain encrypted ciphertexts for some set of plaintexts of their own choosing.
This typically involves acquiring a crib of some type as discussed in the following
section.
Linear Cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack which uses linear relations be-
tween inputs and outputs of an encryption algorithm which holds with a certain
probability. This approximation can be used to assign probabilities to the possible
keys and locate the one that is most probable.
1.9.2 Cribs
The problem with any form of plaintext attack is, of course, how to obtain part or
all of the plaintext in the first place. One method that can be used is to obtain
a crib. A crib, a term that originated at Bletchley Park during the Second World
War, is a plaintext which is known or suspected of being part of a ciphertext. If it
is possible to compare part of the ciphertext that is known to correspond with the
plaintext then, with the encryption algorithm known, one can attempt to identify
which key has been used to generate the cipherext as a whole and thus decrypt an
entire message. But how is it possible to obtain any plaintext on the assumption
that all plaintexts are encrypted in their entirety? One way is to analyse whether or
not there is any bad practice being undertaken by the user, e.g. sending stereotyped
(encrypted) messages. Analysing any repetitive features that can be expected is
another way of obtaining a crib. For example, suppose that a user was writing
letters using Microsoft word, for example, having established an electronic letter
template with his/her name, address, company reference number etc. Suppose we
assume that each time a new letter is written, the entire document is encrypted using
a known algorithm. If it is possible to obtain the letter template then a crib has
been found. Assuming that the user is not prepared to share the electronic template
(which would be a strange thing to ask for), a simple way of obtaining the crib could
be to write to the user in hardcopy and ask that the response from the same user is
of the same type, pleading ignorance of all forms of ICT or some other excuse. This
is typical of methods that are designed to seed a response that includes a useful crib.
Further, there are a number of passive cribs with regard to letter writing that can
be assumed, the use of Dear and Yours sincerely, for example.
During the Second World War, when passive cribs such as daily weather re-
ports became rare through improvements in the protocols associated with the use
of Enigma and/or operators who took their work seriously, Bletchley Park would
ask the Royal Air Force to create some ‘trouble’ that was of little military value.
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This included seeding a particular area in the North Sea with mines, dropping some
bombs on the French coast or, for a more rapid response, asking fighter pilots to
go over to France and ‘shoot up’ targets of opportunity7, processes that came to be
known as ‘gardening’. The Enigma encrypted ciphertexts that were used to report
the ‘trouble’ could then be assumed to contain information such as the name of the
area where the mines had been dropped and/or the harbour(s) threatened by the
mines. It is worth noting that the ability to obtain cribs by gardening was made
relatively easy because of the war in which ‘trouble’ was to be expected and to be
reported. Coupled with the efficiency of the German war machine with regard to its
emphasis on accurate and timely reports, the British were in a privileged position
in which they could create cribs at will and have some fun doing it.
When a captured and interrogated German stated that Enigma operators had
been instructed to encode numbers by spelling them out, Alan Turing reviewed
decrypted messages, and determined that the number ‘eins’ appeared in 90% of
the messages. He automated the crib process, creating an ‘Eins Catalogue’, which
assumed that ‘eins’ was encoded at all positions in the plaintext. The catalogue
included every possible position of the various rotors and plug board settings of
the Enigma. This provided a very simple and effective way of recovering the key
and is a good example of how the statistics (of a word or phrase) can be used in
cryptanalysis.
The use of Enigma by the German naval forces (in particular, the U-boat fleet)
was, compared to the German army and air force, made secure by using a password
from one day to the next. This was based on a code book provided to the operator
prior to departure from base. No transmission of the daily passwords was required,
passive cribs were rare and seeding activities were difficult to arrange. Thus, if not
for a lucky break, in which one of these code books (which were printed in ink that
disappeared if they were dropped in seawater) was recovered in tact by a British
destroyer (HMS Bulldog) from a damaged U-boat (U-110) on May 9, 1941, breaking
the Enigma naval transmissions under their time-variant code-book protocol would
have been very difficult. A British Naval message dated May 10, 1941 reads: ‘1.
Capture of U Boat 110 is to be referred to as operation Primrose; 2. Operation
Primrose is to be treated with greatest secrecy and as few people allowed to know as
possible...’ Clearly, and for obvious reasons, the British were anxious to make sure
that the Germans did not find out that U-110 and its codebooks had been captured
and all the sailors who took part in the operation were sworn to secrecy. On HMS
Bulldog’s arrival back in Britain a representative from Bletchley Park, photographed
every page of every book. The ‘interesting piece of equipment’ turned out to be an
Enigma machine, and the books contained the Enigma codes being used by the
German navy.
7Using targets of opportunity became very popular towards the end of the war. Fighter pilots
were encouraged to ‘get them in the air, get them on the ground, just get them’.
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The U-boat losses that increased significantly through the decryption of U-boat
Enigma ciphers led Admiral Carl Doenitz to suspect that his communications pro-
tocol had been compromised. He had no firm evidence, just a ‘gut feeling’ that
something was wrong. His mistake was not to do anything about it8, an attitude
that was typical of the German High Command who were certifiable with regard to
their confidence in the Enigma system. However, they were not uniquely certifiable.
For example, on April 18, 1943, Admiral Yamamoto (the victor of Pearl Harbour)
was killed when his plane was shot down while he was attempting to visit his forces
in the Solomon Islands. Notification of his visit from Rabaul to the Solomon’s was
broadcast as Morse coded ciphertext over the radio, information that was being rou-
tinely decrypted by the Americans. At this point in the Pacific War, the Japanese
were using a code book protocol similar to that used by the German Navy, in which
the keys were changed on a daily basis, keys that the Americans had ‘generated’
copies of. Some weeks before his visit, Yamamoto had been given the option of
ordering a new set of code books to be issued. He had refused to give the order
on the grounds that the logistics associated with transferring new code books over
Japanese held territory was incompatible with the time scale of his visit and the
possible breach of security that could arise through a new code book being delivered
into the hands of the enemy. This decision cost him his life. However, it is a deci-
sion that reflects the problems associated with the distribution of keys for symmetric
cryptosystems especially when a multi-user protocol needs to be established for ex-
ecution over a wide communications area. In light of this problem, Yamamoto’s
decision was entirely rational but, nevertheless, a decision based on the assumption
that the cryptosystem had not already been compromised. Perhaps it was his ‘faith
in the system’ and thereby his refusal to think the ‘unthinkable’ that cost him his
life!
The principles associated with cryptanalysis that have been briefly introduced
here illustrate the importance of using a dynamic approach to cryptology. Any fea-
ture of a security infrastructure that has any degree of consistency is vulnerable to
attack. This can include plaintexts that have routine phrases such as those used
in letters, the key(s) used to encrypt the plaintext and the algorithm(s) used for
encryption. One of the principal advantages of using chaoticity for designing ci-
phers is that it provides the cryptographer with a limitless and dynamic resource
for producing different encryption algorithms. These algorithms can be randomly
selected and permuted to produce, in principle, an unlimited number of Meta en-
cryption engines that operate on random length blocks of plaintext. The use of
block cipher encryption is both necessary in order to accommodate the relatively
low cycle length of chaotic ciphers and desirable in order to increase the strength of
the cipher by implementing a multi-algorithmic approach. Whereas in conventional
cryptography, emphasis focuses on the number of permutations associated with the
8An instinct can be worth a thousand ciphers, ten-thousand if you like.
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keys used to ‘seed’ or ‘drive’ an algorithm, chaos-based encryption can focus on the
number of permutations associated with the algorithms that are used, algorithms
that can, with care and understanding, be quite literally ‘invented on the fly’. Since
cryptanalysis requires that the algorithm is known and concentrates on trying to
find the key, this approach, coupled with other important details that are discussed
further in later chapters, provides a method that can significantly enhance the cryp-
tographic strength of the ciphertext. Further, in order to satisfy the innocence of the
academic community, it is, of course, possible to openly publish such algorithms (as
in this work, for example), but in the knowledge that many more can be invented
and published or otherwise. This provides the potential for generating a host of
‘home-spun’ ciphers which can be designed and implemented by anyone who wishes
to by-pass established practices and ‘cook it themselves’.
1.10 Steganography
One of the principal weaknesses of all encryption systems is that the form of the
output data (the ciphertext), if intercepted, alerts the intruder to the fact that the
information being transmitted may have some importance and that it is therefore,
worth attacking and attempting to decrypt it. With reference to Figure 44, for
example, if a postal worker observed a locked box passing through the post office,
it would be natural for them to wonder what might be inside. It would also be
natural to assume that the contents of the box would have a value in proportion
with the strength of the box/lock. These aspects of ciphertext transmission can
be used to propagate disinformation, achieved by encrypting information that is
specifically designed to be intercepted and decrypted. In this case, we assume that
the intercept will be attacked, decrypted and the information retrieved. The key to
this approach is to make sure that the ciphertext is relatively strong (but not too
strong!) and that the information extracted is good quality in terms of providing
the attacker with ‘intelligence’ that is perceived to be valuable and compatible with
their expectations, i.e. information that reflects the concerns/interests of the indi-
vidual(s) and/or organisation(s) that encrypted the data. This approach provides
the interceptor with a ‘honey pot’ designed to maximize their confidence especially
when they have had to put a significant amount of work in to ‘extracting it’. The
trick is to make sure that this process is not too hard or too easy. ‘Too hard’ will
defeat the object of the exercise as the attacker might give up; ‘too easy’, and the
attacker will suspect a set-up!
In addition to providing an attacker with a honey-pot for the dissemination of
disinformation it is of significant value if a method can be found that allows the
real information to be transmitted by embedding it in non-sensitive information
after (or otherwise) it has been encrypted, e.g. camouflaging the ciphertext. This
is known as Steganography which is concerned with developing methods of writing
hidden messages in such a way that no one apart from the intended recipient knows
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of the existence of the message in contrast to cryptography in which the existence
of the message itself is not disguised but the content is obscured [72], [73]. This
provides a significant advantage over cryptography alone is that messages do not
attract attention to themselves, to messengers, or to recipients. No matter how
well plaintext is encrypted (i.e. how unbreakable it is), by default, a ciphertext will
arouse suspicion and may in itself be incriminating, as in some countries encryption
is illegal. With reference to Figure 44, Steganography is equivalent to transforming
the ‘strong box’ into some other object that will pass through without being noticed
- an ‘egg-box’, for example.
The word ‘Steganography’ is of Greek origin and means ‘covered’, or ’hidden
writing’. In general, a steganographic message appears as something else known as
a covertext. By way of a simple illustrative example, suppose we want to transmit
the phrase
The Queen likes horses
which is encrypted to produce the cipher stream
syoahfsuyTebhsiaulemNG
This is clearly a scrambled version of a message with no apparent meaning to the
order of the letters from which it is composed. Thus, it is typical of an intercept that
might be attacked because of the very nature of its incomprehensibility. However,
suppose that the cipher stream above could be re-cast to produce the phrase
Beware of Greeks bearing gifts
If this phrase is intercepted it may not be immediately obvious that there is alter-
native information associated with such an apparently innocuous message, i.e. if
intercepted, it is not clear whether or not it is worth initiating an attack.
The conversion of a ciphertext to another plaintext form is called stegotext con-
version and is based on the use of covertext. Some covertext must first be invented
and the ciphertext mapped on to it in some way to produce the stegotext. This can
involve the use of any attribute that is readily available such as letter size, spacing,
typeface, or other characteristics of a covertext, manipulated in such a way as to
carry a hidden message. The basic principle is given below:
Data → Covertext
↓
Plaintext → Ciphertext → Stegotext → Transmission
Note that this approach does not necessarily require the use of plaintext to ciphertext
conversion as illustrated above and that plaintext can be converted into stegotext
directly. A simple approach to is to use a mask to delete all characters in a message
except those that are to be read by the recipient of the message. For example,
consider the following message:
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At what time should I confirm our activities? kindly acknowledge.
This seemingly innocent plaintext could be used to hide the message
Attack now
through application of the following mask:
11000010000000000000000000000000001100000000001000001000111000000
where 0 denotes that a character or space is to be ignored and 1 denotes that a
character or space is used. Apart from establishing a method of exchanging the
mask which is equivalent to the key in cryptography, the principal problem with
this approach is that different messages have to be continuously ‘invented’ in order
to accommodate hidden messages and that these ‘inventions’ must appear to be
legitimate. However, the wealth of data that is generated and transmitted in today’s
environment and the wide variety of formats that are used means that there is much
greater potential for exploiting steganographic methods than were available before
the IT revolution. In other words, the IT revolution has generated a camouflage rich
environment in which to operate and one can attempt to hide plaintext or ciphertext
(or both) in a host of data types, including audio and video files and digital images.
Moreover, by understanding the characteristics of a transmission environment, it
is possible to conceive techniques in which information can be embedded in the
transmission noise, i.e. where natural transmission noise is the covertext. There a
some counter measures - steganalysis - that can be implemented in order to detect
stegotext. However, the technique usually requires access to the covertext which is
then compared with the stegotext to see if any modifications have been introduced.
The problem is to find ways of obtaining the original stegotext.
1.10.1 Hiding Data in Images
The relatively large amount of data contained in digital images makes them a good
medium for undertaking steganography. Consequently digital images can be used
to hide messages in other images. A colour image typically has 8 bits to represent
the red, green and blue components. Each colour component is composed of 256
colour values and the modification of some of these values in order to hide other
data is undetectable by the human eye. This modification is often undertaken by
changing the least significant bit in the binary representation of a colour or grey
level value (for grey level digital images). For example, the grey level value 128 has
the binary representation 10000000. If we change the least significant bit to give
10000001 (which corresponds to a grey level value of 129) then the difference in the
output image will not be discernable. Hence, the least significant bit can be used to
encode information other than pixel intensity. Further, if this is done for each colour
component then a letter of ASCII text can be represented for every three pixels. The
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larger the host image compared with the hidden message, the more difficult it is to
detect the message. Further, it is possible to hide an image in another image for
which there are a number of approaches available (including the application of bit
modification). For example, Figure 5 shows the effect of hiding one image in another
through the process of re-quantization and addition. The image to be embedded is
re-quantised to just 3-bits or 8 grey levels so that it consists of an array of values
between 0 to 7. The result is then added to the host image (an array of values
between 0 and 255) on a pixel by pixel basis such that if the output exceeds 255
then it is truncated (i.e. set to 255). The resulting output is slightly brighter with
minor distortions in some regions of the image that are homogeneous.
Figure 5: Illustration of ‘hiding’ one image (top left) in another image (top right)
through simple re-quantisation and addition (bottom left). By subtracting the bot-
tom left image from the top right image and re-quantising the output, the bottom
right reconstruction is obtained.
Clearly, knowledge of the original host image allows the hidden image to be
recovered (by subtraction) giving a result that is effectively completely black. How-
ever, by increasing its brightness, the hidden image can be recovered as shown in
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Figure 5 which, in this example, has been achieved by re-quantising the data from
0-7 back to 0-255 grey levels. The fidelity of this reconstruction is poor compared
to the original image but it still conveys the basic information, information that
could be covertly transmitted through the host image as an email attachment, for
example. Note that the host image represents, quite literally, the key to recovering
the hidden image. The additive process that has been applied is equivalent to the
process of confusion that is the basis for a substitution cipher. Rather than the key
being used to generate a random number stream using a pre-defined algorithm from
which the stream can be re-generated (for the same key), the digital image is, in ef-
fect, being used as the cipher. Note that the distortion generated by re-quantization
means that the same method can not be used if the hidden image is encrypted. The
degradation in the ciphertext will not allow a decrypt to be accomplished. However,
by diffusing the image with a noise field, it is possible to hide the output in a host
image without having to resort to quantization. This is discussed further in Chapter
3.
Steganography is often used for digital watermarking. This is where the plain-
text, which acts as a simple identifier containing information such as ownership,
copyright and so on, is hidden in an image so that its source can be tracked or
verified. This is equivalent to hiding a 2-bit image in a host image as illustrated in
Figure 6 which uses the same method as discussed above. In this example, a colum-
nar transposition cipher has been used to encrypt this sentence using the keyword:
Steganography. This grid is given by
11 12 03 04 01 07 08 05 10 02 09 06 13
I n t h i s e x a m p
l e , a c o l u m n a
r t r a n s p o s i t i
o n c i p h e r h a s
b e e n u s e d t o
e n c r y p t t h i s
s e n t a n c e u s i n
g t h e k e y w o r d
: S t e g a n o g r a p
h y
and the ciphertext is
haai yaeexus huwg ,t ecnts
t rcnrtht opee eenmntaosira
i npupn gscshstckaamihtisor
elordt yoIlrobesg:hne nene
ypais ndp
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As in the previous example, the host image is required to recover the ciphertext
information and is thus the key to the process.
The methods discussed above refer to electronic-to-electronic type communica-
tions in which there is no loss of information. Steganography and watermarking
techniques can be developed for hardcopy data which has a range of applications.
These techniques have to be robust to the significant distortions generated by the
printing and/or scanning process. A simple approach is to add information to a
printed page that is difficult to see. For example, some modern colour laser printers,
including those manufactured by HP and Xerox, print tiny yellow dots which are
added to each page. The dots are barely visible and contain encoded printer serial
numbers, date and time stamps. This facility provides a useful forensics tool for
tracking the origins of a printed document which has only relatively recently been
disclosed.
Figure 6: Binary image of encrypted information (right), obtained by subtraction
of the covertext image from the stegotext image (left).
1.10.2 Hiding Data in Noise
The art of steganography is to use what ever covertext is readily available to make
the detection of plaintext or, ideally, the ciphertext as difficult as possible. This
means that the embedding method used to introduce the plaintext/cipherext into
the covertext should produce a stegotext that is indistinguishable from the covertext
in terms of its statistical characteristics and/or the information it conveys. From
an information theoretic point of view, this means that the covertext should have
significantly more capacity than the ciphertext, i.e. there must be a high level of
redundancy. Utilising noisy environments often provides an effective solution to this
problem. There are three approaches that can be considered:
• embedding the ciphertext in real noise;
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• transforming the ciphertext into noise that is then added to data;
• replacing real noise with ciphertext that has been transformed in to synthetic
noise with exactly the same properties as the real noise.
In the first case we can make use of noise sources such as thermal noise, flicker
noise, and shot noise associated with electronics that digitize an analogue signal. In
digital imaging this may be noise from the imaging charge couplde device (CCD)
element; for digital audio, it may be noise associated with the recording techniques
used or amplification equipment. Natural noise generated in electronic equipment
usually provides enough variation in the captured digital information that it can be
exploited as a noise source to ‘cover’ hidden data. Because such noise is usually a
linear combination of different noise types generated by different physical mecha-
nisms, it is usually characterised by a normal or Gaussian distribution as a result of
the Central Limit Theorem (see Chapter 3).
In the second case, the ciphertext is transformed into noise whose properties
are consistent with the noise that is to be expected in certain data fields. For
example, lossy compression schemes (such as JPEG - Joint Photographic Expert
Group) always introduce some error (numerical error) into the decompressed data
and this can be exploited for steganographic purposes. By taking a clean image
and adding ciphertext noise to it, information can be transmitted covertly providing
all users of the image assume that it is the output of a JPEG or some other lossy
compressor. Of course, if such an image is JPEG compressed, then the covert
information may be badly corrupted.
In the third case, we are required to analyse real noise and derive an algorithm
for its synthesis. Here, the noise has to be carefully synthesized because it may be
readily observable as it represents the data stream in its entirety rather than data
that is ‘cloaked’ in natural noise. This technique also requires that the reconstruc-
tion/decryption method is robust in the presence of real noise that we should assume
will be added to the synthesized noise during a transmission phase. In this case,
random fractal models are of value because the spectral properties of many noise
types found in nature signify fractal properties to a good approximation. This in-
cludes transmission noise over a range of radio and microwave spectra, for example,
and Internet traffic noise.
With regard to Internet traffic noise the time series data representing packet size
and inter-arrival times shows well defined random fractal properties. There are a
range of time-series models that can be used to characterise Internet traffic noise
based on the number of packets (or bytes) as a function of time. Fractal time-series
models are applicable when the underlying processes have a similar appearance
regardless of the time scale over which they are observed.
An example of the random fractal nature of Internet traffic is given in Figure 7
which shows the number of packets per unit time over four different time scales
[74]. Compared with a time-series model based on Poisson statistics (i.e. a Poisson
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random number generator) as shown in Figure 7, it is clear that Internet traffic noise
has fractal characteristics (i.e. has self-affine behaviour). Like real traffic, Internet
traffic changes over a daily cycle according to the number of users. However, much
of the traffic ‘riding’ the Internet can be modelled using fractals and as the Internet
has become larger and larger, the fractal nature of the traffic has become more and
more pronounced.
1.11 Focus and Principal Themes
This book has been prepared with a focus on chaos based encryption which is pre-
sented in the context of modern cryptology. The purpose of this Chapter has been
to introduce the reader to the basic themes associated with cryptology from both a
historical context and a modern idiom.
The use of chaos in cryptology was first considered in the early 1950s by the
American mathematician and electrical engineer Claude Shannon who laid the the-
oretical foundations for modern information theory and cryptography. It was Shan-
non who first explicitly mentioned the basic stretch-and-fold mechanism associated
with chaos for the purpose of encryption: Good mixing transformations are often
formed by repeated products of two simple non-commuting operations [11]. Hopf 9
considered the mixing of dough by such a sequence of non-commuting operations.
The dough is first rolled out into a thin slab, then folded over, then rolled, and then
folded again and so on. The same principle is used in the making of a Japanese
sword, the aim being to produce a material that is a highly diffused version of the
original material structure.
The use of chaos in cryptography was not fully appreciated until the late 1980s
when the simulation of chaotic dynamical systems became common place and when
the role of cryptography in IT became increasingly important. Since the start of
the 1990s, an increasing number of publications have considered the use of chaos
in cryptography, e.g. [46]-[50]. These have included schemes based on synchronized
chaotic (analogue) circuits, for example, which belong to the field of steganography
and secure radio communication [51]. Over the 1990s cryptography started to at-
tract a variety of scientists and engineers from diverse fields who started exploiting
dynamical systems theory for the purpose of encryption. This included the use of
discrete chaotic systems such as the cellular automata, Kolmogorov flows and dis-
crete affine transformations in general to provide more efficient encryption schemes
[52]-[55]. Since 2000, the potential of chaos- and fractal-based communications, es-
pecially with regard to spread spectrum modulation, has been recognized. Many
authors have described chaotic modulations and suggested a variety of electronics
based implementations, e.g. [49]-[51]. However, the emphasis has been on informa-
9Hopf, Eberhard F. F, (1902-1983), an Austrian mathematician who made significant contribu-
tions in topology and ergodic theory and studied the mixing in compact spaces, e.g. On Causality,
Statistics and Probability, Journal of Mathematics and Physics, 13, 51-102, 1934.
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tion coding and information hiding and embedding. Much of this published work
has been of theoretical and some technological interest with work being undertaken
in both an academic and industrial research context (e.g. [56]-[62]). However, it is
only relatively recently that the application of chaos-based ciphers have been im-
plemented in software and introduced to the market. One example of this is the
basis of the authors own company - Lexicon Data Limited - in which the principle
of multi-algorithmicity using chaos-based ciphers [11], [63] has been used to produce
meta-encryption engines that are mounted on pairs of flash (USB - Universal Serial
Bus) memory sticks. Some of these memory sticks have been designed to include a
hidden memory accessible through a covert procedure from which the engines can be
executed. Further some of the engines have been designed to embed the ciphertext
in host data prior to transmission. The covertext files are then transmitted over the
Internet using fractal modulation where the packet size and inter-submission times
are based on analysis of the Internet traffic noise [45].
The use of fractal geometry for coding information and/or embedding it in ran-
dom fractal noise has been considered in a number of publications (e.g. [64]-[68]). In
this case, the stegotext is generated directly using a random fractal noise generator
which modulates the value of the fractal dimension according to the bit type in an
input bit stream. The output is a contiguous stream of fractal noise whose prop-
erties are ‘tuned’ to be consistent with the noisy environment in which a wireless
communications system is operating. The technique is analogous to using Frequency
Modulation (FM) and is referred to as Fractal Modulation (also FM) which provides
for the reconstruction of a bit stream with acceptable bit-error rates in the presence
of expected signal-to-noise ratios. In addition to using random fractal noise to gen-
erate covertext and/or stegotext fields, the fractal fields themselves can be used as
low resolution printable features (texture maps) that encode information in a way
that is consistent with the principles of Fourier optics - convolution based encoding.
This provides a method of information recovery that is robust to low resolution im-
age acquisition technology and data degradation [69], [70], thus providing a COTS
approach to securing the authenticity of printed materials.
In this work, an attempt has been made to cover the theoretical and mathemati-
cal foundations associated with the applications of fractals and chaos to cryptology.
The applications that are considered should therefore be taken to be case studies
in the utilization of nonlinear dtnamics and chaos to IT security for which many
more ideas and new applications are waiting to be realised. The principal of this
approach is compounded in Figure 8 where it should be understood that ‘Chaos
Theory’ is subservient to ‘Cryptology’ in order for the outcome (i.e. chaos-based
cryptology) to be of practical (and commercial) value. Having considered the use
of deterministic chaos for encrypting data, this work considers ways of hiding the
ciphertext generated in other data fields including digital signals and images.
The approach to encrypting data using multiple algorithms based on determinis-
tic chaos considered in this work represents a ‘paradigm shift’ with regard to single
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algorithm based ciphers that are in the public domain. The importance of this
paradigm shift with regard to cryptography in general may be appreciated in light
of the following text taken from Patrick Mahon’s secret history of Hut 8 - the naval
section at Bletchly Park from 1941-1945 [71]: The continuity of breaking Enigma
ciphers was undoubtedly an essential factor in our success and it does appear to be
true to say that if a key has been broken regularly for a long time in the past, it is
likely to continue to be broken in the future, provided that no major change in the
method of encypherment takes place.
The use of fractal geometry for coding information and/or embedding it in ran-
dom fractal noise has been considered in a number of publications (e.g. [75]-[79]). In
this case, the stegotext is generated directly using a random fractal noise generator
which modulates the value of the fractal dimension according to the bit type in an
input bit stream. The output is a contiguous stream of fractal noise whose prop-
erties are ‘tuned’ to be consistent with the noisy environment in which a wireless
communications system is operating. The technique is analogous to using Frequency
Modulation (FM) and is referred to as Fractal Modulation (also FM) which provides
for the reconstruction of a bit stream with acceptable bit-error rates in the presence
of expected signal-to-noise ratios. In addition to using random fractal noise to gen-
erate covertext and/or stegotext fields, the fractal fields themselves can be used as
low resolution printable features (texture maps) that encode information in a way
that is consistent with the principles of Fourier optics - convolution based encoding.
This provides a method of information recovery that is robust to low resolution im-
age acquisition technology and data degradation [80], [81], thus providing a COTS
approach to securing the authenticity of printed materials.
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Figure 7: Simulated Poisson based time-series model (left), real Internet traffic
time-series (centre) and simulated fractal time-series model taken over four different
time scales (from top to bottom respectively). The shaded areas highlight the data
displayed in each plots above respectively.
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Figure 8: The use of ‘Chaos Theory’ (and fractal geometry) must be subservient to
‘Cryptology’ in general.
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2 Digital Signal Processing
2.1 Signals and Systems
Many aspects of communications engineering have been reduced to the application
of programming methods for processing digital signals using increasingly specialist
Digital Signal Processing (DSP) hardware. The design of any digital communi-
cations system, in terms of both the hardware that executes it and the software
that ‘drives’, is inextricably bound up with the simulation of the system which has
become of major significance in the ‘signals and systems’ industry.
A model that is a fundamental underlying theme in signal processing is com-
pounded in the equation
s(t) = p(t)⊗ f(t) + n(t)
where s(t) is the output signal as a function of time t, f(t) is the input signal to
a system described by the function p(t) and the process of convolution (denoted
by the symbol ⊗) and n(t) is the noise generated by the system. This is the basic
time invariant linear systems model where the function n(t) is not known, only its
probability density function is known (at best).
The convolution process is absolutely fundamental to many physical models. It
describes the smearing or blurring of one function with another which can be seen
in terms of the information content of a signal being distorted by that of another.
The convolution process is also of fundamental importance to statistics in that it
describes the statistical distribution of a system that has evolved from combining two
isolated and distinct sub-systems characterised by specific statistical distributions.
Moreover, as more and more ‘sub-systems’ are combined (linearly), the statistics
of the output approaches a normal or Gaussian distribution. This is the so called
Central Limit Theorem which is fundamental to statistical physics and the stochastic
behaviour communications systems in general.
A principle requirement is to establish the form of the function p(t). In the ideal
case of a noise free environment (i.e. when n(t) = 0∀t) this can be achieved by
inputting an impulse which is described mathematically in terms of the Dirac delta
function δ. In this case,
s(t) = p(t)⊗ δ(t) = p(t)
For this reason, p(t) is often referred to as the Impulse Response Function (IPF)
because it is in effect, describing the response of a system to an impulse. This
fundamental model has an equivalence in frequency space, and, via the convolution
theorem can be written as (with n(t) = 0∀t)
S(ω) = P (ω)F (ω)
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where
S(ω) =
∞∫
∞
s(t) exp(−iωt)dt
P (ω) =
∞∫
∞
p(t) exp(−iωt)dt
and
F (ω) =
∞∫
∞
f(t) exp(−iωt)dt
are the spectra of s(t), p(t) and f(t) respectively and ω is the (angular) frequency.
Here, P (ω) characterises the way in which the frequency distribution of the input
is transferred to the output and for this reason it is commonly referred to as the
(frequency) Transfer Function. In this sense, we can define an ideal system as one in
which P (ω) = 1∀ω. The addition of noise is an important aspect of signal processing
systems because it must always be assumed that no signal or signal processing system
is noise free. The physical origins of noise are determined by a range of effects which
vary considerably from one system to the next. Appropriate statistical models are
required to model the noise term which can then be used to design algorithms for
processing signals that are robust to noise.
The basic model for a signal, i.e.
s(t) = p(t)⊗ f(t) + n(t)
can be cast in terms of both piecewise continuous and generalised functions and also
discrete functions or vectors. Many authors present the problem in terms of the
equation
s = Lf + n
where L is a linear operator (typically a linear matrix operation) and s,p and n
are vectors describing the discrete or digital versions of the functions s, p and n
respectively. Moreover, there is a close connection between the application of this
model for signal processing and that associated with the general solution to phys-
ical problems specified by certain partial differential equations (PDE’s) which are
linear, homogeneous or inhomogeneous with homogeneous and/or inhomogeneous
boundary conditions. In this case, it is often useful to determine how the system
described by a PDE responds to an impulse. The solution to this problem is known
as a Green’s function named after the English mathematician and physicist George
Green. However, the Green’s function is essentially an impulse response function
and provides a solution that is based on a convolution process which is an under-
lying theme of many models in physics and statistics, for example, and a central
component of the methods and ideas discussed here.
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As an example, consider the process of diffusion, in which a source of material
diffuses into a surrounding homogeneous medium; the material being described by
some source function which is a function of both space and time and of compact
support (i.e. has limited spatial extent). Physically, it is to be expected that the
material will increasingly ‘spread out’ as time evolves and that the concentration
of the material decreases further away from the source. It can be shown that a
Green’s function solution to the diffusion equation yields a result in which the spatial
concentration of material is given by the convolution of the source function with a
Gaussian function and that the time evolution of this process is governed by a
similar process. Such a solution is determined by considering how the process of
diffusion responds to a single point source (a space-time dependent impulse) which
yields the Green’s function (in this case, a Gaussian function). The connection
between the basic convolution model for describing signals and systems and the
Green’s function solution to PDEs that describe these systems is fundamental. Thus,
the convolution model that is the basis for so much of the material discussed in
this work is not phenomenological but based on intrinsic methods of analysis in
mathematical physics via the application of Green’s function solutions. Moreover,
under different approximation and conditions, these solutions yield a variety integral
transforms that can be applied in discrete form to digital signals for their analysis
and processing. Many of the these transforms yield properties that are better or
worse in terms of doing ‘something useful’ with the signal. However, in terms of
linking the characteristics of a signal to the ‘physics’ of the system that produces it,
particularly with regard to the interactions of wavefields with matter and the design
of sensors to record such interactions, the Fourier transform has and continues to rein
supreme. Examples of further reading on the application of integral transforms for
signal processing and systems analysis are [82]-[95]. In this section, we focus on basic
DSP algorithms that are primarily based on application of the discrete convolution
sum and the Discrete Fourier Transform computed using the Fast Fourier Transform.
2.2 The Least Squares and Orthogonality Principle
The least squares method and the orthogonality principle are used extensively in
digital signal processing and we start with brief a discussion of these principles.
Suppose we have a real function f(t) which we want to approximate by a func-
tion fˆ(t). We can construct fˆ in such a way that its functional behaviour can be
controlled by adjusting the value of a parameter a say. We can then adjust the value
of a to find the best estimate fˆ of f . So what is the best value of a to choose? To
solve this problem, we can construct the mean square error
e =
∫
[f(t)− fˆ(t, a)]2dt
which is a function of a. The value of a which produces the best approximation fˆ
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of f is therefore the one where e(a) is a minimum. Hence, a must be chosen so that
∂e
∂a
= 0.
Substituting the expression for e into the above equation and differentiating we
obtain ∫
[f(t)− fˆ(t, a)] ∂
∂a
fˆ(t, a)dt = 0.
Solving this equation for fˆ provides the minimum mean square estimate for f . This
method is known generally as the least squares method. However, in order to use the
least squares method, some sought of model for the estimate fˆ must be introduced.
There are a number of such models that can be used.
2.2.1 Linear Polynomial Models
Suppose we expand fˆ in terms of a linear combination of (known) basis functions
yn(t), i.e.
fˆ(t) =
∑
n
anyn(t)
where ∑
n
≡
N/2∑
n=−N/2
and where, for simplicity, let us first assume that f is real. Since the basis functions
are known, to compute fˆ , the coefficients an must be found. Using the least squares
principle, we require an such that the mean square error
e =
∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
anyn(t)
)2
dt
is a minimum. This occurs when
∂e
∂am
= 0 ∀ m.
Differentiating,
∂
∂am
∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
anyn(t)
)2
dt
= 2
∫ (
f(x)−
∑
n
anyn(t)
)
∂
∂am
(
f(t)−
∑
n
anyn(t)
)
dt.
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Noting that
∂
∂am
(
f(t)−
∑
n
anyn(t)
)
= − ∂
∂am
∑
n
anyn(t)
= − ∂
∂am
(...+ a1y1(t) + a2y2(t) + ...+ anyn(t) + ...)
= −y1(t), m = 1;
= −y2(t), m = 2;
...
= −ym(t), m = n;
we have
∂e
∂am
= −2
∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
anyn(t)
)
ym(t)dt = 0.
The coefficients an which minimize the mean square error for a linear polynomial
model are therefore obtained by solving the equation∫
f(t)ym(t)dt =
∑
n
an
∫
yn(t)ym(t)dt
for an.
The previous result can be written in the form∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
anyn(t)
)
ym(t)dt = 0
which demonstrates that the coefficients an are such that the error f−fˆ is orthogonal
to the basis functions ym. It is common to write this result in the form
〈f − fˆ , ym〉 ≡
∫
[f(t)− fˆ(t)]ym(t)dt = 0.
This is known as the orthogonality principle.
2.2.2 Complex Signals, Norms and Hilbert Spaces
Let us consider the case where f is a complex signal. In this case, fˆ must be a
complex estimate of this signal and we should also assume that both yn and an
(which we shall denote by cn) are also complex. The mean square error is then
given by
e =
∫
| f(t)−
∑
n
cnyn(t) |2 dt.
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Now, since the operation (∫
| f(t) |2 dt
)1/2
defines the (Euclidean) norm of the function f which shall be denoted by ‖ • ‖2, we
can write the mean square error in the form
e = ‖f(t)− fˆ(t)‖22
which saves having to write integral signs all the time. The error function above
is an example of a ‘Hilbert space’. The error function above is a function of the
complex coefficients cn and is a minimum when
∂e
∂crm
= 0
and
∂e
∂cim
= 0
where
crm = <[cm]
and
cim = =[cm].
The above conditions lead to the result∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
cnyn(t)
)
y∗m(t)dt = 0
or
〈f − fˆ , y∗m〉 = 0.
This result can be shown as follows:
e =
∫
| f(t)−
∑
n
(crn + ic
i
n)yn(t) |2 dt
=
∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
(crn + ic
i
n)yn(t)
)(
f∗(t)−
∑
n
(crn − icin)y∗n(t)
)
dt.
Now
∂e
∂crm
=
∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
(crn + ic
i
n)yn(t)
)
y∗m(t)dt
−
∫ (
f∗(t)−
∑
n
(crn − icin)y∗n(t)
)
ym(t)dt = 0
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and
∂e
∂cim
= i
∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
(crn + ic
i
n)yn(t)
)
y∗m(t)dt
−
∫ (
f∗(t)−
∑
n
(crn − icin)y∗n(t)
)
ym(t)dt = 0
or∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
(crn + ic
i
n)yn(t)
)
y∗m(t)dt−
∫ (
f∗(t)−
∑
n
(crn − icin)y∗n(t)
)
ym(t)dt = 0.
Subtracting these results gives∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
(crn + ic
i
n)yn(t)
)
y∗m(t)dt = 0
or ∫ (
f(t)−
∑
n
cnyn(t)
)
y∗m(t)dt = 0.
2.2.3 Linear Convolution Models
So far we have demonstrated the least squares principle for approximating a function
using a model for the estimate fˆ of the form
fˆ(t) =
∑
n
anyn(t).
Another important type of model that is used in the least squares method for signal
processing and has a number of important applications is the convolution model, i.e.
fˆ(t) = y(t)⊗ a(t).
In this case, the least squares principle can again be used to find the function a. A
simple way to show how this can be done, is to demonstrate the technique for digital
signals and then use a limiting argument for continuous functions.
Real Digital Signals
If fi is a real digital signal consisting of a set of numbers f1, f2, f3, ..., then we may
use a linear convolution model for the discrete estimate fˆi given by
fˆi =
∑
j
yi−jaj .
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In this case, using the least squares principle, we find ai by minimizing the mean
square error
e =
∑
i
(fi − fˆi)2.
This error is a minimum when
∂
∂ak
∑
i
fi −∑
j
yi−jaj
2 = 0.
Differentiating, we get
−2
∑
i
fi −∑
j
yi−jaj
 ∂
∂ak
∑
j
yi−jaj = −2
∑
i
fi −∑
j
yi−jaj
 yi−k = 0
and rearranging, we have
∑
i
fiyi−k =
∑
i
∑
j
yi−jaj
 yi−k.
The left hand side of this equation is just the discrete correlation of fi with yi and
the right hand side is a correlation of yi with∑
j
yi−jaj
which is itself just a discrete convolution of yi with ai. Hence, using the appropriate
symbols (as discussed in Chapter 4) we can write this equation as
fi  yi = (yi ⊗ ai) yi.
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Real Analogue Signals
With real analogue signals, the optimum function a which minimizes the mean
square error
e =
∫
[f(t)− fˆ(t)]2dt
where
fˆ(t) = a(t)⊗ y(t)
is obtained by solving the equation
[f(t)− a(t)⊗ y(t)] y(t) = 0.
This result is based on extending the result derived above for digital signals to infi-
nite sums and using a limiting argument to integrals.
Complex Digital Signals
If the data are a complex discrete function fi where fi corresponds to a set of complex
numbers f1, f2, f3, ..., then we use the mean square error defined by
e =
∑
i
| fi − fˆi |2
and a linear convolution model of the form
fˆi =
∑
j
yi−jcj .
In this case, the error is a minimum when
∂e
∂ck
=
∑
i
fi −∑
j
yi−jci
∗ yi−k = 0
or
fi  y∗i = (yi ⊗ ci) y∗i .
Complex Analogue Signals
If fˆ(t) is a complex estimate given by
fˆ(t) = c(t)⊗ y(t)
then the function c(t) which minimizes the error
e = ‖f(t)− fˆ(t)‖22
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is given by solving the equation
[f(t)− c(t)⊗ y(t)] y∗(t) = 0.
This result is just another version of the orthogonality principle.
Points on Notation
Notice that in the work presented above, the signs ⊗ and  have been used to denote
convolution and correlation respectively for both continuous and discrete data. With
discrete signals ⊗ and  denote convolution and correlation sums respectively. This
is indicated by the presence of subscripts on the appropriate functions. If subscripts
are not present, then the functions in question should be assumed to be continuous
and ⊗ and  are taken to denote convolution and correlation integrals respectively.
2.3 Digital Filtering in the Time Domain
Time domain filtering is based on processing the ‘real space’ data of a signal rather
than some transform based data. There are a wide range of filters of this type but,
in general, they mostly fall in to one of two classes:
• non-recursive filters;
• recursive filters.
2.3.1 The FIR Filter
The finite impulse response or FIR filter is one of the most elementary but widely
used filters. An impulse response function is simply the output of the filter when an
impulse is applied. If the system is a linear time invariant system then we have,
s(t) =
∫
p(τ − t)δ(τ)dτ = p(t)
and p is referred to the impulse response function. In digital form, the impulse
response function is finite and given by
sj =
∑
i
pj−iδi = pj
where we consider the case when ∑
i
≡
N∑
i=−N
and δi is the Kronecker delta function. For an arbitrary input fi, the filtering
operation is
sj =
∑
i
pj−ifi
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which models the response of an input to the finite impulse response function and
hence the name, FIR filter. Filters of this type have at most 2N + 1 non-zero coef-
ficients.
The FIR Filter for Discrete Convolution
The discrete convolution operation (the convolution sum) can be written in the form
(since the convolution process is commutative)
sj =
N∑
i=−N
pifj−i.
To illustration the nature of this process, consider the case when pi and fi are vectors
with just 3 elements, i.e.
p = (p−1, p0, p1)T ,
f = (f−1, f0, f1)T ,
and where
f−2 = 0, and f2 = 0.
Then,
for j = −1 :
s−1 =
1∑
i=−1
pif−1−i = p−1f0 + p0f−1 + p1f−2 = p−1f0 + p0f−1,
for j = 0 :
s0 =
1∑
i=−1
pif−i = p−1f1 + p0f0 + p1f−1,
for j = 1 :
s1 =
1∑
i=−1
pif1−i = p−1f2 + p0f1 + p1f0 = p0f1 + p1f0.
Clearly, this result can be written in matrix form as s−1s0
s1
 =
 f0 f−1 0f1 f0 f−1
0 f1 f0
 p−1p0
p1
 .
2 DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING 67
Now consider the convolution sum defined as
sj =
N∑
i=−N
pj−ifi.
With
p = (p−1, p0, p1)T , p−2 = p2 = 0
and
f = (f−1, f0, f1)T
we have
for j = −1 :
s−1 =
1∑
i=−1
p−1−ifi = p0f−1 + p−1f0 + p−2f1 = p0f−1 + p−1f0,
for j = 0 :
s0 =
1∑
i=−1
p−ifi = p1f−1 + p0f0 + p−1f1,
for j = 1 :
s1 =
1∑
i=−1
p1−ifi = p2f−1 + p1f0 + p0f1 = p1f0 + p0f1.
In matrix form, this result becomes s−1s0
s1
 =
 p0 p−1 0p1 p0 p−1
0 p1 p0
 f−1f0
f1

Note that  p0 p−1 0p1 p0 p−1
0 p1 p0
 f−1f0
f1
 =
 f0 f−1 0f1 f0 f−1
0 f1 f0
 p−1p0
p1

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and that in general
N∑
i=−N
pifj−i =
N∑
i=−N
pj−ifi
which confirms that the discrete convolution sum is commutative. However, the
latter definition of a convolution sum is better to work with because it ensures that
the matrix is filled with elements relating to the impulse response function pi, i.e.
s = P f .
Clearly, if f is an (2N + 1)th order vector and p contains just three elements say,
then the convolution sum can be written in the form
s−N
...
s−1
s0
s1
...
sN

=

. . .
. . .
p1 p0 p−1
p1 p0 p−1
p1 p0 p−1
. . .
. . .


f−N
...
f−1
f0
f1
...
fN

.
Here, P is a tridiagonal matrix. In general, the bandwidth of the matrix is deter-
mined by the number of elements of the impulse response function. Note that the
inverse process (i.e. deconvolving s given P to compute f) can be solved in this case
by using an algorithm for solving tridiagonal systems of equations.
Useful Visualization of the Discrete Convolution Process
Another way of interpreting the discrete convolution process which is useful visually
is in terms of the of two streams of numbers sliding along each other where at each
location in the stream, the appropriate numbers are multiplied and the results added
together. In terms of the matrix above we have:
...
f−4
f−3
f−2
f−1
f0
f1
f2
f3
f4
...
p1
p0 (= s−2)
p−1
p1
p0 (= s3)
p−1
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In general, if
f =

f−N
...
f−1
f0
f1
...
fN

and p =

p−N
...
p−1
p0
p1
...
pN

then
...
f−4
f−3
f−2
f−1
f0
f1
f2
f3
f4
...
...
p1
p0 (= s−1)
p−1
...
Note that the order of the elements of p is reversed with respect to f .
On Notation and Jargon
The vector p is sometimes called the Kernel, a term taken from the ‘Kernel’ of an
integral equation of the type
s(t) =
∫
K(t, τ)f(τ)dτ
where K is the Kernel. Visualising a discrete convolution in the form discussed
above leads to p being referred to as a ‘window’ since we can think of this process
in terms of looking at the data fi through a window of coefficients pi. As we slide
the stream of coefficients pi along the data fi, we see the data in the form of the
output si which is the running weighted average of the original data fi. Because the
window moves over the data it is often referred to as a ‘moving window’.
2.3.2 Computing the FIR filter
A problem arises in computing the FIR filter (convolution or correlation) at the
ends of the array fi. For example, if p is a 5× 1 kernel, then at the end of the data
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stream we have
...
fN−3 p−2
fN−2 p−1
fN−1 p0
fN p1
p2
In the computation of sN−1 there is no number associated with the data fi with
which to multiply p2. Similarly, in the computation of sN we have
...
fN−3
fN−2 p−2
fN−1 p−1
fN p0
p1
p2
Here, there are no numbers associated with the array fi with which to multiply
p1 and p2. The same situation occurs at the other end of the array fi. Hence, at
both ends of the data, the moving window ‘runs out’ of data for computing the
convolution sum. There are a number of ways of solving this problem including zero
padding, endpoint extension and rapping.
Zero Padding
Zero padding assumes that the data is zero beyond the ends of the array, i.e.
f±N±1 = f±N±2 = f±N±2 = ... = 0.
This method was applied in the previous sections to introduce the FIR filter.
Endpoint Extension
Endpoint extension assumes that the data beyond the ends of the array takes on
the value of the end points of the array, i.e. the extrapolated data is equal in value
to end points:
fN+1 = fN+2 = fN+3 = ... = fN
and
f−N−1 = f−N−2 = f−N−3 = ... = f−N .
This method is sometimes known as the ‘constant continuation method’.
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Rapping
The rapping technique assumes that the array is rapped back on itself so that
fN+1 = f−N ; fN+2 = f−N+1; fN+3 = f−N+2; etc.
and
f−N−1 = fN ; f−N−2 = fN−1; f−N−3 = fN−2; etc.
These methods are used in different circumstances but the endpoint extension tech-
nique is probably one of the most widely used.
2.3.3 Moving Window Filters
The FIR filter is just one example of a moving window filter in which the computa-
tional process is a convolution. There are a range of filters that can be designed in
which various processes are repeatedly applied to the windowed data.
The Moving Average Filter
The moving average filter computes the average value of a set of samples within a
predetermined window.
Example For a 3× 1 window:
...
fi
fi+1
fi+2
fi+3
fi+4
...
si+1 = (fi + fi+1 + fi+2)/3
si+2 = (fi+1 + fi+2 + fi+3)/3
si+3 = (fi+2 + fi+3 + fi+4)/3
As the window moves over the data, the average of the samples ‘seen’ within the
window is computed, hence the term ‘moving average filter’. In mathematical terms,
we can express this type of processing in the form
si =
1
M
∑
j∈w(i)
fj
where w(i) is the window located at i over which the average of the data samples is
computed and M is the total number of samples in w. Note that the moving average
filter is just an FIR of the form
si =
N∑
i=−N
pj−ifi
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with
p =
1
M
(1, 1, 1, ..., 1)
so for a 3× 1 kernel
p =
1
3
(1, 1, 1)
and for a 5× 1 kernel
p =
1
5
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1).
This filter can be used to smooth a signal, a feature which can be taken to include
the reduction of noise. Note that this filter is in effect, the convolution of an input
with a tophat function; the spectral response is therefore a sinc function.
The Median Filter
The median filter moves a window (of arbitrary but usually odd size) over the data
computing the median of the samples defined within the window at each stage.
The median m of a set of numbers is such that half the numbers in the set are
less than m and half are greater than m. For example, if we consider the set
(3, 4, 10, 21, 22, 48, 57), then m = 21. There are a number of ways to compute the
median of an arbitrary set of numbers. One way is to reorder the numbers in as-
cending values.
Example (1,6,2,4,7,3,9)−→(1,2,3,4,6,7,9) giving m = 4. The reordering of the
numbers in this way can be accomplished using a ‘bubble sort’ where the max-
imum values of the array (in decreasing order) are computed and relocated in a
number of successive passes.
The Moving Average .v. the Median Filter
Both filters can be used to reduce noise in a signal. Noise reduction algorithms aim
to reduce noise while attempting to preserve the information content of a signal. In
this sense, because the moving average filter ‘smooths’ the data, the median filter
is a superior noise reducing filter for the removal of isolated noise spikes. Note that
unlike the moving average filter, the median filter is not a convolution process and
the spectral response can not be computed via the convolution theorem.
2.3.4 Statistical Filters
Having introduced the process above, it should be clear to the reader that a range
of filters can be introduced using the moving window principle. The type of filter
reflects the process that is being undertaken. Thus, the mean, variance and other
moments can by computed where the rth moment of the signal si whose histogram
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is Pi ≡ P (xj), j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N formed from N bins is given by1
Mr =
N∑
j=1
(xj −M)rP (xj)
where M is the mean. In addition, the median and mode filters can be computed
using the same approach, the mode being defined as that value which occurs most
often (i.e. has the greatest probability of occurring) or
mode = ‖Pi‖∞.
Other statistical parameters include the skewness, one such measure being defined
by
Skewness =
M3
M
3
2
and the Kurtosis based on the common measure
Kurtosis =
M4
M22
.
Moreover, if the signal has statistical and/or spectral characteristics that change,
it is often informative to investigate such variations especially when the signal is
stochastically non-stationary. For example, suppose that the input is a discrete
stochastic signal si that is Gamma-distributed, i.e. ignoring scaling, its histogram
is given by
P (xi) = xαi exp(−βxi)
where α and β are time variant. Then, by computing α and β on a moving window
basis, the signals αi and βi can be used to analyse the non-stationary behaviour of
the data. The computation undertaken at each position of the window along the
data stream in this example can be based on a least squares fit, where α and β are
computed such that
e(α, β) = ‖ lnDi − lnPi‖22
is a minimum where Di ≡ D(xi), i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N is the histogram of the input
data formed from N bins. Clearly, the size of the window has to provide data that
produces a statistically significant result. As a final example, consider a random
fractal signal with variations in the Fourier dimension q and whose power spectrum
is modelled by
Pˆi =
c
| xi |2q
where c is a constant. By utilising the error function
e(q, c) = ‖ lnPi − ln Pˆi‖22
1Note the the second moment M2 is the variance.
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and minimizing it with respect to q and c, an expression for q (and c) can be obtained
that is then used to compute q on a moving window basis to yield the signal qi where
i is the position of the window.
2.3.5 Interpolation using the FIR Filter
Discrete convolution can be used effectively to interpolate a function. For example,
suppose we want to linearly interpolate a function fi from N data points to 2N where
the computation of a point between fi+1 and fi is given by
fi +
fi+1 − fi
2
=
fi+1 − fi
2
.
This process is equivalent to implementing the following:
• Given the initial array (f1, f2, f3, ..., fN ) of size N , construct the array gi =
(0, f1, 0, f2, 0, f3, 0, ..., fN , 0) which is of size 2N + 1 and is zero padded.
• Convolve gi with the kernel 12(1, 0, 1).
2.3.6 The IIR Filter
The FIR filter is based on the model
si = pi ⊗ fi.
It represents a system in which an input fi is modified (via the a convolution process)
by some system characterized by pi to produce an output si. In such a process, there
is no feedback of the output to the input. Suppose that we want to model a feedback
system where the output is fed back into the input. Now, let the original input fi
give an output s(1)i = pi ⊗ fi in the usual way. Feeding this output back into the
input, the next input becomes fi + s
(1)
i giving an output
s
(2)
i = pi ⊗ (fi + s(1)i ) = pi ⊗ fi + pi ⊗ s(1)i = pi ⊗ fi + pi ⊗ pi ⊗ fi.
Similarly, we can write
s
(3)
i = pi ⊗ (fi + s(2)i ) = pi ⊗ fi + pi ⊗ s(2)i = pi ⊗ fi + pi ⊗ pi ⊗ fi + pi ⊗ pi ⊗ pi ⊗ fi
so that in general, for n = 1, 2, ...
s
(n)
i = pi ⊗ fi + pi ⊗ s(n−1)i
where s(0)i = 0. Now, the term pi ⊗ fi is just a FIR filter describing how the input
fi is modified by the impulse response function pi. The second term introduces the
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feedback process. Suppose we consider a filter qi say, which allows us to write the
iterative process
s
(n)
i = pi ⊗ s(n−1)i
in terms of the recursive process
si = qi ⊗ si.
On the basis of the above, it is then valid to consider a general linear filter of the
form
si = pi ⊗ fi + qi ⊗ si.
Now, if qi = 0, then the FIR filter is obtained which is non-recursive. However, if
qi 6= 0, then the filter is recursive and is known as an Infinite Impulse Response or
IIR filter. Unlike the computation of the FIR filter, in this case, we need to reserve
space for the modified values of si as the computation proceeds; we cannot simply
over write them into si directly. The filter must be calculated recursively and thus,
there is no way of applying the filter to a single segment of a signal and IIR filters
are said to be only suitable for infinite signals (hence the name). Note that the
length of the data stream associated with the computation of the first and second
terms of the IIR filter does not have to be same. Also note that in Fourier space,
this result becomes
Si = PiFi +QiSi
or
Si = RiFi
where
Ri =
Pi
1−Qi
which is rational requiring that Qi 6= 1 ∀i.
2.3.7 Non-Stationary Problems
The principal model for a signal, i.e.
s = p⊗ f + n
assumes that the ‘system’ is time invariant and that the process is stationary. The
term non-stationary is used in a number of circumstances and needs to be defined
carefully whenever the term is used. Here, a non-stationary process refers to the
case when:
• the noise statistics change with time;
• the impulse response function changes with time;
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• both points above apply.
We have already briefly mentioned the use of statistical type filters coupled with
the moving window principle for the analysis of signals with time variant statistics
which applies to the analysis of systems conforming to point (i) above. In this
section, we focus on the case when the impulse response function is time variant.
The essential point to understand is that when p changes with time, the convolution
process becomes
s(t) =
∫
p(t− τ, t)f(τ)dτ
rather that just
s(t) =
∫
p(t− τ)f(τ)dτ
for which there is no equivalent convolution theorem. Thus, the application of this
theorem for transforming in and out of Fourier space in order to develop the Fourier
filters discussed in Chapters 13, 14 and 15 no longer holds; however, the convolution
process itself does. By way of an illustration consider the case where we convolve a
data stream f1, f2, f3, ..., fN with a 3× 1 kernel
p = (1 + i, 2 + i, 1 + i)
Using the moving window principle, with zero padding we have
s1 = f1,
s2 = 2f1 + 3f2 + 2f3,
s3 = 3f2 + 4f3 + 3f4,
...
In terms of a matrix representation, we have
s1
s2
s3
s4
...
sN−1
sN

=

3 2
3 4 3
4 7 4
. . .
N 1 +N + 1 N
2 +N 1 +N


f1
f2
f3
f4
...
fN−1
fN

.
This matrix is tridiagonal but with elements that increase monotonically from the
top-left to the bottom-right of the matrix. To deconvolve the signal s, this system
of equations needs to be solved directly using the algorithms discussed in Chapter 7.
The example above illustrates the case when the kernel is time variant with regard
to the values of its elements but the size of the kernel remains the same (in this case,
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a 3 × 1 vector). Another case is when the size of the kernel changes. To illustrate
this, consider the kernel
p = 1, p ∈ Ri.
Here, the kernel is a unit vector which linearly increases in size (i.e. the number of
elements in the vector space). With zero padding, the matrix representation of this
process becomes 
s1
s2
s3
s4
...
sN

=

1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
. . .
1 1 1 1 . . . 1


f1
f2
f3
f4
...
fN

.
Here, the characteristic matrix is lower diagonal and the solution for fi is trivial and
given by
fi = si − si−1 ≡ pi ⊗ si
where
pi = (1,−1).
Note that si is the discrete integral of fi and fi is the discrete differential (forward
difference) of si.
There are many other simple examples that can be used to illustrate the pro-
cess of non-stationary convolution, but the essential issue, is that to undertake the
inverse process, appropriate methods of solving the associated matrix equations are
required and the deconvolution problem must be approach is real space. Note that
as the bandwidth (the size of the vector space) of the kernel changes, so does the
bandwidth of the matrix. Further, for non-stationary processes, where the kernel is
relatively small compared to the data, the characteristic matrix is sparse and thus,
iterative techniques become appropriate for the general case (i.e. assuming that the
characteristic matrix is not symmetric positive definite for example).
For further reading with regard to timne domain signal processing see [96]-[101].
2.4 Digital Filtering in the Fourier Domain
Fourier space filters operate on data obtained by computing the Discrete Fourier
Transform of a signal. This is accomplished using the Fast Fourier Transform algo-
rithm. Fourier space filters are usually multiplicative operations which operate on
the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of the signal. If Si, Pi and Fi are taken to
2 DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING 78
denote the DFT’s of si, pi and fi respectively, then, using the discrete convolution
theorem, in Fourier space,
si =
∑
j
pi−jfj
transforms to
Si = PiFi.
If pi is composed of just a few elements, then the discrete convolution can be com-
puted directly. However, if pi is composed of many elements then it is numerically
more efficient to use a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and perform the filtering
operation in Fourier space. A Fourier space filter is just one type (although a fun-
damentally important type) of transform space filter where the transform is chosen
according to the properties of the input data and the desired result of the output.
Many problems associated with the processing of digital signals are related to
what is generally referred to as inverse problems. Consider the case when
si =
∑
j
pi−jfj .
This discrete convolution can be written in the form (see Chapter 16)
s = P f
where P is a matrix whose elements are the components of the kernel pi arranged in
an appropriate order. A common inverse problem encountered in DSP is: ‘given si
and pi compute fi’. This inverse problem is called deconvolution. Since a convolution
can be written in terms of a matrix equation, the solution to this problem can be
compounded in terms of the solution to a set of linear simultaneous equations which
can be undertaken using methods discussed in Part II of this book. However, if we
express the same problem in Fourier space, then we have
Si = PiFi
and the problem now becomes: ‘given Si and Pi find Fi’. In this case, the solution
appears trivial since
Fi =
Si
Pi
where 1/Pi is known as the ‘inverse filter’. However, such approaches to solving this
problem lead to ill-conditioned results especially when the data (Pi and/or Fi) is
noisy and methods of regularization are needed to develop robust solutions. This
is the Fourier space equivalent problem of solving the system of linear equations
P f = s when they are ill-conditioned (see Chapter 8) in real space.
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Another approach is to use the logarithm to convert the multiplicative process
PiFi into an additive one, i.e.
logSi = logPi + logFi
and attempt to solve for Fi using the result that
Fi = exp[logSi − logPi]
but again, problems can occur in the computation of these functions when the data
is noisy.
All aspects of Fourier transform based filtering require the efficient computation
of a discrete Fourier transform and in the following section the Fast Fourier transform
is discussed.
2.4.1 The Fast Fourier Transform
The Fast Fourier Transform or FFT is an algorithm for computing the Discrete
Fourier Transform with less additions and multiplications. The DFT (in standard
form) of an N -point vector is given by
Fm =
∑
n
fn exp(−2piinm/N)
where ∑
n
≡
N−1∑
n=0
.
How much computation is involved in computing the DFT of N points? If we write
WN = exp(−2pii/N)
then
Fm =
∑
n
WnmN fn.
This result is a matrix equation which can be written in the form
F0
F1
...
FN−1
 =

W 00N W
01
N . . . W
0(N−1)
N
W 10N W
11
N ... W
1(N−1)
N
...
...
. . .
...
W
(N−1)0
N W
(N−1)1
N . . . W
(N−1)(N−1)
N


f0
f1
...
f(N−1)
 .
In this form, we see that the DFT is essentially computed by multiplying an N -point
vector fn by a matrix of coefficients given by a (complex) constant WN to the power
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of nm. This requires N×N multiplications Thus, for example, to compute the DFT
of 1000 points requires 106 multiplications!
By applying a simple but very elegant trick, a N -point DFT can be written in
terms of two N2 -point DFT’s. The FFT algorithm is based on repeating this trick
again and again until a single point DFT is obtained. The basic idea is compounded
in the following result:
N−1∑
n=0
fn exp(−2piinm/N)
=
(N/2)−1∑
n=0
f2n exp[−2pii(2n)m/N ] +
(N/2)−1∑
n=0
f2n+1 exp[−2pii(2n+ 1)m/N ]
=
(N/2)−1∑
n=0
f2n exp[−2piinm/(N/2)]+exp(−2piim/N)
(N/2)−1∑
n=0
f2n+1 exp[−2piinm/(N/2)]
=
(N/2)−1∑
n=0
f2nW
nm
N/2 +W
m
N
(N/2)−1∑
n=0
f2n+1W
nm
N/2.
The result above leads to the fundamental property:
DFT of a N-point array
= DFT of even components + WmN × DFT of odd components.
Using the subscripts e and o to represent odd and even components respectively, we
can write this result in the form
Fm = F em +W
m
N F
o
m
The important thing to note here, is that the evaluation of F em and F
o
m is over N/2
points, the N/2 even components and the N/2 odd components of the original N -
point array. To compute F em and F
o
m we only need half the number of multiplications
that are required to compute Fm.
Because the form of the expressions for F em and F
o
m are identical to the form
of the original N -point DFT, we can repeat the idea and decompose F em and F
o
m
into even and odd parts producing a total four N4 -point DFT’s as illustrated be-
low. We can continue subdividing the data into odd and even components until we
get down to the DFT of a single point. However, because the data is subdivided
into odd and even components of equal length, we require an initial array of size
N = 2k, k = 1, 2, 3, 4, ... Computing the DFT in this way reduces the number of
multiplications needed to the order of N logN which, for even moderate values of
N is considerably smaller than N2.
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Fm
⇓
F em + W
m
N F
o
m
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
F eem +W
m
N/2F
eo
m + W
m
N ×(F oem +WmN/2F oom )
Example
Consider the 2 point FFT with data (f0, f1). Then
Fm =
1∑
n=0
fnW
nm
2 = W
0
1 f0 +W
m
2 W
0
1 f1 = f0 + exp(ipim)f1
so that
F0 = f0 + f1
and
F1 = f0 + exp(ipi)f1 = f0 − f1.
Now consider the 4 point FFT operating on the data (f0, f1, f2, f3). Here,
Fm =
3∑
n=0
fnW
nm
4 =
1∑
n=0
f2nW
nm
2 +W
m
4
1∑
n=0
f2n+1W
nm
2 = f0+W
m
2 f2+W
m
4 (f1+W
m
2 f3).
Thus,
F0 = f0 + f1 + f2 + f3,
F1 = f0 + f2W2 + f1W4 + f3W4W2,
F2 = f0 + f2W 22 + f1W
2
4 + f3W
2
4W
2
2
and
F3 = f0 + f2W 32 + f1W
3
4 + f3W
3
4W
3
2 .
Further, certain values of WmN are simple, for example,
W 02 = 1, W
1
2 = −1, W 04 = 1, W 14 , W 24 = −1, W 34 = −i.
Also, if we let k = n+N/2, then
exp
(
2piik
N
)
= exp
(
2pii(n+N/2)
N
)
= exp
(
2piin
N
)
exp(pii) = − exp
(
2piin
N
)
and thus,
W
(n+N/2)
N = −WnN .
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Even arguments Odd arguments
f0, f2, f4, f6 f1, f3, f5, f7
Even Odd Even Odd
f0, f4 f2, f6 f1, f5 f3, f7
Original Original Bit-reversed Re-ordered
Argument Array Argument Array
000 f0 000 f0
001 f1 100 f4
010 f2 010 f2
011 f3 110 f6
100 f4 001 f1
101 f5 101 f5
110 f6 011 f3
111 f7 111 f7
2.4.2 Bit Reversal
Consider the 8-point array
f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6, f7
and the decomposition of this array into even and odd components as given below.
To use the FFT algorithm, the input array must first be expressed in the form
f0, f4, f2, f6, f1, f5, f3, f7.
The general procedure for re-ordering an input array of this type follows a simple
bit-reversal rule where the position of an element of the original array fi is expressed
in binary form. The bits are then reversed to obtain the position of this element
in the re-ordered array as illustrated below. If the FFT algorithm is applied to
an array in its natural order, then the output is bit-reversed. Bit reversal can be
applied either before of after the computations commence. The effect of applying
this method is to reduce the number of multiplications from O(N2) to O(N logN)
which for relatively small array sizes considerably reduces the time taken to perform
a DFT.
The method discussed above depends on using array sizes of 2N and is therefore
a base-2 algorithm. It is natural to ask, why this method cannot be extended, i.e.
instead of decomposing the original array into two arrays (based on the odd and
even components of the original) why not decompose it into three or four arrays
and repeat the process accordingly leading to base-3 and base-4 algorithms. The
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problem with this approach is that, although it can lead to slightly less operations,
the reordering of the data required to establish an appropriate output is significantly
more complicated than bit reversal. The extra effort that is required to establish a
re-ordering algorithm tends to outweigh the reduction in the processing time from
adopting a base-3 or base-4 approach.
2.4.3 Data Windowing
Unlike the Fourier transform which is expressed in terms of an infinite integral,
the DFT involves computing with a discrete array of finite extent. Thus, it is
important to assess the difference between the DFT transform of a function and
its theoretical Fourier transform. Computing the DFT of a digital signal with N
samples is equivalent to multiplying an infinite run of sampled data by a ‘window
function’ which is zero except during the total sampling time N∆t and is unity
during that time. Consider the following optical form of the DFT
Fm =
(N/2)−1∑
n=−N/2
fn exp(−i2pinm/N).
When an N -point DFT is computed, the data are ‘windowed’ by a square window
function. To identify the ‘effect’ of computing an N -point DFT, consider
Fm ∼
N/2∫
−N/2
f(t) exp(−iωmt)dt =
∞∫
−∞
f(t)w(t) exp(−iωmt)dt
where
w(t) =
{
1, | t |≤ N/2;
0, | t |> N/2.
Using the product theorem we can write
Fm ∼ N2pi
∞∫
−∞
F (ωm − ω)sinc(ωN/2)dω
where
sinc(ωN/2) =
sin(ωN/2)
ωN/2
.
Thus, a sample of the discrete spectrum Fm obtained by taking the DFT of a N -
point signal is not given by F (ωm) but by F (ωm) convolved with a ‘sinc’ function.
Note, that
Fm → F (ωm) as N →∞
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since
lim
N→∞
N
2pi
sinc(ωN/2) = δ(ω)
and ∞∫
−∞
F (ωm − ω)δ(ω)dω = F (ωm).
Each sample Fm is an approximation to F (ωm) which depends on the influence of
the ‘sinc’ function associated with one sample ‘bin’ on the next sample ‘bin’. The
‘sinc’ function ‘leaks’ from one bin to the next producing errors in the values of
the neighbouring spectral components. The reason for this ‘leakage’ is that the
square window (i.e. the tophat function) turns on and off so rapidly that its Fourier
transform (i.e. the sinc function) has substantial components at high frequencies.
To remedy this situation, we can multiply the input data fn by a window function
wn that changes more gradually from zero to a maximum and then back to zero as
n goes from −N/2 to N/2. Many windows exist for this purpose. The difference
lies in trade-off’s between the ‘narrowness’ and ‘peakedness’ of the ‘spectral leakage
function’ (i.e. the amplitude spectrum) of the window function.
2.4.4 Examples Windows
For n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1 we have:
1. The Parzan window
wn = 1−
∣∣∣∣∣n− 12N1
2N
∣∣∣∣∣
2. The Welch window
wn = 1−
(
n− 12N
1
2N
)2
3. The Hanning window (Cosine taper)
wn =
1
2
[
1− cos
(
2pin
N
)]
4. The Hamming window
wn = 0.54− 0.46 cos
(
2pin
N
)
5. The von Hann window (Raised cosine)
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wn =
1
2
[
1 + cos
(
pi(n− 12N)
1
2N
)]
6. The generalized von Hann window
wn = b+ 2a cos
(
pi(n− 12N)
1
2N
)
; 2a+ b = 1
7. The Kaiser window
wn =
I0
[
α
√
1−
(
(n− 1
2
N)
1
2
N
)2]
I0
where I0 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and α is a constant.
Windows of this type (and many others) are of significant value when the size of the
arrays are relatively small. The larger the array that is used to represent a signal, the
less the spectral leakage and hence, the less significant the requirement of applying
an appropriate window becomes. Data windowing was particularly important in the
days when the size of an array that could be stored and processed was relatively small
and hence, text books in this field that date from the 1960s and 1970s (particularly
those concerned with the application of microprocessors) tend to make a ‘big deal’
over the ‘theory of windows’.
2.4.5 Computing with the FFT
Computing with the FFT involves a basic principle which is that the FFT can be
used to implement digital algorithms derived from some theoretical result which is
itself based on Fourier theory, provided the data is adequately sampled (to avoid
aliasing) and appropriate windows are used (as required) to minimize spectral leak-
age.
The FFT provides a complex spectrum with real and imaginary arrays ai and
bi respectively. From the output of the FFT we can construct a number of useful
functions required for spectral analysis:
1. The discrete amplitude spectrum given by
√
a2i + b
2
i .
2. The discrete power spectrum a2i + b
2
i .
3. The discrete phase spectrum tan−1(bi/ai)± 2pin.
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The dynamic range of the amplitude and power spectra is often very low especially
at high frequencies. Analysis of the spectrum can be enhanced using the logarithmic
function and generating an output given by
log
√
a2i + b
2
i
or
log(a2i + b
2
i ).
It practice, it is typical to add 1 to a2i + b
2
i to prevent a singularity occurring if ai
and bi are equal to zero for a particular value of i. This also ensures that the output
is greater than or equal to zero. If a logarithm to base 10 or log10 is used, the scale
of the spectrum is measured in decibels (dB) where one decibel is equal to one tenth
of a logarithmic unit. This scale is often used by engineers for spectral analysis and
originates from the legacy of acoustic signal analysis.
2.4.6 Discrete Convolution and Correlation
Discrete Convolution
To convolve two discrete arrays pi and fi of equal length using an FFT we use the
convolution theorem and consider the result
si = pi ⊗ fi
⇓
Si = PiFi
⇓
si = <[IDFT(Si)]
where Si, Pi and Fi are the DFT’s of si, pi and fi respectively computed using the
FFT and IDFT denotes the inverse DFT also computed using the FFT. A typical
program will involve the following steps:
1. Input the real arrays p and f.
2. Set the imaginary parts associated with p, f and s to zero.
3. Compute the DFT’s of f and p using the FFT.
4. Do complex multiplication:
5. Compute the inverse DFT using the FFT.
6. Write out s.
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Using pseudo code, the algorithm for convolution using an FFT is:
for i=1 to n; do:
fr(i)=signal_1(i)
fi(i)=0.
pr(i)=signal_2(i)
pi(i)=0.
enddo
forward_fft(fr,fi)
forward_fft(pr,pi)
for i=1 to n; do:
sr(i)=fr(i)*pr(i)-fi(i)*pi(i)
si(i)=fr(i)*pi(i)+pr(i)*fi(i)
enddo
inverse_fft(sr,si)
Discrete Correlation
To correlate two real discrete arrays pi and fi of equal length using an FFT we use
the correlation theorem and consider the result
si = pi  fi
⇓
Si = P ∗i Fi
⇓
si = <[IDFT(Si)]
where Si, Pi and Fi are the DFT’s of si, pi and fi respectively computed using the
FFT. Thus, a typical program will involve the following steps:
• Input the real arrays p and f.
• Set the imaginary parts associated with p, f and s to zero.
• Compute the DFT’s of f and p using the FFT.
• Do complex multiplication:
• Compute the inverse DFT using the FFT.
• Write out s.
Using pseudo code, the algorithm for correlation using an FFT is:
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for i=1 to n; do:
fr(i)=signal_1(i)
fi(i)=0.
pr(i)=signal_2(i)
pi(i)=0.
enddo
forward_fft(fr,fi)
forward_fft(pr,pi)
for i=1 to n; do:
sr(i)=fr(i)*pr(i)+fi(i)*pi(i)
si(i)=fr(i)*pi(i)-pr(i)*fi(i)
enddo
inverse_fft(sr,si)
2.4.7 Computing the Analytic Signal
The Argand diagram representation provides us with a complex representation of
the analytic signal given by
s(t) = A(t) exp[iθ(t)] = A(t) cos θ(t) + iA(t) sin θ(t)
where A(t) are the amplitude modulations and θ(t) is the instantaneous phase.
Writing s(t) in the form
s(t) = f(t) + iq(t)
then q(t) - the quadrature signal - is given by the Hilbert transform of f(t). Being
able to compute the analytic signal provides us with the signal attributes, i.e. the
amplitude modulation, the frequency modulations and the instantaneous phase (see
Chapter 5). The analytic signal s(t) is related to f(t) by
s(t) =
1
pi
∞∫
0
F (ω) exp(iωt)dω
and s(t) is characterized by a single side-band spectrum whose real and imaginary
parts are f(t) and q(t) respectively. We can write this result as
s(t) =
1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
2F (ω)U(ω) exp(iωt)dω
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where
U(ω) =
{
1, ω ≥ 0;
0, ω < 0.
Thus, to compute the Hilbert transform of a discrete function fi say where i =
1, 2, ..., N we can apply the follow procedure:
1. Take the DFT of fi to get Fi.
2. Set Fi to zero for all negative frequencies.
3. Compute the inverse DFT of Fi.
Then, on output, the real part of the inverse DFT is fi and the imaginary part of the
inverse DFT is qi. In practice, the DFT can be computed using a FFT. Thus, using
pseudo code, the FFT algorithm for computing the Hilbert transform is (noting that
the DC level occurs at n/2 + 1)
for i=1 to n; do:
sreal(i)=signal(i)
simaginary(i)=0.
enddo
forward_fft(sreal,simaginary)
for i=1 to n/2; do:
sreal(i)=0.
sreal(i+n/2)=2.*sreal(i+n/2)
simaginary(i)=0.
simaginary(i+n/2)=2.*simaginary(i+n/2)
enddo
inverse_fft(sreal,simaginary)
for i=1 to n; do:
signal=sreal(i)
hilbert_transform(i)=simaginary(i)
enddo
For further reading with regard to Fourier domain signal processing see, for
example, [102]-[106].
2.5 Inverse Solutions
Digital filtering in the frequency domain is the basis for an important range of filters
which are designed to solve the inverse problem, i.e. the extraction of information
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from a digital signal in the presence of (additive) noise. This mode of filtering relies
on extensive use of the FFT and without the FFT, this type of filtering would be
very time consuming to implement. Fourier based filters usually have a relatively
simple algebraic form. They change the ‘shape’ of the input spectrum via a multi-
plicative process of the type:
Output spectrum = Filter × Input spectrum
Filters of this type characterize the frequency response of a system to a given input.
The algebraic form of the filter usually originates from the solution (with appropriate
conditions and approximations) to a particular type of problem.
2.5.1 The Inverse Filter
The inverse filter is a straightforward approach to deconvolving the equation
si = pi ⊗ fi + ni.
In the absence of any useful information about the noise ni, we may ignore it under
the assumption that its total contribution to the signal si is small. We can then set
about inverting the reduced equation
si = pi ⊗ fi.
The basic approach to solving this problem is to process the data si in Fourier space.
Using the convolution theorem, we have
Si = PiFi.
Re-arranging and taking the inverse DFT, denoted by IDFT, we get
fi = IDFT
(
Si
Pi
)
= IDFT
(
P ∗i Si
| Pi |2
)
.
The function 1/Pi is known as the inverse filter.
The criterion for the inverse filter is that the mean square of the noise is a
minimum. In other words, fi is chosen in such a way that the mean square error
e = ‖ni‖2 = ‖si − pi ⊗ fi‖2
is a minimum. Using the orthogonality principle (see Chapter 8), this error is a
minimum when
[si − pi ⊗ fi] p∗i (x) = 0
and through the correlation and convolution theorems, in Fourier space, this equa-
tion becomes
[Si − PiFi]P ∗i = 0.
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Solving for Fi, we obtain the same result as before, namely,
Fi =
P ∗i
| Pi |2Si.
In principle, the inverse filter provides an exact solution to the problem when
ni approaches zero. However, in practice this solution is fraught with difficulties.
First, the inverse filter is invariably a singular function due to zeros occurring in
| Pi |. Equally bad is the fact that even if the inverse filter is not singular, it is
usually ill-conditioned. This is where the magnitude of Pi goes to zero so quickly as
i increases that 1/ | Pi |2 rapidly acquires extremely large values. The effect of this
ill-conditioning is typically to amplify the noisy high frequency components of Si.
This can lead to a reconstruction for fi which is dominated by the noise in si. The
inverse filter can therefore only be used when:
• the inverse filter is nonsingular;
• the signal to noise ratio of the data is very small.
Such conditions are rare. The computational problems associated with the inverse
filter can be avoided by implementing a variety of different filters whose individual
properties and characteristics are suited to certain types of experimental data.
2.5.2 The Wiener Filter
The Wiener filter is a minimum mean square filter (i.e. it is based on application
of the least squares principle). This filter is commonly used for signal and image
restoration in the presence of additive noise. It is named after the American math-
ematician Norbert Wiener who was among the first to discuss its properties. The
problem (and consequent solution) can be formulated using either continuous or
discrete functions. Here, the latter approach is taken which is consistent with the
analysis of digital signals. The problem is as follows: Let si be a digital signal con-
sisting of N real numbers i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1 formed by a time invariant stationary
process of the type
si =
∑
j
pi−jfj + ni
where ∑
j
≡
N−1∑
j=0
.
Find an estimate for fi of the form
fˆi =
∑
j
qjsi−j .
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Clearly, the problem is to find qi. Wiener’s solution to this problem is based on
utilizing the ‘least squares principle’.
Application of the least squares principle to this class of problem is based on
finding a solution for qi such that
e = ‖fi − fˆi‖22 ≡
N−1∑
i=0
(fi − fˆi)2
is a minimum. Under the condition that the noise is signal independent, i.e.∑
j
nj−ifj = 0 and
∑
j
fj−inj = 0,
the DFT of qi is given by
Qi =
P ∗i
| Pi |2 + |Ni|2|Fi|2
where Fi, Pi and Ni are the DFT’s of fi, pi and ni respectively. Here, Qi is known
as the ‘Wiener Filter’ and using the convolution theorem we can write the required
solution as
fˆi = IDFT (QiSi)
where Si is the DFT of si, IDFT is taken to denote the inverse DFT and since the
data si is real, only the real part of the output is taken.
Derivation of the Wiener Filter
The function e defines an ‘error’ in the sense that the closer fˆi is to fi, the smaller
the error becomes. The error is a function of qi and hence is a minimum when
∂
∂qk
e(qj) = 0 ∀k.
Differentiating, we get (as discussed in Chapter 8)
N−1∑
i=0
fi −∑
j
qjsi−j
 si−k = 0.
We now use the convolution and correlation theorems to write the above equation
in the form
FiS
∗
i = QiSiS
∗
i
giving
Qi =
S∗i Fi
| Si |2
2 DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING 93
where Fi, Si and Qi and the DFT’s of fi, si and qi respectively. This function can
be written in terms of Pi and Ni (the DFT’s of pi and ni respectively) since
si =
∑
j
pi−jfj + ni
which transforms to
Si = PiFi +Ni
via the convolution theorem. This gives
S∗i Fi = (P
∗
i F
∗
i +N
∗
i )Fi = P
∗
i | Fi |2 +N∗i Fi.
Now,
| Si |2= SiS∗i = (PiFi +Ni)(P ∗i F ∗i +N∗i ) =| Pi |2| Fi |2 + | Ni |2 +PiFiN∗i +NiP ∗i F ∗i
and
Qi =
P ∗i | Fi |2 +N∗i Fi
| Pi |2| Fi |2 + | Ni |2 +PiFiN∗i +NiP ∗i F ∗i
.
Solution for Signal Independent Noise
If we assume that the noise is signal independent, then we can say that to a good
approximation, there is no correlation between the signal (in particular, the input
fi) and the noise and visa versa. This statement is compounded mathematically by
the conditions ∑
j
nj−ifj = 0 and
∑
j
fj−inj = 0.
Using the correlation theorem, these conditions can be written in the form
N∗i Fi = 0 and F
∗
i Ni = 0.
These conditions allow us to drop the cross terms in the expression for Qi leaving
us with the result
Qi =
P ∗i | Fi |2
| Pi |2| Fi |2 + | Ni |2
or after rearranging
Qi =
P ∗i
| Pi |2 + |Ni|2|Fi|2
.
Properties of the Wiener Filter
As the noise goes to zero (i.e. as | Ni |2→ 0) the Wiener filter reduces to the ‘inverse
filter’ for the system, i.e.
P ∗i
| Pi |2 .
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Hence, with minimal noise, the Wiener filter behaves like the inverse filter. As the
power spectrum of the input goes to zero (i.e. as | Fi |2→ 0), the Wiener filter has
zero gain. This solves problems concerning the behaviour of the filter as | Pi |2 ap-
proaches zero. In other words, the filter is ‘well conditioned’. Note that the quotient
| Fi |2 / | Ni |2 is a measure of the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR).
Practical Implementation
The Wiener filter is given by
Qi =
P ∗i
| Pi |2 + |Ni|2|Fi|2
.
Clearly, the main problem with this filter is that in practice, accurate estimates of
| Ni |2 and | Fi |2 are usually not available. The practical implementation of the
Wiener filter usually involves having to make an approximation of the type
Qi ∼ P
∗
i
| Pi |2 +Γ
where Γ is a suitable constant. The value of Γ ideally reflects knowledge on the SNR
of the data, i.e.
Γ ∼ 1
(SNR)2
.
In practice, it is not uncommon for a user to apply the Wiener filter over a range
of different value of SNR and then choose a restoration fˆi which is optimum in the
sense that it is a good approximation to the users a priori knowledge on the expected
form of the impulse response function.
FFT Algorithm for the Wiener Filter The Wiener filter has a relative sim-
ple algebraic form. The main source of CPU time is the computation of the DFT’s.
In practice this is done by restricting the data to be of size 2k and using a FFT.
Using pseudo code, the algorithm for the Wiener filter is:
snr=snr*snr
constant=1/snr
for i=1, 2, ..., n; do:
sr(i)=signal(i)
si(i)=0.
pr(i)=IRF(i)
pi(i)=0.
enddo
forward_fft(sr,si)
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forward_fft(pr,pi)
for i=1, 2, ..., n; do:
denominator=pr(i)*pr(i)+pi(i)*pi(i)+constant
fr(i)=pr(i)*sr(i)+pi(i)*si(i)
fi(i)=pr(i)*si(i)-pi(i)*sr(i)
fr(i)=fr(i)/denominator
fi(i)=fi(i)/denominator
enddo
inverse_fft(fr,fi)
for i=1, 2, ..., n; do:
hatf(i)=fr(i)
enddo
The Wiener filter is one of the most robust filters for solving problems of this
kind, restoring signals in the presence of additive noise. It can be used with data of
single or dual polarity and for 1D or 2D signal processing problems which are the
result of linear time invariant processes and non-causal. A loop can be introduced
allowing the user to change the value of SNR or to sweep through a range of values
of SNR on an interactive basis. This is known as ‘interactive restoration’. An
example of the Wiener filter in action is given in Figure 9 using the MATLAB code
provided below. In this example, the input signal is assumed to be zero except for
two components which are unit spikes or Kronecker delta’s spaced apart by as user
defined amount. The reason for using such a function as an input, is that it is ideal
for testing the filtering operation in terms of the resolution obtained in the same
way that two point sources can be used for evaluating the resolution of an imaging
system for example. This type of test input can be considered in terms of a two
impulses which need to be recovered from the effects of a system characterized by a
known IRF which ‘smears’ the impulses together. Further, we can consider such an
input to be a binary stream with two non-zero elements in which the task is their
optimal recovery from an output with additive (Gaussian) noise.
function WIENER(sigma,snr_signal,snr_filter)
%Input:
% sigma - standard deviation of Gaussian IRF
% snr_signal - signal-to-noise ratio of signal
% snr_filter - signal-to-noise ratio for computing Wiener filter
%
n=512; %Set size of array (arbitrary)
nn=1+n/2; %Set mid point of array
m=64; %Set width of spikes
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Figure 9: Example of a Wiener filter restoration (bottom right) of a noisy signal (bot-
tom left) generated by the convolution of an input consisting of two spikes (top left)
with a Gaussian IRF (top right). The simulation and restoration of the signal given
in this example is accomplished using the MATLAB function WIENER(50,5,1).
%Compute input function (two spikes of width m centered
%at the mid point of the array).
mm=m/2;
for i=1:n
f(i)=0.0;
end
f(nn-mm)=1.0;
f(nn+mm)=1.0;
%Plot result
figure(1);
subplot(2,2,1), plot(f);
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%Compute the IRF - a unit Gaussian distribution
for i=1:n
x=i-nn;
p(i)=exp(-(x.*x)/(sigma*sigma));
end
%Plot result
subplot(2,2,2), plot(p);
%Convolve f with p using the convolution theorem and normalize to unity.
f=fft(f); p=fft(p);
f=p.*f;
f=ifft(f); f=fftshift(f); f=real(f);
f=f./max(f); %N.B. No check on case when f=0.
%Compute random Gaussian noise field and normalize to unity.
noise=randn(1,n);
noise=noise./max(noise);
%Compute signal with signal-to-noise ratio defined by snr_signal.
s=f+noise./snr_signal;
%Plot result
subplot(2,2,3), plot(s);
%Restore signal using Wiener filter.
%Transform signal into Fourier space.
s=fft(s);
%Compute Wiener filter.
gamma=1/(snr_filter).^2;
rest=(conj(p).*s)./((abs(p).*abs(p))+gamma);
rest=ifft(rec); rest=fftshift(rest); rest=real(rest);
%Plot result
subplot(2,2,4), plot(rest);
Note that the signal-to-noise ratio of the input signal is not necessarily the same
as that used for regularization in the Wiener filter. As the noise increases, a larger
value of SNR (as used for the Wiener filter) is required but this in turn leads to
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more ringing in the restoration. The ideal restoration, is one that provides optimum
resolution of the input signal with minimum ringing. This leads to a method of
automation by searching for a restoration in which the optimum result is that for
which the ratio ∑
i
| grad of fˆi |∑
i
zeros in fˆi
is a maximum. This is the ratio of the cumulative gradient of the output (which is a
measure of the resolution of the restoration) to the number of zero crossings (which
is a measure of the amount of ringing generated by the Wiener filter).
2.5.3 Estimation of the Signal-to-Noise Power Ratio
From the algebraic form of the Wiener Filter derived above, it is clear that this
particular filter depends on: (i) the functional form of the Fourier transform of
the Impulse Response Function (the Transfer Function) Pi that is used; (ii) the
functional form of | Ni |2 / | Fi |2. The IRF of the system can usually be found by
literally recording the effect a system has on a single impulse as an input which leaves
us with the problem of estimating the signal-to-noise power ratio | Fi |2 / | Ni |2.
This problem can be solved if one has access to two successive recordings under
identical conditions as shall now be shown.
Consider two digital signals denoted by si and s′i of the same object function fi
recorded using the same IRF pi (i.e. the system) but at different times and hence
with different noise fields ni and n′i. Here, it can be assumed that the statistics of
the noise fields are the same. These signals are given by
si = pi ⊗ fi + ni
and
s′i = pi ⊗ fi + n′i
respectively where the noise functions are uncorrelated and signal independent, i.e.
we can impose the conditions
ni  n′i = 0, fi  ni = 0, ni  fi = 0, fi  n′i = 0, n′i  fi = 0.
We now proceed to compute the autocorrelation function of si given by
ci = si  si.
Using the correlation theorem we get
Ci = SiS∗i = (PiFi +Ni)(PiFi +Ni)
∗ =| Pi |2| Fi |2 + | Ni |2
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where Ci is the DFT of ci. Next, we correlate si with s′i giving the cross-correlation
function
c′i = si  s′i.
Using the correlation theorem again, we have
C ′i =| Pi |2| Fi |2 +PiFiN ′∗i +NiP ∗i F ∗i +NiN ′∗i =| Pi |2| Fi |2
The noise-to-signal ratio can now be obtained by dividing Ci by C ′i giving
Ci
C ′i
= 1 +
| Ni |2
| Pi |2| Fi |2
and re-arranging, we obtain the result
| Ni |2
| Fi |2 =
(
Ci
C ′i
− 1
)
| Pi |2 .
Note that both Ci and C ′i can be obtained from the available data si and s
′
i. Sub-
stituting this result into the formula for Qi, we obtain an expression for the Wiener
filter in terms of Ci and C ′i given by
Qi =
P ∗i
| Pi |2
C ′i
Ci
.
The approach given above, represents one of the most common methods for com-
puting the signal-to-noise ratio of a system.
2.5.4 Power Spectrum Equalization
As the name implies, the Power Spectrum Equalization (PSE) filter is based on
finding an estimate fˆi whose power spectrum is equal to the power spectrum of the
desired function fi. The estimate fˆi is obtained by employing the criterion
| Fi |2=| Fˆi |2
together with the linear convolution model
fˆi = qi ⊗ si.
Like the Wiener filter, the PSE filter also assumes that the noise is signal indepen-
dent. Since
Fˆi = QiSi = Qi(PiFi +Ni)
and given that N∗i Fi = 0 and F
∗
i Ni = 0, we have
| Fˆi |2= FˆiFˆ ∗i =| Qi |2 (| Pi |2| Fi |2 + | Ni |2).
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The PSE criterion can therefore be written as
| Fi |2=| Qi |2 (| Pi |2| Fi |2 + | Ni |2).
Solving for | Qi |, fˆi is then given by
fˆi = IDFT(| Qi | Si)
where | Qi | is the PSE filter given by
| Qi |=
(
1
| Pi |2 + | Ni |2 / | Fi |2
)1/2
.
Like the Wiener filter, in the absence of accurate estimates for | Fi |2 / | Ni |2, we
approximate the PSE filter by
| Qi |'
(
1
| Pi |2 +Γ
)1/2
where
Γ =
1
(SNR)2
.
Note that the criterion used to derive this filter can be written in the form∑
i
(| Fi |2 − | Fˆi |2) = 0
or using Parseval’s theorem ∑
i
(| fi |2 − | fˆi |2) = 0
which should be compared to that for the Wiener filter, i.e.
minimise
∑
i
| fi − fˆi |2 .
2.5.5 The Matched Filter
The matched filter is a result of finding a solution to the following problem: Given
that
si =
∑
j
pi−jfj + ni,
find an estimate for the Impulse Response Function (IRF) given by
fˆi =
∑
j
qjsi−j
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where
r =
|∑
i
QiPi |2∑
i
| Ni |2| Qi |2
is a maximum. The ratio defining r is a measure of the signal-to-noise ratio. In
this sense, the matched filter maximizes the signal-to-noise ratio of the output.
Assuming that the noise ni has a ‘white’ or uniform power spectrum, the filter Qi
which maximizes the SNR defined by r is given by
Qi = P ∗i
and the required solution is therefore
fˆi = IDFT(P ∗i Si).
Using the correlation theorem, we then have
fˆi =
∑
j
pj−isj .
The matched filter is therefore based on correlating the signal si with the IRF pi.
This filter is frequently used in systems that employ linear frequency modulated
(FM) pulses - ‘chirped pulses’ - which will be discussed later.
Derivation of the Matched Filter
With the problem specified as above, the matched filter is essentially a ‘by-product’
of the ‘Schwarz inequality’, i.e.∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
QiPi
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
∑
i
| Qi |2
∑
i
| Pi |2
as discussed in Chapter 8. The principal trick is to write
QiPi =| Ni | Qi × Pi| Ni |
so that the above inequality becomes∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
QiPi
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
| Ni | Qi Pi| Ni |
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
∑
i
| Ni |2| Qi |2
∑
i
| Pi |2
| Ni |2 .
From this result, using the definition of r given above, we see that
r ≤
∑
i
| Pi |2
| Ni |2 .
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Now, if r is to be a maximum, then we want
r =
∑
i
| Pi |2
| Ni |2
or ∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
| Ni | Qi Pi| Ni |
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∑
i
| Ni |2| Qi |2
∑
i
| Pi |2
| Ni |2 .
But this is only true if
| Ni | Qi = P
∗
i
| Ni |
and hence, r is a maximum when
Qi =
P ∗i
| Ni |2 .
White Noise Condition
If the noise ni is white noise, then its power spectrum | Ni |2 is uniformly distributed.
In particular, under the condition
| Ni |2= 1 ∀i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1
then
Qi = P ∗i .
FFT Algorithm for the Matched Filter
Using pseudo code, the algorithm for the matched filter is
for i=1 to n; do:
sr(i)=signal(i)
si(i)=0.
pr(i)=IRF(i)
pi(i)=0.
enddo
forward_fft(sr,si)
forward_fft(pr,pi)
for i=1 to n; do:
fr(i)=pr(i)*sr(i)+pi(i)*si(i)
fi(i)=pr(i)*si(i)-pi(i)*sr(i)
enddo
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inverse_fft(fr,fi)
for i=1 to n; do:
hatf(i)=fr(i)
enddo
2.5.6 Deconvolution of Frequency Modulated Signals
The matched filter is frequently used in systems that utilize linear frequency mod-
ulated (FM) pulses. IRF’s of this type are known as chirped pulses. Examples of
where this particular type of pulse is used include real and synthetic aperture radar,
active sonar and some forms of seismic prospecting for example. Interestingly, some
mammals (dolphins, whales and bats for example) use frequency modulation for
communication and detection. The reason for this is the unique properties that FM
IRFs provide in terms of the quality of extracting information from signals with very
low signal-to-noise ratios and the simplicity of the process that is required to do this
(i.e. correlation). The invention and use of FM IRFs for man made communications
and imaging systems dates back to the early 1960s (the application of FM to radar
for example); mother nature appears to have ‘discovered’ the idea some time ago.
Linear FM Pulses
The linear FM pulse is given (in complex form) by
p(t) = exp(−iαt2), | t |≤ T/2
where α is a constant and T is the length of the pulse. The phase of this pulse is
αt2 and the instantaneous frequency is given by
d
dt
(αt2) = 2αt
which varies linearly with t. Hence, the frequency modulations are linear which is
why the pulse is referred to as a linear FM pulse. In this case, the signal that is
recorded is given by (neglecting additive noise)
s(t) = exp(−iαt2)⊗ f(t).
Matched filtering, we have
fˆ(t) = exp(iαt2) exp(−iαt2)⊗ f(t).
Evaluating the correlation integral,
exp(iαt2) exp(−iαt2) =
T/2∫
−T/2
exp[iα(t+ τ)2] exp(−iατ2)dτ
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= exp(iαt2)
T/2∫
−T/2
exp(2iατt)dτ
and computing the integral over τ , we have
exp(iαt2) exp(−iαt2) = T exp(iαt2)sinc(αTt)
and hence
fˆ(t) = T exp(iαt2)sinc(αTt)⊗ f(t).
In some systems, the length of the linear FM pulse is relatively long. In such cases,
cos(αt2)sinc(αTt) ' sinc(αTt)
and
sin(αt2)sinc(αTt) ' 0
and so
fˆ(t) ' T sinc(αTt)⊗ f(t).
Now, in Fourier space, this last equation can be written as
Fˆ (ω) =
{
pi
αF (ω), | ω |≤ αT ;
0, otherwise.
The estimate fˆ is therefore a band limited estimate of f whose bandwidth is deter-
mined by the product of the chirping parameter α with the length of the pulse T .
An example of the matched filter in action is given in Figure 10 obtained using the
MATLAB code given below. Here, two spikes have been convolved with a linear FM
chirp whose width or pulse length T is significantly greater than that of the input
signal. The output signal has been generated using an SNR of 1 and it is remark-
able that such an excellent restoration of the input is recovered using a relatively
simple operation for processing data that has been so badly distorted by additive
noise. The remarkable ability for the matched filter to accurately recover informa-
tion from linear FM type signals with very low SNRs leads naturally to consider its
use for covert information embedding. This is the subject of the case study that
follows which investigates the use of for covertly watermarking digital signals for the
purpose of signal authentication.
function MATCH(T,snr)
%Input:
% T - width of chirp IRF
% snr - signa-to-noise ratio of signal
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%
n=512; %Set size of array (arbitrary)
nn=1+n/2; %Set mid point of array
%Compute input function (two spikes of width m centered
%at the mid point of the array.
m=10; %Set width of the spikes (arbitrary)
for i=1:n
f(i)=0.0; %Initialize input
p(i)=0.0; %Initialize IRF
end
f(nn-m)=1.0;
f(nn+m)=1.0;
%Plot result
figure(1);
subplot(2,2,1), plot(f);
%Compute the (real) IRF, i.e. the linear FM chirp using a
%sine function. (N.B. Could also use a cosine function.)
m=T/2;
k=1;
for i=1:m
p(nn-m+i)=sin(2*pi*(k-1)*(k-1)/n);
k=k+1;
end
%Plot result
subplot(2,2,2), plot(p);
%Convolve f with p using the convolution theorem and normalize to unity.
f=fft(f); p=fft(p);
f=p.*f;
f=ifft(f); f=fftshift(f); f=real(f);
f=f./max(f); %N.B. No check on case when f=0.
%Compute random Gaussian noise field and normalize to unity.
noise=randn(1,n);
noise=noise./max(noise);
%Compute signal with signal-to-noise ratio defined by snr.
s=f+noise./snr;
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%Plot result
subplot(2,2,3), plot(s);
%Restore signal using Matched filter.
%Transform to Fourier space.
s=fft(s);
%Compute Matched filter.
rest=conj(p).*s;
rest=ifft(rest); rest=fftshift(rest); rest=real(rest);
%Plot result
subplot(2,2,4), plot(rest);
Examnples of further reading include [107]-[110].
2.5.7 Constrained Deconvolution
Constrained deconvolution provides a filter which gives the user additional control
over the deconvolution process. This method is based on minimising a linear opera-
tion on the object fi of the form gi⊗ fi subject to some other constraint. Using the
least squares approach, we find an estimate for fi by minimizing ‖gi ⊗ fi‖2 subject
to the constraint
‖si − pi ⊗ fi‖2 = ‖ni‖2.
Using this result, we can write
‖gi ⊗ fi‖2 = ‖gi ⊗ fi‖2 + λ(‖si − pi ⊗ fi‖2 − ‖ni‖2)
because the quantity inside the brackets on the right hand side is zero. The constant
λ is called the Lagrange multiplier. Using the orthogonality principle, ‖gi ⊗ fi‖2 is
a minimum when
(gi ⊗ fi) g∗i − λ(si − pi ⊗ fi) p∗i = 0.
In Fourier space, this equation becomes
| Gi |2 Fi − λ(SiP ∗i − | Pi |2 Fi) = 0
and solving for Fi, we get
Fi =
SiP
∗
i
| Pi |2 +γ | Gi |2
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Figure 10: Example of a matched filter in action (bottom right) by recovering infor-
mation from a noisy signal (bottom left) generated by the convolution of an input
consisting of two spikes (top left) with a linear FM chirp IRF (top right). The sim-
ulation and restoration of the signal given in this example is accomplished using the
MATLAB function MATCH(256,1).
where γ is the reciprocal of the Lagrange multiplier (= 1/λ). Hence, the constrained
least squares filter is given by
P ∗i
| Pi |2 +γ | Gi |2 .
The constrained deconvolution filter allows the user to change G to suite a particular
application. This filter can be thought of as a generalization of the other filters; thus,
if γ = 0 then the inverse filter is obtained; if γ = 1 and | Gi |2=| Ni |2 / | Fi |2 then
the Wiener is obtained and if γ = 1 and | Gi |2=| Ni |2 − | Pi |2 then the matched
filter is obtained.
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2.5.8 Homomorphic Filtering
The homomorphic filter employs the properties of the logarithm to write the equation
Si = PiFi
in the form
lnSi = lnPi + lnFi.
In this case, the object function fi can be recovered using the result
fi = IDFT[exp(lnSi − lnPi)].
This type of operation is known as homomorphic filtering. In practice, deconvolu-
tion by homomorphic processing replaces the problems associated with computing
the inverse filter 1/Pi with computing the logarithm of a complex function (i.e. com-
puting the functions lnSi and lnPi). By writing the complex spectra Si and Pi in
terms of their amplitude and phase spectra, we get
Si = ASi exp(iθ
S
i )
and
Pi = APi exp(iθ
P
i )
where ASi and A
P
i are the amplitude spectra of Si and Pi respectively and θ
S
i and
θPi are the phase spectra of Si and Pi respectively. Using these results, we can write
fi = <{IDFT[exp(lnASi − lnAPi ) cos(θSi − θPi ) + i exp(lnASi − lnAPi ) sin(θSi − θPi )]}
Homomorphic filtering occurs very naturally in the processing of speech signals and
it is closely related to the interpretation of such signals via the Cepstrum.
2.6 Bayesian Estimation
The processes discussed so far have not taken into account the statistical nature
of the signal and in particular, the statistics of the (additive) noise. To do this,
another type of approach needs to be considered which is based on Bayesian estima-
tion. Bayesian estimation allows digital filters to be constructed whose performance
is determined by various (statistical) parameters which can be computed (approxi-
mately) from the statistics of the data.
2.6.1 Bayes Rule
Suppose we toss a coin, observe whether we get heads or tails, and then repeat
this process a number of times. As the number of trials increases, we expect that
the number of times heads or tails occurs is half that of the number of trials. In
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other words, the probability of getting heads is 1/2 and the probability of getting
tails is also 1/2. Similarly, if a cubic dice with six faces is thrown repeatedly, then
the probability of it landing on any one particular face is 1/6. In general, if an
experiment is repeated N times and an event A occurs n times, then the probability
of this event P (A) is defined as
P (A) = lim
N→∞
( n
N
)
.
The probability is the relative frequency of an event as the number of trials tends to
infinity. However, in practice, only a finite number of trials can be conducted and
we therefore define the (experimental) probability of an event A as
P (A) =
n
N
where N is assumed to be large. Nevertheless, the results that follow are only
strictly valid under the limiting condition that N →∞, just as, for example, a delta
sequence Sn(t) is only strictly valid under the condition that
lim
n→∞
∞∫
−∞
Sn(t)f(t)dt =
∞∫
−∞
δ(t)f(t)dt = f(0).
Suppose we have two coins which we label C1 and C2. We toss both coins
simultaneously N times and record the number of times C1 is heads, the number of
times C2 is heads and the number of times C1 and C2 are heads together. What is
the probability that C1 and C2 are heads together ? Clearly, if m is the number of
times out of N trials that heads occurs simultaneously, then the probability of such
an event must be given by
P (C1 heads and C2 heads) =
m
N
.
This is known as the joint probability of C1 being heads when C2 is heads. In
general, if two events A and B are possible and m is the number of times both
events occur simultaneously, then the joint probability is given by
P (A and B) =
m
N
.
Now suppose we setup an experiment in which two events A and B can occur. We
conduct N trials and record the number of times A occurs (which is n) and the
number of times A and B occur simultaneously (which is m). In this case, the joint
probability may written as
P (A and B) =
m
N
=
m
n
× n
N
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Now, the quotient n/N is the probability P (A) that event A occurs. The quotient
m/n is the probability that events A and B occur simultaneously given that event A
has already occurred. The latter probability is known as the conditional probability
and is written as
P (B | A) = m
n
where the symbol B | A means B ‘given’ A. Hence, the joint probability can be
written as
P (A and B) = P (A)P (B | A).
Suppose we undertake an identical experiment but this time we record the number
of times p that event B occurs and the number of times q that event B occurs
simultaneously with event A. In this case, the joint probability of events B and A
occurring together is given by
P (B and A) =
q
N
=
q
p
× p
N
.
The quotient p/N is the probability P (B) that event B occurs and the quotient
q/p is the probability of getting events B and A occurring simultaneously given
that event B has already occurred. The latter probability is just the probability of
getting A ‘given’ B, i.e.
P (A | B) = q
p
.
Hence, we have
P (B and A) = P (B)P (A | B).
Now, the probability of getting A and B occurring simultaneously is exactly the
same as getting B and A occurring simultaneously, i.e.
P (A and B) = P (B and A).
By using the definition of these joint probabilities in terms of the conditional prob-
abilities we arrive at the following formula:
P (A)P (B | A) = P (B)P (A | B)
or alternatively
P (B | A) = P (B)P (A | B)
P (A)
.
This result is known as Bayes rule. It relates the conditional probability of ‘B given
A’ to that of ‘A given B’.
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2.6.2 Bayesian Signal Analysis
In signal analysis, Bayes rule is written in the form
P (f | s) = P (f)P (s | f)
P (s)
where f is the information we want to recover from the signal which is assumed (as
usual) to be the result of a time invariant stationary process and given by
s = p⊗ f + n
where p is the impulse response function and n is the noise. This result is the basis
for a class of filters which are known collectively as Bayesian estimators. In simple
terms, Bayesian estimation attempts to recover f in such a way that the probability
of getting f given s is a maximum. In practice, this is done by assuming that P (f)
and P (s | f) obey certain statistical distributions which are consistent with the
experiment in which s is measured. In other words, models are chosen for P (f) and
P (s | f) and then f is computed at the point where P (f | s) reaches its maximum
value. This occurs when
∂
∂f
P (f | s) = 0.
The function P is the Probability Density Functions or PDF. The PDF P (f | s)
is called the a posteriori PDF. Since the logarithm of a PDF varies monotonically
with that PDF, the a posteriori PDF is also a maximum when
∂
∂f
lnP (f | s) = 0.
Using Bayes rule, we can write this equation as
∂
∂f
lnP (s | f) + ∂
∂f
lnP (f) = 0.
Because the solution to this equation for f maximizes the a posteriori PDF, this
method is known as the maximum a posteriori or MAP method.
2.6.3 Examples of Bayesian Estimation
Suppose we measure a single sample s (one real number) in an experiment where it
is known a priori that
s = f + n
where n is noise (a random number). Suppose that it is also known a priori that
the noise is determined by a zero mean Gaussian distribution of the form
P (n) =
1√
2piσ2n
exp(−n2/2σ2n)
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where σn is the standard deviation of the noise. The probability of measuring s
given f - the conditional probability P (s | f) - is determined by the noise since
n = s− f
and we can therefore write
P (s | f) = 1√
2piσ2n
exp[−(s− f)2/2σ2n].
To find the MAP estimate, the PDF for f must also be known. Suppose that f also
has a zero-mean Gaussian distribution of the form
P (f) =
1√
2piσ2f
exp(−f2/2σ2f ).
Then,
∂
∂f
lnP (s | f) + ∂
∂f
lnP (f) =
(s− f)
σ2n
− f
σ2f
= 0.
Solving this equation for f gives
f =
sΓ2
1 + Γ2
where Γ is the signal-to-noise ratio defined by
Γ =
σf
σn
.
Note that as σn → 0, f → s which must be true since s = f + n and n has a
zero-mean Gaussian distribution. Also note that the solution we acquire for f is
entirely dependent on the prior information we have on the PDF for f . A different
PDF produces an entirely different solution. To illustrate this, let us suppose that
f obeys a Rayleigh distribution of the form
P (f) =
{
f
σ2f
exp(−f2/2σ2f ), f ≥ 0;
0, f < 0.
In this case,
∂
∂f
lnP (f) =
1
f
− f
σ2f
and we get (still assuming that the noise obeys the same zero-mean Gaussian dis-
tribution)
(s− f)
σ2n
+
1
f
− f
σ2f
= 0.
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This equation is quadratic in f and its solution is
f =
sΓ2
2(1 + Γ2)
[
1±
√
1 +
4σ2n
s2Γ2
(
1 +
1
Γ2
)]
.
The solution for f which maximizes the value of P (f | s) can then be written in the
form
f =
s
2a
(
1 +
√
1 +
4aσ2n
s2
)
where
a = 1 +
1
Γ2
.
Note that if
2σn
√
a
s
<< 1
then
f ' s
a
which is identical to the MAP estimate obtained earlier where it was assumed that
f was Gaussian distributed.
2.6.4 Maximum Likelihood Method
From the previous example, it is clear that the MAP estimate is only as good as the
prior information on the statistical behaviour of f - the object for which we seek a
solution. When P (f) is broadly distributed compared with P (s | f), we can apply
a further approximation. In particular, if P (f) is roughly constant, then ∂ lnP/∂f
is close to zero and therefore
∂
∂f
lnP (f | s) ' ∂
∂f
lnP (s | f).
In this case, the a posteriori PDF is a maximum when
∂
∂f
lnP (s | f) = 0.
The estimate for f that is obtained by solving this equation for f is called the
maximum likelihood or ML estimate. To obtain this estimate, only prior knowledge
on the statistical fluctuations of the conditional probability is required. If, as in the
previous example, we assume that the noise is a zero-mean Gaussian distribution,
then the ML estimate is given by
f = s.
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Note that this is the same as the MAP estimate when the standard deviation of the
noise is zero.
The basic difference between the MAP and ML estimates is that the ML estimate
ignores prior information about the statistical fluctuations of the object f . ML
estimation only requires a model for the statistical fluctuations of the noise. For
this reason, the ML estimate is usually easier to compute. It is also the estimate
to use in cases where there is a complete lack of knowledge about the statistical
behaviour of the object. To further illustrate the difference between the MAP and
ML estimate and as prelude to their use in signal analysis, consider the case where
we measure N samples of a real signal si in the presence of additive noise ni which is
the result of transmitting a known signal fi modified by a random amplitude factor
a, the samples of the signal being given by
si = afi + ni; i = 1, 2, ..., N.
The problem is to find an estimate for a. To solve problems of this type, using
Bayesian estimation, we need to introduce multi-dimensional probability theory. In
this case, the PDF is a function of not just one number s but the set of numbers
s1, s2, ..., sN , i.e. a vector space. To emphasize this, we use the vector notation
P (s) ≡ P (s1, s2, s3, ..., sN ).
The ML estimate is given by solving the equation
∂
∂a
lnP (s | a) = 0
for a where
P (s | a) ≡ P (s1, s2, ..., sN | a).
Let us assume that the noise is described by a zero-mean Gaussian distribution of
the form
P (n) ≡ P (n1, n2, ..., nN ) = 1√
2piσ2n
exp
(
− 1
2σ2n
N∑
i=1
n2i
)
.
The conditional probability is then given by
P (s | a) = 1√
2piσ2n
exp
(
− 1
2σ2n
N∑
i=1
(si − afi)2
)
and
∂
∂a
lnP (s | a) = 1
σ2n
N∑
i=1
(si − afi)fi = 0.
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Solving this last equation for a we obtain the ML estimate
a =
N∑
i=1
sifi
N∑
i=1
f2i
.
The MAP estimate is obtained by solving the equation
∂
∂a
lnP (s | a) + ∂
∂a
lnP (a) = 0
for a. Using the same distribution for the conditional PDF, let us assume that a
has a zero-mean Gaussian distribution of the form
P (a) =
1√
2piσ2a
exp(−a2/2σ2a)
where σ2a is the standard deviation of a. In this case,
∂
∂a
lnP (a) = − a
σ2a
and hence, the MAP estimate is obtained by solving the equation
∂
∂a
lnP (s | a) + ∂
∂a
lnP (a) =
1
σ2n
N∑
i=1
(si − afi)fi − a
σ2a
= 0
for a. The solution to this equation is given by
a =
σ2a
σ2n
N∑
i=1
sifi
1 + σ
2
a
σ2n
N∑
i=1
f2i
.
Note that if σa >> σn, then,
a '
N∑
i=1
sifi
N∑
i=1
f2i
which is the same as the ML estimate.
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2.6.5 Maximum Likelihood Method
The maximum likelihood method uses the principles of Bayesian estimation dis-
cussed above to design deconvolution algorithms or filters. The problem is as follows
(where all discrete functions are assumed to be real): Given the digital signal
si =
∑
j
pi−jfj + ni,
find an estimate for fi when pi is known together with the statistics for ni. The ML
estimate for fi is determined by solving the equation
∂
∂fk
lnP (s1, s2, .., sN | f1, f2, ..., fN ) = 0.
As before, the algebraic form of the estimate depends upon the model that is chosen
for the PDF. Assume that the noise has a zero-mean Gaussian distribution. In this
case, the conditional PDF is given by
P (s | f) = 1√
2piσ2n
exp
− 1
2σ2n
∑
i
(si −
∑
j
pi−jfj)2

where σn is the standard deviation of the noise. Substituting this result into the
previous equation and differentiating, we get (see Chapter 8 - the orthogonality
principle)
1
σ2n
∑
i
si −∑
j
pi−jfj
 pi−k = 0
or ∑
i
sipi−k =
∑
i
∑
j
pi−jfj
 pi−k.
Using the appropriate symbols, we may write this equation in the form
sn  pn = (pn ⊗ fn) pn
where  and ⊗ denote the correlation and convolution sums respectively. The ML
estimate is obtained by solving the equation above for fn. This can be done by
transforming it into Fourier space. Using the correlation and convolution theorems,
in Fourier space this equation becomes
SmP
∗
m = (PmFm)P
∗
m
and thus
fn = IDFT(Fm) = IDFT
(
SmP
∗
m
| Pm |2
)
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where IDFT denotes the inverse DFT. Thus, for Gaussian statistics, the ML filter
is given by
ML filter =
P ∗m
| Pm |2
which is identical to the inverse filter.
2.6.6 Maximum a Posteriori Method
This method is based on computing fi such that
∂
∂fk
lnP (s1, s2, ..., sn | f1, f2, ..., fn) + ∂
∂fk
lnP (f1, f2, ..., fn) = 0.
Consider the following models for the PDF’s:
(i) Zero-mean Gaussian statistics for the noise,
P (s | f) = 1√
2piσ2n
exp
− 1
2σ2n
∑
i
| si −
∑
j
pi−jfj |2
 .
(ii) Zero-mean Gaussian distribution for the object
P (f) =
1√
2piσ2f
exp
(
− 1
2σ2f
∑
i
| fi |2
)
where for generality, we also assume that the data may be complex. By substituting
these expressions for P (s | f) and P (f) into the equation above, we obtain (using
the orthogonality principle)
1
σ2n
∑
i
si −∑
j
pi−jfj
 p∗i−k − 1σ2f fk = 0.
Rearranging, we may write this result in the form
sn  p∗n =
σ2n
σ2f
fn + (pn ⊗ fn) p∗n.
In Fourier space, this equation becomes
SmP
∗
m =
1
Γ2
Fm+ | Pm |2 Fm.
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The MAP filter for Gaussian statistics is therefore given by
MAP filter =
P ∗m
| Pm |2 +1/Γ2
where
Γ =
σf
σn
which defines the signal-to-noise ratio. Note that this filter is the same as the
Weiner filter under the assumption that the power spectra of the noise and object
are constant. Also, note that
MAP filter→ ML filter as σn → 0.
The algebraic form of this filter is based on the assumption that the noise is Gaus-
sian. For PDF’s of other forms, the computation of the filter can become more
complicated. Note that in practice, the value of σn can be obtained by recording
the output of a system with no input. The output is then noise driven and a his-
togram can be computed from this output noisefield from which an estimate of σn
can be computed using a least squares fit to the function exp(−n2/2σ2n) for exam-
ple. Bayesian estimation is a very useful approach for the extraction of ‘signals from
noise’ when accurate statistical information on the signal and noise are available and
has a wide range of applications other than those that have been focused on here.
However, the method often leads to estimates that are idealized ‘middle of the road’
solutions and there is some truth to the observation that with Bayesian statistics,
one sees a horse, thinks of a donkey and ends up with a mule!
2.7 The Maximum Entropy Method
The entropy of a system describes its disorder; it is a measure of the lack of in-
formation about the exact state of a system. Information is a measure of order, a
universal measure applicable to any structure or any system. It quantifies the in-
structions that are needed to produce a certain organisation. There are several ways
in which one can quantify information but a specially convenient one is in terms
of binary choices. In general, we compute the information inherent in any given
arrangement from the number of choices we must make to arrive at that particular
arrangement among all possible ones. Intuitively, the more arrangements that are
possible, the more information that is required to achieve a particular arrangement.
2.7.1 Information and Entropy
Consider a simple linear array such as a deck of eight cards which contains the ace
of diamonds for example and where we are allowed to ask a series of sequential
questions as to where in the array the card is. The first question we could ask is in
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which half of the array does the card occur which reduces the number of cards to
four. The second question is in which half of the remaining four cards is the ace of
diamonds to be found leaving just two cards and the final question is which card is
it. Each successive question is the same but applied to successive subdivisions of the
deck and in this way we obtain the result in three steps regardless of where the card
happens to be in the deck. Each question is a binary choice and in this example, 3 is
the minimum number of binary choices which represents the amount of information
required to locate the card in a particular arrangement. This is the same as taking
the binary logarithm of the number of possibilities, since log2 8 = 3. Another way of
appreciating this result, is to consider a binary representation of the array of cards,
i.e. 000,001,010,011,100,101,110,111, which requires three digits or bits to describe
any one card. If the deck contained 16 cards, the information would be 4 bits and if
it contained 32 cards, the information would be 5 bits and so on. Thus, in general,
for any number of possibilities N , the information I for specifying a member in such
a linear array, is given by
I = − log2N = log2
1
N
where the negative sign is introduced to denote that information has to be acquired
in order to make the correct choice, i.e. I is negative for all values of N larger than 1.
We can now generalize further by considering the case where the number of choices
N are subdivided into subsets of uniform size ni. In this case, the information
needed to specify the membership of a subset is given not by N but by N/ni and
hence, the information is given by
Ii = log2 pi
where pi = ni/N which is the proportion of the subsets. Finally, if we consider the
most general case, where the subsets are nonuniform in size, then the information
will no longer be the same for all subsets. In this case, we can consider the mean
information given by
I =
∑
i
pi log2 pi
which is the Shannon entropy measure established in his classic works on informa-
tion theory in the 1940s. Information, as defined here, is a dimensionless quantity.
However, its partner entity in physics has a dimension called ‘Entropy’ which was
first introduced by Ludwig Boltzmann as a measure of the dispersal of energy, in a
sense, a measure of disorder, just as information is a measure of order. In fact, Bolt-
mann’s entropy concept has the same mathematical roots as Shannon’s information
concept in terms of computing the probabilities of sorting objects into bins (a set of
N into subsets of size ni) and in statistical mechanics the entropy is defined as
E = −k
∑
i
pi ln pi
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where k is Boltzmann’s constant (=3.2983 × 10−24Calories/oC). Shannon’s and
Boltmann’s equations are similar. E and I have opposite signs, but otherwise differ
only by their scaling factors and they convert to one another by E = −(k ln 2)I.
Thus, an entropy unit is equal to −k ln 2 of a bit. In Boltzmann’s equation, the
probabilities pi refer to internal energy levels. In Shannon’s equations pi are not a
priori assigned such specific roles and the expression can be applied to any physical
system to provide a measure of order. Thus, information becomes a concept equiv-
alent to entropy and any system can be described in terms of one or the other. An
increase in entropy implies a decrease of information and vise versa. This gives rise
to the fundamental conservation law:
The sum of (macroscopic) information change and entropy change in a given system
is zero.
In signal analysis, the entropy of a signal is a measure of the lack of information
about the exact information content of the signal, i.e. the precise value of fi for a
given i. Thus, noisy signals have a larger entropy. The general definition for the
entropy of a system E is
E = −
∑
i
pi ln pi
where pi is the probability that the system is in a state i. The negative sign is
introduced because the probability is a value between 0 and 1 and therefore, ln pi is
a value between 0 and −∞, but the Entropy is by definition, a positive value.
Maximum entropy deconvolution is based on modelling the entropy of the in-
formation input or the object function fi. A reconstruction for fi is found such
that
E = −
∑
i
fi ln fi
is a maximum which requires that fi > 0∀i. Note that the function x lnx has a single
local minimum value between 0 and 1 whereas the function −x lnx has a single local
maximum value. It is a matter of convention as to whether a criteria of the type
E =
∑
i
fi ln fi
or
E = −
∑
i
fi ln fi
is used leading to (strictly speaking) a minimum or maximum entropy criterion
respectively. In some ways, the term ‘maximum entropy’ is misleading because it
implies that we are attempting to recover information from noise with minimum
information content and the term ‘minimum entropy’ conveys a method that is
2 DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING 121
more consistent with the philosophy of what is being attempted, i.e. to recover
useful and unambiguous information from a signal whose information content has
been distorted by (additive) noise. For example, suppose we input a binary stream
into some time invariant linear system, where f = (...010011011011101...). Then, the
input has an entropy of zero since 0 ln 0 = 0 and 1 ln 1 = 0. We can expect the output
of such a system to generate floating point values (via the convolution process) which
are then perturbed through additive noise. The output si = pi⊗ fi +ni (where it is
assumed that si > 0∀i) will therefore have an entropy that is greater than 0. Clearly,
as the magnitude of the noise increases, so, the value of the entropy increases leading
to greater loss of information on the exact state of the input (in terms of fi, for some
value of i being 0 or 1). With the deconvolution process, we ideally want to recover
the input without any bit-errors. In such a hypothetical case, the entropy of the
restoration would be zero just as a least squares error would be. However, just as
we can seek a solution in which the least squares error is a minimum, so we can
attempt a solution in which the entropy is a minimum in the case when we define it
as
E =
∑
i
fi ln fi
or a maximum in the case when we define the entropy as
E = −
∑
i
fi ln fi.
2.7.2 Maximum Entropy Deconvolution
Given the signal equation
si = pi ⊗ fi + ni
we find fi such that the entropy E, defined by
E = −
∑
i
fi ln fi
is a maximum. Note that because the ln function enters in to this argument, the
maximum entropy method must be restricted to cases where fi is real and positive.
Hence, the method can not be applied to an original (dual-polarity) signal but to
its amplitude modulations for example.
From the signal equation, we can write
si −
∑
j
pi−jfj = ni
where we have written the (digital) convolution operation out in full. Squaring both
2 DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING 122
sides and summing over i, we can write
∑
i
si −∑
j
pi−jfj
2 −∑
i
n2i = 0.
Now, this equation holds for any constant λ (the Lagrange multiplier) which is a
multiple of the left hand side. We can therefore write the equation for E as
E = −
∑
i
fi ln fi − λ
∑
i
si −∑
j
pj−ifj
2 −∑
i
n2i

because the second term on the right hand side is zero anyway (for all values of λ).
Given this equation, our problem is to find fi such that the entropy E is a maximum,
i.e.
∂E
∂fk
= 0 ∀k.
Differentiating and switching to the notation for 1D convolution ⊗ and 1D correla-
tion , we find that E is a maximum when
−1− ln fi + 2λ(si  pi − pi ⊗ fi  pi) = 0
or, after rearranging,
fi = exp[−1 + 2λ(si  pi − pi ⊗ fi  pi)].
This equation is transcendental in fi and as such, requires that fi is evaluated
iteratively, i.e.
fn+1i = exp[−1 + 2λ(si  pi − pi ⊗ fni  pi)], n = 1, 2, ..., N.
The rate of convergence of this solution is determined by the value of the Lagrange
multiplier given an initial estimate of fi, (i.e. f0i ) in a way that is analogous to the
use of a relaxation parameter for solving the equation x = Mx + c iteratively (see
Chapter 9).
2.7.3 Linearization
The iterative nature of this nonlinear estimation method may be undesirable, primar-
ily because it is time consuming and may require many iterations before a solution
is achieved with a desired tolerance. The MEM can be linearized by retaining the
first two terms (i.e. the linear terms) in the series representation of the exponential
function leaving us with the following equation
fi = 2λ(si  pi − pi ⊗ fi  pi).
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Using the convolution and correlation theorems, in Fourier space, this equation
becomes
Fi = 2λSiP ∗i − 2λ | Pi |2 Fi
which after rearranging gives
Fi =
SiP
∗
i
| Pi |2 + 12λ
.
Thus, we can define a linearized maximum entropy filter of the form
P ∗i
| Pi |2 + 12λ
.
Note that this filter is very similar to the Wiener filter. The only difference is
that the Wiener filter is regularized by a constant determined by the SNR of the
data whereas this filter is regularized by a constant determined by the Lagrange
multiplier.
2.8 The Cross Entropy Method
The cross entropy or Patterson entropy as it is sometimes referred to, uses a criterion
in which the entropy measure
E = −
∑
i
fi ln
(
fi
wi
)
is maximized where wi is some weighting function based on any available a priori
information of the structure of fi. If the computation described earlier is re-worked
using this definition of the cross entropy, then we obtain the result
fi = wi exp[−1 + 2λ(si  pi − pi ⊗ fi  pi)].
The cross entropy method has a synergy with the Wilkinson test in statistics in
which a discrete PDF or histogram Pi say of a stochastic field pi is tested against
a histogram Qi representative of a stochastic field qi. A standard test to quantify
how close the stochastic behaviour of pi is to qi (the null-hypothesis test) is to use
the Chi-squared test in which we compute
χ2 =
∑
i
(
Pi −Qi
Qi
)2
.
The Wilkinson test uses the metric
E = −
∑
i
Pi ln
(
Pi
Qi
)
.
Further reading includes [111]-322.
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3 Data Encryption Algorithms and Standards
The majority of cryptosystems are based on a series of ‘round transformations’ which
are ‘driven’ by some iteration function. The role of this function is to transform
information (the plaintext) into an unpredictable form (plaintext) which is uniquely
dependent upon a particular ‘key’ as illustrated in Figure 11.
Figure 11: A basic cryptosystem transforms plaintext (input) to ciphertext (output)
using a known iteration function and a key.
The iteration functions used in many cryptosystems have a unique design which
is often based on a historical lagacy determined by performance criteria, applica-
tions dependency, up-grades and modifications, user profile and so on. However, in
general, the design of such iteration functions have a common goal in terms of their
ability to output data that is unpredictable, data that is commonly referred to as
‘noise’.
In any application involving the detection and measurement of a signal, the re-
sulting data must always be assumed have errors ideally within some acceptable
tolernce. Such errors are the result of the natural noise that accompanies and, in
some cases, characterises the detection of a signal. Thus, the analysis of natural
noise and its simulation holds an important place in many areas of science and
engineering. There are numerous techniques used to quantify natural noise but of
specific importance is the use of the Probability Density Function (PDF) and the
Power Spectrum (PS). These functions provide information on the probabilities of
occurance of data (histogram for discrete data) and its frequency spectrum (discrete
Fourier transform for discrete data) respectively. However, apart from some special-
ist applications which use natural noise generated through radioactive, for example,
most cryptosystem are based on simulated noise that is a characteristic of the itera-
tion function used, i.e. data that is not random but pseudorandom. In otherwords,
in cryptography, we have control (through the design of the iteration function) over
the type of noise that is produced to covert plaintext to ciphertext, a ‘control’ that
is, of course, necessary to recover the plaintext in a key dependent way. This control
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(the iteration function(s) that is used) must be exercised in a way that produces a
cryptographically secure ciphertext, i.e. a ‘control’ that transforms the plaintext to
ciphertext with maximum possible diffusion (1 bit of the key influences all bits of
the ciphertext) and confusion (ciphertext stream is uniformly distrbuted).
There are a wide range of PDFs and PSDFs that characterise a noise field and
numerous physical models have evolved for the puspose of simulating such fields. Fig-
ure 12 shows examples of simulated signals together with the histograms and power
spectra for three different (discrete) noise fields (uniformly distributed, normally
(Gaussian) distributive and fractal noise) that are illustrative of their diversity. The
Figure also includes an example of a (discrete) chaotic signal that, by comparison
with the noise signals, has an descernable regularity. In this sense, chaotic signals
are not the same as noise signals and must be interpreted differently. The origin of
chaotic fields and their interpretation is considered later after first introducing the
simulation of noise through the computation of pseudorandom number streams.
3.1 Pseudo Random Number Generators
The security of a number of cryptographic algorithms depends on the generation of
unpredictable random numbers [128] [143], even though it is difficult to generate a
truly random number generator using software-based algorithms [146].
Good random number generators enhance the strength of cryptography and
many different methods of generating random numbers have been developed for
this purpose. An interesting and relatively simple method is called the Diceware
passphrase [134]. In this method, a list of words is generated and each word num-
bered. The numbers are generated from an dice, which acts as a random number
generator, and are assembled as a five digit number, e.g. 43146. This number is then
used to look up a word in a word list. A major advantage of the Diceware approach
is that the level of unpredictability in the passphrase can be easily calculated. Each
diceware word adds 12.9 bits of information entropy to the passphrase, i.e. log2(65)
bits where five words (slightly over 64 bits) are considered a minimum length.
The best random numbers are created by harnessing natural physical processes,
such as radioactive decay, which is known to exhibit truly random behaviour [123].
Emissions may be detected in rapid succession or with relatively long delays between
emissions, delays that are unpredictable and random [141]. An emission detector
cycles through the alphabet at a fixed rate and outputs a letter when an emission
is detected. The cycle then continues until the next emission is detected providing
another randomly selected letter and so on, a process generates genuinely random
numbers. For example, HotBit [144] random numbers are generated using a radiation
source involving beta decay. A user contacts the server, where upon the output can
be downloaded over the web. The random numbers provided by HotBits are ideal
for stream cipher. However, because they are not generated by some key dependent
encryption algorithm, the entire random number stream needs to be exchanged
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between sender and receiver rather then the key itself.
The term ‘random’ must be used loosely because software based random number
generators as used in cryptography are basically pseudorandom, i.e. simulations of
random processes at best. A pseudorandom generator is a deterministic algorithm
that expands short random seeds into much longer bit sequences that appear to be
random. In other words, although the output of a pseudorandom generator is not
really random, there is no easy method of telling the difference [125]. The better
the pseudorandom number generator, the better the design of an encryption engine.
[142] In turn, most generators used for encryption exploit the properties of prime
numbers and hence are prime number dependent, hence the importance of prime
numbers in applied cryptography.
The term ‘random’ must be used loosely because software based random number
generators as used in cryptography are basically pseudo-random, i.e. simulations of
random processes at best. In other words, although the output of a pseudo-random
generator is not really random, there is no easy method of telling the difference
[125]. The better the pseudo-random number generator, the better the design of an
encryption engine [142]. In turn, most generators used for encryption exploit the
properties of prime numbers and hence, are prime number dependent. This is the
principal reason behind, the importance of prime numbers in applied cryptography.
A Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) is an algorithm that output a
discrete array of numbers that appear to be random, a randomness that is quan-
tifiable in terms of a statistical distribution. However, PRNGs do not produce real
random numbers because they do not have to - hence the use of the work Pseudo.
Most simple applications, such as in computer games or in the application of Monte-
Carlo simulations, for example, need relatively few random numbers to be effective.
Nevertheless, the use of a poor random number generators can lead to results that
are compounded in terms of spurious correlations. Indeed, some PRNGs do not nec-
essarily produce anything that looks even remotely like natural random sequences.
However, with some careful design contraints, they can be made to approximate
such sequences, approximations can be applied to produce noise fields that are used
to ‘confuse’ plaintext. A fundamental issue concerning PRNGs is that a digital com-
puter can only be in a finite number of states (a large finite number, but a finite
number nonetheless), and the data that is output can only be a deterministic func-
tion of the input data and the current state of the digital computer. This means
that any PRNG on a computer (at least, on a finite-state machine) is, by definition,
periodic and thus, all PRNGs are cyclical. Anything that is periodic is, by definition,
predictable and can not therefore be classed as truely random. Thus, the best that
a digital computer can produce is a pseudorandom sequence or series, i.e. a sequence
of numbers that ‘looks’ random - the output of PRNG. The period of the sequence
should be long enough so that a finite sequence of reasonable length (i.e. one that
is actually used) is not periodic. If, for example, a billion random bits are required,
then a random bit sequence generator should not be designed that repeats after only
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Figure 12: Examples of 100 element noisy digital signals (left) together with the
characteristic 16-bit histograms (centre) and logarithmic power spectra (right). The
types of noise are (from top to bottom) uniform, Gaussian or normally distributed,
fractal noise and a chaotic signal.
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sixteen thousand bits. These relatively short non-periodic sequences should be as
statistically indistinguishable as possible from real random sequences. In addition,
they should not be compressible, e.g. the distribution of run lengths (a sequence
containing the same bit type) for 0s and 1s should be the same. These properties
can be empirically measured and then compared with statistical expectations.
In practice, a number sequence generator is pseudorandom if it looks random
and passes all the statistical tests of randomness that can be found and imple-
mented in practice. Considerable effort has and continues to go into producing good
pseudorandom sequences on a computer. Discussions of generators abound in the
literature, along with various tests of randomness. However, all of these generators
are periodic - there is no exception. However, with potential periods of 2256 bits and
higher, they can be used for the largest applications. The problem with all pseu-
dorandom sequences is the correlations that result from their inevitable periodicity.
Every pseudorandom sequence generator will produce them if the sequence is long
enough.
Within a cycle, a pseudorandom sequence must have the property that it is
unpredictable. In other words, it must be computationally impossible to predict
what the next random bit will be, given complete knowledge of the algorithm or
hardware generating the sequence and all of the previous bits in the stream. Thus,
a pseudorandom sequence is really random if, in addition to looking random and
passing all known statistical tests for randomness, it has another additional property
which is that it cannot be reliably reproduced. For example, if the sequence gener-
ator is run twice with the exactly same inputs (at least as exact as computationally
possible), then the sequences are completely unrelated, i.e. their cross correlation
functions are effectively zero. However, this property is not usually possible to
produce on a finite state machine and for some applications of random number se-
quences, is not desirable, one of the most important example being cryptography.
In crytography, for example, it is essential that we are able to reproduce exactly the
same random number sequence from the same key in order to decrypt a ciphertext.
Thus, we refer to those processes that produce number streams which look random
(and passes appropriate statistical tests) and are unpredictable but reproducable
as Pseudo Random Number Generators. Pseudorandom numbers are therefore not
numbers generated by a random process but are numbers generated by a completely
deterministic arithmetic process that is based on the execution of a given algorithm.
3.2 PRNG Algorithms
There are a range of algorithms for generating pseudo random numbers. Many of
these algorithms are suitable for the purpose of simulation (e.g. simulating noise)
but not suitable for encryption. Further, many algorithms include (usually in terms
of some form of post-processing) methods for outputing random numbers that con-
form to a pre-defined statistical distribution and/or spectral characteristic used for
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x 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2x 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256
2xmod13 2 4 8 3 6 12 11 9
Table 3: Use of the moular function for random number generation
simulating fields that are of statistical and/or spectral significance, e.g. Gaussian,
Poisson and Reyleigh distributed fields. This includes algorithms for simulating
random fractal fields, e.g. ω−q noise fields. In this section, we review the principal
methods for generating uniformly distributed random number streams.
3.2.1 The Linear Cogruential Method
A typical mechanism for generating discrete random numbers ni is via the iterative
process defined by (where i is an integer)
ni+1 = (ani + b)modP, i ≥ 0
which produces a decimal integer number stream in the range [0, P ] and is known
as the Linear Congruential Method (LCM) [129]. Here, the modular function mod
operates in such a way as to output the remainder from the division of ani + b by
P , e.g.
23mod7 = 2 and 6mod8 = 6.
By convention amod0 = a and amodb has the same sign as b. Clearly, in order to
execute the above iteration, an initial value or ‘seed’ is required to be assigned to
n0.
The reason for using modular arithmetic is because modular based functions
tend to behave more erratically than conventional functions. For example, consider
the function y = 2x and the function y = 2xmod13. The table below illustrates the
difference between the output of these two function.
This approach to creating random sequences was first introduced by D H Lehmer
in 1949 and requires attention with regard to the numerical values assigned to the
parameters a, b and P which are constrained as follows: 0 < a < P , 0 ≤ b < P and
0 ≤ n0 < P . The essential point to understand when employing this method, is that
not all values of the four parameters (a, b, n0 and P ) produce sequences that pass all
the tests for randomness. Further, all such generators eventually repeat themselves
cyclically, the length of this cycle (the period) being at most P . When b = 0 the
3 DATA ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS AND STANDARDS 130
algorithm is faster and referred to as the multiplicity congruential method and many
authors refer to mixed congruential methods when b 6= 0.
The initial value or ‘seed’ n0 is repeatedly multiplied by a and added to b, each
product being reduced by modulo P . For example, suppose we let a = 13, b = 0,
P = 100 and n0 = 1; we will then generate the following sequence of two digit
numbers
1, 13, 69, 97, 61, 93, 09, 17, 21, 73, 49, 37, 81, 53, 89, ...
For certain choices of a and P , the resulting sequence n0, n1, n2, ... is fairly evenly
distributed over [0, P ] and contains the expected number of upward and downward
double runs (e.g. 13, 69, 97) and triple runs (e.g. 9,17,21,73) and agrees with other
predictions of probability theory. The values of a and P can vary and good choices
are required to obtain runs that are statistically acceptable and have long cycle
lengths, i.e. produce a long stream of numbers before the stream is repeated. For
example, suppose we choose a = 7, b = 12, P = 30 and n0 = 0, then the following
sequence is generated
0, 12, 16, 4, 10, 22, 16, 4, 10, 22, 16, 4, ...
Here, after the first three digits, the sequence repeats the digits 4, 10, 22, 16; the
‘cycle length’ of the number generator is very short. To improve the cycle length, P
is conditioned to be a prime number whose ‘size’ is close to that of the word length
of the computer.
The reason for using a prime number is that it is divisible by only 1 or itself.
Hence, the modulo operation will tend produce an output which is distinct from
one element to the next. Typical examples of those prime numbers that can be
used take the form 2n − 1 where n is an integer (Mersenne prime numbers and
not for any value of n!). A typical example of a Mersenne prime number is given
by 231 − 1 = 2147483648. Values of the multiplier a vary considerable from one
application to the next and include values such as 75 or 77 for example.
The use of prime numbers for generating noise fields and their application in
cryptology is fundamental. Many standard and some non-standard cryptosystem
make explicit use of prime numbers and associated prime number theory, e.g. the
RSA algorithm. For this reason, a short overview of prime numbers is given in
Appendix F. For long periods, P must be large. The other factor to be considered
in choosing P is the speed of the algorithm. Computing the next number in the
sequence requires division by P and hence a, convenient choice is the word length
of the computer. Perhaps the most subtle reasoning involves the choice of the
multiplier a such that a cycle of period of maximum length is obtained. However, a
long period is not the sole criterion that must be satisfied. For example, a = b = 1,
gives a sequence which has a maximum period P but is anything but random. It
is always possible to obtain the maximum period but a satisfactory sequence is
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not always attained. When P is the product of distinct primes only a = 1 will
produce a full period, but when P is divisible by a high power of some prime, there
is considerable latitude in the choice of a.
There are a few other important rules for optimising the performance of a ran-
dom number generator using the linear congruential method in terms of developing
sensible choices for a, b and P , these include:
• b is relatively prime to P .
• a− 1 is a multiple of every prime dividing P .
• a− 1 is a multiple of 4 if P is a multiple of 4.
These conditions allow a linear sequence to have a period of length P .
Pseudorandom number generators are often designed to produce a floating point
number stream in the range [0, 1]. This is achieved by normalising the integer stream
after the random integer stream has been computed. This produces a uniform dis-
tributed noise field consisting of floating point numbers (to single of double precision
as required) between 0 and 1 inclusively.
The seed used to initiate the process is typically a relatively long integer which
is determined by the user. The exact value of the seed should not change the
statistics of the output, but it will change the numerical values in the elements
of the output array. These values can only be reproduced using the same seed,
i.e. such pseudorandom number generators do not satisfy the property that their
outputs cannot be reliably reproduced.
The output of such a generator is good enough for many simulation type ap-
plications but not suitable for cryptograohy. There are a few simple guidelines to
follow when using such random number generators:
• Make sure that the program calls the generator’s initialisation routine before
it calls the generator.
• Use initial values that are ‘somewhat random’, i.e. have a good mixture of
bits. For example 2731774 and 10293082 are ‘safer’ than 1 or 4096 (or some
other power of two).
• Note that two similar seeds (e.g. 23612 and 23613) may produce sequences that
are correlated. Thus, for example, avoid initialising generators on different
processors or different runs by just using the processor number or the run
numbers as the seed.
The algebraic form of the standard LCM algorithm discussed so far suggests a
number of a number of ‘variations on a theme’ such as the iteration
ni+1 = (a1n2i + a2ni + a3)modP
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or
ni+1 = (a1n3i + a2n
2
i + a3ni + a4)modP
or, more generally
ni+1 = (a1nmi + a2n
m−1
i + a3n
m−2
i + ...am+1)modP
where aj are predefined (integer) numbers and P is a prime number.
3.2.2 Shuffling
An extra stage which helps further randomise the output of a PRNG is to shuffle
the output within a temporary storage. For the iteration
ni+1 = (ani + b)modP, i ≥ 0,
unless a very poor choice of values for a, b, and P has been made, shuffling insures a
consistent random number stream. The algorithm is very simple and can be applied
to post process any random number generator. We first initialise an array x[i], i =
1, 2, ..., N with random numbers from a random number generator RAND(seed).
The last integer random number computed n[N ] is then set to y. To create the next
random number, we use the following algorithm:
j = 1 + Int(N ∗ y)
y = x[j]
x[j] = RAND()
Output y
This simple indirection frees the list of random numbers from any sequential corre-
lation. The exact size of the array, x[. . .], is most of the time irrelevant.
3.2.3 Additive Generators
Additive generators create very long cycles of random numbers. A typical algorithm
commences by initialising an array ni with random numbers (not all of which are
even) so that we can consider the initial state of the generator to be n1, n2, n3, ....
We then apply
ni = (ni−a + ni−b + ...+ ni−m)mod2e
where a, b, ...,m and e are assigned integers.
An example of this method is the ‘Fish generator’ in which
ni = (ni−55 + ni−24)mod232.
The algorithm commences by initialising an array x[1..55] with random numbers,
not all of which are even. Then two pointers are initialised, j is set to 24, and k is
set to 55. To create the next random number we apply the following algorithm:
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n[k] = (n[k] + n[j]) mod 2e
decrease k and j by 1
if j = 0 then j = 55
if k = 0 then k = 55
Output n[k]
This algorithm has repeatedly proved itself to be very reliable, and universally pop-
ular. It is fast as no multiplication operations are required, and can work equally
well with floating point numbers as with integers. The period of the sequence of
random numbers is also very large, being of the order 2f (255 − 1), where 0 ≤ f ≤ e.
The initial choice of values 24 and 55 is very important to achieving a large loop
length.
Further examples include the linear feedback shift register given by
nn = (c1ni−1 + c2ni−2 + cjni−j)mod2e
which, for specific values of c1, c2, ...cj , has a cycle length of 2e.
3.2.4 Gaussian Noise Generation
The PRNGs considered so far are designed to output a uniformly distributed array
of random numbers. In the simulation of different noise fields it is often necessary
to output random numbers that conform to a pre-defined statistical distribution.
Because so many noise fields are Gaussian distributed, for simulation purposes,
Gaussian noise generation has an important place. In cryptogarphy, however, the
purpose of a Gaussian noise generator is not for using the output as a cipher10 but
as a covertext in order to create a stegotext that is compatible with a transmission
environment that is characterised by Gaussian noise, or a Gaussian distributed image
texture, for example.
3.2.5 Box-Muller Algorithm
We consider the Box-Muller algorithm for creating random numbers with a zero
mean probability distribution and standard deviation of one, given by
p(y)dy =
1√
2pi
exp
(
−y
2
2
)
.
The algorithm is used to create two independent normal distributed values, y1
and y2, using the Box-Muller transform that is based on the following algorithm:
10A cipher should ideally by uniformly distributed
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repeat
v1 = RAND()
v2 = RAND()
R2 = v21 + v
2
2
until R2 ≤ 1
y1 = v1
√
−2 lnR2
R2
y2 = v2
√
−2 lnR2
R2
where RAND() is a uniform distributed random numer generator.
The basis for this method is as follows. Assume we wish to create two values
y1 and y2; we first create two uniform random values, x1, x2 on (0, 1). This can be
written as
y1 =
√
−2 lnx1 cos 2pix2 and y2 =
√
−2 lnx1 sin 2pix2
or, equivalently,
x1 = exp
(
−1
2
(
y21 + y
2
2
))
and x2 =
1
2pi
tan−1
y2
y1
.
We can now calculate the joint probability distribution of the two y’s, with the
following:
p(y1, y2)dy1dy2 = p(x1, x2)
∣∣∣∣∂(x1, x2)∂(y1, y2)
∣∣∣∣ dy1dy2
where |∂(x1, x2/∂(y1, y2| is the Jacobian determinant. Thus,
∣∣∣∣∂(x1, x2)∂(y1, y2)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂x1∂y1 ∂x1∂y2∂x2∂y1 ∂x2∂y2
∣∣∣∣∣ = −
[
1√
2pi
exp
(
−y
2
1
2
)][
1√
2pi
exp
(
−y
2
2
2
)]
.
This means that y1 and y2 are independent. So this method creates two Gaussian
distributed values from two uniformly distributed random values as required. A
further trick is to create v1, v2 as two points on a unit circle; then two simplifications
can be made as
sin 2pix2 = v1/R and cos 2pix2 = v2/R
where R =
√
v21 + v
2
2, and x1 = R
2.
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3.2.6 The Central Limit Algorithm
The Central Limit Theorem can be used to compute a Gaussian distributed random
number stream by adding different uniformly distributed random number streams
together, each of which has been generated using a different seed. The following
algorthm illusrates the principle of this approach:
for i=1 to N
v1[i] = RAND(seed1)[i]
v2[i] = RAND(seed2)[i]
...
vM [i] = RAND(seedM )[i]
end
for i=1 to N
y[i] = v1[i]+v2[i]+...+v3[i]
end
Here, the seeds should be ‘random’ (i.e. have a good mixture of bits) and can be
produced using, for example, another random generator - RAND(seed0). The num-
ber of uniformly random number streams required to create a Gaussian distributed
field (i.e. the value of M) can be relatively low, M ≤ 4 say. Note, that incomparison
to the Box-Muller algorithm, this algorithm avoids having to compute squares and
the functions sqrt and ln.
3.3 Statistical Tests
Pseudorandom number generators are iterative algorithms whose performance de-
pends on the choice of the parameters which affects how random the output really
is and the cycle length available. In order to quantify the parameters in terms of the
‘quality’ of output, a series of statistical tests are required which are essential before
one can assert the suitability of the parameters to produce a random sequence. The
most commonly applied initial tests are the Chi-squared and Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests. Such tests establish whether the numbers from the sequence are correctly
distributed. We now present a brief overview of the procedures involved.
3.3.1 Chi-squared Test
Assume that observations can fall into one of n different outcomes, and the expected
probability for the kth outcome is pk. If there are N independent observations, with
Yk of them falling into outcome k, the Chi-squared statistic is given by
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χ2 =
∑
1≤k≤n
(Yk −Npk)2
Npk
and is the measure of deviation from the expected.
Given n possible outcomes we need to be able to find out when χ2 is too large or
too small. The table below tells us how likely a value of χ2 is. Consider the entry s
found in row n, column p which states that the probability that χ2 is less than s is p
if the number of samples is suitably large enough. Thus, if, over a series of tests, χ2
is often abnormally too large or too small, then that probability generator should
be considered suspect.
p = 5% p = 25% p = 50% p = 75% p = 95%
n = 5 0.71 1.92 3.36 5.39 9.45
n = 10 3.33 5.90 8.34 11.39 16.92
n = 20 7.26 11.04 14.34 18.25 25.00
3.3.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
The Chi-squared test relies on the distribution giving n distinct outcomes. Often
the outcomes cover a very large range. A similar procedure can be carried out by
defining the empirical distribution function,
Fn(x) =
Number of xi ≤ x, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
N
.
This gives us two measures, K+n that gives the greatest deviation from F when Fn
is greater than F , and K−n that gives the greatest deviation when Fn is less than F ,
i.e.
K+n =
√
nmax
x
[Fn(x)− F (x)] and K−n =
√
nmax
x
[F (x)− Fn(x)].
Similarly to the Chi-squared test, there exists an equation to calculate how likely
a series of tests are.
p = 5% p = 25% p = 50% p = 75% p = 95%
n = 5 0.0947 0.3249 0.5245 0.7674 1.1392
n = 10 0.1147 0.3297 0.5426 0.7845 1.1688
n = 20 0.1298 0.3461 0.5547 0.7975 1.1839
n = 30 0.1351 0.3509 0.5605 0.8036 1.1916
≈
√
1
2 ln
1
1−p − 16√n
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3.3.3 Alternative Tests
To be sure of the randomness of numbers, further tests may be necessary. We outline
a few of the popular ones.
Serial independence looks at the independence one value has over the next. Pairs
of numbers can then be considered as single values.
Gap analysis looks at the distance of the occurrence of one value to the next time
it appears again.
The poker test considers the number of similar elements within a group of random
numbers. The number of k-tuples with r different values, when there are n possible
values, can be Chi-square tested with the probability,
pr =
n(n− 1) . . . (n− r − 1)
nk
(
k
r
)
.
The Coupon test is related to the poker test and looks at the length of segments
required to get a complete set of all the integers 0 to d. The Chi-squared test can be
applied to the set Yi, d ≤ i ≤ t for some arbitrary t > d. Yi contains the number of
occurrences where the complete set occurs within a segment of exactly i length, and
Yt includes the number of occurrences when the segment length is ≥ t. The number
of observations is then N = t − d + 1. Defining k = t − d + 1 the corresponding
probability distribution is given by
pk =

d!
dk
(
r − 1
d− 1
)
, d ≤ k < t;
1− d!
dt−1
(
t− 1
d
)
, k = t.
The permutation test creates a sequence of groups each having t elements. There
are t! relative orderings in which the elements in each group can occur. Again a
Chi-squared test can be applied to this sequence of permutations with k = t! and
pk = 1/t!
The run test examines the length of monotonic sequences, either up or down. These
length sequences are not independent as long as runs are likely to be followed by
short ones and vice versa. To simplify the probabilities, a process of throwing away
the element that follows a run makes them independent again. Then a Chi-squared
test can be carried out.
Many other tests can be employed to deal with subsequences or correlations
between elements and special tests for analysing test sets that are smaller than
the possible number of categories can be developed. Special care also needs to be
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considered when dealing with algorithms that require a set of numbers at a time,
for example within multidimensional sets.
Testing random number generators is useful for one main reason; to confirm
to a third party that the random number generator being used is correct for their
algorithm and will not cause spurious results. The simple recommendation is to
always be prepared to look at the output of a random number generator and perform
at least one test. It is important to remember that there are many poor pseudo
random number generators that can sometimes only show their flaws under certain
conditions. A sequence that passes one test may easily fail on another.
3.4 Encryption using PRNGs
In cryptography, pseudo random number generation plays a central role as does
modular arithmetic in general. One of the principal goals in cryptography is to
design random number generators that provide outputs (random number streams)
where no element can be predicted from the preceding elements given complete
knowledge of the algorithm. Another important feature is to produce generators
that have long cycle lengths. A further useful feature, is to ensure that the entropy
of the random number sequence is a maximum, i.e. that the histogram of the number
stream is uniform. Finally, the use of modular arithmetic coupled with the use of
prime numbers (see Appendix F) in the development of encryption algorithms tends
to provide functions which are not invertible. They are one-way functions that can
only be used to reproduce a specific (random) sequence of numbers from the same
initial condition.
The basic idea in symmetric cryptography is to convert a plaintext into a cipher-
text using a key that is used as a seed for the PRNG. A plaintext file is converted
to a stream of integer numbers using ASCII (American Standard Code for Informa-
tion Interchange) conversion. For example, suppose we wish to encrypt the authors
surname Blackledge for which the ASCII11 decimal integer stream or vector is
p = (66, 108, 97, 99, 107, 108, 101, 100, 103, 101).
Suppose we now use the linear congruential PRNG defined by12
ni+1 = animodP
where a = 13, P = 131 and let the seed be 250659, i.e. n0 = 250659. The output of
this iteration is
n = (73, 32, 23, 37, 88, 96, 69, 111, 2, 26).
If we now add the two vectors together, we generate the cipher stream
c = f + n = (139, 140, 120, 136, 195, 204, 170, 211, 105, 127).
11Any code can be used.
12Such a PRNG is not suitable for crptography and is being used for illustrative purposes only
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Clearly, provided the recipient of this number stream has access to the same algo-
rithm (including the values of the parameters a and P ) and crucially, to the same
seed n0, the vector n can be regenerated and p obtained from c by subtracting n from
c. However, in most cryptographic systems, this process is usually accomplished by
using binary streams where the binary stream representation of the plaintext p and
that of the random number stream or cipher n, is used to generate the ciphertext
binary stream c via the process
c = n⊕ f
where ⊕ denotes the XOR operation. Restoration of the plaintext is then accom-
plished via the operation
f = n⊕ c = n⊕ n⊕ f .
Clearly, the processes above are examples of digital confusion in which the in-
formation contained in the field f (the plaintext) is ‘confused’ using a stochastic
function c (the cipher) via addition (decimal integer process) or with an XOR oper-
ator (binary process). Here, the seed plays the part of a key that it utilised for the
process of encryption and decryption. This is an example of symmetric encryption
in which the key is a private key known only to the sender and recipient of the
encrypted message.
Given that the algorithm used to generate the random number stream is publi-
cally available (together with the parameters it uses which are typically ‘hard-wired’
in order to provide a random field pattern with a long cycle length), the problem
is how to securely exchange the key to the recipient of the encrypted message so
that decryption can take place. If the key is particular to a specific communica-
tion and is used once and once only for this communication (other communications
being encrypted using other keys), then the process is known as a one-time pad,
because the key is only used once. Simple though it is, this process is not open to
attack. In other words, no form of cryptanalysis will provide a way of deciphering
the encrypted message. The problem is how to exchange the keys in a way that is
secure and thus, solutions to the key exchange problem are paramount in symmetric
encryption.
The illustration of the principle of symmetric encryption given above highlights
the problem of key exchange, i.e. providing the value of n0 to both sender and
receiver. In addition to developing the technology for symetric encryption (e.g.
the algorithm or algorithms), it is imperative to develop appropriate protocols and
procedures for using it effectively with the aim of reducing inevitable human error,
the underlying principles being:
• the elimination of any form of temporal correlation in the used algorithm;
• the generation of a key that is non-intuitive and at best random;
• the exchange of the key once it has been established.
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3.5 Example Encryption Algorithms
In cryptography, the design of specialised random number generators with idealized
properties forms the basis of many of the algorithms that are applied. Although the
type of random number generators considered so far are of value in the generation of
noise fields, the properties of these algorithms are not well suited for cryptography
especially if the cryptosystem is based on a public domain algorithm. This is because
it is relatively easy to apply brute force attacks in order to recover the parameters
used to ‘drive’ a known algorithm especially when there is a known set of rules
required to optimise the algorithm in terms of parameter specifications, e.g. as with
the LCM. In this section, we briefly discuss some of these algorithms.
3.5.1 Symmetric Ciphers
Symmetric ciphers typically use an iteration of the type
ni+1 = f(ni, p1, p2, ...)
where pi is some parameter set (e.g. prime numbers) and n0 is the key. The cipher
n, which is usually of decimal integer type, is then written in binary form (typically
using ASCII 7-bit code) and the resulting bit stream used to encrypt the plaintext
(after conversion to a bit stream with the same code) using an XOR operation.
The output bit stream can then be converted back to ASCII ciphertext form as
required. Decryption is then undertaken by generating the same cipher (for the
same key) and applying an XOR operation to the ciphertext (binary stream). The
encryption/decryption procedure is thus of the same type and attention if focused
on the type of algorithm that is used for computing the cipher. However, whatever
algorithm is designed and irrespective of its ‘strength’ and the length of the key hat
is used, in all cases, symmetric systems require the users to exachange the key. This
requires the use of certain key exchange algorithms that is discussed later.
Symmetric ciphers can be further categorised into stream and block ciphers.
Stream ciphers are essential Vernam type ciphers which encrypt bit streams on a bit
by bit basis. Block ciphers operate of blocks of the stream and apply permutations
and shifts to the data which depend on the key used. This is analogous to the use
of shuffling in pseudorandom number generation. In both cases, examples of the
algorithms and products are given in Appendix G.
3.5.2 Blum Blum Shub Algorithm
The Blum Blum Shub (BBS) generator [119] is one of the most cryptographically
strong pseudorandom number generators available and is given by
ni+1 = n2imod(pq)
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where p and q are two prime numbers whose product forms the so called Blum
integer. We choose two large prime numbers, p and q, that both have a remainder
of 3 when divided by 4, i.e. p = q = 3mod4 which is equivalent to
pmod4 = qmod4 = 3
The BBS is referred to as a cyptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator.
A pseudorandom bit generator is said to pass the next-bit test if there is not a
polynomial-time algorithm that, on input of the first k bits of an output sequence,
can predict the (k + 1)th bit with a probability significantly greater than 1/2. In
other words, given the first k bits of the sequence, there is not a practical algorithm
that can even allow us to state that the next bit will be 1 (or 0) with a probability
greater than 1/2. Further, this generator is unpredictable to the left and to the right
meaning that for a given sequence generated, a cryptanalyst cannot predict the next
or previous bit in the sequence. The security associated with this algorithm lies in
the difficulty of factoring pq and the non-linear nature of the iteration which makes
it effectively impossible to predict the output of the generator unless the exact value
of n0 - the ‘key’ - is known.
3.5.3 Asymmetric Ciphers
Asymmetric ciphers are based on two different keys. One key is held in the public
domain and the other key is unique to the receiver of an encrypted message. This
technique is best associated with the RSA algorithm. The RSA algorithm gets
its name after the three inventors, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman who developed the
generator in the mid 1970s.13 It has since withstood years of extensive cryptanalysis.
To date, cryptanalysis has neither proved nor disproved the security of the algorithm
in a complete and self-consistent form which suggests a high confidence level in the
algorithm.
3.5.4 The RSA Agorithm
The RSA algorithm is named after Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adel-
man, Computer Science researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
who developed and patented the algorithm in 1977. RSA gets its security from the
difficulty of factoring large numbers [126]. The public and private keys are functions
of a pair of large (100 to 200 digits or even larger) prime numbers. Recovering the
plaintext from the public key and the cipher text is conjectured to be equivalent to
factoring the product of the two primes. The success of this algorithm, which is one
13There are some claims that the method was first developed at GCHQ in England and then
re-invented (or otherwise) by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman; the idea was not published openly by
GCHQ, only as an internal report.
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of the oldest and most popular public key cryptosystems, is based on difficulty of
factoring.
The basic generator is given by
ni+1 = neimod(pq)
where p, q and e are prime numbers and e < pq. Although this generator can be
used to compute a noise field ni, the real value of the algorithm lies in its use for
transforming plaintext Pi to ciphertext Ci directly via the equation
Ci = P ei mod(pq), e < pq
We then consider the decryption process to be based on the same type of transform,
i.e.
Pi = Cdi mod(pq)
The problem is then to find d given e, p and q. The ‘key’ to solving this problem is
to note that if ed− 1 is divisible by (p− 1)(q − 1), i.e. d is given by the solution of
de = mod[(p− 1)(q − 1)]
then
Cdi mod(pq) = P
ed
i mod(pq) = Pimod(pq)
using Fermat’s Little Theorem, i.e. for any integer a and prime number p
ap = amodp
Note, that this result is strictly dependent on the fact that ed − 1 is divisible by
(p−1)(q−1) making e a relative prime of (p−1)(q−1) so that e and (p−1)(q−1) have
no common factors except for 1. This algorithm, is the basis for many public/private
or asymmetric encryption methods. Here, the public key is given by the number e
and the product pq which are unique to a given recipient and in the public domain
(like an individuals telephone number). This public key is then used to encrypt a
message transformed into a decimal integer array Mi say using the one-way function
Ci = M ei mod(pq).
The recipient is then able to decrypt the ciphertext Ci with knowledge of p and q
which represents the private key obtained by solving the equation
de = mod[(p− 1)(q − 1)]
for d and then using the result
Mi = Cdi mod(pq).
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In this way, the sender and receiver do not have to exchange a key before encryp-
tion/decryption can take place and such systems, in effect solve the key exchange
problem associated with symmetric ciphers.
Note that the prime numbers p and q and the number e < pq must be distributed
to Alice and Bob in such a way that they are unique to Alice and Bob on the condition
that d exists! This requires an appropriate infrastructure to be established by a
trusted third party whose ‘business is to distribute values of e, pq and d to its clients
a Public Key Infrastructure. A PKI is required in order to distribute public keys,
i.e. different but appropriate values of e and pq for use in public key cryptography
(RSA algorithm). This requires the establishment of appropriate authorities and
directory services for the generation, management and certification of public keys.
Recovering the plaintext from the public key and the cipher text can be conjec-
tured to be equivalent to factoring the product of the two primes. The success of
the system, which is one of the oldest and most popular public key cryptosystems, is
based on the difficulty of factoring. The principal vulnerability of the RSA algorthm
with regard to an attack is that e and pq are known and that p and q must be prime
numbers - elements of a large but (assumed) known set. To attack the cipher, d
must be found. But it is known that d is the solution of
de = mod[(p− 1)(q − 1)]
which is only solvable if e < pq is a relative prime of (p− 1)(q − 1). An attack can
therefore, be launched by searching through prime numbers whose magnitudes are
consistent with the product pq (which provides a search domain) until the relative
prime condition is established for factors p and q. However, factoring pq to calculate
d given e is not trivial. It is possible to attack an RSA cipher by guessing the value
of (p − 1)(q − 1) but this is no easier than factoring pq which is the most obvious
means of attack. It is also possible for a cryptanalyst to try every possible d but
this brute force approach is less efficient than trying to factor pq.
Using typical computing power, factoring pq given e is relatively intractable. It
is possible to attack RSA by guessing the value of (p − 1)(p − 1) but this attack is
no easier than factoring pq which is the most obvious means of attack [135]. Any
adversary will have the public key, e, pq and to find the decryption key d, the at-
tacker has to factor pq. It is possible for a cryptanalyst to try every possible d but
this brute force approach is less efficient than trying to factor pq. The application
of dedicating computing facilities for this purpose can also be applied to compute
large values of primes. For this reason, the increase in computing power will not
necessarily provide a solution for breaking RSA encrypted data. Further, any con-
ceivable method invented for a cryptanalyst to deduce d may also provide a new way
to factor large numbers which can, in turn, be used to develop new RSA based en-
ryption. Thus, all that RSA cryptanalysis has shown is that the attacks discovered
to date illustrate the pitfalls to be avoided when implementing RSA and although
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RSA ciphers can be attacked, the algorithm can still be considered secure when used
properly. In order to ensure the continued strength of the cipher, RSA run factoring
challenges on their websites. As with all PKI and other cryptographic products, this
algorithm is possibly most vulnerable to authorities (at least those operating in the
UK) having to conform to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Section
49 - see Appendix A.
3.5.5 Hash Functions
A hash function is a one way function which takes an input and returns a fixed-size
output string [149] [147]. Hash functions have a variety of general computational
uses and they provide one of the best ways for checking the authenticity of stored
files. For example, if a file has been modified and its hash functions recalculated,
then there will be a change in the output value (hash values). Hash functions
are quite useful for network administrators as they can use them for files that are
important in running the system, and do not change at all, or do not change often.
Tripwire Inc. [150], provides software which periodically calculates hash function for
the network administrator to see. If there are any changes, the administrator will
be notified which helps identify a potential attack on the network. Cryptographic
algorithms such as RC5 and SHA1 [148] use hash functions. When employed in
cryptography, hash functions Hash(x) are usually chosen to have some additional
properties such as: (i) the input can be of any length; (ii) the output has a fixed
length; (iii) Hash(x) is relatively easy and fast to compute for any given input x;
(iv) Hash(x) is a one-way function and is collision-free.
3.6 Example Encryption Systems
The use of PRNG for designing encryption systems is not usually based on explicit
use of the PRNG considered so far. They are based on similiar principles but with
a number of variations on a theme which include round transformation and shifts
operating of data streams and/or blocks of data. This section provides a brief
overview of some of the more commonly used encryption systems [146]
3.6.1 Digital Encryption Standard
The Data Encryption Standard (DES), known as the Data Encryption Algorithm
(DEA) by ANSI and the DEA-1 by ISO, has been the world wide standard since the
late 1970s and was originally developed by IBM in 1974. It is a symmetric (private
key) system that has held up remarkably well against years of cryptanalysis. In
order for it to be acceptable as the standard encryption algorithm, DEA had to
meet with the following specifications:
• provide a high level of security;
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• be completely specified and easy to understand;
• the security of the algorithm must reside in the key (the security should not
depend on the secrecy of the algorithm);
• the algorithm must be available to all users;
• the algorithm must be acceptable for use in diverse applications;
• it must be economically implementable in electronic devices;
• it must be efficient to use;
• it must be able to be validated;
• it must be exportable.
DES is a block cipher using 64-bit blocks. The key length is 56-bits, a relatively
low key length which is why DES was upgraded to DES3 in the 1990s. The key is
usually expressed as a 64-bit number, but every 8th-bit is used for parity checking and
is ignored. The security of DES resides within the key(s). The algorithm operates
on a 64-bit block of plaintext. After an initial permutation, the block is split into
two halves, each 32-bits long. The algorithm then initiates 16 rounds of identical
operations in which the data is combined with the key. After the 16th-round, the two
halves are joined, and a final permutation (the inverse of the initial permutation)
completes the algorithm. In each round the key bits are shifted, and then 48-bits
are selected from the 56-bits of the key. The right half of the data is expanded
to 48-bits via an expansion permutation, combined with 48-bits of the shifted and
permuted key via an XOR opertaion, sent through 8 ‘S-boxes’ producing 32 new bits,
and permuted again. These four operations constitute a function f . The output of
function f is then combined with the left half via another XOR operation. The
result of these operations becomes the new right half; the old right half becomes the
new left half. These operations are repeated 16 times
In effect, DES is based on randomisation of the data via the process of shuffling.
If Bi is the result of an iteration, Li and Ri are the left and right halves of Bi, Ki is
the 48-bit key for round i, and f is the function includes the substituting, permuting
and XORing with the key, then a round is as follows:
Li = Ri−1
Ri = Li−1 ⊕ f(Ri−1,Ki)
DES processes plaintext blocks of n = 64 bits, producing 64-bit ciphertext blocks.
The effective size of the key K is 56 bits; more precisely, the input key K is specified
as a 64-bit key, 8 bits of which (bits 8, 16, ... 64) may be used as parity bits. The
256 keys implement (at most) 256 of 264 possible bijections on 64-bit blocks. The
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encryption process proceeds in 16 stages of rounds. From the input key K, sixteen
48-bit subkeys Ki are generated, one for each round. Within each round, eight fixed
carefully selected 6-to-4 bit substitution mappings (S-boxes) Si, collectively denote
S, are used. The 64-bit plaintext is divided into 32-bit halves L0 and R0. Each
round is functionally equivalent, taking 32-bit inputs Li−1 and Ri−1 from a previous
round and producing a 32-bit output. If E is taken to denote a fixed expression
permutation, mapping Ri− 1 from 32 to 48-bits (all bits are used once, some are
used twice) and P is another permutation on 32-bits, then an initial permutation
(IP ) precedes the first round. Following the last round, the left and right halves
are exchanged and, finally, the resulting string is bit permuted by the inverse of
IP . Decryption involves the same key and algorithm, but with subkeys applied to
the internal rounds in the reverse order. A simplified view is that the right half of
each round (after expanding a 32-bit input of 8 characters of 6-bits each) carries out
key-dependent substitutions on each of the 8 characters and then uses a fixed bit
transposition to redistribute the bits of the resulting characters to produce a 32-bit
output.
Using a step-by-step approach, the DES algorithm is given below.
Input: plaintext m1, ...,m64; 64-bit key K = k1, ..., k64 (includes 8 parity bits)
Output: 64-bit ciphertext block C = c1, ..., c64
1. (Key schedule) Compute sixteen 48-bit round keys Ki from K (using the DES
key schedule algorithm - see below).
2. (L0, R0)← IP (m1,m2, ...,m64).
3. (16 rounds) for i from 1 to 16, compute Li andRi, with f(Ri−1,Ki) = P (S(E(Ri−1⊕
Ki))) computed as follows:
(a) Expand Ri−1 = r1, r2, ..., r32 from 32 to 48 bits, i.e.
T ← E(Ri−1)
so that T = r32, r1, r2, ..., r32, r1.
(b) T ′ ← T⊕Ki where T ′ is represented as eight 6-bit character strings (B1, ..., B8) =
T ′.
(c) T ′′ ← (S1(B1), S2(B2), ..., Ss(Bs)). Here Si(Bi) maps Bi = b1, b2, ..., b6.
(d) T ′′′ ← P (T ′′).
4. b1, b2, ..., b64← (R16, L16) (exchange final blocks L16, R16).
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5. C ← IP−1(b1, b2, ..., b64).
Key Schedule Algorithm
Input: 64-bit key K = k1, ..., k64 (including 8 odd-parity bits).
Output: sixteen 48-bit keys Ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ 16
1. Define vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 16 as follows: vi = 1 for i ∈ 1, 2, 9, 16, vi = 2 otherwise. (These
are left-shift values for 28-bit circular rotations.)
2. T ← PCI(K) where T is represented as 28-bit halves (C0, D0).
3. For i from 1 to 16 compute Ki as follows:
Ci ← (Ci−1 ← vi), Di ← (Di−1 ← vi),Ki ← PC2(Ci, Di)
Since its invention in the 1970s, the security of DES has been studied intensively.
Special techniques such as differential and linear cyptanalysis have been used to
attack DES, but the most successful attacks have been based on exhaustive searches
of the key space. With special hardware of large networks and workstations, it is
now possible to decrypt DES ciphertexts in a few days or even hours. In addition,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) have sponsored the development of a
crypto chip named Deep Crack that can process 88 billion DES keys per second and
has successfully cracked 56-bit DES in a few days. For example, in the paper Six
Ways to Break DES [127] outlines various methods that can be used to break the
encryption. Today, DES can only be considered secure if triple encryption is used.
In this context, it is important to know that DES is not a group. This means that
for the two DES keys K1 and K2 there is, in general, not a third DES key K3 such
that DES(k1) ◦DES(k2) = DES(k3). If DES were a group, then multiple encryption
would not lead to increased security. In fact, the subgroup that the DES encryption
permutations generate in the permutation group S64! is at least of the order of
102499. Hence, triple encryption DES or DES3 has become the preferred standard for
symmetric encryption systems world wide since the 2001. Sometimes known as triple
DES, this is a block cipher formed from the DES algorithm,. 3DES uses 2 56-bit
keys, giving an effective key length of 112 bits, and performs DES encryption on the
data three times using these keys. However, DES3 is slowly disappearing from use,
largely replaced by its natural successor, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
One large-scale exception is within the electronic payments industry, which still uses
DES3 extensively and continue to develop and promulgate standards based upon it.
This guarantees that DES3 will remain an active cryptographic standard well into
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the future. By design, DES and therefore DES3, suffer from slow performance in
software; on modern processors, AES tends to be around six times faster. DES3 is
better suited to hardware implementations, and indeed where it is still used it tends
to be with a hardware implementation but even so, AES outperforms it. AES like
DES and DES3 uses a transposition approach rather than substitution.
3.6.2 Advanced Encryption Standard
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is based on the Rijndael algorithm and
is an iterated block cipher with a variable block length and a variable key length.
The block length and key length can be independently specified at 128 and 256
bits. The Rijndael Block Cipher was selected by the National Institute of Science
and Technology (NIST), mainly because DES was an aging standard and no longer
addressed the needs for strong encryption.
Unlike its predecessor DES, AES is a substitution-permutation network, not
a Feistel network. It is fast in both software and hardware, is relatively easy to
implement, and requires little memory. As a new encryption standard, it is currently
being deployed on a large scale.
Due to the fixed block size of 128 bits, AES operates on a 4×4 array of bytes,
termed the state (versions of Rijndael with a larger block size have additional
columns in the state). Most of AES calculations are done in a special finite field.
The algorithm is based on the following criteria:
• resistance against all known attacks;
• speed and compactness of code on a wide range of platforms;
• design simplicity.
In most ciphers, the round transformation has the Feistel structure. In this
structure, typically, part of the bits of the intermediate state are simply transposed
unchanged to another position. The round transformation in the Rijindael algorithm
does have a Feistel structure. Instead, the round transformation is composed of three
distinct invertible uniform transformations called layers. By uniform, we mean that
every bit of the state is treated in a similar way.
The specific choices for the different layers are for a large part based on the
application of a wide trail strategy, a design method used to provide resistance
against linear and differential cryptanalysis. Here, every layer has its own function
as follows:
The linear mixing layer guarantees high diffusion of multiple rounds.
The non-linear layer provides for the parallel application of S-boxes that have
optimum worst-case non-linear properties.
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The key additional layer is a simple XOR of the round key to the intermediate
state.
The ‘state’ of the cipher can be pictured as a rectangular array of bytes which
has four rows, the number of columns being denoted by Nb which is equal to the
block length divided by 32. The cipher key is similarly pictured as a rectangular
array with four rows, the number of columns of the cipher key being denoted by Nk
and equal to the key length divided by 32.
Encryption takes place using four stages:
1. Substitute bytes: Uses an S-box to perform byte-by-byte substitution of the
block.
2. Shift rows: A simple permutation.
3. Mix Columns: Substitution.
4. Add round key: Bitwise XOR of current block and portion of the expanded key.
The Rijndael cipher is suited for effective implementation on a wide range of pro-
cessors with dedicated hardware. On an 8-bit processor, the algorithm can be pro-
grammed by simply implementing the different component transformations. This is
straight forward for row shift (RowShift) and for the round key addition. The im-
plementation of byte-by-byte substitution (ByteSub) requires a table of 256 bytes.
The round key addition, ByteSub and RowShift can be effectively combined and
executed serially per state byte. The indexing overhead is minimised by explicitly
coding the operation for every dtate byte. The different steps of the round trans-
formation can be combined in a single set of lookup tables, allowing for very fast
implementations on processors with word lengths of 32-bits or above.
The cipher is suited for implemention on dedicated hardware. There are several
trade-offs between area and speed that are possible. Because the implementation in
software on general purpose processors is usually very fast, the need for hardware
implementations is usually limited to two specific cases:
(i) Extremely high speed chips with no area restrictions: the look-up tables can be
hardwired and the XOR operations can be conducted in parallel.
(ii) Compact co-processors on a Smart Card to speed up execution: for this platform,
typically, the S-box operation can be hardwired.
In the table look-up implementation, it is essential that the only non-linear step
(ByteSub) is the first transformation in a round that the rows are shifted before
column mixing is applied. In the inverse of a round, the order of the transformations
in the round is reversed and, consequently, the non-linear setup will end up being
the last step of the inverse round and the rows are shifted after the application of
(the inverse of) the column mixing.
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AES cryptosystems are expected to perform strongly for all key lengths and
block lengths defined. The most efficient key recovery attack for the AES is by ex-
haustive key search. This is the most efficient way of obtaining information for given
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The expected effort of exhaustive key search depends on
the length of the cipher key:
For a 16-byte key, 2127 applications of the Rijndael algorithm.
For a 24-byte key, 2191 applications of the Rijndael algorithm.
For a 32-byte key, 2255 applications of the Rijndael algorithm.
The rationale for this is that a considerable safety margin is taken with respect to
all known attacks. It is, however, impossible to make non-speculative statements
with regard to unknown matters.
The principal advantage of this cipher is that it does not base its security, or
any part of it, on obscure and poorly understood interactions between arithmetic
operations. The variable block lengths allow the construction of collision-resistant
iterated functions. Although the number of rounds is hard-wired in the algorithm
specifications, it can be modified as a parameter to enhance security.
In terms of a software application, the cipher and its inverse make use of different
codes and/or tables. In hardware, the inverse cipher can only partially re-use the
circuitry that implements the cipher. Encryption is performed at the add round
key stage; this is the only stage in which the key is used. Thus, ciphering always
begins with this round. The other three stages provide confusion, diffusion and
non-linearity. Since the key is not used in these stages, no security is provided. The
ciphering process can be viewed as alternating operations of XOR encryption of a
block followed by scrambling of the block (the other three stages) followed by XOR
encryption. This provides for efficiency and strong encryption.
As of 2006, the only successful attacks against AES have been side channel at-
tacks. The National Security Agency (NSA) reviewed all the AES finalists, including
Rijndael, and stated that all of them were secure enough for US Government non-
classified data. In June 2003, the US Government announced that AES may be used
for classified information: ‘The design and strength of all key lengths of the AES
algorithm (i.e. 128, 192 and 256) are sufficient to protect classified information up
to the SECRET level. TOP SECRET information will require use of either the 192
or 256 key lengths. The implementation of AES in products intended to protect na-
tional security systems and/or information must be reviewed and certified by NSA
prior to their acquisition and use. This marks the first time that the public has had
access to a cipher approved by NSA for encryption of TOP SECRET information.
Many public products use 128-bit secret keys by default; it is possible that NSA
suspects a fundamental weakness in keys this short, or they may simply prefer a
safety margin for top secret documents (which may require security decades into the
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future). The most common way to attack block ciphers is to try various attacks on
versions of the cipher with a reduced number of rounds. AES has 10 rounds for 128-
bit keys, 12 rounds for 192-bit keys, and 14 rounds for 256-bit keys. By 2006, the
best known attacks were on 7 rounds for 128-bit keys, 8 rounds for 192-bit keys, and
9 rounds for 256-bit keys. Some cryptographers worry about the security of AES.
They feel that the margin between the number of rounds specified in the cipher and
the best known attacks is too small for comfort. There is a risk that some way to
improve such attacks might be found and then the cipher could be broken.
3.6.3 Lucifer
Lucifer is generally considered to be the first civilian block cipher, developed in
the 1970s based on work undertaken by Horst Feistel [122]. A revised version of
the algorithm was adapted as a FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard)
standard. It was chosen by the US National Bureau of Standards (NBS) after public
invitation for submissions and some internal changes by NBS. DES was publicly
released in 1976 and has been widely used ever since. Lucifer’s S-boxes have 4-bit
inputs and 4-bit outputs; the input of the S-boxes is the bit permuted output of
the S-boxes of the previous round; the input of the S-boxes of the first round is the
plaintext.
Using differential cryptanalysis against the initial version of Lucifer it was shown
that Lucifer, with 32-bit blocks and 8 rounds could be broken with 40 chosen plain-
texts and 229 steps; the same attack can break Lucifer with 128-bit blocks and 8
rounds with 60 chosen plaintexts and 253 steps. Lucifer has been available some
time and has been succeeded by DES, DES3 and AES. Moreover, all of Lucifer’s US
patents have now expired.
3.6.4 FEAL
FEAL was designed in Japan by Shimizu and Miyaguchi from NTT (Nippon Tele-
graph and Telephone) Corporation, Japan as a replacement to DES [121]. It was
originally built as a four-round cryptosystem with a 64-bit block size and a 64-bit key
size. This was done in order to give high performance in software. However, a num-
ber of attacks against FEAL-4 were announced including one attack that required
only 20 chosen plaintexts. This led the designers to introduce a revised version, i.e.
FEAL-N, where N denotes a number of rounds.
FEAL was designed for speed and simplicity, especially for software on 8-bit
microprocessors (e.g. chipcards). It uses byte oriented operations (8-bit addition
mod 256, 2-bit left rotation and XOR), avoids bit-permutations and look-up tables
and offers small code size. The basic algorithm is as follows [133]:
Input: 64-bit plaintext M = m1, ...,m64; 64-bit key K = k1, ..., k64
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Output: 64-bit ciphertext block C = c1, ..., c64
1. (key schedule) Compute sixteen 16-bit subkeys Ki from K
2. Define ML = m1, ...,m32, MR = m33, ...,m64.
3. (L0, R0)← (ML,MR)⊕ ((K8,K9), (K10,K11)) (XOR initial subkeys).
4. R0 ← R0 ⊕ L0
5. For i is 1 to 8 do: Li ← Ri−1, Ri ← Li−1 ⊕ f(Ri−1,Ki−1).
6. L8 ← L8 ⊕R8.
7. (Rs, Ls)← (Rs, Ls)⊕ ((K12,K13), (K14,K15)). (XOR final subkeys).
8. C ← (Rs, Ls) (the order of the final blocks is exchanged).
The same algorithm can be used for decryption, but with the key schedule reversed.
Cryptanalysis method for this method is repoted in [118].
3.6.5 IDEA
IDEA operartes on 64-bit blocks. Developed in Zurich by Xuejia Lai and James
Massey, it is generally regarded to be one of the most secure public domain block
ciphers. It utilizes a 128-bit key and is designed to be resistant to differential crypt-
analysis [137], [132]. . While IDEA is not a Feistel cipher, decryption is carried out
in the same manner as encryption once the decryption subkeys have been calculated
from the encryption subkeys. Care has been taken in making a structure that is
easily implemented in both software and hardware. The security of IDEA relies on
the use of three incompatible types of arithmetic operations on 16-bit words: XOR,
addition modulo 216, and multiplication modulo 216 + 1. Its speed in software can
be compared to that of DES.
One of the principles considered during the design of IDEA was to facilitate
analysis of its strength against differential cryptanalysis; IDEA is considered to be
immune from differential cryptanalysis. In addition, no linear cryptanalysis attacks
on IDEA have been reported and there is no known algebraic weakness in IDEA.
The most significant cryptanalytic result is that a large class of 251 weak keys can
be found when the use of such a key during encryption can be detected and the key
recovered. However, since there are 2128 possible keys, this result has little impact
on the practical security of the cipher for encryption. IDEA is generally considered
secure and both the cipher development and its theoretical basis are sound.
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3.6.6 Skipjack
Skipjack is the encryption algorithm contained in the Clipper chip [137], [120] and
was designed by the NSA. It uses an 80-bit key to encrypt 64-bit blocks of data.
Skipjack can provide greater security than DES, since it uses 80-bit keys with 32
rounds. By contrast, DES uses 56-bit keys with only 16 rounds.
Since its release in 1987, the Skipjack algorithm has remained secret and a num-
ber of cryptographers have remained suspicious of this fact. Some considered that
the algorithm may be insecure, others were conserned that NSA may have inserted
a ‘trapdoor’. The US government, aware of such criticism, decided to invite a small
group of independent cryptographers to examine the Skipjack algorithm. The cryp-
tographers issued a report which stated that, although their study was too limited
to reach a definitive conclusion, they nevertheless believed that Skipjack was secure.
The following report was issued by the independent committee:
Under the assumption that the cost of processsing power is halved every 18 months,
it will be 36 years before the difficulty of breaking Skipjack by exhaustive search will
be equal to the difficulty of breaking DES today. Thus, there is no significant risk
that Skipjack will be broken by exhaustive search in the next 30-40 years.
There is no significant risk that Skipjack can be broken through a shortcut method
of attack, including differential cryptanalysis. There are no weak keys; there is no
complementation property. The experts, not having time to evaluate the algorithm
to any great extent, instead evaluated NSA’s own design and evaluation process.
The strength of Skipjack against cryptanalytic attack does not depend on the secrecy
of the algorithm. In 1998 the US government decided to de-classify Skipjack.
3.6.7 GOST
GOST is a symmetric block cipher designed by the former government of Soviet
Union [130], [124]. It is a 64-bit block cipher with a 256-bit key. The iteration for
the GOST algorithm is 32 rounds. To encrypt, a block is divided into two halves,
left, L, and right, R. The sub-key for round i is Ki. A typical GOST round i is
Li = Ri−1
Ri = Li−1 ⊕ f(Ri−1,Ki)
The right half and the ith subkey are added to modulo 232. The output is then
divided into 8 4-bit data blocks. Each block becomes the input to a different S-box.
There is a total of eight S-boxes and thus, each four bits go to one S-box. Each
S-box is a permutation of the numbers 0 to 15. For example, an S-box might look
like:
8, 11, 3, 5, 0, 10, 1, 4, 15, 7, 13, 6, 14, 2, 9, 12.
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The outputs of all eight S-boxes are combined into a 32-bit word. The word is then
circular shifted 11 bits to the left. The result is XORed to the left half to become
the new right half, and the right half becomes the new left half. This process is
repeated 32 times.
The are some major differences between GOST and DES [137]
• DES has a complicated procedure for generating subkeys from the keys. GOST
has a very simple procedure.
• DES has a 56-bit key; GOST has a 256-bit key. If you add in the secret S-box
permutations, GOST has a total of about 610 bits of secret information.
• The S-boxes in DES have 6-bit inputs and 4-bit outputs, the S-boxes in GOST
have 4-bit inputs and outputs. Both algorithms have eight S-boxes, but an
S-box in GOST is one-fourth the size of an S-box in DES.
• DES has an irregular permutation, called a P-box; GOST uses an 11-bit left
circular shift.
• DES has 16 rounds; GOST has 32 rounds.
GOST’s designers tried to achieve the balance between efficiency and security.
They modified DES’s basic design to create an algorithm which will work better for
software implementation. Basically, the security of GOST has been increased by
making the key very large, keeping the S-boxes secret, and doubling the number of
iterations.
3.6.8 Blowfish
The Blowfish algorithm was developed in 1993 by Bruce Schneier, President of a
consulting firm specialising in computer security and author of Applied Cryptogra-
phy. Blowfish is a 64-bit block cipher with a single 128-bit encryption key [140] [139].
Blowfish provides a good encryption rate in software and no effective cryptanalysis
of it has been found to date. However, the Advanced Encryption Standard now
receives more attention. Schneier designed Blowfish as a general-purpose algorithm,
intended as a replacement for the aging DES and free of the problems associated
with other algorithms. At the time, many other designs were proprietary, encum-
bered by patents or kept as government secrets. Schneier has stated that, ‘Blowfish
is unpatented, and will remain so in all countries. The algorithm is hereby placed
in the public domain, and can be freely used by anyone’.
Blowfish is a 64-bit block cipher with a variable key length. It was designed to
meet the following criteria: speed, compactness, simplicity, and above all, security.
It is optimised for applications where the key is mainly static, like communication
lines, or automatic file encryption.
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Blowfish is a Feistel network consisting of 16 rounds. The input is a 64-bit data
element x. The basic algorithm is given below [138].
x is divided into (xL, xR)
For i = 1 to 16:
xL = xL ⊕ Pi
xR = F (xL)⊕ xR
Swap xl and xR (undo the last swap)
xR = xR ⊕ P17
xL = xL ⊕ P18
Recombine xL and xR.
Decryption is the same as encryption except that P1, ..., P18 are in reverse order.
3.6.9 SEAL
SEAL is a software efficient stream cipher designed by Rogaway and Coppersmith
[145]. It is a pseudorandom function family under the control of a key. Prepro-
cessed into a set of tables, SEAL stretches a 32-bit ‘position index’ into a keystream
of essential arbitrary length. It then encrypts by XORing this keystream with the
plaintext, in the manner of a Vernam cipher. As with any Vernam cipher, it is im-
perative that the keystream only be used once. On a modern 32-bit processor, SEAL
can encrypt messages at a rate of about 5 instructions per byte. In comparison, the
DES algorithm is some 10-30 times as expensive.
SEAL is a length increasing PRF: under control of a 160-bit key a, SEAL maps
a 32-bit string n to an L-bit string SEAL(a, n, L). The number L can be made as
large or as small as is needed for a target application, but output lengths ranging
from a few bytes to a few thousand bytes are anticipated.
A PRF can be used to make a good stream cipher. In a stream cipher the
encryption of a message depends not only on the key a and the message x but also
on the message’s ‘position’ n in the data stream. This position is often a counter
(sequence number) which indicates which message is being ciphered. The encryption
of string x at position n is given by (n, x⊕SEAL(a, n, L)), where L = |x|. In other
applications n may indicate the address of a piece of data on disk.
SEAL has been designed with the following features which enhance its strength
[137]:
1. Use of a large, secret, key-derived S-box.
2. Alternate arithmetic operations which do not commute (addition and XOR).
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3. Use of an internal state maintained by the cipher which is not directly manifest
in the data stream.
4. Varying the round function according to the round number, and varying the
iteration function according to the iteration number.
One way to assess performance in a table-based cipher like SEAL is to simply count
the number of S-box look-ups per byte generated output. SEAL uses 0.5 look-ups
per byte of output. Merkle’s 16-round Khufu uses 2 table look-ups per byte, while
the S/P permutations of a software DES require 16 or 32 look-ups per byte. These
comparisons ignore the rest of the work which each cipher does, and this work is in
fact greater in SEAL than in Khufu or DES.
Even though SEAL provides a fast strong encryption, it does not, by itself,
provide data authenticity. If there is a need, SEAL-encrypted message, can be
accompanied by message authentication code (MAC).
3.6.10 RC4
RC4 is a variable key size stream cipher developed by Rivest in 1987 [131]. The
keystream is independent of the plaintext. It has an 8-bit S-box: S0, S1, ...S255. The
entries are used as numbers 0 through 255 and permutated. The permutation itself
is a function of the variable length key. The two counters i and j are both initialised
to zero.
The following function generates a random byte:
i = (i+ 1) mod 256
j = (j + Si) mod 256
swap Si and Sj
t = (Si + Sj) mod 256
K = Si
Encryption takes place by XORing the byte K with the plaintext and decryption is
the reverse. Encryption is 10 times faster than DES. RC4 is quite a strong encryp-
tion, even though its algorithm looks so simple that most experienced programmers
can code it from memory.
3.6.11 FSAngo
FSAngo is a high speed stream cipher which works on symmetric key systems devel-
oped in conjunction with Fujisoft ABC Inc. and Tokyo Denki University [136]. A
random key is generated using the FSRansu random number generator. Designers
of FSRansu claim that the sequence provided by the PRNG do not provide enough
information to identify the keys. The key space is over 10600. The random numbers
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have been tested for frequency linear complexity and statistical distribution; the
result could not determine any helpful pattern. The program works at high speed
and is compatible with all processors. It can also be easily implemented in hardware
with minor modifications.
3.6.12 Quantum Cyptography
This technology is aimed at overcoming the problems of key exchange. The secrecy
of keys distributed by quantum cryptography is guaranteed in an absolute fashion
by quantum physics. Quantum Key Distribution is a technology that exploits a
fundamental principle of quantum physics - observation causes perturbation - to
exchange cryptographic keys between two remote parties over optical fiber networks
with absolute security.
3.7 Examples Encryption Industries
This section provides a brief overview of example companies undertaking business
in cryptography and data security.
3.7.1 RSA Security Inc.
RSA Security (formerly Security Dynamics Technologies) is a top maker of hardware
and software used to protect and manage computer network access. Most of its sales
come from flagship product SecurID, which authorises entry by PINs and random-
access codes displayed on cards or tokens. The company also makes data encryption
and e-business security tools. Its products are sold to corporations, as well as to
users in the finance, research, and government markets. RSA Security generates
about 70% of its sales in the US.
3.7.2 Rainbow Technologies
Rainbow Technologies pretty much covers the spectrum of antipiracy software and
hardware. The company makes products that prevent the unauthorised use of soft-
ware, and information security products that protect the security of satellite, In-
ternet, and network communications. Its software protection products contain a
hardware key included with each copy of a client’s software program and software
that tells the program to search for the key. Its information and Internet secu-
rity products utilise encryption technology and are marketed to government entities
and commercial businesses. Rainbow’s growing Spectria division offers e-commerce
consulting services and wireless communication tools.
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3.7.3 Cylink Corporation
The company’s security software, remote-access tools, and other products protect the
transmission of information across the Internet and corporate computer networks.
Cylink also sells encryption tools, smart cards, and management software. Its clients
include large banks (about a third of sales) and government agencies, as well as
electronics experts such as Cisco, WorldCom, and Motorola. The company generates
about 45% of its sales outside North America. Cylink divested a line of modems
and other wireless products to focus on security. Honeywell, through its acquisition
of security alarm maker Pittway, owns 28% of Cylink.
3.7.4 Network Associates
Network Associates makes a viral computer more virile. The acquisitive security
software maker is continually duking it out with Symantec to be the top data se-
curity specialist. The company develops antivirus, network management, and help
desk software. Its products include VirusScan and the Sniffer family of network
monitoring and troubleshooting programs. Network Associates sells its products
through a direct sales force and through top distributors such as Ingram Micro and
Tech Data. The company also generates a share of sales on the Internet through
its publicly traded McAfee.com subsidiary, of which Network Associates owns about
85%. Services such as consulting and support account for nearly a third of sales.
3.7.5 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd
Network intruders get burned when playing with Check Point Software Technologies’
firewalls. The company’s resource protection, or firewall, software shields corporate
networks from internal and external unauthorised access. Its FireWall-1 verifies
remote users, controls access, and blocks viruses and other unwanted Web content.
VPN-1 lets companies set up virtual private networks for secure internal and remote
communications. Check Point sells its products directly and through manufacturers,
resellers, and systems integrators including IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and EDS. Over
half of the company’s business comes from resellers in the the US.
3.7.6 AXENT Technologies Inc.
AXENT Technologies puts its emphasis on hacker stress. Its security management
and firewall software provide companywide network security, including access con-
trol, data confidentiality, intrusion detection, and remote-access and Internet au-
thentication services. AXENT derives about 70% of its sales from software license
fees; the rest come from the service fees for consulting, maintenance, and training
that it offers through its Secure Network Consulting subsidiary. The company mar-
kets its products to customers such as WorldCom, Mobil, Xerox, Unilever, and the
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US Air Force. AXENT has agreed to be acquired by rival security software maker
Symantec
3.7.7 BindView Development Corporation
BindView Development gives computer network managers a bird’s-eye view. The
company makes systems management and security software for complex computer
networks operating on Microsoft’s Windows NT and Novell’s NetWare operating
systems. Its line of enterprise management software products includes tools for
network management, security, asset management, inventory analysis, and report-
ing. BindView also offers Web-based risk management (bv-Control), systems mi-
gration (bv-Admin), and anti-hacker software. The company has more than 5,000
customers, including Nabisco Holdings, Rockwell International, and the United Na-
tions. Founder and chairman Eric Pulaski owns 19% of the company
3.7.8 Internet Security Systems Inc.
Who is hacking into my system? Internet Security Systems (formerly ISS Group)
keeps e-commerce safe with its network security monitoring, detection, and response
software and services. The company’s SAFEsuite product line protects corporate
networks, extranets, and the Internet from misuse and security violations. Internet
Security Systems also offers its ePatrol software for remote security management.
The company also offers outsourced security management services, which include
continuous monitoring of network traffic and devices, detection of and response
to security risks, and frequent review of security policies. Products are available
individually or in suites that provide comprehensive network security.
3.7.9 Baltimore Technologies plc
Baltimore Technologies would have you balk no more at the thought of sending sensi-
tive electronic transmissions. The company makes cryptographic software and hard-
ware designed to protect digital data within a company’s electronic infrastructure,
from its MailSecure e-mail software to its UniCERT system for business networks.
Baltimore also offers consulting and systems integration services to customers, which
include ABN AMRO Bank, Bank of Ireland, and VISA. Baltimore made Internet
history in 1998 when US President Bill Clinton and Ireland Prime Minister Bertie
Ahern digitally ‘signed a communique´ using the company’s technology. However,
Baltimore Technologies went into receivership in 2002.
3.7.10 Entrust Technologies Inc.
Whom do you trust with your network security? Entrust Technologies’ security
software ensures the privacy of electronic communications and transactions across
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corporate intranets and the Internet. Its Entrust suite of tools automates the man-
agement of digital certificates (electronic passports that identify computer users) and
monitors applications such as remote access and e-mail. Entrust also issues digital
certificates through Entrust.net, offers systems integration services, and (through
its 2000 acquisition of privately held enCommerce) offers software for managing
e-business portals. Customers include Citibank, J.P. Morgan, and NASA. Canada-
based telecom giant Nortel Networks owns 32% of Entrust.
3.7.11 VeriSign Inc.
Online transmissions may soon be VeriSign-ed, sealed, and delivered. The com-
pany’s software provides digital certificates of authentication used to encrypt data
and protect access to data and transactions sent over the Internet and large networks.
VeriSign has worked with such companies as Microsoft, Visa, and American Express
to deploy electronic safeguards for online activities that include e-mail, home bank-
ing, and credit card purchases. The company also provides its certification services
and products, primarily in the US, to such companies as Bank of America and AT&
T. VeriSign is expanding internationally and is tapping a new stream of clients from
its subsidiary, Internet domain registrar Network Solutions.
3.7.12 Trend Micro Inc
Trend Micro won’t let the Web bugs bite. The company develops antivirus software
for the server systems that power computer networks and desktop PCs. Its products
protect data in file servers, e-mail servers, Internet gateways, and other systems.
Trend Micro sells its software through resellers including Ingram Micro and Tech
Data and through partnerships with manufacturers such as Cisco and Compaq.
Nearly 60% of sales are to customers outside of Japan. The company’s ipTrend
subsidiary is developing electronic transaction protection products for the Linux
operating system. The company was founded in 1988 by chairman and CEO Steve
Chang, an ex-HP engineer, after he was swindled by software pirates
3.7.13 WatchGuard Technologies Inc
WatchGuard Technologies watches businesses and guards their transactions and
communications. The company’s subscription-based LiveSecurity products and ser-
vices protect computer networks from intruders, providing threat responses, software
updates, and information alerts. The company also offers user authentication and
data encryption software for virtual private networks. Internet service providers use
the system to provide ourtsourced security services. WatchGuard targets customers
ranging from home office users and educational institutions to its core market of
small and large corporations. AT& T, PSINet, and Verio count themselves among
its clients. Half of WatchGuard’s sales come from outside the US.
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4 Encryption using Determnistic Chaos
The concepts of randomness, unpredictability, complexity and entropy form the ba-
sis of modern cryptography and a cryptosystem can be interpreted as the design of
a key-dependent bijective transformation that is unpredictable to an observer for a
given computational resource. For any cryptosystem, including a Pseudo-Random
Number Generator (PRNG), encryption algorithm or a key exchange scheme, for ex-
ample, a cryptanalyst has access to the time series of a dynamic system and knows
the PRNG function (the algorithm that is assumed to be based on some iterative
process) which is taken to be in the public domain by virtue of the Kerchhoff-
Shannon principal, i.e. the enemy knows the system. However, the time series is not
a compact subset of a trajectory (intermediate states are hidden) and the iteration
function is taken to include a ‘secret parameter’ - the ‘key’. We can think of the
sample as being ‘random’, ‘unpredictable’ and ‘complex’. What do these properties
mean mathematically and how do they relate to chaos? This paper focuses on an-
swers to this question, links these properties to chaotic dynamics and consider the
issues associated with designing pseudo-random number generators based on chaotic
systems. The theoretical backound associated with using chaos for encryption is in-
troduced with regard to randomness and complexity. A complexity and information
theortic approach is considered based on a study of the complexity and entropy
measures associated with chaotic systems. A study of pseudo-randomness is then
given which provides the foundations for the numerical methods that need to be
realed for the practical implementation of data encryption. We study cryptographic
systems using finite-state approximations to chaos or ‘pseudo-chaos’ and develop an
approach based on the concept of multi-algorithmic cryptography that exploits the
properties of pseudo-chaotic algorithms.
4.1 Randomness and Complexity
The concepts of randomness, unpredictability, complexity and entropy form the
basis of modern cryptography and a cryptosystem can be interpreted as the design
of a key-dependent bijective transformation that is unpredictable to an observer for a
given computational resource. In the first part of this paper we link these concepts to
chaotic dynamics and consider the issues associated with designing pseudo-random
number generators based on chaotic systems.
For any cryptosystem, including a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG),
encryption algorithm or a key exchange scheme, for example, a cryptanalyst has ac-
cess to the time series of a dynamic system and knows the PRNG function (the
algorithm assumed to be based on some iterative process) which is taken to be in
the public domain by virtue of the Kerchhoff-Shannon principle, i.e. the enemy
knows the system. However, the time series is not a compact subset of a trajec-
tory (intermediate states are hidden) and the iteration function is taken to include
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a ‘secret parameter’ - the ‘key’. We can think of the sample as being ‘random’,
‘unpredictable’ and ‘complex’. What do these properties mean mathematically and
how do they relate to chaos? This paper focuses on answers to this question. In
addition to probabilistic properties, we consider algorithmic complexity, i.e. the
length of the shortest algorithm capable of producing a cryptographically secure
sequence.
Intuitively, the internal complexity of a system provides its external unpre-
dictability and a sequence is called algorithmically random if its algorithmic
complexity equals the length of the sequence. An algorithmically random sequence is
computationally incompressible and contains no recognizable patterns (redun-
dancies). Clearly, a purely random system is also algorithmically random. However,
the concepts of pseudo and algorithmic randomness are different; a pseudo-random
string is generated with a compact seed, but the external observer is not able (prac-
tically) to reconstruct the generator and predict the sequence. In other words, the
string is highly compressible for authorized communicators but computationally in-
compressible for the potential adversary and, in a general sense, an algorithmically
random string can be predicted by a probabilistic machine.
Randomness or unpredictability can be ‘measured’ using such properties as algo-
rithmic complexity and/or entropy, i.e. the degree of uncertainty about the system.
Quantitatively, the Shannon entropy is in direct proportion to the algorithmic com-
plexity in ergodic systems, where statistical properties of a single sequence coincides
with that of all sequences generated by a PRNG. A randomness measure for chaos
is the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy that is, roughly speaking, a multi-resolution inte-
gration of Lyapunov exponents.
4.2 Complexity Theoretic Approach
In this paper we use a common terminology based on complexity theory [151] and,
for completeness, we provide a brief introduction to the subject.
4.2.1 Turing Machine
A Turing machine is a hypothetical device that can theoretically implement any
computer algorithm. It provides a unified framework to measure the complexity (i.e.
program length and working time) of computational problems such as generating,
transforming and matching cryptographic sequences. We denote a Turing machine
as
T = 〈S,A,Γ, F, q0〉 ,
where S is the finite state set of the control, A is the finite tape alphabet (A = {0, 1}),
Γ is a finite rule state of the form γ : S ×A → S ×A× {L,N,R}, F ⊆ S is a set of
halting accepting states and q0 ∈ S is the initial state. The state {L,N,R} includes
‘tape commands’ such as: ‘move left’ (L), ‘stay in place’ (N) and ‘move right’ (P ).
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The machine configuration T is the triplet 〈s, α, i〉 where s ∈ S is the current state,
α ∈ A∗ is the ‘tape string’ and 1 ≤ i ≤ |α| is the head position counting from
the left to the end of the tape. The machine is initialized in the following way:
(i) a string α ⊂ A∗ is loaded onto the tape; (ii) the head is seeded to the leftmost
position; (iii) the initial state q is assigned to the state variable s. At every step,
(i) the machine reads a symbol from the current cell, depending on the symbol read
and the current state, (ii) it makes a transition to a new state; (iii) it overwrites the
current cell with a new symbol; (iv) it moves the head one step left or right, or stays
in place. The machine halts when a state f ∈ F is reached.
A Turing machine is said to accept a string α if a sequence of rules γ1, . . . , γm ⊂
Γ∗ exists that puts the machine from an initial state s0 to any halting accepting
state f ∈ F . The machine rejects a string, if it halts in s /∈ F or if it never
halts. A language L over a finite alphabet A is a subset (A)?, i.e. a subset of all
finite strings over A. A machine is said to accept a language L if it accepts all the
strings α ∈ L and rejects β /∈ L. A deterministic Turing machine has single-valued
rules γ : S × A → S × A × {L,N,R}, i.e. there are no rules with the same parts
S × A. By contrast, a non-deterministic machine may have multi-valued rules. If
there exists a polynomial p (l) limiting the machines working time m (the number
of steps) that depends of the input string length l (m < p (l)), the machine is said
to run in polynomial time. The complexity class P is the set of languages accepted
by a deterministic polynomial-time machines. The complexity class NP is the set
of languages accepted by non-deterministic polynomial-time machines.
A probabilistic Turing machine is a deterministic Turing machine that can flip
a fair coin to determine its next move. A probabilistic machine is said to accept a
language L if it enters an accepting state for α ∈ L with probability p1 > 2/3 and
halts α /∈ L with probability p0 > 2/3. The complexity class BPP consists of all
languages recognized by probabilistic polynomial-time machines.
4.2.2 Algorithmic Complexity
The concept of algorithmic complexity was suggested independently by three math-
ematicians A. N. Kolmogorov, P. Solomonov and G. J. Chaitin:
Definition 1 The algorithmic complexity KM (α) of a finite string α ∈ {0, 1}n with
respect to a Turing Machine M is the length l(pi) of the smallest computer program
pi, which generates it, i.e.
KM (α) = min
pi:M(pi)=α
l(pi).
Kolmogorov showed, that there exists a universal Turing machine U , that performs
computations equivalent to pi (designed for an arbitrary machine M) and that the
changes in pi required to adopt it for U depend on M but not on α. Consequently,
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the algorithmic complexity KM with respect to any machine M is related to KU (S)
by
KU (S) ≤ KA(S) + CA, (1)
where CM is a constant, which is independent from α. Here after, we omit the
subscript U assuming that K(α) = KU (α). Unfortunately, algorithmic complexity
cannot be commuted i.e. there is no universal solution for simplifying programs
and for proving that the length is minimal. Thus, we cannot apply this definition
directly to compare the complexity of cryptographic sequences or algorithms. Nev-
ertheless the theoretical applications are very important. In particular, Kolmogorov
complexity provides a unified approach to the problem of data compressibility.
4.2.3 Compressibility and Algorithmic Randomness
A string αn of length n is said to be c-incompressible ifK(αn) ≥ n−c. Incompressible
strings (where c = 0 or else is relatively small) are called algorithmically random.
4.3 Symbolic Complexity
For an infinite string α∞ or a generator, it is interesting to consider the symbolic
complexity given by the limit
c(α∞) = lim
n→∞
K(αn)
n
. (2)
From (1) it follows that the symbolic complexity c(α∞) is invariant with respect to
the choice of Turing machine. If a string has a finite Kolmogorov complexity (e. g.
a pseudo-random string), its symbolic complexity tends to 0. A truly random string
has c = 1 because its length equals the length of the shortest program. Clearly, c > 0
if and only if the generator has infinite complexity. In chaotic systems, this happens
if the complexity of the initial conditions is infinitely large or a certain amount of
randomness is introduced into the system from the environment.
4.4 Information Theoretic Approach
In ideal cryptosystems, the distribution of the ciphertext cannot be differentiated
from uniform noise and thus provides no useful information for an adversary.
4.4.1 True Randomness
We define a Probability Distribution Function (PDF) as a function from strings
L = {αj} to nonnegative real numbers, i.e. Pr : L → [0, 1] such that
∑
α∈L
Pr (α) = 1.
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Definition 2 A string α is called truly (purely) random (or unpredictable) if, for
any substrings, βn, γn ∈ α, 0 > n > length(α)
Pr(βn) = Pr(γn)
.
A truly random string cannot be predicted, i.e. for any symbol si ∈ α, the con-
ditional probability Pr(si|si−1, si−2, . . .) = Pr(si). In other words, an arbitrary large
amount of knowledge about the previous states does not increase the probability of
the successful prediction of the next state. An infinite and truly random string has
a delta autocorrelation function and an infinite and uniform power spectrum (white
noise).
4.4.2 Shannon Entropy
The Shannon entropy measures the amount of information required to determine
precisely the system state among all possible states [152]. In cryptography, the
entropy is related to the unpredictability of an encryption system for an adversary.
The entropy of a string αn of length n is defined as
Hn = −
∑
α∈An
Pr (αn) log|A| Pr (αn), (3)
where Pr : An → [0, 1] is the PDF of αn on the set of nth symbol strings. The
maximum of Hn is achieved when Pr (αn) is a uniform distribution and the string
is truly random. The conditional entropy hn denotes the average amount of infor-
mation supplied with each (n + 1)th symbol provided the previous n symbols are
known:
hn = hn+1|n =
{
Hn+1 −Hn, n ≥ 1
H1, n = 1
In other words, hn quantifies the average uncertainty when predicting the next sym-
bol. As soon as knowledge about a previous state cannot increase the uncertainty,
the function Hn is non decreasing and hn+1 ≤ hn. For a stationary information
source there exists a limit
hSh = lim
n→∞hn = limn→∞
Hn
n
, (4)
called the entropy of information source (cryptographic system). Further, if α is
a kth order Markov sequence, then hn = hSh for all n ≥ k. A Markov sequence
corresponds to a deterministic process, in which the next state depends on the
previous k states, i.e. for si ∈ α
Pr(si|si−1, si−2, . . .) = Pr(si|si−1, si−2, . . . , si−k)
Examples of Markov processes can be found in most cryptographic systems such as
PRNG’s and block ciphers.
4 ENCRYPTION USING DETERMNISTIC CHAOS 166
4.4.3 Entropy-Complexity Relationship
Intuitively, complexity and the entropy are related in terms of ‘cause and effect’:
the more complex the internal organization of a system, the more unpredictable its
behavior is and the higher the entropy becomes. The complexity is the size of the
‘internal program’ that generates a state sequence (string), whereas the entropy is
computed from the probability distribution of this sequence. Formally, the following
result can be applied for stationary ergodic sources [153]:
lim
n→∞
〈Kn〉
Hn
=
1
ln 2
, (5)
where
〈Kn〉 =
∑
αn∈{0,1}n
Pr(αn)K(αn)
Hence, the average complexity 〈Kn〉 is asymptotically proportional (with the coeffi-
cient ln 2) to the entropy as n increases.
4.5 Entropy and Complexity
4.5.1 Partitioning and Symbolic Dynamics
Consider a chaotic system S = 〈X, f〉 with an f -invariant measure µ. Any set of m
disjoint regions that covers the state space X is a partition denoted by
β = {X1, X2, ..., Xm} :
i=m⋃
i=1
Xi = X, Xi ∩Xj = ∅, ∀i 6= j.
A unique symbol si ∈ A is assigned to every region Xi. The process of partitioning
the state space and assigning symbols to every region from the partition resulting
in macroscopic dynamics is called symbolic dynamics [154]. A function σ defines
partitions and their symbolic names as follows:
σ (x) = {si ∈ A|x ∈ Xi}.
A trajectory φ(x0) passing across the subsets Xi produces a symbolic trajectory
α(x0).
4.5.2 Kolmogorov-Sinai Entropy
The Lyapunov exponents measure how fast we lose the capability to predict the be-
havior of a chaotic system in time. The disadvantage is that this measure does not
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consider the resolution under which the system is observed, unlike the Kolmogorov-
Sinai entropy [153]. Let the partition β = {X1, X2, ..., Xm} be the observer’s res-
olution. Looking at the system state x, the observer can only determine the fact
that x ∈ Xi and reconstruct the symbolic trajectory αn = {sm1 , sm2 , . . . , smn} cor-
responding to the regions visited. The entropy of a trajectory αn with respect to
partition β is given by
Hβn = −
∑
αn
Pr (αn) log|A| Pr (αn),
where Pr (αn) is the probability of occurrence of the substring αn. The conditional
entropy of the (n+1)th symbol provided the previous n symbols are known is defined
as
hβn = h
β
n+1|n =
{
Hβn+1 −Hβn , n ≥ 1
Hβ1 , n = 1
The entropy for a partition β is given by
hβ = lim
n→∞h
β
n = limn→∞
1
n
Hβn .
The Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy of a chaotic system is the supremum over all possible
partitions
hKS = sup
β
hβ. (6)
The KS entropy equals zero for regular systems, is finite and positive for determin-
istic chaos and infinite for a truely random process. It is related to the Lyapunov
exponents by hKS =
∑
1≤d≤D
λd and proportional to the time horizon T on which the
system is predictable.
4.5.3 Complexity of a Trajectory
The complexity of a trajectory at a point x0 with respect to a finite open coverage
β is defined as
Cβ(x0) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
min
αn∈[ψ(x)]n
K(αn),
where [ψ(x)]n =
{
αn|f j(x0) ∈ Xj
}
and K(αn) is the algorithmic complexity of α.
The complexity of the trajectory of a point x0 is
C(x0) = sup
β
Cβ(x0).
Definition 3 (algorithmically random trajectory, [155], [156]) The trajectory of a
point x0 is called algorithmically random if its complexity is positive, i.e. c(x0) > 0.
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The Brudno-White theorem defines the relationship between the KS entropy and
complexity:
Theorem 1 (complexity of the trajectory, [155], [156]) The symbolic trajectories
of almost all x ∈ X (with respect to the invariant measure µ) are algorithmically
random and their complexity is given by
c(x) =
hKS
ln 2
, (7)
Though it is practically impossible to quantify the algorithmic complexity of a string,
most strings over a finite alphabet produced by a chaotic system and are algorith-
mically random.
4.6 Pseudo-Randomness
4.6.1 Probabilistic Ensembles
Let Pri(α) be a probability distribution function of strings {0, 1}l(i), where l(i) is
a positive polynomial. We write Π = {Pri}i∈I for an ensemble of distributions
indexed by I ⊂ N. The ensemble of the uniform distributions Π0 = {Pr0,i}i∈N
for all i ∈ N and α, β ∈ {0, 1}i satisfies Pr0,i(α) = Pr0,i(β). To measure the ‘de-
gree of randomness’ of a string, its probability ensemble should be compared with
that of the uniform distributions. Having limited resources, computers can process
only a subset of distributions. Thus, we introduce the concept of polynomial in-
distinguishability. Roughly speaking, two probabilistic ensembles are polynomially
indistinguishable if they assign ‘about the same’ mass to the same subsets of strings,
efficiently recognized by a Turing machine:
Definition 4 (polynomial indistinguishability, [157], [158], [159]) Let Π1 = {Pr1,i}i∈I
and Π2 = {Pr2,i}i∈I be two probability ensembles each indexed by I. Let T be a prob-
abilistic polynomial-time Turing machine called a test. The test gets two inputs: an
index i and a string α. Let PrT1 (i) be the probability that, on input index i and a
string α chosen according to the distribution Pr1,i, the test T outputs 1. Similarly,
PrT2 (i) denotes the probability that, on input index i and a string α chosen according
to the distribution Pr2,i, the test T outputs 1. We say that Π1 and Π2 are indis-
tinguishable with polynomial p(i) if for all probabilistic polynomial-time tests T and
sufficiently large i ∈ N ∣∣PrT1 (i)− PrT2 (i)∣∣ < 1p(i) .
Definition 5 (pseudo-random probability ensemble, [157], [158], [159]) The proba-
bility ensemble Π = {Pri}i∈I is said to be pseudo-random if, for any positive poly-
nomial p(i), the ensemble Π is indistinguishable from p(i) with uniform ensemble
Π0 = {Pr0,i}i∈I .
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Definition 6 (unpredictable probability ensemble, [157], [158], [159]) Let Π = {Pr1,i}i∈I
be a probabilistic ensemble indexed by I. Let T be a probabilistic ensemble polynomial-
time Turing machine that on input (index i and a string α), outputs a single bit,
called the guess. Let bit (α, r) denote the rth bit of the sequence α and pref (α, r) de-
note the prefix of r bits of the string α, i.e. pref (α, r) = bit(α, 1) bit(α, 2) . . . bit(α, r).
We say that the machine T predicts the next bit of Π, if for some polynomial p(i)
and infinitely many i’s,
Pr (M (i, pref(α, r)) = bit(α, r + 1)) ≥ 1
2
+
1
p(i)
,
where the probability space is that of the string α chosen according to Pr1,i and the
integer r is chosen at random with uniform distribution in {0, 1, . . . , l (α)− 1}. We
say that Π is unpredictable if there exists no probabilistic polynomial time machine
T which predicts the next bit of Π.
Theorem 2 [158], [159], [160] The probability ensemble Π is pseudo-random if and
only if Π is unpredictable.
4.6.2 One-Way Functions
One-way functions are functions that are easy to evaluate (β = f(α)), but hard
(on average) to invert (α = f−1(β)) and lie at the heart of modern cryptography, in
particular, their use in public-key schemes. The computational gap between forward
and inverse evaluation quantifies the efficiency of the one-way transformation. A
formal definition of a one-way function is given in terms of complexity theory:
Definition 7 (one-way function [160], [158], [159]) A function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗
is called one way if it satisfies the following: (i) there is a deterministic polynomial-
time Turing machine that on input α returns f(α); (ii) for any probabilistic polynomial-
time Turing machine M , any positive polynomial p(n) and sufficiently large n
Pr(M(f(α), 1n) ∈ f−1(α)) < 1
p(n)
,
where the probability is taken over all possible choices of α ∈ {0, 1}n and the internal
tosses of M conform to a uniform probability distribution. The role of 1n is to allow
machine M to run in a time polynomial over the length of the pre-image it is supposed
to find.
A stronger notion of unpredictability is that of a hard-core predicate. A polynomial-
time computable predicate b is called a hard-core of a function f if all algorithms,
given f(α), can guess b(α) only with a probable success which is negligibly better
than a half.
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Definition 8 (hard-core predicate, [160], [158], [159]) Let f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and
f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}. The predicate b is said to be hard-core of the function f , if:
(i) there is a deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine that on input α returns
b(α); (ii) there is no probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine M such that for
any positive polynomial p(n) and sufficiently large n
Pr(M(f(α), 1n) = b(α))) <
1
2
+
1
p(n)
,
where the probability is taken over all possible choices of α ∈ {0, 1}n and the internal
tosses of M conform to a uniform probability distribution.
Theorem 3 (existence of a one-way function with a hard-core predicate, [157],
[158]) If there exists a one-way function, then there exists a one-way function with
a hard-core predicate.
4.6.3 Pseudo Random Number Generators
In general, a PRNG is an efficient (deterministic) algorithm that on input of a short
seed (initial condition), outputs a typically much longer sequence that is computa-
tionally indistinguishable from a uniformly chosen string.
Definition 9 (pseudo-random generator, [160], [158]) Let l : N → N satisfy l(n) >
n for all n ∈ N. A pseudo-random generator, with a stretch function l(n), is a
deterministic polynomial time algorithm G satisfying the following:
1. For every α ∈ {0, 1}∗ it holds that |G (α)| = l (|α|)
2. The probabilistic ensembles Π = G (Prn0 ) and Π
p(n)
0 are computationally undis-
tinguishable.
Theorem 4 (construction of a pseudo-random generator, [157], [158]) Let f be a
one-way 1 : 1 function and b be a hard-core predicate of f . Then
G(α) = b(α)b(f(α)) . . . b(f l(|α|)−1(α))
is a pseudo-random generator with a stretch function l.
Consequently, a pseudo-random generator can be constructed from any one-way
length-preserving function (rather then merely one-way permutations). On the other
hand, the existence of a one-way function is a necessary condition to the existence
of the pseudo-random generator, that is
Theorem 5 (existence of pseudo-random generators, [158]) Pseudo-random gener-
ators exist if and only if one-way functions exists.
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Figure 13: A synergy between a chaotic system (top: ≈ is a rounding function, xˆn
is the output) and a PRNG (bottom: b is a hard-core predicate, yn is the output).
Assuming the existence of one-way 1:1 functions, there can exist probability dis-
tributions that are non-uniform and are not even statistically close to being uniform
but are nevertheless computationally indistinguishable from a uniform distribution
[159]. The definition of a pseudo-random generator given above cannot be applied
directly since there is no practical way to prove or check rigourously indistinguisha-
bility.
Practical cryptography is based on passing known statistical tests [167], which
ensure the pseudo-random property of a generator. Moreover, it is considered that
pseudo-random sequences can be used instead of truly random sequences in most
cryptographic applications. Although there is a synergy between pseudo-random
generators and chaotic systems there is a also fundamental and important difference
which is that the iterated function of a chaotic system is not required to be one-
way. Chaos theory pays no attention to the algorithmic complexity of f and f−1,
which is one of the main problems associated with the applications of chaos theory
to cryptography. However, based on the study provided, we now present the design
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methods and example algorithms required to implement chaos to encrypt data.
4.7 Applications of Chaos for Digital Cryptography
From a theoretical point of view, chaotic systems produce infinite random strings
that are asymptotically uncorrelated. This property relates to genuine chaotic sys-
tems with an infinite number of states. For applications to digital cryptography, a
finite-state systems approach is required which puts certain constraints on the de-
sign of the algorithm(s). In this paper, we study these constraints and present the
principal criteria required to design meta-encryption engines using pseudo-chaotic
algorithms.
Figure 14: Properties of chaotic and pseudo-chaotic systems.
The notion of pseudo-chaos introduced in [168], for example, involves a nu-
merical approximation of chaos. The fundamental differences between chaos and
pseudo-chaos include the following: (i) The state variable has a finite length (i.e.
stores the state with finite precision) and the system has a finite number of states;
(ii) the iterated function is evaluated with approximation methods where the result
is rounded (or truncated) to a finite precision; (ii) the system may be observed during
a finite period of time. The basic problem is that rounding is applied during itera-
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tion and the error accumulation causes the original and the approximated processes
to diverge. Thus, in general, pseudo-chaos is a poor approximation of chaos because
the approximated model does not converge to the original model, and, formally,
may exhibit non-chaotic properties including trajectories that eventually become
periodic (i.e. contain patterns) and cycles that appear as soon as two states are
rounded to the same approximate value. Consequently, the Lyapunov exponent and
the Kolmogorov-Sinai information entropy discussed earlier may approach 0. For
this reason, it is not possible to directly transform continuous chaotic generators to
numerically based generators that require numerical approximations to be made as
as summarized in Figure 14. Thus, to use chaos theory for applications in cryptog-
raphy, a study must be undertaken of pseudo-chaotic systems. This study forms the
remit of this paper which is concerned with the question of what are the minimal,
typical and maximal periods of the orbits (i.e. string lengths) generated by a pseudo
chaotic system? Such questions are important in most cryptographic systems. In
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 15: Examples of orbits of a pseudo-chaotic system. (a) Dangerously short
orbits (unsuitable for cryptography); (b) A single orbit (the best choice for cryptog-
raphy); (c) Multiple orbits with the same length (also suitable for encryption).
general, a pseudo-chaotic system produces orbits with different lengths (sometimes
called random-length orbits) as illustrated in Figure 15a. Of course, such patterns
constitute serious vulnerability as a system may have weak plaintexts and weak keys
resulting in recognizable ciphertexts.
If a system has a stable attractor for all initial conditions and parameters, and all
orbits have (almost) the same length (Figure 15c), there are more chances to develop
a secure encryption scheme. Nevertheless, multiple orbits reduce the search space
required for cryptanalysis. An ideal cryptosystem has a single orbit passing through
the whole state space (Figure 15b). Another important step in the evaluation of a
pseudo-chaotic system is to estimate the Lyapunov exponent of a typical orbit for
a time not exceeding its period. However, the analysis of periodic orbits depends
critically on the order in which the orbits are considered [169]. Two ordering criteria
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are considered in the literature, both corresponding to a Lebesgue measure: ordering
according to the system size and ordering according to a minimal period or within
a period on a lexicographical basis.
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Figure 16: A Laypunov exponent of a chaotic (a) and pseudo-chaotic (b) system
A comparison between the average Lyapunov curve of a chaotic system and an
analogous pseudo-chaotic system is given in Figure 16. If the pseudo-chaotic system
has a finite precision σ, then the exponential divergence given by
enλ =
|fn (x0 + ε)− fn (x0)|
ε
, n→∞, ε→ 0, (8)
will eventually be limited by ε = σ. Usually the fraction (8) grows exponentially
during the first few iterations and then increases linearly until it finally levels off at
a certain finite value.
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4.8 Floating-point Approximations
Floating-point and fixed point arithmetic are the most straightforward solutions
for approximating a continuous system on a finite state machine [170]. Both ap-
proaches imply that the state of a continuous system is stored in a program variable
with a finite resolution. A state variable x can be written as a binary fraction
bmbm−1 . . . b1 . a1a2 . . . as, where ai, bj are bits, bmbm−1 . . . b1 denotes the integer
part and a1a2 . . . as is the fractional part of x. Under a finite resolution, instead of
xn+1 = f (x), we write
xn+1 = roundk (f (xn)) ,
where k ≤ s and roundk (x) is a rounding function defined as
roundk (x) =
bmbm−1 . . . b1 . a1a2 . . . ak−1 (ak + ak+1) .
The iterative rounding is accumulative and results in surprisingly different behav-
ior of pseudo-chaos compared with the continuum counterpart. Figure 17 shows how
fast the original and approximated trajectories diverge. For cryptographic applica-
tions, the rounding off function exposes another danger. Rounding or truncating the
state (e.g. to zero values) can lead to the process dropping out of the chaotic attrac-
tor and the system state typically remaining at a certain constant value or infinity.
Thus, it is necessary to exclude some forbidden initial conditions and parameters
which yield short orbits or patterns of behavior after a small number of iterations.
Figure 18 is a plot of the average cycle length verses floating-point precision and
shows that high precision does not guarantee a sufficiently long trajectory.
Another problem associated with the application of pseudo-chaos to encryption
is the sensitivity to floating-point processor implementations. Diversified mathe-
matical algorithms or internal precisions in intermediate calculations can lead to a
situation where the same encryption application code can generate different cryp-
tographic sequences leading to an incompatibility between software environments.
A chaos-based string with two different seeds produces two different sequence with
probability 1. This is true for chaotic systems with an infinite state space, where the
probability Pr
(
f(xn) = f(x′n)
) → 0 with xn 6= x′n (despite of the fact that f−1 is
multi-valued). In finite-state approximations, the probability of mapping two points
into one is much higher. Furthermore, this can occur at each iteration so that a
significant number of trajectories may have identical end routes.
In spite of these shortcomings, a number of investigators have explored the ap-
plications of continuous chaos to digital cryptography and in the following sections,
an overview of encryption schemes based on a floating-point approximation to chaos
is given.
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Figure 17: Trajectories of a continuous-state chaotic system (9) and its 64-bit
floating-point approximation. The first curve is obtained by means of the ana-
lytical solution (10). The rounding off error is amplified at each iteration and the
trajectories diverge exponentially.
4.9 Partitioning the State Space
Floating-point cryptographic systems require a mapping from the plaintext alphabet
{0, 1}m (e.g. 8 bit symbols) to the state space X (e.g. 64 bit floating-point numbers)
and, sometimes, from the state space to the ciphertext alphabet. A partition can
be defined by a partitioning function σ : X → {0, 1}m as with symbolic dynamics.
For example, a simple function for two subsets can be designed by taking the last
significant bit:
σ(bmbm−1 . . . b1 . a1a2 . . . as) = as.
If a floating-point system is a pseudo-random generator, the function σ must be
irreversible as with a hard-core predicate. This can be archived with an equiprobable
mapping where partitions are selected in such a way that each symbol occurs with
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Figure 18: The average and the minimal cycle length of the logistic system (9) verses
floating-point precision obtained from 10 samples of the logistic system.
the same probability. However, it is not obligatory to cover all the state space or
assign symbols to all partitions. On the contrary, we can change the statistical
properties of the resulting symbolic trajectory by assigning symbols in a particular
way. For example, Figure 21 shows a discrete probability distribution of state points
in the attractor of the logistic system. By choosing regions with almost the same
probability mass, we obtain better statistics in the output, i.e. avoid any statistical
bias associated with a cipher. The number of subsets can be increased, for example,
up to 4, 8, 16 etc. In this case the generator will produce more pseudo-random
bits per iteration (m = 2, 3, 4). However, increasing m reduces the cryptographic
strength of the generator since it becomes easier to invert σ.
4.10 Example Chaotic Maps
We consider some example chaotic maps which illustrate the principles of using
pseudo-chaos for encrypting data.
4.10.1 Logistic Map
In 1976, Mitchell Feigenbaum studied the complex behavior of the so-called logistic
map given by
xn+1 = 4rxn (1− xn) , (9)
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where x ∈ (0, 1) and r ∈ (0, 1). For any long sequence of N numbers generated from
the seed x0 we can calculate the Lyapunov exponent given by
λ (x0) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log |r (1− 2xn)|.
For example, the numerical estimation for r = 0.9 and N = 4000 is λ (0.5) ≈ 0.7095.
Figure 19: Bifurcation of the logistic map. The most ‘unpredictable’ behavior occurs
when r → 1.
With certain values of the parameter r, the generator delivers a sequence, which
appears pseudo-random. The Freigenbaum diagram (Figure 19) shows the values of
xn on the attractor for each value of the parameter r. As r increases, the number
of points in the attractor increases from 1 to 2, 4, 8 and hence to infinity. In this
area (r → 1) it may be considered difficult to estimate the final state of the system
(without performing n iterations) given an initial conditions x0, or vice-versa - to
recover x0 (which can be a key or a plaintext) from xn. This complexity is regarded
as a fundamental advantage in using continuous chaos for cryptography. However,
for the boundary value of the control parameter r = 1 the analytical solution [171],
[172] is:
xn = sin2 (2n arcsin
√
x0) . (10)
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Figure 20: Attractor points corresponding to different values of the parameter r in
the Matthews map.
When n = 1 we have the initial equation (9). Hence, the state xn can be computed
directly from x0 without performing n iterations.
Bianco et al. [173] used the logistic map (9) to generate a sequence of floating
point numbers which are then converted into a binary sequence. The binary sequence
is XOR-ed with the plaintext, as in a one-time pad cipher where the parameter r
together with the initial condition x0 form a secret key. The conversion from floating
point numbers to binary values is done by choosing two disjoint interval ranges
representing 0 and 1. The ranges are selected in such a way, that the probabilities
of occurrence of 0 and 1 are equal (as illustrated in Figure 21). Note, that an
equiprobable mapping does not ensure a uniform distribution. Though the numbers
of zeros and ones are equal, the order is not necessarily random.
It has been pointed out by Wheeler [174] and Jackson [175] that computer imple-
mentations of chaotic systems yield surprisingly different behavior, i.e. it produces
very short cycles and trivial patterns (a numeric example in this paper being given
in Figure 18).
4.10.2 Matthews Map
Matthews [176] generalizes the logistic map with cryptographic constraints and de-
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Figure 21: The Probability Density Function of a state sequence produced by the
logistic system with an incomplete partition.
velops a new map to generate a sequence of pseudo-random numbers based on the
iteration
xn+1 = (r + 1)
(
1
r
+ 1
)r
xn (1− xn)r , r ∈ (1, 4) .
The Matthews system exhibits chaotic behavior for parameter values within an ex-
tended range (Figure 20) thereby stretching the key space. However, no robust cryp-
tographic system has been created using this map because of the general floating-
point issues discussed previously.
4.10.3 Other Examples of Chaotic Maps
Gallagher et el. [177] developed a chaotic stream cipher based on the transformation
f (x) =
(
a+
1
x
)x
a
, x ∈ (0, 10) , a ∈ [0.29, 0.40] .
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Both the initial condition x0 and the parameter a represent the key. After n0 = 200
iterations, the system encrypts the plaintext byte p1 into the ciphertext float c1 =
fn0+n1 (x0), i.e. the chaotic map is applied p1 ∈ [0, 255] times. Subsequent plaintexts
are encrypted using the same trajectory. Clearly, the disadvantages of such an
encryption scheme are: (i) the data expansion (the floating-point representation
of ci is considerably larger that the source byte pi); (ii) unstable cycles incident
to floating-point chaos generators. Kotulski [178] proposes a two dimensional map
matching the reflection law of a geometric square and defines conditions under which
the system is chaotic and mixing. In addition to a range of specific maps suggested
by a wealth of authors, there are, in principle, an unlimited number of iteration
functions available or that can be invented to generate cryptographic sequences
where the nonlinear transformation can be more or less complex, e.g.
rx
[
1− tan
(
1
2
x
)]
or rx [1− log (1 + x)]
Although each system has a particular state distribution in the phase space, qual-
itatively, its behavior is similar to a basic chaotic system such a logistic map. To
increase unpredictability (i.e. the number of states, nonlinearity, complexity) high-
order multi-dimensional chaotic system can be used [179]. However, to date, no
known systems have been implemented as a working encryption algorithm. This
is principally due to the relatively complex numerical integration schemes that are
required and the non-uniform distribution of state variables. However, by consider-
ing a number of randomly selected pseudo-chaotic algorithms (all of which meet the
appropriate design criteria) that operate on randomly selected plaintext blocks, it
is possible to produce a multi-algorithmic approach to data encryption which is the
principal concept presented in this paper.
4.10.4 Pseudo-Chaos and Conventional Cryptosystems
Existing pseudo-random generators can be viewed as pseudo-chaotic systems. For
example, consider the Blum-Blum-Shub system [180] given by the iterated function
xn+1 = x2n mod M where M = pq, where p, q are two distinct prime numbers each
congruent to 3 modulo 4. The output bit bn is obtained from a predicate σ(xn), which
is the last significant bit of xn. Besides the sensitivity to the initial condition and
the topological transitivity, a pseudo-random generator has to be computationally
unpredictable. The last property is ensured by a one-way iterated function and a
hard-core predicate. A one-way transformation is based on a certain mathematical
problem, which is considered unsolved. For example, the Blum-Blum-Shub function
works under the assumption that integer factorization is intractable. Chaos theory
is not focused on the algorithmic complexity of the iterated function, whereas in
cryptography the complexity is the key issue, i.e. security.
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4.10.5 Symmetric Block Ciphers
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Figure 22: A typical block cipher is a combination of several pseudo-chaotic systems
All classical iterative block ciphers, at least with regard to our notation, are
pseudo-chaotic or combinations of several pseudo-chaotic systems. As an example,
consider the Rijndael algorithm which form the basis for the Advanced Encryption
Standard [181]. The system state x is a two-dimensional array of bits. The plain-
text is assigned to the initial conditions x0 and, after a fixed number of iterations
(n = 10 . . . 14), the ciphertext is obtained from the final state xn. The encryption
transformation is a combination of several pseudo-chaotic maps: (i) the substitution
phase is a composition of multiplicative inverse and affine transformations; (ii) the
mixing phase includes cycle shifts and column multiplication over a finite field; (iii)
the round key is obtained from another pseudo-chaotic system. If we consider the
substitution and mixing phases as a single iterated function, the encryption scheme
will represent two linked pseudo-chaotic systems (Figure 22).
4.10.6 Multi-Algorithmic Generators
Protopopescu [182] proposes an encryption scheme based on multiple iterated func-
tions: m different chaotic maps are initialized using a secret key. If the maps depend
on parameters, these too are determined by the key. The maps are iterated using
floating point arithmetic and m bytes are extracted from their floating point repre-
sentations, one byte from each map. These m numbers are then combined using an
XOR operation. The process is repeated to create a one time pad which is finally
XOR-ed with the plaintext. In this paper, we extend the Protopopescu scheme to
include a multi-algorithmic approach based on the following: (i) chaotic systems
can be connected to each other (i.e. the state of each system influences the states
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of all other systems) to increase the average orbit length and form a single chaotic
system with a large state space and more stable orbits; (ii) the set of chaotic systems
(iterated functions) can be different for each encryption session. This can be imple-
mented by supplying an iterated function set with the key; (iii) the output bit can
be generated in each qth iteration to increase the independence of bits; (iv) chaotic
systems can be permuted in a complex manner, in particular, the order in which
they are utilized or ‘turned on’ by a key. We can define this extended cryptographic
system as 
x1n+1 = f1(x
2
n, k
1), b1j = σ1(x
1
qj)
x2n+1 = f2(x
2
n, k
2), b2j = σ2(x
2
qj)
· · · · · ·
xmn+1 = fm(x
m
n , k
m), bmj = σm(x
m
qj)
bj = b1j ⊕ b2j ⊕ . . .⊕ bmj ,
where f1, f2, . . . , fm are iterated functions of the session set, 〈x10, k1, x20, k2, . . . , xm0 , km〉
are initial conditions, b1j , b
2
j , . . . b
m
j are the internal state bits in the (n = qj)
th mo-
ment of time, bj is the generator output and where the mixing component providing
property (i) is given by 
x1n = mix1(x
1
n, x
2
n, . . . , x
m
n )
x2n = mix2(x
1
n, x
2
n, . . . , x
m
n )
· · ·
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n )
A demonstration encryption system - Crysptic - based on multiple chaotic systems
with extended properties (i)-(iv) is available from [183]. The system solves the prob-
lems relating to the floating-point arithmetic to provide (m−1) redundant systems.
In practice, an encryption engine can be based on any number of algorithms, each
algorithm having been ‘designed’ with respect to the required (maximum entropy)
performance conditions through implementation of appropriate conditional parame-
ters T and ∆± where T is the threshold defining the partition between bits as shown
in Figure 21 and ∆± defines the extent of each partition. The basic steps are as
follows:
Step 1: Invent a (non-linear) function f and apply the iteration xn+1 = f(xn, p1, p2, ...)
Step 2: Normalise the output of the iteration so that x∞ = 1.
Step 3: Graph the output xn and adjust parameters p1, p2, ... until the output
‘looks’ chaotic.
Step 4: Graph the histogram of the output and observe if there is a significant
region of the histogram over which it is ‘flat’.
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Step 5: Set the values of the thresholds T and ∆± based on ‘observations’ made in
Step 4.
Analysing of the iteration using a Feigenbaum diagram can also be undertaken
but this can be computationally intensive and each function can be categorised in
terms of parameters such as the Lyapunov Dimension and information entropy, for
example. It should be noted that many such inventions fail to be of practical value
because their statistics may not be suitable (e.g. the histogram may not be flat
enough or is flat only over a very limited portion of the histogram), chaoticity may
not be guaranteed for all values of the seed x0 between 0 and 1 and the numerical
performance of the algorithm may be poor. The aim is to obtain an iteration that
is numerically relatively trivial to compute, provides an output that has a broad
statistical distribution and is valid for all floating point values of x0 between 0 and
1.
The functions used for the demo system available at [183] are given in the follow-
ing table where the values of T , ∆+ and ∆− apply to the normalised output stream
generated by each function.
Function f(x) r T ∆+ ∆−
rx(1− tan(x/2)) 3.3725 0.5 0.3 0.3
rx[1− x(1 + x2)] 3.17 0.5 0.25 0.35
rx[1− x log(1 + x)] 2.816 0.6 0.3 0.2
r(1− | 2x− 1 |1.456) 0.9999 0.5 0.3 0.3
| sin(pirx1.09778) | 0.9990 0.6 0.25 0.25
The functions given in the table above produce outputs that have a relatively broad
and smooth histogram which can be made flat by application of the values of T and
∆± as illustrated in Figure 21 Some functions, however, produce poor characteristic
in this respect. For example, the function
f(x) = r | 1− tan(sinx) |, r = 1.5
has a highly irregular histogram which is not suitable in terms of applying values of
T and ∆± and, as such, is not an appropriate IFS for this application.
4.11 Systems Implementation - Crypstic
In conventional encryption systems, it is typical to provide a Graphical User Interface
(GUI) with fields for inputting the plaintext and outputting the ciphertext where
the name of the output (including file extension) is supplied by the user. Crypstic
[183] outputs the ciphertext by overwriting the input file. This allows the file name,
including the extension, to be used to ‘seed’ the encryption engine and thus requires
that the name of the file remains unchanged in order to decrypt. The seed is used
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to initiate the session key. The file name is converted to an ASCII 7-bit decimal
integer stream which is then concatenated and the resulting decimal integer used to
seed a hash function whose output is of the form (d, d, f, f, f) where d is a decimal
integer and f is a 32-bit precision floating point number between 0 and 1.
The executable file is camouflaged as a .dll file which is embedded in a folder
containing many such .dll files. The reason for this is that the structure a .dll file is
close to that of a .exe file. Nevertheless, this requires that the source code must be
written in such a way that all references to its application are void. This includes
all references to the nature of the data processing involved including words such
as Encrypt and Decrypt (strings that are replaced by E and D respectively in a
GUI), so that the compiled file, although camouflaged as a .dll file, is forensically
inert to attacks undertaken with systems such a WinHEX [184]. This must include
the development of a run time help facility. Clearly, such criteria are at odds with
the ‘conventional wisdom’ associated with the development of applications but the
purpose of this approach is to develop a forensically inert executable file that is
obfuscated by the environment in which it is placed. This is based on the forensically
inert approach to software engineering.
4.11.1 Procedure
The approach to loading the application to encrypt/decrypt a file is based on re-
naming the .dll file to an .exe file with a given name as well as the correct extension.
Simply renaming a .dll file in this way can lead to a possible breach of security by a
potential attacker using a key logging system [185]. In order to avoid such an attack,
Crypstic uses an approach in which the name of the .dll file can be renamed to a .exe
file by using a ‘deletion dominant’ procedure. For example, suppose the application
is called enigma.exe, then by generating a .dll file called engine gmax index.dll, re-
naming can be accomplished by deleting (in the order given) lld. followed by dni x
followed by en followed by g and then inserting a . between ae and including e after
ex. A further application is required such that upon closing the application, the .exe
file is renamed back to its original .dll form. This includes ensuring that the time
and date stamps associated with the file are not updated.
The procedure described above is an attampt to obfuscate the use of passwords
which are increasingly open to attack especially with regard to password protected
USB memory sticks. Many manufacturers break all the rules when attempting to
implement security. Checking the password and unlocking the stick are two separate
processes, both initiated from the PC. Thus, from the point of view of the stick, they
are both separate processes, but this is a major flaw. The best USB sticks handle
all the encryption to and from the flash memory themselves and do not keep a
password at all. The fact that the data cannot be decrypted without it makes it
safe. Many USB sticks store a password inside the flash-controller and check it
against a password sent by the PC before unlocking the flash-memory. This way,
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the password cannot be found by reading out the flash-chip manually. Other USB
sticks do the same but store the password on flash. Some sticks even store the
password on flash and let the PC do the validation.
In addition to the procedures associated with password validation, the concept
of password protection is becoming increasingly redundant. For example, Elcomsoft
Limited recently filed a US patent for a password cracking technique that relies on
the parallel processing capabilities of modern graphics processors. The technique
increases the speed of password cracking by a factor of 25 using a GeForce 8800
Ultra graphics card from Nvidia. ‘Cracking times can be reduced from days or hours
to minutes in some instances and there are plans to introduce the technique into
password cracking products’ (http://techreport.com/discussions.x/13460).
4.11.2 Protocol
Crypstic is a symmetric encryption system that relies on the user working with a
USB memory stick and maintaining a protocol that is consistent with the use of a
conventional set of keys, typically located on a key ring. The simplest use of Crystic
is for a single user to be issued with a Crypstic which incorporates an encryption
engine that is unique (through the utilisation of a unique set of algorithms). The user
can then use the Crypstic to encrypt/decrypt files and/or folders (after application
of a compression algorithm such as pkzip, for example) on a PC before closure
of a session. In this way, the user maintains a secure environment using a unique
encryption engine with a ‘key’ that includes a covert access route. If any crypstic, by
any party, is lost, then a new pair of sticks are issued with new encryption engines
unique to both parties. In addition to a two-party user system, crypstics can be
issued to groups of users in a way that provides an appropriate access hierarchy as
required.
4.12 Cryptography and Chaos
There is a fundamental relationship between cryptography and chaos. In both cases,
the object of study is a dynamic system that performs an iterative nonlinear trans-
formation of information in an apparently unpredictable but deterministic manner.
In terms of sensitivity to initial conditions together with the mixing properties of
chaotic systems, with appropriate entropy conscious post-processing, it is possible
to ensure cryptographic confusion and diffusion. However, there are a number of
conceptual differences between chaos theory and cryptography: (i) chaos theory is
often concerned with the study of dynamical systems defined on an infinite state
space whereas cryptography relies on a finite-state machine and all chaos models
implemented on a computer are approximations, i. e. digital computers can only
generate pseudo-chaos; (ii) chaos theory typically studies the asymptotic behaviour
of a nonlinear system (i.e. the behaviour of the system as the number of itera-
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tions approach infinity when the Lyapunov dimension can be quantified), whereas
cryptography focuses on the effect of a small number of iterations that are typi-
cally determined by the size of the plaintext; (iii) chaos theory is not necessarily
concerned with the algorithmic complexity but in the interpretation of a physical
model from which it has been derived; in cryptography, complexity is the key issue
and thus, the concepts of cryptographic security and efficiency have no counterparts
in chaos theory; (iv) classical chaotic systems usually have recognizable attractors
whereas in cryptography, we attempt to eliminate any structure by post processing
the output to produce a maximum entropy cipher; (v) unlike chaos in general, cryp-
tographic systems use a combination of independent variables to provide an output
that is unpredictable to an observer; (vi) chaos theory is often associated with the
mathematical model used to quantify a physically significant problem, whereas in
cryptography, the physical model is of no importance. Point (vi) is of particular
importance with regard to the design of chaos based encryption engines. Whereas
previous publications in this field (e.g. [176], [173], [187] and [188]) have considered
variations on a theme of established chaotic systems, in this paper, we have consid-
ered the idea that, in principal, an unlimited number of systems can be ‘invented’
by a designer in order to provide a limitless range of multi-algorithmic encryption
engines.
The approach to encrypting data discussed in this paper represents a ‘paradigm
shift’ with regard to single algorithm based ciphers that are in the public domain.
4.13 Cloud Security
Cloud computing is expected to grow considerably in the future because it has so
many advantages with regard to sale and cost, change management, next generation
architectures, choice and agility. However, one of the principal concerns for users
of the Cloud is lack of control and above all, data security. This paper considers
an approach to encrypting information before it is ‘place’ on the Cloud where each
user has access to their own encryption algorithm, an algorithm that is based on a
set of Iterative Function Systems that outputs a chaotic number stream, designed
to produce a cryptographically secure cipher. We study cryptographic systems us-
ing finite-state approximations to chaos or ‘pseudo-chaos’ and develop an approach
based on the concept of multi-algorithmic cryptography that exploits the properties
of pseudo-chaos. Although such algorithms can be taken to be in the public domain
in order to conform with the Kerchhoff-Shannon principal, i.e. the enemy knows the
system, their combination can be used to secure data in a way that is unique to each
user. This provides the potential for users of the Cloud to upload and transfer data
in the knowledge that they are encrypting their data in a way that is algorithm as
well key dependent, thereby defeating a known algorithm attack. This paper reports
on one application of this approach called Crypstic in which the encryption engine
is mounted on a USB memory stick and where the key is automatically generated
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by the characteristics of the plaintext/ciphertext file.
Current debates with regard to Cloud Computing assume that little will change
for users that depend upon third party hosting for their servers. Further, there
appears to be a view that standard security protocols will provide sufficient security
in the future. These assumptions ignore the widely held view that the Cloud is
insecure. This perception is being constantly reinforced in the mind of the user by
the increasingly slow and complicated anti-malware software required and frequent
stories in the media about major security breaches - often by hostile governments.
Most businesses rely on some proprietary know-how, process, design or other
commercial secret to preserve their competitive position and to try and delay product
cycle decay. Business, especially now, is very conscious of the need to avoid fixed
and capital costs to reduce their vulnerability to volatility. Cloud Computing, as
a capital and fixed cost free approach, is an obvious solution but perceived lack
of security for commercially sensitive data is a major barrier to conversion from
in-house information and communications technology.
4.13.1 The Role of Encryption
Conventional encryption, as a means of securing data, has several drawbacks for
commercial users. These include the following: (i) Decision-makers do not under-
stand exactly what encryption is or how to judge the relative strengths of different
systems; (ii) Industry certification standards and legal regulations, which are relied
upon by both governments and commercial organisations, seek to stratify encryption
strength by key length while the underlying algorithms are judged by their resistance
to standard attacks. This general approach is common to many industries and is not
specific to encryption; (iii) The way in which certification is applied causes, as an
unintended consequence, systemic risks to be inherent in any approved system. (iv)
Certification is both expensive and slow creating a high barrier to entry for innova-
tive encryption systems and making commercially available systems lag years behind
the technologies available to hackers. (v) State regulation with regard to the sale of
encryption technology can make the process of commercialising new concepts capital
investment intensive [189]; (vi) It is clear that the certification process is valued by
governments as a means of understanding, controlling and limiting the strength of
encryption to meet their security needs in terms of surveillance. Unfortunately, this
approach is fatally flawed as it wrongly assumes that hostile governments do not
have equivalent or better capabilities to breach encryption.
4.13.2 Data Encryption on the Cloud
How are users going to use The Cloud? For practical purposes, commercial users
need to process and store data and communicate with new data and output from
stored data. In most cases what is needed is a combination of a Website and
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Database with secure communications. There is also a need to protect against
Malware. This is where encryption faces difficulties as it is impossible to identify
Malware if it infiltrates a data stream and is encrypted. Also, in spite of some claims
to the contrary, a database cannot be encrypted and then used efficiently. For data
to be used it has to be readable. The dilemma therefore is, how can data be se-
curely processed within the cloud. With server hosting, the problem is dealt with by
encrypting the communication channel, installing anti-malware, providing physical
security and segregating a particular user’s servers. Thus, the key is to physically
and electronically protect the environment where live processing of data takes place
and provide data security using encryption for all communication channels and when
data needs to be stored.
The greatest danger from using conventional encryption within The Cloud is
that the systemic risks inherent in such encryption methods with only key manage-
ment to separate secret data contaminate The Cloud as a whole. In other words,
a fundamental breach of the encryption engine can bring the whole edifice down.
It is this issue that provides the focus for this paper which introduces an approach
to encrypting data where all systemic risk can be minimised by replacing the issue
of key management with the management of meta-encryption-engines using mul-
tiple encryption algorithms based on chaos theory - multi-algorithmicity. This is
based on a Technology to License called Crypstic which is available from Hothouse
at Dublin Institute of Technology http://www.dit.ie/hothouse/ and has been devel-
oped by the Information and Communications Security Research at the same In-
stitute - http://eleceng.dit.ie/icsrg. The current version is designed specifically for
the meta-encryption-engines to be mounted and executed on a USB memory ‘key’.
However, irrespective of where the engines are mounted, to be credible, their control
and processing environment has to be undertaken within a cluster of physically and
electronically secure hosting locations.
In the context of using Crypstic to secure data on the Cloud, each meta-engine
is specific to an individual user and each individual must be properly validated and
authorized to have a meta-engine which can be submitted to a user upon request.
Each meta-engine device provides a secure entry point and The Cloud which act
like a telephone exchange so that secure communication to the exchange and from
the exchange can be achieved without the need for the parties to share their meta-
engines. As each meta-engine also is seeded for each file or packet differently the
overall system can act like a ‘one-time pad’.
4.13.3 Cloud Computing and Encryption using Chaos
Cloud computing is set to become a dominating theme in security. The Cloud
Security Alliance document Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud
Computing V2.1 [190] provides an overview of the issues associated with security on
the cloud. The following issues are pertinent to the possibility of using encryption
4 ENCRYPTION USING DETERMNISTIC CHAOS 190
by chaos to solve the problem:
Cloud computing is inevitable. For example, it avoids the need to acquire infras-
tructure, it decreases ‘time to market’ and gives flexibility to update in real time.
It is instantly scaleable to meet unexpected increases or decreases in traffic volumes
and it saves money by transforming the business model from capital expenditure
and depreciation to predictable operating cost. Examples of early adopters to the
Cloud include the New York Times who wanted to convert 70 years of articles into
PDF format to store it electronically. Using the Cloud it achieved this within 24
hours with no residual unneeded IT infrastructure - a ‘one-off’ project cost. Start-up
companies can use the Cloud to give them full IT capabilities with up-front costs and
agility to change requirements and scale up at short notice if successful. The Cloud
provides low revenue cost ‘Customer Relationship Management’ facilities without
the need to customize data and process applications. However, there are a number
of issues with regard to Cloud Computing which include: trust, loss of privacy, regu-
latory violation, data replication and erosion of integrity and coherence, application
sprawl and dependencies. A general overview of the ‘Pros and Cons’ associated with
Cloud Computing is given in Figure 23.
Of these ‘pros and cons’, security is a potential major problem for the Cloud. In
other words, it is imperative to treat the Cloud as a hostile territory. Consequently
user-based security is a likely solution and it is in this context that chaos based
cipher generation may provide a solution.
Cloud computing only represents 4% of current IT spend and is expected to
more than double by 2012. Software as a Service (SaaS) by itself is projected to
nearly double from $9B to $17B (less than 10% of the total market). However,
user-security underpins acceptance of cloud architecture. The approach consider in
this paper is based on each user having their own encryption engine enabling both
protection and control, e.g.
PC + Crypstic = Cloud Security
4.14 Discussion
The application of chaos to generating ciphers can create billions of different cryp-
tographically secure encryption engines for users. The commercial solution is to
generate a website where users can pay for a unique encryption engine to be pro-
duced that, upon a remote payment, can be downloaded and used to encrypt their
data before ‘storage’ on the Cloud. This requires a large database of encryption en-
gines to be created. Once created, a randomly selected sequence of these algorithms
can be created on a user-by-user basis. The operational conditions under which this
approach can be pursued on a commercial basis depends upon country in which
the company is registered. For example, in the UK, commercial operations must
conform to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 [189] which inevitably
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Figure 23: The Pros and Cons associated with Cloud Computing.
requires an infrastructure to be established involving the employment of staff and is
therefore capitalization and overheads intensive.
Chaos can be considered to be a superset of other random number generators
used in standard encryption algorithms. There are many disadvantages in using
chaos for cryptography but it is nevertheless an interesting application of nonlinear
dynamics. The principal value of chaos is the ability to create many different al-
gorithms. This is of course possible with conventional random number generators
such as Knuth’s M-algorithm [191] but chaos provides greater diversity in terms of
the functions available (other than the mod function, for example). However, there
are still some major theoretical/computational problems with this approach which
include the following:
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4.14.1 Structurally stable pseudo-chaotic systems
We ideally require a structurally stable cryptosystem, i.e. a system that has (almost)
the same cycle length and Lyaponov exponent for all initial conditions. Most of the
known pseudo-chaotic systems do not possess this property and there is no rigorous
analytical method, as yet, for assessing this property. This is an important problem
because without solving it, it is not possible to guarantee that a crypto system
based on a deterministic chaotic algorithm or set of algorithms will always produce
uncorrelated number streams for any and all keys.
4.14.2 Conditions of unpredictability for chaotic systems
What properties of a chaotic system guarantee its computational unpredictability?
There is still no theoretically plausible method for evaluating a chaotic system in
terms of the necessary/sufficient conditions and properties that will absolutely guar-
antee the unpredictability of the system to acceptable cryptographic standards. The
approach currently being taken is based more on a trial and error approach without
the use of an algorithm proving facility. The use of formal methods of software
engineering may be of value with regard to this issue.
4.14.3 Natively Binary Chaos
While there are, in principle, an unlimited number of chaos based algorithms that
can be invented, they currently rely on the use of floating point arithmetic and re-
quire high precision FP arithmetic to generate reasonably large cycles (deterministic
chaotic algorithm have relatively low cycle lengths which is another disadvantage).
These floating point schemes are time consuming given that the number streams
they produce are usually converted into bit stream anyway. Designing algorithms
that output bit streams directly would therefore be a significant advantage. No
theoretical study of this natively binary chaos appears to have been undertaken to
date.
4.14.4 Asymmetric chaos-based cryptography
Asymmetric systems are based on trapdoor functions, i.e. functions that have a one-
way property unless a secret parameter (trapdoor) is known. One of the best known
examples of this is the RSA algorithm that makes use of the properties of prime
numbers to design the trapdoor. There is currently no counterpart of a trapdoor
transformation, as yet, known in chaos theory.
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5 Digital Watermarking
Digital watermarking is an area of growing importance in information technology
security as discussed in Chapter 1. One of the principal aims is to design methods
which provide for the authentication [192] of data (encrypted or otherwise) but in a
more general sense, digital watermarking may be used to hide information in data.
With rapid growth in computer networks and information technology, a large
number of copyright works now reside in digital form. Further, electronic publish-
ing is becoming increasingly popular. These developments in computer technology
increase the problems associated with copyright protection and enforcement and
thus, future developments in networked multimedia systems are conditioned by the
development of efficient methods to protect ownership rights against unauthorised
copying and redistribution. Digital watermarking has recently emerged as a candi-
date to solve this difficult problem. The mid-1990s saw the convergence of a number
of different information protection technologies, whose theme was the hiding (as
opposed to encryption) of information. Hiding can refer to either making the in-
formation imperceptible or keeping the existence of the information secret [192].
Important sub-disciplines of information hiding are steganography and watermark-
ing. Steganography and watermarking are concerned with techniques that are used
to imperceptibly convey information. However, they are two different and distinct
disciplines: Watermarking, is the practice of hiding a message (copyright notices or
individual serial numbers for example) about an image, audio clip, video clip, or
other work of media within that work itself [192] without degrading its quality in
such a way that it is expected to be permanently embedded into the data and can
be detected later. Steganography, on the other hand, is the study of the techniques
used to hide one message inside another, without disclosing the existence of the
hidden message or making it apparent to an observer that this message contains
a hidden message [193]. From the previous definitions we distinguished them as
follows [192],[1]:
• The information hidden by a watermarking system is always associated with
the object to be protected or its owner while steganographic systems just hide
information.
• As the purpose of steganography is to have a covert communication between
two parties whose existence is unknown to a possible attacker, a successful at-
tack consists of detecting the existence of this communication. Watermarking,
as opposed to steganography, has the additional requirement of robustness
against possible attacks; even if the existence of the hidden information is
known it should be hard for an attacker to destroy the embedded watermark.
In other words, steganography is mainly concerned with detection of the hid-
den message while watermarking concerns potential removal by a pirate.
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• Steganographic communications are usually point-to-point (between sender
and receiver) while watermarking techniques are usually one-to-many.
5.1 Principal Components of Digital Watermarking
All watermarking schemes share the same generic building blocks (see Figure 24).
These blocks and their functions are described below [194],[195].
Figure 24: The general framework of a watermarking system [196]
Watermark Embedding System (Signature Casting): The embedded data
is the watermark that one wishes to embed. It is usually hidden in a message referred
to as a cover (work), producing the watermarked cover. The inputs to the embedding
system are the watermark, the cover and an optional key. A key is used to control
the embedding process so as to restrict detection and/or recovery of the embedded
data to parties who know of it. The watermarked cover may face some intentional
and/or unintentional distortion that may affect the existence of the watermark. The
resultant outputs are called the ‘Possibly Distorted Watermarked Cover’.
Watermark Detection System (Extraction): The inputs to the detection
system are the possibly distorted watermarked cover, the key and depending on
the method, the original cover or the original watermark. Its output is either the
recovered watermark or some kind of confidence measure indicating how likely it is
for a given watermark at the input to be present in the work under inspection (e.g.
Correlation). Current watermarking schemes may be viewed as spread-spectrum
communications systems [192], whose aim is to send the watermark between two
parties with two sources of noise; noise due to the original cover and noise due to
processing.
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5.2 Applications
In this section we discuss some of the scenarios where watermarking is already being
used as well as other potential applications. The list given here [192],[1],[194],[197]
is by no means complete and is intended to give a perspective of the broad range of
possibilities that digital watermarking opens.
Owner Identification. Embedding the identity of a work’s copyright holder as a
watermark in order to prevent other parties from claiming the copyright of the
data.
Labelling. The hidden message can contain labels that, for example, allow for
annotation of images or audio data. Of course, the annotation may also be
included in a separate file, but with watermarking it becomes more difficult
to destroy or lose this label, since it becomes closely tied to the object that
it annotates. This is especially useful in medical applications since it prevents
potentially dangerous errors.
Fingerprinting (Transaction Tracking). This is similar to the previous appli-
cation and allows acquisition devices (such as video cameras, audio recorders,
etc.) to insert information about the specific device (e.g., an ID number and
date of creation). This is especially useful for identifying people who obtain
content legally but illegally redistribute it. This can involve the embedding of
a different watermark into each distributed copy.
Authentication. Embedding signature information in a work that can be later
checked to verify if it has not been tampered with.
Copy and Playback Control. The message carried by the watermark may con-
tain information regarding copy and display permissions. A secure module can
be added in copy or playback equipment to automatically extract this permis-
sion information and block further processing if required. In order to be ef-
fective, this protection approach requires agreements between work providers
and consumer electronics’ manufacturers to introduce compliant watermark
detectors in their video players and recorders. This approach is being taken in
Digital Videodiscs (DVD) for example.
Broadcast Monitoring. Identifying when and where works are broadcast by recog-
nising watermarks embedded in the data.
Additional Information. The embedded watermark could be an n-bit index to a
database of URLs stored on a known location on the Internet. This index is
used to fetch a corresponding URL from the database. The URL is then used
to display the related web pages.
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5.3 Classifications
Watermarking systems can be classified according to several aspects which are de-
scribed below.
5.3.1 Private/Public Systems
Private Marking Systems (Informed Detector). These require at least the orig-
inal cover. This means that only the copyright holder can detect the water-
mark. In a private system, we can identify where the distortions are, and invert
them before applying the watermark detector (using the original cover to re-
verse the embedding process or using the original work as a ‘hint’ to find where
the watermark could be in the distorted watermarked cover). These types of
systems may also require a copy of the embedded watermark for detection and
just yield a ’YES’ or ’NO’ response to the question: does the distorted marked
object contain this watermark? Private systems usually feature increased ro-
bustness (greater strength to the embedded bits) not only toward noise-like
distortions, but also distortions in the data geometry since it allows the de-
tection and inversion of geometrical distortion [197]. Unfortunately, for these
techniques to be applied, the possibility to access the original image must be
granted. This mean that the set-up of a watermarking system becomes more
complicated, and on the other hand, the owners of the original images are
compelled to insecurely share their works with anyone who wants to check the
existence of the watermark.
Semi-private Marking Systems. These systems use the original watermark only
and check whether it exists in the cover or not.
Public Marking Systems (Blind Marking). These systems remain the most
challenging since they require neither the secret original nor the embedded
watermark . Blind watermarking techniques are less robust and are therefore
more suitable for applications requiring lower security than copyright applica-
tion, such as authorised copy distribution in electronic commerce.
5.3.2 Transformation
Another classification criterion distinguishes schemes into spatial domain techniques
and transform domain techniques depending on whether the watermark is encoded
by directly modifying pixels (such as simply flipping low-order bits of selected pix-
els) or by altering some frequency coefficients obtained by transforming the image
into the frequency domain. Spatial domain techniques are simple to implement and
often require a lower computational cost, although they can be less robust against
tampering than methods which place the watermark in the transform domain. Wa-
termarking schemes that operate in a transform space are increasingly common, as
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this can aid robustness against several attacks and distortions (the transform do-
main method hides messages in a significant area of the cover image which makes
them more robust to attacks). However, while they are more robust to various kind
of signal processing, they remain imperceptible to the human sensory system. Most
schemes operate directly on the components of some transform of the cover like dis-
crete cosine transform, discrete wavelet transforms and discrete Fourier transforms.
5.4 Visibility
Copyright marks do not always need to be hidden, as some systems use visible digital
watermarks [194], but most of the literature has focused on invisible (or transparent)
digital watermarks which have wider applications. Modern visible watermarks may
be visual patterns (e.g. a company logo or copyright sign) overlaid on digital images.
5.4.1 Robustness
Fragile Watermarks. Watermarks that have very limited robustness and are de-
stroyed as soon as the object is modified too much. They are applied to detect
modifications of the watermarked data, rather than conveying unreadable in-
formation [192]. Cryptographic techniques have already made their mark on
authentication. However, there are two significant benefits that arise from
using watermarking: First, the signature becomes embedded in the message.
Second, it is possible to create ’soft authentication’ algorithms that offer a
multi-valued measure that accounts for different unintentional transformations
that the data may have suffered instead of the classical yes/no answer given
by cryptography-based authentication.
Robust Watermarks. These have the property that is not feasible to remove them
or make them useless without destroying the object at the same time. This
usually means that the mark should be embedded in the most robust significant
components of the object [197].
5.4.2 Naturalness
Watermarks that range from pseudorandom sequences to small image logo that can
be easily recovered and authenticated.
5.5 Properties
Watermark system can be characterised by a number of defining properties [192],[197],[194].
The relative importance of each property is dependent on the requirements of the
application and the role that the watermark will play. Some important properties
are listed below:
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Fidelity (watermark imperceptibility). Perceptual similarity between the orig-
inal and the watermarked versions must be very high (i.e. the difference be-
tween the original image and the embedded watermarked work should be invis-
ible). It has been argued that the watermark should not be noticeable to the
viewer instead of being imperceptible [197]. Furthermore, if a signal is truly
imperceptible, then perceptually base lossy compression algorithms should, in
principle, remove such a signal. Current compression algorithms can still leave
room for an imperceptible signal to be inserted. This may not be true of the
next generation of compression algorithms. Thus, to survive the next gener-
ation of lossy compression algorithms, it is necessary for a watermark to be
noticeable to a trained observer.
Statistical Invisibility The watermark must be statistically invisible to thwart
unauthorised removal (i.e. a statistical analysis should not produce any ad-
vantage from the attacking point of view). The noise-like watermark is statis-
tically invisible and has good auto-correlation properties.
Readily Extracted If the decoder needs to run in real-time, then it is necessary
for the decoding process to be significantly simpler than the encoding process
[197]. In some applications, this requirement is reversed depending on the
purpose of watermarking system.
Data Payload This refers to the amount of information that can be carried in a
watermarked cover and raises capacity issues in digital watermarking. The
length of the watermark serves as a measure of the capacity. A longer wa-
termark signal means that more coefficients need to be modified; hence, the
watermarked images look ’noisier’. The more information one wants to embed,
the lower the watermark robustness.
Embedding Effectiveness The probability that the embedder will successfully
embed a watermark in a randomly selected work. This property is related to
real-time embedding system (which must be high).
False Positive Rate The frequency with which we should expect a watermark to
be detected in a non-watermarked object (which must be low).
Robustness (Security) The watermark should be resilient to standard manipu-
lations which are both intentional and unintentional in nature. Some authors
[192] distinguish between resistance to intentional and unintentional attacks.
They use ’security’ when dealing with the ability of the watermark to resist
hostile attacks while using the ’robustness’ when dealing with the ability of
the watermark to survive normal processing of the content such as spatial fil-
tering, lossy compression, printing and scanning, geometric distortions (such
as rotation, translation and scaling). Note, that robustness actually comprises
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two separate issues: (i) whether or not the watermark is still present in the
data after distortion; (ii) whether the watermark detector can detect it. For
example, watermarks inserted by many algorithms remain in the data after
geometric distortions but the corresponding detection algorithm can only de-
tect the watermark if the distortion is first removed, otherwise the detector
can not detect the watermark [197]. In general, any increase in robustness
comes at the expense of increased watermark visibility. Also the presence of
the original cover increases the robustness. For example, the use of the origi-
nal image permits some pre-processing to be carried out before the watermark
checking such as: rotation angles, translation and scaling factors which can
usually be estimated together with missing parts of the image which can be
replaced by corresponding parts of the original one. It is possible to undertake
and exhaustive search on different rotation angles and scaling factors until a
watermark is found, but this is prohibitively computationally intensive.
5.6 Distortions and Attack
In practice, a watermarked cover may be altered either intentionally or uninten-
tionally, so the watermarking system should still be able to detect and extract the
watermark. The distortions are limited to those that do not produce excessive degra-
dations, since otherwise the transformed object would be unusable. Several authors
have classified attacks based on a range of aspects. One famous classification has
been carried out by Craver et al. [198],[199].
5.6.1 Attack Classifications
There four general classes of attacks [198], organised by the way in which an attack
attempts to defeat the watermarking technology. These classes are illustrated below
together with some examples for each class. Some of them may be intentional or
unintentional, depending on the application.
5.6.2 Robustness (Unauthorised removal)
This type of attacks aim to diminish or remove the presence of a digital watermark
from its associated content, while preserving the content so that it is not useless
after the attack is over. Some examples of robustness attacks are discussed below.
Additive Noise. This may happen (unintentionally) in certain applications such
as D/A (printing) and A/D (scanning) converters or from transmission errors.
It could happen intentionally by an attacker who is trying to destroy the
watermark (or make it undetectable) by adding noise to the watermarked
cover.
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Filtering. Linear filtering such as low-pass filtering or non-linear filtering such as
median filtering.
Collusion Attack. In some watermarking schemes, if an image has been water-
marked many times under different secret keys, it is possible to collect many
such copies and ’average’ them into a composite image that closely resembles
the original image and does not contain any useful watermarking data [200].
Inversion Attack (elimination attack). An attacker may try to estimate the
watermark and then remove the watermark by subtracting the estimate or
reverse the insertion process to perfectly remove the watermark. This means
that an attacked object can not be considered to contain a watermark at all
(even using a more sophisticated detector). Note, that with different water-
marked objects, it is possible to improve the estimate of the watermark by
simple averaging.
Lossy Compression. This is generally an unintentional attack, which appears very
often in multimedia applications. Practically, nearly all audio, video and dig-
ital images that are currently distributed via the Internet are in compressed
form. Lossy image compression algorithms are designed to disregard redun-
dant perceptually-insignificant information in the coding process. Watermark-
ing tries to add invisible information to the image. An optimal image coder
would therefore simply remove any embedded watermark information. How-
ever, even state-of-the-art image coding such as JPEG 2000 does not achieve
optimal coding performance and therefore there is a ’distortion gap’ that can
be exploited for watermarking. Actually, one can observe that the use of a par-
ticular transform provides good results against compression algorithms based
on the same transform. For instance, DCT-domain image watermarking is
more robust to JPEG compression than spatial-domain watermarking.
5.6.3 Presentation (Masking Attacks)
This attack does not attempt to remove the watermark, but instead, alters the
content so that the watermark can no longer be detected or extracted easily. This
means that the attacked work can still be considered to contain the watermark, but
the watermark is undetectable by an existing detector (such as a detector sensitive
to image rotation). Examples of presentation attack include:
Chopping Attack (mosaic attack). Here, an image is ’chopped’ into distinct
sub-images, which are embedded one after another in a web page. Common
web browsers render sub-images together as a single image, so the result is
identical to the original image. However, the chopping process distributes the
original image’s watermark into many pieces and the watermark cannot be
recovered unless the original image is reconstructed first.
5 DIGITAL WATERMARKING 201
Rotation and Spatial Scaling. Detection and extraction fail when rotation or
scaling is performed on the watermarked image because the embedded wa-
termark and the locally generated version do not share the same spatial pat-
tern anymore. This kind of attack can be unintentional, occurring during
the scanning-printing process (copies from printing and/or scanning maybe
rotated, scaled, cropped or translated in comparison with the original image).
Cropping. This is a very common attack since in many cases the attacker is inter-
ested in a small portion of the watermarked object, such as parts of a certain
picture or frames of a video sequence. With this in mind, in order to sur-
vive this kind of attack, the watermark needs to be spread over the whole
document.
5.7 Interpretation
This kind of attack seeks to forge invalid or multiple interpretations from watermark
evidence [198] whereby an attacker can devise a situation, which prevents assertion
of ownership. Some examples are:
• Multiple watermarking: An attacker may watermark an already watermarked
object (creating uncertainty about which watermark was inserted first) and
later make claims of ownership. The easiest solution is to time-stamp the
hidden information by a certification authority.
• Unauthorised embedding (Forgery). Embedding an illegitimate watermark
into works that should not contain them or using watermark inversion to re-
move the original watermark before inserting a new watermark.
5.7.1 Legality
In a legal attack, the attacker uses a legal precedent, the identity or reputation of the
object owner, or some other non-technical information to establish doubt in court
as to whether a watermark actually constitutes the proof that its owner claims.
5.7.2 Cox Classification for Attacks
Cox et al. [192] classify the attacks into two main categories: active and passive.
Active attacks (e.g. changing the cover) include:
• Unauthorised removal (robustness attack).
• Unauthorised embedding (forgery).
Passive attacks (e.g. not changing the cover) include unauthorized detection which
can be in three levels according to severity:
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• the adversary detects and deciphers an embedded message;
• the adversary detects the watermark and distinguishes one mark from another,
but can not decipher what the marks mean;
• the adversary detects the watermark but without distinguishing the decipher.
There are situations in which the watermark has no hostile enemies and need not
to be secure, e.g. when the watermark is used to provide enhanced functionality.
5.8 Watermarking and Cryptography
Watermarking is distinguished from other techniques such as placing the mark in the
media header, encoding it in a visible bar, or speaking it out loud as an introduction
to an audio clip in three ways:
• a watermark is imperceptible;
• a watermark is inseparable from the work (once the digital image is printed
on paper, all data in the header is left behind and further, this data may not
survive a change in the image format);
• a watermark undergoes the same transformations on the work, which can help
in authentication and detection based on the kind of alteration that the image
has undergone.
5.8.1 Cryptography
Cryptography can be defined as the study of secret writing, i.e. concealing the
contents of a secret message by transforming the original message into a form that
cannot be easily interpreted by an observer. Thus, the mere discovery of encrypted
data suggests that something is illicit, or at least secret, is occurring. Cryptographic
techniques can hide a message from plain view during communication, and can also
provide auxiliary information that effectively proves the messages. However, tra-
ditional cryptosystems suffer from one important drawback, which renders them
useless for the purpose of enforcing copyright law [199]: they do not permanently
associate cryptographic information with work. Thus, cryptography alone cannot
make any guarantees about the redistribution or alteration of content after it has
initially passed through the cryptosystem (i.e. cryptography can not help the seller
monitor how a legitimate customer handles the content after decryption). Water-
marking can fulfil this need; it places information within the content where it is never
removed during normal usage. Further, steganography has a distinct advantage over
cryptography; it allows for the communication of secret information without alerting
an attacker to the presence of the secrets.
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5.8.2 Fidelity
It is currently widely accepted that robust/high fidelity watermarking techniques
should largely exploit the characteristics of the HVS and human auditory system
(HAS) for more effectively hiding watermarks. Perceptual masking techniques ex-
ploit the perceptual masking properties of the human auditory system and of the
human vision system [194]. A good watermarking schema has to adapt to the par-
ticular image being watermarked in order to exploit specific HVS characteristics and
hence, amplifying the watermark where the alterations are least likely to be noticed.
Local image characteristics that can help determine the visibility of a watermark
are listed below:
Texture. It is usually true to say, that the human eyes are not sensitive to the small
changes in texture but are very sensitive to small changes in the smooth areas
of an image. Hence, it should be possible to incorporate more information
into those parts of the image that contain more textures than smooth area.
Related methods accomplish this by calculating a value of local contrast and
mapping increasing contrast values to increasing watermark magnitudes [202].
Edges. Edge information of an image is the most important factor for perception of
the image. This can present a problem though, as directional edges separating
two distinct objects in an image may be identified as high contrast areas. This
results in the application of a higher strength watermark signal around the
connected edges which causes objectionable watermark ringing on connected
edges. Methods have also been proposed which identify areas of true high con-
trast texture while protecting connected directional edges [202],[203] (regions
that contain a sudden transition in luminance).
Brightness/Contrast. When the mean value of the square of the noise is the
same as the background, the noise tends to be most visible against mid-gray
backgrounds. The mid-gray regions have lower noise-capacity compared to
other regions [203].
5.8.3 Robustness
The key to making the watermark robust and to preventing the watermark from be-
ing easily attacked is to embed the watermark in the perceptually significant regions
of the image. These regions do not change much after several signal processing or
compression operations. Moreover, if these regions lose their fidelity significantly,
the reconstructed image could be perceptually different from the original one (i.e.
visual fidelity is only preserved if the perceptually significant regions remain intact).
Also, lossy image compression algorithms are designed to disregard redundant in-
formation. Information bits placed within textured areas of the image are therefore
more vulnerable to attack. The question, therefore, is how much extra watermark
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information can we add to the perceptually significant regions without any impact
on the visual fidelity? There is a compromise to be reached between hiding a large
number of information bits where they can least be seen, but where they can be
attacked by image compression algorithms, or placing fewer bits on less textured
but safer portions of the image.
5.8.4 Capacity
Every pixel value of an image can be altered only to a certain limit without making
a perceptible difference to the image quality. This limit can be called as the ’just
noticeable distortion’ or JND level [204],[202],[203]. For instance, smooth areas are
assigned relatively low JND compared to strongly textured regions (i.e. strongly
textured regions have a very high capacity for noise).
5.8.5 Shaping
There is an advantage to shaping the watermark spectrum based on the cover to
match currently known human visual systems. Inserting a watermark that is a
function of the cover leads to a non-linear embedding procedure. Such a procedure
has the advantage that when the image energy in a particular area is small, the
watermark energy is also reduced, thereby avoiding artifacts, and when the image
energy is large, the watermark energy is increased, thereby improving the robustness
of the procedure. Conversely, if simple linear addition to the watermark and image
occurs, then the energy of the watermark must be very low in order to avoid worst-
case scenarios in which the image energy in a particular place is very low and artifacts
are created because the watermark energy was too strong relative to the image [197].
5.8.6 Spread Spectrum
Spread spectrum techniques spread a narrow band signal (watermark) over a much
wider band (cover) such that the signal-to-noise ratio in any single band is very low.
However, with precise knowledge of the spreading function, the receiver is able to ex-
tract the transmitted signal, summing up the signals in each of the bands such that
the detector signal-to-noise ratio is strong. Spread spectrum techniques are useful
because they have a low probability of interception by an attacker [194]. Embedding
a watermark in the high frequency spectrum yield low robustness whereas embed-
ding the watermark in the low frequency spectrum yields visible impacts. Spread
spectrum techniques can reconcile these conflicting points by allowing a low-energy
signal to be embedded in each of the frequency bands (both high and low).
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5.9 Open Problems
Even though watermarking is a fast growing field there are a number of outstanding
problems such as the following [205]:
• Optimisation between robustness and visibility limiting the capacity.
• Detection speed which is crucial especially in a real time applications.
• Reading the watermark after geometric distortion.
• Adaptability to different printing process, paper and ink which may degrade
the watermark. Moreover, printed images do not maintain their quality over
time. They are subject to aging, soiling, crumbling, tearing, and deterioration.
Designing a watermark scheme to compensate for these kinds of unintentional
attacks is another challenge.
• Different input devices (scanner, cameras) introduce different types of distor-
tions. Accounting for these differences in detection is also a major challenge.
5.10 Theoretical Concepts
In cryptography and stenography (the process of hiding secret information in data
[1]) the principal ‘art’ is to develop methods in which the processes of diffusion and
confusion are maximised; one important criterion being that the output s should
be dominated by the noise n which in turn should be characterized by maximum
entropy (i.e. a uniform statistical distribution) [206].
Given the equation
s = Pˆ f + n
then being able to recover f from s given n (and the operator Pˆ ) provides a way
of authenticating the signal. If, in addition, it is possible to determine that a copy
and/or modification of s has been made leading to some form of data degradation
and/or corruption that can be conveyed through an appropriate analysis of f , then
a scheme can be developed that provides a check on: (i) the authenticity of the data
s; (ii) its fidelity [193], [194].
Formally, the recovery of f from s is based on the inverse process
f = Pˆ−1(s− n)
where Pˆ−1 is the inverse operator. Clearly, this requires the field n to be known
a priori. If this field has been generated by a pseudorandom or a pseudochaotic
number generator, then the initial condition(s) used to generate this field must be
known a priori in order to recover the data f . In this case, the seed represents the
private key required to recover f . However, in principle, n can be any field that
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is considered appropriate for confusing the information Pˆ f including a pre-selected
signal or image. Further, if the process of confusion is undertaken in which the signal-
to-noise ratio is set to be very low (i.e. ‖n‖ >> ‖Pˆ f‖), then the watermark f can be
hidden covertly in the data n provided the inverse process Pˆ−1 is well defined and
computationally stable. In this case, it is clear that the host signal or image n must
be known in order to recover the watermark f leading to a private watermarking
scheme in which the field n in its entirety is a key. This field can of course be
(lossless) compressed and encrypted as required. In addition, the operator Pˆ (and
its inverse Pˆ−1) can be key dependent. The value of this operator key dependency
relies on the nature and properties of the operator that is used and whether it is
compounded in an algorithm that is required to be in the public domain for example.
Another approach is to consider the case in which the field n is unknown and to
consider the problem of extracting the watermark f in the absence of knowledge of
this field. In this case, the reconstruction is based on the result
f = Pˆ−1s+m
where
m = −Pˆ−1n
Now, if a process Pˆ is available in which ‖Pˆ−1s‖ >> ‖m‖, then an approximate
(noisy) reconstruction of f can be obtained in which the noise m is determined by
the original signal-to-noise ratio of the data s and hence, the level of covertness of
the diffused watermark Pˆ f . In this case, it may be possible to post-process the
reconstruction (de-noising for example) and recover a relatively high-fidelity version
of the watermark, i.e.
f ∼ Pˆ−1s
This approach (if available) does not rely on a private key (assuming Pˆ is not key
dependent). The ability to recover the watermark in this case, only requires knowl-
edge of the operator Pˆ (and its inverse) and post-processing options as required. The
problem here is to find an operator that is able to recover the watermark effectively
in the presence of the field n. Ideally, we require an operator Pˆ with properties such
that Pˆ−1n→ 0.
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6 Chirp Coding and Fractal Modulation
In this chapter, we consider the case in which
Pˆ = δ(t)⊗t
where ⊗t denotes the convolution integral over independent variable t. In this case
s(t) = f(t) + n(t)
where f is contructed from a sequence of Morlet wavelet or chirp function, specifi-
cally, a linear Frequency Modulated (FM) chirp of the (complex) types exp(±iαt2)
where α is the chirp parameter and t is the independent variable. The inverse process
is undertaken by correlating with the (complex) conjugate of the chirp exp(−iαt2).
This provides a reconstruction for f in the presence of the field n that is accurate and
robust with very low signal-to-noise ratios. Further, we consider a watermark based
on a coding scheme in which the field n is the input. The watermark f is therefore
n-dependent. This allows an authentication scheme to be developed in which the
watermark is generated from the field in which it is to be hidden. Authentication of
the watermarked data is then based on comparing the code generated from s ∼ n
and that reconstructed from s = f + n when ‖f‖ << ‖n‖. This is an example of a
self-generated coding scheme which avoids the use, distribution and application of
reference codes. There are numerous applications of this technique in areas where
authentication is mandatory. For example, the method can readily be applied to
audio data with no detectable differences in the audio quality of the data, providing
a tamper proof facility that can be used to validate the authenticity of the data.
Another steganographic approach is also introduced in this chapter in which
binary information (encrypted or otherwise) is fractal modulated to produce a con-
tiguous fractal noise stream that is representative of background (fractal) noise.
This is an example of hiding information in noise and is designed for the covert
transmission of signals in a wireless environment.
6.1 Wavelets
We consider an approach to ‘watermarking’ digital signals using wavelets. In par-
ticular, we introduce a technique that utilises Morlet wavelets (with zero charac-
teristic frequency). These wavelets modulate the frequency linearly with time and
are consequenctly known as linear frequency modulated wavelets or ‘chirps’. The
method introduced is therefore known as ‘chirp coding’. The principles underlying
this approach are based on the use of a matched filter to provide a reconstruction
of a chirped code that is uniquely robust, i.e. in the case of very high signal-to-
chirp ratios. The theoretical and computational aspects of the matched filter and
the properties of a chirp are revisited to provide the essential background of the
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method. Signal code generating schemes are then addressed and details of the cod-
ing and decoding techniques considered. The method considered is of value for
embedding information in digital signals and for authenticating the data. The ap-
proach is generic in the sense that it can can be used for a range of data types and
applications (the authentication of speech and audio signals for example).
In Chapter 3, we considered Fresnel diffusion which is based on the principles as-
sociated with Fresnel optics as presented in Appendix B in which the object function
f is mapped to an image function u at a distance z via the equation
u(x, y) = p(x, y)⊗x ⊗yf(x, y)
where the Point Spread Function (PSF) p is given by (ignoring scaling)
p(x, y) = exp
[−iα(x2 + y2)]
and
α =
pi
zλ
Here, λ is the wavelength. By correlating u with p∗ we obtain an estimate fˆ for f
given by
fˆ(x, y) ' XY sinc(αXx)sinc(αY y)⊗x ⊗yf(x, y).
which in Fourier space becomes
Fˆ (kx, ky) =
{
pi2
α2
F (kx, ky), | kx |≤ piXzλ , | ky |≤ piYzλ ;
0, otherwise.
Observe that for a fixed values of X, Y and z, as λ decreases, the bandwidth of
fˆ(x, y) increases. In other words the resolution on the structure of f , as determined
by fˆ , increases as the wavelength decreases. This is of course consistent with the
basic expression for resolution R in which
R ∼ D
λ
where D is the size of the aperture. The point here, is that in optics, the wavelength
governs the resolution available and in Fresnel optics this is a consequence of the
fact that the convolution kernel is given by exp(ipiR2/zλ), R =
√
x2 + y2. Note
that for the one-dimensional case, we can write this result in the form
u(x) =
∫
w
(
x− y
L
)
f(y)dy
where
w(x) = exp(ipix2)
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and
L = zλ.
In principal, by changing the wavelength of a Fresnel imaging system, we can change
the resolution of the system and thus explore the structure of the two-dimensional
object function f(x, y) on a multi-resolutional basis. In a practical Fresnel imaging
system, for example, it is not usually possible to adjust the wavelength in an arbi-
trary way. However, for signal processing, we can choose to analyse a function f(t)
by convolving it with the function w(t) over a range of scales L.
The function w(t) is an example of a wavelet known as the Morlet wavelet which,
as a function of time t, is given by (without the correction term and for unit ampli-
tude)
w(t) = exp[i(ω0t− t2/2)]
where ω0 is the characteristic frequency of the wavelet. However, w is only one of a
number of arbitrary functions that may be considered. Thus, from a generic point
of view, we are at liberty to generalise and define the wavelet transformation of a
signal f(t) as
f(t)↔ FL(t)
in terms of projections of f(t) onto a family of functions that are all normalised
dilations and translations of a prototype ‘wavelet’ function w, i.e.
Wˆ [f(t)] = FL(τ) =
∫
f(t)wL(t, τ)dt
where
wL(t, τ) =
1√| L |w
(
τ − t
L
)
, L 6= 0.
The parameters L and τ are continuous dilation and translation parameters respec-
tively.
Note that the wavelet transformation is essentially a convolution transform in
which w(t) is the convolution kernel but with a factor L introduced. The introduc-
tion of this factor provides dilation and translation properties into the convolution
integral that gives it the ability to analyse signals in a multi-resolution role where
the convolution integral is now a function of L. In general, a multi-resolution signal
analysis is a framework for analysing signals based on isolating variations in the
signal that occur on different temporal or spatial scales. The basic analysis involves
approximating the signal at successively coarser scales through repeated applications
of a smoothing (convolution) operator.
The multi-resolution properties of the wavelet transform have been crucial to
their development and success in the analysis and processing of signal and images.
Wavelet transformations play a central role in the study of self-similar or fractal
signals and images. The transform constitutes as natural a tool for the manipulation
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of self-similar or scale invariant signals as the Fourier transform does for translation
invariant such as stationary and periodic signals. All wavelet signal analysis is
based on convolution type operations which include a scaling property in terms
of the amplitude and temporal extent of the convolution kernel either in one- or
many-dimensions (e.g. [207], [208] and [209]).
A necessary and sufficient condition for this transformation to be invertible is
that w(t) satisfy the admissibility condition∫
|W (ω) |2| ω |−1 dω = Cw <∞
where W is the wavelets Fourier transform, i.e.
W (ω) =
∫
w(t) exp(−iωt)dt
Provided w has reasonable decay at infinity and smoothness, as is usually the case
in practice, the admissibility condition above is equivalent to the condition∫
w(t)dt = 0
For any admissible w(t), the wavelet transform has an inverse given by
f(t) = Wˆ−1[FL(τ)] =
1
Cw
∫ ∫
FL(τ)wL(t, τ)L−2dLdτ
There are a wide variety of wavelets available [i.e. functional forms for wL(τ)] which
are useful for processing signals in ‘wavelet space’ when applied in discrete form.
The properties of the wavelets vary from one application to another but in each
case, the digital signal fi is decomposed into a matrix (a set of vectors) Fij where j
is the ‘level’ of the decomposition. Note that a random fractal signal in which
u(t) =
1
t1−q/2
⊗t n(t)
is, in effect, a wavelet transform for L = 1 where
wq =
1
t1−q/2
Fractal modulation involves the generation of fractal noise for different values of q
that can be used to encode information [193], [201].
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6.2 Matched Filtering using Chirps
The Matched Filter (e.g. [210], [211] and [212]]) is one of the most common filters
used for pattern recognition. It is based on correlating the data with a matching
template of the feature that is assumed to be present in the date [211]]. If the
feature does indeed exist, then the output of the filter produces a local maximum or
spike where the feature occurs. This process can be applied generally, but when the
template and feature are based on linear FM wavelets the result has some special
and important properties which provide an output that is uniquely robust in the
presence of high noise levels, i.e. high degrees of confusion. It is this property that
forms the basis for a variety of active information systems such as those used in
Real and Synthetic Aperture Radar (e.g. [213], [214] and [215]), active sonar and
some forms of seismic prospecting, for example. A chirped signal is used in pulse
compression Real and Synthetic Aperture Radar applications because of its ability
to give low side-lobes when correlated with itself. This gives an advantage of being
detected in the presence of high background noise. In a watermarking application,
this background noise becomes the signal to be watermarked. Interestingly, some
mammals (dolphins, whales and bats, for example) use frequency modulation for
communication and detection. The reason for this is the unique properties that
chirps provide in terms of the quality of extracting information from signals with
very low signal-to-noise ratios and the simplicity of the process that is required to do
this (i.e. correlation). The invention and use of chirps for man-made communications
and information systems dates back to the early 1960s (the application of FM to
radar for example); mother nature appears to have ‘discovered’ the idea some time
ago. The use of frequency modulation is the basis the method presented here and, in
the following section, the theoretical background to the Matched Filter is considered
and the result of using chirp functions with matched filtering re-visited.
6.2.1 The Matched Filter
We start by considering the basic linear stationary (convolution) model for a signal
s as a function of time t, namely
s(t) = p(t)⊗t f(t) + n(t)
where f is the Impulse Response Function (IRF), p is the Instrument Function, n is
the noise (which is typically taken to have stationary statistics) and
[p(t)⊗t f(t)](t) =
∫
p(t− τ)f(τ)dτ.
A fundamental inverse (deconvolution) problem is to find an estimate fˆ of f given
s. The Matched Filter is based on assuming a linear convolution model for this
estimate of the form
fˆ(t) = q(t)⊗t s(t)
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Clearly, the problem is to find the filter q. The Matched Filter is based on finding
q subject to the condition that
r =
| ∫ Q(ω)P (ω)dω |2∫ | N(ω) |2| Q(ω) |2 dω (7.2)
is a maximum where Q, P and N are the Fourier transforms of q, p and n respectively
and where we defined the Fourier transform pair as
F (ω) =
∫
f(t) exp(−iωt)dt,
f(t) =
1
2pi
∫
F (ω) exp(iωt)dω.
in which the limits of the integrals are taken to be in (−∞,∞). Note, that the ratio
defining r is a ‘measure’ of the signal-to-noise ratio. In this sense, the matched filter
maximises the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the output.
Assuming that the noise n has a ‘white’ uniform power spectrum, the filter Q
which maximises the SNR defined by r can be shown to be given by the simple result
Q(ω) = P ∗(ω).
The required solution is therefore given by
fˆ(t) =
1
2pi
∫
P ∗(ω)S(ω) exp(iωt)dω
Using the ‘correlation theorem’ we can write
fˆ(t) = p(t) s(t) ≡
∫
p(τ + t)s(τ)dτ.
Hence, the matched filter is based on correlating the signal s with the IRF p.
6.2.2 Derivation of the Matched Filter
With the problem specified as given in the previous section, the matched filter is
essentially a ‘by-product’ of the ‘Schwarz inequality’, i.e. the result∣∣∣∣∫ Q(ω)P (ω)dω∣∣∣∣2 ≤ ∫ | Q(ω) |2 dω ∫ | P (ω) |2 dω.
If we write
Q(ω)P (ω) =| N(ω) | Q(ω)× P (ω)| N(ω) |
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then the above inequality becomes∣∣∣∣∫ Q(ω)P (ω)dω∣∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣∣∫ | N(ω) | Q(ω) P (ω)| N(ω) |dω
∣∣∣∣2
≤
∫
| N(ω) |2| Q(ω) |2 dω
∫ | P (ω) |2
| N(ω) |2dω.
From this result, using the definition of r given in equation (7.2), we see that
r ≤
∫ | P (ω) |2
| N(ω) |2dω.
Now, if r is to be a maximum, then we require that
r =
∫ | P (ω) |2
| N(ω) |2dω
or ∣∣∣∣∫ | N(ω) | Q(ω) P (ω)| N(ω) |dω
∣∣∣∣2 = ∫ | N(ω) |2| Q(ω) |2 dω ∫ | P (ω) |2| N(ω) |2dω.
But this is only true if
| N(ω) | Q(ω) = P
∗(ω)
| N(ω) |
Hence, r is a maximum when
Q(ω) =
P ∗(ω)
| N(ω) |2 .
6.2.3 ‘White Noise’ Condition
The noise term n(t) can, in principle, have arbitrary characteristics although they
are usually assumed to be stationary. The noise is characterised by two fundamental
characteristics: (i) the Probability Distribution Function (PDF) or the Character-
istic Function (i.e. the Fourier transform of the PDF); (ii) the Power Spectral
Distribution Function (PSDF). To apply the Matched Filter, the function | N(ω) |2
in addition to P (ω) is required to be known a priori. In some practical systems this
is possible if the Impulse Response Function is set to zero so that the output of the
system is ‘noise driven’. In general however, it is often necessary to apply a suitable
model for the PSDF. Such models may include random fractal noise, for example.
However, if we consider the case when the PSDF is uniform or ‘white’ and of unit
amplitude then we can write
| N(ω) |2= 1∀ω
so that the Matched Filter reduces to the simple result
Q(ω) = P ∗(ω).
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6.2.4 Deconvolution of Linear FM Chirps
The matched filter is frequently used in systems that utilise linear Frequency Mod-
ulated (FM) signals. Signals of this type are known as ‘chirped signal’. A linear
FM signal which is taken to be of compact support (t ∈ [−T/2, T/2]) is given (in
complex form) by
p(t) = exp(iαt2), | t |≤ T
where α is a constant and T is the length of the signal. The phase of this signal is
given by αt2 (i.e. it has a quadratic phase factor) and its instantaneous frequency
is therefore given by
d
dt
(αt2) = 2αt
which varies linearly with time t. Hence, the frequency modulations are linear which
is why the signal is referred to as a ‘linear’ FM pulse.
Let us first consider the case when the additive noise term is neglected and
consider a signal given by
s(t) = exp(iαt2)⊗x f(x), | t |≤ T.
If we now apply a (white noise) matched filter, then we have
fˆ(t) = exp(−iαt2) exp(iαt2)⊗t f(t), | t |≤ T.
The correlation integral can now be evaluated thus
exp(−iαt2) exp(iαt2) =
T/2∫
−T/2
exp[−iα(τ + t)2] exp(iατ2)dτ
= exp(−iαt2)
T/2∫
−T/2
exp(−2iαtτ)dτ.
Evaluating the integral over τ , we have
exp(−iαt2) exp(iαt2) = T exp(−iαt2)sinc(αTt)
and hence
fˆ(t) = T exp(−iαt2)sinc(αTt)⊗t f(t).
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6.2.5 Approximation for Long Chirps
A further useful simplification can now be made to the result for fˆ which allows the
exponential term to be ignored. In particular, if we consider T >> 1 then
cos(αt2)sinc(αTt) ' sinc(αTt)
and
sin(αt2)sinc(αTt) ' 0
so that
fˆ(t) ' T sinc(αTt)⊗t f(t).
This simplification, under a condition that is often practically applicable, allows the
result for fˆ to be easily analysed in Fourier space. Using the convolution theorem
we can write (ignoring scaling by pi/α)
Fˆ (ω) =
{
F (ω), | ω |≤ αT ;
0, | ω |> T. (2.2)
which describes fˆ as being a band-limited version of f (assuming the f is not band-
limited) where the bandwidth is determined by αT .
In the presence of additive noise, the result is
fˆ(t) ' T sinc(αTt)⊗t f(t) + exp(−iαt2) n(t)
The correlation function produced by the correlation of exp(−iαt) with n(t) will,
in general, be relatively low in amplitude since n(t) will not normally have features
that match or correlate with those of a (complex) chirp. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that
‖T sinc(αTt)⊗t f(t)‖ >> ‖ exp(−iαt2) n(t)‖
and that in practice, fˆ is a band-limited reconstruction of f with high SNR. Thus,
the use of chirps for diffusing an input f allows for a high degree confusion using
additive noise with relative low SNRs
An example of a matched filter reconstruction is given in Figure 25. Here, two
unit spikes have been convolved with a linear FM chirp of the form p(t) = sin(αt2)
whose width or pulse length T is significantly greater than that of the input signal.
The output signal has been generated using an SNR of 1 where the SNR is defined
by
SNR =
‖p(t)⊗t f(t)‖∞
‖n(t)‖∞
and where ‖ • ‖∞ denotes the uniform norm. Clearly, this example illustrates the fi-
delity of the reconstruction for f(t) using a relatively simple operation for processing
data that has been badly distorted by additive noise.
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Figure 25: Example of a reconstruction using the matched filter (bottom right) from
a noisy signal (bottom left) generated by the convolution of an input consisting of
two spikes (top left) with a linear FM chirp (top right).
6.3 Chirp Code Watermarking
Consider the field n(t) to be some pre-defined signal to which a watermark is to be
‘added’ to generate s(t). In principle, any watermark described by a function f(t)
can be used. On the other hand, for the purpose of authentication we require two
criterion: (i) f(t) should represent a code which can be reconstructed accurately
and robustly; (ii) the watermark should be sensitive (and ideally ultra-sensitive) to
any degradation in the field s(t). To satisfy condition (i), it is reasonable to consider
f(t) to represent a bit stream, i.e. to consider the discretized version of f(t) - the
vector fi - to be composed of a set of elements with value 0 or 1. This binary
code can of course be based on a key or set of keys which, when reconstructed, is
compared to a key for the purpose of authenticating the data. However, this requires
the distribution of such keys (public and/or private). Instead, we consider the case
where a binary sequence is generated from the field n(t). There are a number of
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approaches that can be considered based on the spectral characteristics of n(t), for
example, or through application of wavelet decomposition which is discussed later.
6.3.1 Chirp Coding
Given that a binary sequence has been generated from n(t) through some process,
we now consider the method of chirp coding. The purpose of chirp coding is to
‘diffuse’ each bit over a range of compact support. However, it is necessary to
differentiate between 0 and 1 in the sequences. The simplest way to achieve this is
to change the polarity of the chirp. Thus, for 1 we apply the chirp sin(αt2), t ∈ T
and for 0 we apply the chirp -sin(αt2), t ∈ T where T is the chirp period. The
chirps are then concatenated to produce a contiguous stream of data, i.e. a signal
composed of ±chirps or a ‘chirp stream’. Thus, the binary sequence 010 for example
is transformed to the signal
s(t) =

−chirp(t), t ∈ [0, T );
+chirp(t), t ∈ [T, 2T );
−chirp(t), t ∈ [2T, 3T ).
The period over which the chirp is applied depends on the length of the signal to
which the watermark is to be applied and the length of the binary sequence. In the
example given above the length of the signal is taken to be 3T . In practice, care
must be taken over the chirping parameter α that is applied given a period T in
order to avoid aliasing and in some cases it is of value to apply a logarithmic sweep
instead of a linear sweep.
6.3.2 Decoding
Decoding or reconstruction of the binary sequence requires the application of a cor-
relator using the function chirp(t), t ∈ [0, T ). This produces a correlation function
that is either -1 or +1 depending upon whether −chirp(t) or +chirp(t) has been
applied respectively. For example, after correlating the chirp coded sequence 010
given above, the correlation function c(t)becomes
c(t) =

−1, t ∈ [0, T );
+1, t ∈ [T, 2T );
−1, t ∈ [2T, 3T ).
from which the original sequence 010 is easily inferred - the change in sign of the
correlation function identifying a change of bit (from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0). Note, that
in practice the correlation function may not be exactly 1 or -1 when reconstruction
is undertaken in the presence of additive noise; the binary sequence is effectively
recovered by searching the correlation function for changes in sign.
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6.3.3 Watermarking
The watermarking process is based on adding the chirp stream to the signal n(t).
Let the chirp stream be given by the function h(t), then the watermarking process
is described by the equation
s(t) = a
[
bh(t)
‖h(t)‖∞ +
n(t)
‖n(t)‖∞
]
where the coefficients a > 0 and 0 < b < 1 determine the amplitude of the signal s
and the chirp stream-to-signal ratio where
a = ‖n(t)‖∞.
The coefficient a is required to provide a watermarked signal whose amplitude is
the same as the original signal n. The value of b is adjusted to provide an output
that is acceptable in the application to be considered but to also provide a robust
reconstruction of the binary sequence by correlating s(t) with chirp(t), t ∈ [0, T ).
6.4 Code Generation
In the previous section, the method of chirp coding a binary sequence and water-
marking the signal n(t) has been discussed where it is assumed that the sequence
is generated from n(t). In this section, the details of this method are presented.
There are a wide variety of coding methods that can be applied [216]. The problem
is to convert the salient characteristics of the signal n(t) into a sequence of bits that
is relatively short and conveys information on the signal in a unique and complete
way. There are a number of ways of undertaking this. For example, in practice the
digital signal ni - which is composed of an array of floating point numbers - could be
expressed in binary form and each element concatenated to form a contiguous bit
stream. However, the length of the code (i.e. the total number of bits in the stream)
will tend to be large leading to high computational costs in terms of the application
of chirp coding/decoding. What is required, is a process that yields a relatively
short binary sequence (when compared with the original signal) that reflects the im-
portant properties of the signal in its entirety. Two approaches are considered here:
(i) Power Spectral Density decomposition and (ii) Wavelet decomposition [217].
6.4.1 Power Spectrum Decomposition
Let N(ω) be the Fourier transform n(t) and define the Power Spectrum P (ω) as
P (ω) =| N(ω) |2
Here, we consider a binary sequence that is taken to ‘encode’ the spectral character-
istics of the signal. Thus, if for example, the binary sequence is based on just the low
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frequency components of the signal, then any distortion of the high frequencies of
the watermarked signal will not affect the recovered watermark. Hence, we consider
the case where the power spectrum is decomposed into N components as follows:
P1(ω) = P (ω), ω ∈ [0,Ω1)
P2(ω) = P (ω), ω ∈ [Ω1,Ω2)
...
PN (ω) = P (ω), ω ∈ [ΩN−1,ΩN )
Note that it is assumed that the signal n(t) is band-limited with a bandwidth of
ΩN .
The set of the functions P1, P2, ..., PN now represent the complete spectral char-
acteristics of the signal n(t). Since each of these functions represents a unique part
of the spectrum, we can consider a single measure as an identifier or tag. A natural
measure to consider is the energy which is given by the integral of the functions over
their frequency range. In particular, we can consider the energy values in terms of
their contribution to the spectrum as a percentage, i.e.
E1 =
100
E
Ω1∫
0
P1(ω)dω
E2 =
100
E
Ω2∫
Ω1
P2(ω)dω
...
EN =
100
E
ΩN∫
ΩN−1
PN (ω)dω
where
E =
ΩN∫
0
P (ω)dω.
Code generation is then based on the following steps:
(i) Rounding to the nearest integer the (floating point) values of Ei to decimal integer
form:
ei = round(Ei), ∀i
6 CHIRP CODING AND FRACTAL MODULATION 220
(ii) Decimal integer to binary string conversion:
bi = binary(ei)
(iii) Concatenation of the binary string array bi to a binary sequence:
fj = cat(bi)
The watermark fj is then generated by chirp coding.
6.4.2 Wavelet Decomposition
The wavelet transform was discussed earlier in this chapter and is defined by
Wˆ [f(t)] = FL(t) =
∫
f(τ)wL(t, τ)dτ
where
wL(t, τ) =
1√| L |w
(
t− τ
L
)
.
The wavelet transformation is essentially a convolution transform in which w(t) is
the convolution kernel but with a factor L introduced. The introduction of this factor
provides dilation and translation properties into the convolution integral (which is
now a function of L) that gives it the ability to analyse signals in a multi-resolution
role. It is this property that is the basis for considering the following approach.
We consider a code generating method that is based on computing the energies
of the wavelet transformation over N levels. Thus, the signal n(t) is decomposed
into wavelet space to yield the following set of functions:
FL1(τ), FL2(τ), ... FLN (τ).
The (percentage) energies of these functions are then computed, i.e.
E1 =
100
E
∫
| FL1(τ) |2 dτ,
E2 =
100
E
∫
| FL1(τ) |2 dτ,
...
EN =
100
E
∫
| FLN (τ) |2 dτ,
where
E =
N∑
i=1
Ei.
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The method of computing the binary sequence for chirp coding from these energy val-
ues follows that described in the method of power spectrum decomposition. Whether
applying the power spectrum decomposition method or wavelet decomposition tech-
nique, the computations are undertaken in digital form using a DFT and a DWT
(Discrete Wavelet Transform) respectively.
6.5 Coding and Decoding Processes
The coding process reads in a named file, applies the watermark to the data using
wavelet decomposition and writes out a new file using the same file format. The
decoding process reads a named file (assumed to contain the watermark or other-
wise), recovers the code from the watermarked data and then recovers the (same
or otherwise) code from the watermark. The coding program displays the decimal
integer and binary codes for analysis. The decoding program displays the decimal
integer streams generated by the wavelet analysis of the input signal and the stream
obtained by processing the signal to extract the watermark code or otherwise. This
process also provides an error measure based on the result
e =
∑
i
| xi − yi |∑
i
| xi + yi |
where xi and yi are the decimal integer arrays obtained from the input signal and
the watermark (or otherwise). In the application considered here, the watermarking
method has been applied to audio (.wav) files in order to test the method on data
which requires that the watermark does not affect the fidelity of the output (i.e.
audio quality). Only a specified segment of the data is extracted for watermarking
which is equivalent to applying and off-set to the data. The segment can be user
defined and if required, form the basis for a (private) key system. Further, any
wavelet can be used for this process and the actual wavelet used yields another
feature that can form part of the private key required to extract the watermark.
Coding Process
The coding process is compounded in the following basic steps:
Step 1: Read a .wav file.
Step 2: Extract a section of a single vector of the data (note that a .wav contains
stereo data, i.e. two vectors).
Step 3: Apply wavelet decomposition using Daubechies wavelets with 7 levels. Note
that in addition to wavelet decomposition, the approximation coefficients for the
input signal are computed to provide a measure on the global effect of introducing
the watermark into the signal. Thus, 8 decomposition vectors in total are generated.
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Step 4: Compute the (percentage) ‘energy values’.
Step 5: Round to the nearest integer and convert to binary form.
Step 6: Concatenate both the decimal and binary integer arrays.
Step 7: Chirp code the binary sequence.
Step 8: Scale the output and add to the original input signal.
Step 9: Re-scale the watermarked signal.
Step 10: Write to a file.
Decoding process
The decoding process is as follows:
Step 1: Steps 1-6 in the coding processes are repeated.
Step 2: Correlate the data with a chirp identical to that used for chirp coding.
Step 3: Extract the binary sequence.
Step 4: Convert from binary to decimal.
Step 5: Display the original and reconstructed decimal sequence.
Step 6: Display the error.
The method of digital watermarking compounded in coding/decoding algorithms
given makes specific use of the chirp function. This function is unique in terms of its
properties for reconstructing information (via application of the matched filter). The
approach considered here allows a code to be generated directly from the input signal
and that same code is used to watermark the signal. The code used to watermark
the signal is therefore self-generating. Reconstruction of the code only requires a
correlation process with the watermarked signal to be undertaken. This means that
the signal can be authenticated without access to an external reference code. In
other words, the method can be seen as a way of authenticating data by extracting
a code (the watermark) within a code (the signal) and is consistent with approaches
that attempt to reconstruct information without the host data [218].
Audio data watermarking schemes rely on the imperfections of the human au-
dio system. They exploit the fact that the human auditory system is insensitive
to small amplitude changes, either in the time or frequency domains, as well as
insertion of low amplitude time domain echoes. Spread spectrum techniques aug-
ment a low amplitude spreading sequence, which can be detected via correlation
techniques. Usually, embedding is performed in high amplitude portions of the sig-
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nal, either in the time or frequency domains. A common pitfall for both types of
watermarking systems is their intolerance to detector de-synchronization and defi-
ciency of adequate methods to address this problem during the decoding process.
Although other applications are possible, chirp coding provides a new and novel
technique for fragile audio watermarking. In this case, the watermarked signal does
not change the perceptual quality of the signal. In order to make the watermark
inaudible, the chirp generated is of very low frequency and amplitude. Using audio
files with sampling frequencies of over 1000Hz, a logarithmic chirp can be generated
in the frequency band of 1-100Hz. Since the human ear has low sensitivity in this
band, the embedded watermark will not be perceptible. Depending upon the band
and amplitude of the chirp, the signal-to-watermark (chirp stream) ratio can be in
excess of 40dB. Figure 26 is an example of an original and a watermarked audio
signal which shows no perceptual difference during a listening test. Various forms
of attack can be applied which change the distribution of the percentage sub-band
energies originally present in the signal including filtering (both low pass and high
pass), cropping and lossy compression (MP3 compression) with both constant and
variable bit rates. In each case, the signal and/or the watermark is distorted enough
to register the fact that the data has been tampered with. Figure 27 shows the
power spectral density of the original, watermarked and an attacked audio signal.
The band pass filtering attack is such that there is negligible change in the power
spectral density; however, the tampering is easily detected by the proposed tech-
nique. Further, chirp based watermarks are difficult to remove from the signal since
the initial and the final frequency is at the discretion of the user and its position in
the data stream can be varied through application of an offset, all such parameters
being combined to form a private key.
6.6 Application to Audio Data Authentication
With the increase in computing power and high bandwidth internet connectivity,
copying, editing and illegal distribution for audio has become very easy. To over-
come this problem, digital audio watermarking has been proposed for applications
such as copyright, annotation, authentication, broadcast monitoring, and tamper-
proofing [219], [220] and [222]. An important goal to be achieved by a watermark is
its imperceptibility such that the end user is unaware of its presence. This is espe-
cially important when the audio data is music where degradation in quality cannot
be tolerated. Most of the developed algorithms take advantage of the Human Audi-
tory System (HAS) limitations to embed a perceptually transparent watermark into
a host signal. A wide range of time domain embedding techniques such as alteration
of the Least Significant Bit (LSB) [224], echo addition [225], [226], Quantization
Index Modulation (QIM) and spread spectrum [228], [221] methods and transform
domain techniques such as Fourier, Cepstral [230], Wavelet [231], [232] , [233] etc.
have been tried. Most of these methods and the algorithms developed fall in the
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Figure 26: Original signal (above) and chirp based watermarked signal for tamper
proofing (below)
category of robust watermarking due to their high tolerance towards different at-
tacks. However, there are some applications where there is a need for checking the
authenticity/originality of audio. Such applications in digital audio authentication
can be found in areas such as broadcasting, sound recording of criminal events etc.
Thus, watermarking for such applications must be fragile i.e. the watermark should
‘break’ as soon as any tampering is undertaken on the (watermarked) signal. It is
also desirable to have a watermark extraction process that is ‘blind’, implying that
the original signal is not required to extract the watermark. To achieve this, a fixed
watermark sequence can be embedded. However, this decreases the security of the
scheme. Also, a unique watermark sequence should be used to increase security.
A solution to the this problem is to use a signal dependent watermark sequence.
However, to facilitate a blind extraction process, watermark extraction should be
transparent to the watermarking scheme (implying that the sequence extracted from
the original and watermarked signals are the same). A high robustness to attacks
along with a high data rate for the embedded watermark cannot be achieved simulta-
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Figure 27: Difference in the power spectral density of the original, watermarked and
tampered signal. The tampering attack is done by using a band pass filter with
normalised lower cut-off frequency of 0.01 and higher cut-off frequency 0.99
neously [192]. There have been various attempts to increase the payload capacity for
robust watermarking [234] including multi-level watermarking in different domains
that have recently been proposed [235].
In this section we consider a new multi-level robust audio watermarking scheme
based on embedding ‘chirp’ (i.e. a stream of frequency modulated signals). The
method exploits a unique property of a chirp which is that it can be recovered in very
noisy environment. The watermarking sequence is derived from the signal spectrum
by dividing it into sub-bands using wavelet decomposition. Four levels of watermark
are embedded without any perceptual distortion. Objective measurements using the
Perceptual Evaluation of Audio Quality (PEAQ) test are reported using audio files
from Speech Quality Assessment Material (SQAM) with an Objective Difference
Grade less than -1.0. The embedded watermark is found to be robust to different
simulated attacks. Due to two different processes of watermark sequence extraction,
self-authentication and tamper-assessment can also be performed using the proposed
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technique. Further, the HAS limitation of having poor sensitivity to frequencies
below 100Hz can be exploited. Along with robustness, the proposed scheme has a
capability for blind self-authentication as well. Thus, the scheme provides a multi-
level robust watermarking method with tamper detection capability.
A chirp is a signal whose frequency increases or decreases with time and may be
linear, quadratic or logarithmic as shown by the spectrograms in Figure 1.
Figure 28: Spectrograms of different types of chirp: linear (above), quadratic (cen-
tre) and logarithmic (below)
For example, the instantaneous frequency of a logarithmic chirp signal is given
by
ωi(t) = ω0 + 10βt (1)
where β is expressed as
β =
1
t1
log10(ω1 − ω0) (2)
Here, ω0 is the initial frequency and ω1 is the final frequency at time t1.
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6.6.1 Watermark Generation
To embed the watermark in a signal n(t), we use a chirp c(t) and watermark sequence
m based on the following equation
y (t) = n (t) + k · c (t) if m = 1, t ∈ [0, T ) (3)
y (t) = n (t)− k · c (t) if m = 0, t ∈ [0, T ) (4)
where y (t)is the watermarked signal and k is the scaling factor. The watermark
sequence is binary with ‘+1’ or ‘-1’ values which implies that a scaled version of a
chirp is added to the original signal in-phase or out-of-phase. This sequence can be
generated by using a secret key such that, once the key is known, the entire sequence
can be generated. In this paper we propose a technique to generate the watermark
sequence using the audio signal itself.
A unique property of an audio signal is its spectral variation. This can be
exploited to derive a watermark binary sequence. The entire power spectrum is
decomposed into N sub-bands i.e.
Pi (ω) = P (ω) , ω ∈ [Ωi−1,Ωi) 1 ≤ i ≤ N (5)
It is important that the signal n (t) is band-limited and has a bandwidth ofΩN .
The set of functions P1, P2, ..., PN represent the complete spectral characteristics
of the signal n (t). Since each of the components represents a unique part of the
spectrum, a natural measure is to consider the energy, which is given in terms of the
integral of the power spectrum over the frequency range. The energy calculated in
each sub-band is represented as a percentage of the total energy of the signal. The
reason for calculating percentage energies of the sub-bands is to avoid any influence
of signal scaling on the authentication of the signal. The energy in the ith sub-band
is given by
Ei =
100
E
∫ Ωi
Ωi−1
Pi(ω)dω 1 ≤ i ≤ N (6)
where
E =
∫ ΩN
0
P (ω)dω (7)
An audio signal is split into sub-bands by applying the wavelet transformation
which is defined by [236].
WL (t) =
∫
f (τ)wL (t, τ) dτ (8)
where
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WL (t, τ) =
1√|L|w
(
t− τ
L
)
Concatenating the total energy and sub-band energies gives a watermark vector.
All the elements of this vector are converted into binary form in which a ‘0’ is
replaced by ‘-1’ thereby giving the watermark binary sequence m. The watermark
is then embedded using equation (3). A second level of watermark is applied by
choosing a different initial and final frequency with a different watermark sequence.
The length of the chirp added can also be different for different levels.
6.6.2 Watermark Recovery
Recovery of the watermark binary sequence requires correlation of the chirp func-
tion over the desired interval ([nT, (n + 1)T) , n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ., ) with the water-
marked signal. This produces a correlation function that is either +1 or -1 depending
upon whether the embedded chirp is in-phase or out-of-phase. In practice +1 or -1
is never obtained and thus, thresholding is applied such that if the value is posi-
tive then the bit is assumed to be 1 and 0 otherwise. The chirp used to recover
the watermark must have the same parameters as those used during the embedding
watermark sequence. These parameters can be used to define part of a private key.
6.6.3 Results
To verify the proposed scheme, audio files were selected from the Speech Quality
Assessment Material (SQAM) which is commonly used for assessing the quality of
speech coders. A logarithmic chirp signal with a frequency sweep less than 100Hz
was used for embedding the watermark. This frequency range was chosen to keep the
watermarks imperceptible. Wavelet decomposition using a ‘Daubechies 4’ mother
wavelet was carried out. The resultant sub-bands obtained for a 48kHz sampled
signal are 0-3kHz, 3-6kHz, 6-9kHz, 9-12kHz, 12-15kHz, 15-18kHz and 18-24kHz. A
binary watermark sequence was derived by representing percentage sub-band ener-
gies by 12 bits with a total energy of 32 bits giving a total of 116 bit information.
The coded chirp was scaled and embedded into the signal. The first level of water-
mark was embedded by using a chirp frequency sweep of 0-15Hz. A total of four
embedding levels was investigated with chirp specifications as shown in Table 1.
In order to analyse the worst case performance, the same sub-band based wa-
termark sequence was embedded at all four levels. Further, the length of the chirp
and the start point for the embedding process was kept the same at all levels giving
overlapping chirp frequency ranges over a common time frame and thereby, giving a
maximum possibility of error during the detection process. Subjective assessment of
the speech quality was carried out by calculating the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) at
each embedding level. The average SNR was evaluated for different levels providing
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Embedding level Frequency range (Hz) SNR (dB) ODG
1 0-15 30.9050 -0.46556
2 0-30 28.1748 -0.77894
3 0-45 27.3172 -0.88256
4 0-60 26.7349 -0.95156
Table 4: SNR and ODG achieved for different level of embedding
the results shown in Table 1. This SNR can be improved if the length of the chirp
is increased. However, it is important to take into consideration the human hearing
curve to interpret the SNR achieved. Since the human ear has very poor sensitivity
below 100 Hz a lower SNR is still imperceptible upon listening. To further verify
the above results, tests based on Perceptual Assessment of Audio Quality (PEAQ,
Basic) [237] were also carried out. The PEAQ algorithm is the ITU-R recommen-
dation (ITU-R BS.1387) for perceptual evaluation of wide-band audio codecs. This
algorithm models fundamental properties of the auditory system along with physio-
logical and psychoacoustic effects. It uses both original and test signals, and applies
techniques to find differences between them. An Objective Difference Grade (ODG)
is evaluated using a total of eleven Model Output Variables (MOV) of the basic ver-
sion of PEAQ. The original signal and watermarked signal for different embedding
levels was used to evaluate ODG with results as given in Table 1. ODG values mimic
the listening test ratings and have values -4.0 (very annoying) to 0 (imperceptible
difference).
Although all the MOVs were calculated from the PEAQ (basic version) test,
only those relevant to watermarking are reported here. The Noise-to-Mask Ratio
(NMR) is an estimate in dBs of the ratio between the actual distortion (caused due
to the embedding watermark in this case) and the maximum inaudible distortion.
The total NMR is the average of the NMRs calculated over all frames. Negative
NMR values indicate inaudibility whereas values larger than 0dB indicate audible
distortions caused by the watermark. This is an important test for checking the
inaudibility of the embedded watermark at different levels. Results for both speech
signal and music signals were analysed separately and are plotted in Figure 3 along
with the overall average. As stated earlier, the SNR (obtained in Table 1) shows a
high level of watermark, but due to its very low frequency, it is not audible.
The noise loudness quantifies the partial loudness of distortions that is introduced
during when the watermark is embedded in the host signal. The Root Mean Square
(RMS) value of noise loudness has a maximum limit of 14.8197. Figure 4 shows
a normailsed plot of the average RMS noise loudness achieved on the SQAM data
for all of the 4 levels considered. It is possible for the total NMR to be below
0dB (implying inaudiable), but there may be a large number of frames with small
positive values and few frames with large negative value. This distribution can be
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seen by evaluating the number of disturbed frames. A relatively disturbed frame
is one in which the maximum NMR exceeds 1.5 dB and is expressed as a fraction
of the total frames. The results in Figure 4 show that with 4 level embedding,
less than 3.5 percent of the frames have an NMR above 1.5dB. Thus, the multi-
level watermarking proposed is imperceptible. To evaluate the robustness and self-
authentication capability, different attacks were simulated as discussed below.
6.6.4 Robustness
To evaluate the robustness of a multi-level watermark, correlation between the wa-
termark sequences (obtained by sub-band energies from the original signal) and the
extracted watermark (obtained by correlating the chirp with the watermarked signal)
was carried out. Different attacks such as addition of additive white Gaussian noise,
up-sampling, down-sampling, re-sampling, low-pass and high-pass filtering were car-
ried out on the multi-level watermarked audio signal. The tests were carried out on
all the SQAM files providing ‘average results’ as described below.
For an attack using additive noise, it was found that watermark embedded using
a low frequency sweep was more robust when compared to a high frequency sweep.
The average SNR at which the detection error starts for level-1 embedding was
found to be -1.9060dB while for level-4, it was 12.14dB. The overall robustness to
noise of the scheme was 13.0376dB which clearly shows that a level-4 watermark
(sweep from 0-60 Hz) is more sensitive to noise. Thus is, or course, to be expected
and illustrates that multi-level watermarking can help in embedding critical and
important information using lower frequency sweeps that it more resistant to attack.
The sampling rates were varied from 10% to 200% of the sampling frequency and
the watermark recovered at all levels without any error. Thus, the extraction scheme
has no effect on changes to the sampling rate. Amplitude scaling also observed to
have no effect on watermark recovery provided, it was constant over the entire
frequency band.
To simulate a filtering attack, the watermarked signal was passed through a
finite impulse response high-pass filter of order ‘50’ and cut-off frequency of ‘fc’.
This cut-off frequency was varied and extraction of watermark was carried out until
an error was obtained. It was observed that the error in recovering the watermark
occurred at fc=936Hz. Since a filter has smooth transitions from stop-band to pass-
band, the embedded chirp streams are not removed but severely attenuated. Since
the chirp can be extracted from very noisy environment, it is possible to extract
the watermark at high cut-off frequency. However, appreciable degradation of in
audio quality occurs using high-pass filters with fc=936Hz. The results obtained are
shown in Figure 5. Note that higher cut-off frequencies can be achieved if the order
of the filter is reduced. The scheme is resistant to low-pass filter attack since the
embedded watermark occupies a very low frequency band. Removing the watermark
by a low-pass filter effectively removes the entire signal along with the watermark.
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Attack % bit error Result
White noise (SNR=45.0732 dB) 0.59 Failed
Low-pass filter (bandwidth 0-23996Hz) 3.83 Failed
High-pass filter (bandwidth 3.84-24000Hz) 5.23 Failed
Sampling rate conversion (4*fs/5) 16.46 Failed
Sampling rate conversion (6*fs/5) 14.33 Failed
Up-sampling by 2+Down-sampling by 2 4.58 Failed
Down -sampling by 2+Up-sampling by 2 6.90 Failed
Table 5: Signal Authentication Test
To have intelligible audio quality, the bandwidth of the low-pass filter should be at
least 4 kHz for which the watermark is fully recoverable without any error.
6.6.5 Self-Authentication
For self-authentication of audio two watermark sequences are extracted from the
same watermarked signal and the original signal is not required. This gives an advan-
tage of blind signal authentication. A signal is authenticated if the two watermark
sequences extracted perfectly match. To evaluate self-authentication capability, ad-
ditive white Gaussian noise was generated and added to the watermarked signal.
The proposed technique could detect any added noise at a level of about 45.0732dB
SNR. This is because of change in percentage energies in the sub-bands as a result
of adding noise; even if the noise is perfectly white. Further the total energy also
changes by adding noise, thus the two extracted watermark sequence will not match.
A low-pass filter with a cut-off frequency of 23996Hz (which is 99.98% of full
bandwidth) was designed and the watermarked signal passed through. Although
the signal suffers imperceptible changes (because filtering changes the percentage
energy distribution) the extracted watermark sequenceS did not match perfectly.
A difference in 3.83% of the bit stream was found when the two watermarks were
compared. Similarly, a high-pass filter with a cut-off frequency of 3.84Hz was used
and a 5.23% bit error observed. In both cases, the filters were finite impulse response
filters of the order 50.
Altering the sampling rate changes the percentage of sub-band energies which is
thus, easily detected. By re-sampling at 80% of the sampling frequency, a 16.46% bit
error was observed, while for re-sampling at 120% of sampling frequency a bit error
of 14.33% was observed. While keeping the final rates unaltered, the signal was first
up-sampled and then down-sampled. This attack was also detected with the results
shown in Table 2. The proposed multi-level watermarking scheme discussed in this
paper is found to be robust to various attacks tested. Further, it is observed that
a low frequency chirp sweep provides more robustness when compared to a high
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frequency sweep. Thus, different levels of watermark robustness can be achieved
using this technique. Since the watermark sequence is derived from the percentage
sub-band energies, it is unique and signal dependent. Due to the two different
process of watermark extraction, the method has an additional advantage in terms of
self-authenticity, thereby making a multi-level watermarking scheme simultaneously
robust and fragile.
6.7 Secure Digital Communications
A digital communications systems is one that is based on transmitting and receiving
bit streams. The basic processes involved are as follows: (i) a digital signal is
obtained from sampling an analogue signal derived from some speech and/or video
system; (ii) this signal is converted into a binary signal consisting of 0s and 1s (bit
stream); (iii) the bit stream is then modulated and transmitted; (iv) at reception,
the transmitted signal is demodulated to recover the transmitted bit stream; (v) the
digital signal is reconstructed. Digital to analogue conversion may then be required
depending on the type of technology being used.
In the case of sensitive information, an additional step is required between stages
(ii) and (iii) above where the bit stream is coded according to some classified algo-
rithm. Appropriate decoding is then introduced between stages (iv) and (v) with
suitable pre-processing to reduce the effects of transmission noise for example which
introduces bit errors. The bit stream coding algorithm is typically based on a pseu-
dorandom number generator or non-linear maps in chaotic regions of their phase
spaces (chaotic number generation). The modulation technique is typically either
Frequency Modulation or Phase Modulation. Frequency modulation involves assign-
ing a specific frequency to each 0 in the bit stream and another higher (or lower)
frequency to each 1 in the stream. The difference between the two frequencies
is minimized to provide space for other channels within the available bandwidth.
Phase modulation involves assigning a phase value (0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2) to one of
four possible combinations that occur in a bit stream (i.e. 00, 11, 01 or 10).
‘Spread spectrum’ or ‘frequency hopping’ is used to spread the transmitted (e.g.
frequency modulated) information over many different frequencies. Although spread
spectrum communications use more bandwidth than necessary, by doing so, each
communications system avoids interference with another because the transmissions
are at such minimal power, with only spurts of data at any one frequency. The
emitted signals are so weak that they are almost imperceptible above background
noise. This feature results in an added benefit of spread spectrum which is that
eaves-dropping on a transmission is very difficult and in general, only the intended
receiver may ever known that a transmission is taking place, the frequency hopping
sequence being known only to the intended party. Direct sequencing, in which the
transmitted information is mixed with a coded signal, is based on transmitting each
bit of data at several different frequencies simultaneously, with both the transmitter
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and receiver synchronized to the same coded sequence. More sophisticated spread
spectrum techniques include hybrid ones that leverage the best features of frequency
hopping and direct sequencing as well as other ways to code data. These methods
are particularly resistant to jamming, noise and multipath anomalies, a frequency
dependent effect in which the signal is reflected from objects in urban and/or ru-
ral environments and from different atmospheric layers, introducing delays in the
transmission that can confuse any unauthorized reception of the transmission.
6.8 Fractal Modulation
Embedding information in data whose properties and characteristics resemble those
of the background noise of a transmission system is of particular interest in covert
digital communications. Here, we explore a method of coding bit streams by modu-
lating the fractal dimension of a fractal noise generator. Techniques for reconstruct-
ing the bit streams (i.e. solving the inverse problem) in the presence of additive noise
(assumed to be introduced during the transmission phase) are then considered. This
form of ‘embedding information in noise’ is of value in the transmission of informa-
tion in situations when a communications link requires an extra level of security
or when an increase in communications traffic needs to be hidden in a covert sense
by coupling an increase in the background noise of a given area with appropriate
disinformation. Alternatively, the method can be considered to be just another layer
of covert technology used for digital communications in general.
The purpose of fractal modulation is to try and make a bit stream ‘look like’
transmission noise (assumed to be fractal). Here we focus on the design of algorithms
which encode a bit stream in terms of two fractal dimensions that can be combined
to produce a fractal signal characteristic of transmission noise. Ultimately, fractal
modulation can be considered to be an alternative to frequency modulation although
it requires a significantly greater bandwidth for its operation.
The problem is as follows: given an arbitrary binary code, convert it into a non-
stationary fractal signal by modulating the fractal dimension in such a way that the
original binary code can be recovered in the presence of additive noise with minimal
bit errors.
In terms of the theoretical details considered in Chapter 3, we consider a model
of the type
u(t) =
1
t1−q(t)/2
⊗t n(t)
where n is a stochastic functions and where q(t) is assigned two states, namely q1
and q2 (which correspond to 0 and 1 in a bit stream respectively) for a fixed period
of time. The forward problem (fractal modulation) is then defined as: given q(t)
compute u(t). The inverse problem (fractal demodulation) is defined as: given u(t)
compute q(t) in the presence of assumed additive noise.
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6.8.1 Computational Methods
There are two principal digital algorithms that are required to implement fractal
modulation in practice. The first of these concerns the computation of discrete
fractal noise uj given q which is as follows:
• Compute a pseudorandom zero mean (Gaussian) distributed array nj , j =
0, 1, ..., N − 1.
• Compute the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of nj giving Nj ideally using
a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) which limits the N −1 to be an integer power
of 2.
• Filter Nj with 1/(iωj)q/2.
• Inverse DFT the result using a FFT to give uj (real part).
The second algorithm is an inversion algorithm. Given the digital algorithm
described above, the inverse problem can be defined as given uj compute q. A
suitable approach to solving this problem, which is consistent with the algorithm
given above is to estimate q from the power spectrum of uj whose expected form
(considering the positive half space only and excluding the DC component which is
singular) is
Pˆj =
A
ωqj
; j = 1, 2, ..., (N/2)− 1
where A is a constant. Here, we assume that the FFT provides data in ‘standard
form’ and that the DC or zero frequency component occurs at j = 0. If we now
consider the error function
e(A, q) = ‖ lnPj − lnPˆj‖22
where Pj is the power spectrum of uj , then the solution of the equations (least
squares method)
∂e
∂q
= 0;
∂e
∂A
= 0
gives
q =
(
N
2 − 1
) (N/2)−1∑
j=1
[(lnPj)(lnωj)]−
(
(N/2)−1∑
j=1
lnωj
)(
(N/2)−1∑
j=1
lnPj
)
(
(N/2)−1∑
j=1
lnωj
)2
− (N2 − 1) (N/2)−1∑
j=1
(lnωj)2
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and
A = exp

(N/2)−1∑
j=1
lnPj + q
(N/2)−1∑
j=1
lnωj
N
2 − 1
 .
The algorithm required to implement this inverse solution is as follows:
• Compute the power spectrum Pj of the fractal noise uj using an FFT.
• Extract the positive half space data (excluding the DC term).
• Compute q.
This algorithm (which is commonly known as the Power Spectrum Method)
provides a reconstruction for q which is (on average) accurate to 2 decimal places
for N ≥ 64.
6.8.2 Modulation and Demodulation
Instead of working in terms of the Fourier dimension q, we shall consider the fractal
dimension given by
D =
5− 2q
2
where D ∈ (1, 2). The technique is outlined below:
• For a given bit stream, allocate Dmin to bit=0 and Dmax to bit=1.
• Compute a fractal signal of length N for each bit in the stream.
• Concatenate the results to produce a contiguous stream of fractal noise.
The total number of samples can be increased through N (the number of samples
per fractal) and/or increasing the number of fractals per bit. This results in improved
estimates of the fractal dimensions leading to a more accurate reconstruction.
Fractal demodulation is achieved by computing the fractal dimensions using a
conventional moving window to provide the fractal dimension signature Di, i =
0, 1, 2, .... The bit stream is then obtained from the following algorithm:
If Di ≤ ∆ then bit =0;
If Di > ∆ then bit =1;
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where
∆ = Dmin +
1
2
(Dmax −Dmin).
The principal criteria for the optimization of this modulation/demodulation tech-
nique is to minimize (Dmax − Dmin) subject to accurate reconstructions for Di in
the presence of (real) transmission noise with options on:
(i) fractal size - the number of samples used to compute a fractal signal;
(ii) fractals per bit - the number of fractal signals used to represent one bit;
(iii) Dmin (the fractal dimension for bit=0) and Dmax (the fractal dimension for
bit=1);
(iv) addition of Gaussian noise before reconstruction for a given SNR.
Option (iv) is based on the result compounded in the asymptotic model where the
signal is taken to be the sum of fractal noise and white Gaussian noise.
An example of a fractal modulated signal is given in Figure 29 in which the binary
code 0....1....0.... has been considered in order to illustrate the basic principle.
This figure shows the original binary code (top window) the (clipped) fractal
signal (middle window) and the fractal dimension signature Di (lower window -
dotted line) using 1 fractal per bit, 64 samples per fractal for a ‘Low dimension’
(Dmin) and a ‘Hi dimension’ (Dmax) of 1.1 and 1.9 respectively. The reconstructed
code is superimposed on the original code (top window - dotted line) and the original
and estimated codes are displayed on the right hand side. In this example, there is
a 2% bit error. By increasing the number of fractals per bit so that the bit stream is
represented by an increased number of samples, greater accuracy can be achieved.
This is shown in Figure 30 where for 3 fractals/bit there are no bit errors. In
this example, each bit is represented by concatenating 3 fractal signals each with 64
samples. The reconstruction is based on a moving window of size 64. In Figures 17.9
and 17.10, the change in signal texture from 0 to 1 and from 1 to 0 is relatively clear
because (Dmin, Dmax) = (1.1, 1.9). By reducing the difference in fractal dimension,
the textural changes across the signal can be reduced. This is shown in Figure 31
for (Dmin, Dmax) = (1.6, 1.9) and a random 64 bit pattern where there is 1 bit in
error. Figure 32 shows the same result but with 10% white Gaussian noise added
to the fractal modulated signal before demodulation. Note that the bit errors have
not been increased as a result of adding 10% noise.
Fractal modulation is a technique which attempts to embed a bit stream in fractal
noise by modulating the fractal dimension. The errors associated with recovering
a bit stream are critically dependent on the SNR. The reconstruction algorithm
provides relatively low bit error rates with a relatively high level of noise, provided
the difference in fractal dimension is not too small and that many fractals per bit
are used. In any application, the parameter settings would have to optimized with
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Figure 29: Fractal modulation of the code 0...1...0... for one fractal per bit.
respect to a given transmission environment.
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Figure 30: Fractal modulation of the code 0...1...0... for three fractals per bit.
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Figure 31: Fractal modulation of a random bit stream without additive noise.
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Figure 32: Fractal modulation of a random bit stream with 10% additive noise.
7 DIGITAL IMAGE WATERMARKING METHODS 241
7 Digital Image Watermarking Methods
The use of image based information exchange has grown rapdily over the years in
terms of both e-to-e image storage and transmission and in terms of maintaining
paper documents in electronic form. Further, with the dramatic improvements in the
quality of COTS printing and scanning devices, the ability to counterfeit documents
has become a widespread problem. Consequently, there has been an increasing
demand to develop digital watermarking techniques which can be applied to both
electronic and printed images (and documents) that can be authenticated, prevent
unauthorized copying of their content and withstand a substantial amount of abuse
and degradation before and during scanning.
Like many aspects of digital signal processing watermarking schemes fall into
two categories: spatial domain and transform domain techniques. This depends
on whether the watermark is encoded by directly modifying pixels (such as sim-
ply flipping low-order bits of selected pixels) or by altering some frequency coeffi-
cients obtained by transforming the image in the frequency domain. Spatial domain
techniques are simple to implement and often require a lower computational cost,
although they can be less robust against tampering than methods that place the
watermark in the transform domain. This section14 provides an overview of the
principal techniques associated with digital image watermarking.
7.1 Transform Domain Methods
Watermarking schemes that operate in a transform space are increasingly common,
as these schemes possess a number of desirable features including:
• By transforming spatial data into another domain, statistical independence
between pixels as well as high-energy compaction can be obtained.
• The watermark is irregularly distributed over the entire spatial image upon an
inverse transformation, which makes it more difficult for attackers to decode
and read the mark.
• One can provide markers according to the perceptual significance of different
transform domain components, which means that one can adaptively place a
watermark where it is least noticeable, such as within a textured area.
• Transform domain methods can hide messages in significant areas of the cover
which makes them more robust against several attacks and distortion. How-
ever, while they are more robust to various kinds of signal processing, they
remain imperceptible to the human sensory system.
14An edited version of K. W. Mahmoud, Low Resolution Watermarking for Print Security, PhD
Thesis, Loughborough University, 2005, (Chpater 2).
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• Cropping may be a serious threat to any spatially based watermark but is less
likely to affect a frequency-based scheme. Since watermarks applied to the
frequency domain will be dispersed over the entirety of the spatial image upon
inverse transformation, we can retrieve part of the watermark.
• Lossy compression is an operation that usually eliminates perceptually unim-
portant components of a signal. Most processing of this sort takes place in
the frequency domain. In fact, matching the transform with a compression
transform may result in better performance of the data-hiding schema (i.e.
DCT for JPEG, Wavelet for JPEG-2000).
• The characteristics of the Human Visual System (HVS) can be fully exploited
in the frequency domain.
7.2 Frequency Domain Processing and HVS
It is usually the case, that the HVS is not sensitive to small changes in edges and
texture but they are very sensitive to small changes in the smooth areas of an
image. In flat featureless portions of the image, important information concerned
with the ’flat parts’ concentrate on the lowest frequency components, while, in a
highly textured image, energy is concentrated in the high frequency components.
Therefore, the human eyes are more sensitive to lower frequency noise, rather than
high frequency noise. Taking into account these fundamental points:
• The watermark should be embedded into the higher frequency components
to achieve better perceptual invisibility, however, high frequencies might be
discarded after attacks such as lossy compression, shrinking or scanning.
• In order to prevent the watermark from being easily attacked, it is often nec-
essary to embed it into the lower frequency coefficients. The attacker can not
change these coefficients, otherwise the image can be damaged. However, the
human eyes are more sensitive to lower frequency noise.
From the points discussed above, in order to invisibly embed a watermark, which
can survive most attacks, it is clear, that a reasonable trade-off is to embed the
watermark into the middle frequency range of the image [238].
7.3 Frequency Domain Processing
In watermarking in the transform domain, the original host data is transformed,
and the transformed coefficients are perturbed by a small amount in one of several
possible ways in order to represent the watermark. Coefficient selection is based
on perceptual significance or energy significance. When the watermarked image is
compressed or modified by any image processing operation, noise is added to the
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already perturbed coefficients. The private retrieval operation subtracts the received
coefficients from the original ones to obtain the noise perturbation. The watermark
is then estimated from the noisy data as best as possible. The most difficult problem
associated with blind watermark detection in the frequency domain is to identify the
coefficients used for watermarking. Embedding can be done by adding a pseudo-
random noise field, quantization (threshold) or image (logo) fusion. Most algorithms
consider HVS to minimize perceptibility. The aim is to place more information bits
where they are most robust to attack and are least noticeable. Most schemes operate
directly on the components of some transform of the cover such as the Discrete Co-
sine Transform (DCT), Discrete Wavelet Transforms (DWT) and Discrete Fourier
Transforms (DFT). In this section we introduce each transformation, illustrate its
main features and introduce some techniques that use transformation in watermark-
ing.
7.4 Discrete Cosine Transform
The DCT transform has a number of advantages in respect of watermarking:
• The DCT has the primary advantage that it is a sequence of real numbers,
provided that the input sequence is real.
• The two-dimensional DCT is the basis for most popular lossy digital image
compression systems used today, e.g. the JPEG system.
• The sensitivity of HVS to the DCT basis images has been extensively studied
resulting in a default JPEG quantization table.
7.5 Embedding Techniques using the DCT
Zhao, et al. [239] approach the problem by segmenting the image into 8x8 blocks.
Block DCT transformation and quantization steps are applied on each block. A bit
of information can be encoded in a block using the relation between three quan-
tized DCT coefficients (c1, c2, andc3) from this block. The three coefficients must
correspond to the middle frequencies. One block encodes a ‘1’, if c1 > c3 + d and
c2 > c3 +d. On the other hand, a ‘0’ is encoded, if c1 +d < c3 and c2 +d < c3. The
parameter d accounts for the minimum distance between two coefficients. The higher
d is, the more robust the method will be against image processing techniques. If the
relations between the coefficients do not correspond to the encoded bit, a change
must be made to the coefficients so that they can represent the encoded bit. If the
modification required to code one bit of information is too large, then the block is not
used and marked as an invalid block. Consequently, the blocks are de-quantized and
the inverse DCT is applied. In the decoding step, comparing the three coefficients
of every block in the quantized DCT domain can restore the label.
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Cox, et al. [240] present an image watermarking method in which the mark
(a sequence of real numbers {wi} having a normal distribution with zero mean and
a unity variance) is embedded in the n (excluding the DC term) most perceptually
significant frequency components V = {vi} of an image’s DCT to provide greater
robustness to JPEG compression. The watermark is inserted using he procedure
v´i = vi + α × vi × wi. This modulation law is designed to take into account the
frequency masking characteristics of the human visual system. This non-linear in-
sertion procedure adapts the watermark to the energy present in each coefficient.
The advantage of this is that when vi is small, the watermark energy is also small,
thereby avoiding artifacts. When vi is large, the watermark energy is increased
for robustness. The parameter α represents a compromise between robustness and
image fidelity. The presence of the watermark is verified by extracting the main
components of the original image and those with same index from a watermarked
image and inverting the embedding formula to give a possibly modified watermark
W ′. The watermark is said to be present if the correlation between W and W ′ is
greater than a given threshold.
Barni, et al. [241] propose a watermarking algorithm similar to Cox’s method.
However, instead of using the n largest DCT coefficients as Cox does, the set is
produced by arranging the DCT coefficients in a zigzag order and a subset in the
mid-frequency range is selected. The lowest coefficients are then skipped to preserve
perceptual invisibility. The watermark is then embedded in this set of coefficients
in the same way as Cox’s. In order to enhance the invisibility of the watermark, the
spatial masking characteristics of the HVS are also exploited to adapt the watermark
to the image being signed: the original image I and the watermarked image I ′ are
added pixel by pixel according to a local weighting factor b(i, j), thus producing a
new watermarked image ˆIi,j = Ii,j(1− bi,j) + bi,j × I ′i,j , in a region characterized by
low-noise sensitivity, where the embedding of the watermarking data is easier (e.g.
highly textured regions where bi,j ≈ 1), i.e. in regions more sensitive to change, in
which the insertion of the watermark is more disturbing (e.g. uniform regions where
bi,j ≈ 0) the watermark is embedded only to a minor extent. In the extraction
phase, one first extracts the subset of modified coefficients from the full frame DCT
of the watermarked image. The correlation between the marked (possibly corrupted
coefficients) and the mark itself is taken as a measure of the mark presence.
O’ Ruanaidh, et al. [242] present a private watermarking technique for images
using bi-directional coding in the DCT domain. In bi-directional coding, the image
is divided up into blocks. The DCT is computed for each block. The mean of each
block is incremented to encode a ‘1’ or decremented to encode a ‘0’. This may be
accomplished by using simple thresholding techniques. A JPEG quantization table
(visual masking) is used to weight the DCT coefficients in each block. The most
significant components are then selected by comparing the square of the component
magnitude to the total energy in the block. In the decoding step, the mean of
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each block in the original non-watermarked image is compared with the mean of the
corresponding blocks in the tested copy to decode the stored bit.
Swanson, et al. [243] embed the watermark by computing the DCT for each
block in the cover. A perceptual mask is computed for each block. The resulting
perceptual mask is then scaled and multiplied by the DCT of the pseudo-noise wa-
termark. The schema uses a different sequence for each block. The watermark is
then added to the corresponding block. The watermark can be detected by correlat-
ing the modified watermark with the original watermark and comparing the result
to a threshold.
Chae, et al. [244] use a public technique to embed a signature (watermark)
into images. The signature DCT coefficients are quantized according to a signature
quantization matrix. The resulting quantized coefficients are encoded using lattice-
codes. The choice of the signature quantization matrix affects the quantity and the
quality of the embedded data. The codes are inserted into the middle frequency
DCT coefficients of the host image. This insertion is adaptive to the local texture
content of the host image blocks and is controlled by the block texture factor. The
texture factor is computed using a wavelet transform. The selected host coefficients
are then replaced by the signature codes and combined with the original unaltered
DCT coefficients to form a fused block of DCT coefficients. The fused coefficients
are then inverse-transformed to give an embedded image.
Bors, et al. [245] propose a watermark algorithm based on imposing con-
straints in the DCT domain. The block sites for embedding the watermark are
selected based on a Gaussian network classifier, then the DCT constraints are em-
bedded in the selected blocks. Two distinct algorithms are considered here. The
first algorithm embeds a linear constraint on selected DCT frequency coefficients
(i.e. Y = FQ, where F is the vector of the modified DCT coefficients, and Q is
the weighting vector provided by the watermark). In the second approach, circular
regions are defined around certain DCT coefficients. For a selected block site, they
evaluate the Euclidean distance between its DCT coefficient vectors and that of the
watermark. The chosen DCT coefficients are changed to the value of the closest
watermark parameter vector. After modifying the DCT values, the image is recon-
structed based on the inverse DCT transform. In the detection stage, a check is
made on the DCT constraints after which the respective block is located. A given
site is considered as being ’signed’ when the probability of detecting the constrained
DCT coefficients and the probability of detecting the location constraint is maxi-
mized. The original image is not required for watermark detection and simulations
have showed this method to be resistant to JPEG compression and filtering.
Kankanhalli, et al. [203] propose a way of analysing the noise sensitivity of
every pixel based on the local region content (texture, edges and luminance). If
the distortion caused by the watermarking algorithm is at or below a threshold, the
degradation in the original image quality is imperceptible. The analysis is based on
the DCT coefficients. The energy in the DCT coefficients can be used as a measure of
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roughness, and the count of large-magnitude fluctuations in a high-energy block can
then be used to decide if the block has an edge or is highly textured. The work also
analyses the contribution of luminance to noise sensitivity. This luminance analysis
is done at the pixel level in the spatial domain. The authors use the previous mask
to embed an invisible watermark in the spatial domain.
B. Tao, et al. [246] have an approach that is similar to that of [203]. Here,
the block as a whole is given a sensitivity label that shapes the watermark based
on texture and edges analysis. The embedding is then done in the DCT transform
domain.
7.6 Discrete Wavelet Transform
The Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) is similar to a hierarchical sub-band sys-
tem, where the sub-bands are logarithmically spaced in frequency and represent
octave-band decomposition. The DWT can be implemented using digital filters and
down-samplers [247]. The original image is split into four quadrant bands after
decomposition. The four quadrants contain approximations to the sub-band (LL),
horizontal detail sub-band (LH), vertical detail sub-band (HL) and a diagonal detail
sub-band (HH). This process can be repeatedly applied on the approximation sub-
band to generate the next coarser scale wavelet coefficients. The process continues
until some final scale is reached. The wavelets transform has a number of advantages
[248], [249] over other transform that can be exploited for watermarking including
the following:
• It is well known that wavelet coding has been exploited in new compression
standards such as JPEG2000 and MPEG4 due to the excellent performance
in compression.
• The wavelet transform requires a lower computational cost of O(n) compared
with the Fourier or the Cosine transform which are of O(nlogn), where n is
the length of the signal.
• The wavelet transform processes data at different scales or resolutions, high-
lighting both large and small features. This allows watermarking to become
adaptive as it depends on the local image characteristic at each resolution
level.
• The wavelet functions provide good space-frequency localization and thus, they
are suited for analyzing images where most of the informative content is rep-
resented by components localized in space such as edges and borders.
• With the DWT, the edges and texture are usually exploited very well in the
high frequency sub-band (HH, HL and LH). Therefore, adding a watermark
via these large coefficients is difficult for the human eye to perceive.
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• Wavelet functions have advantages over traditional Fourier methods in ana-
lyzing signals containing many discontinuities or sharp changes.
• The wavelet transform is flexible enough to adapt to a given set of images
or particular type of application. The decomposition filters (such as Haar,
Daubechies-4, 6 or bi-orthogonal filters) and the decomposition structure (wavelet
packet, complex wavelet transform) can be chosen to reflect the characteristics
of the image.
• Research into human perception [250] indicates that the retina of the eye splits
an image into several frequency channels each spanning a bandwidth of ap-
proximately one octave. The signals in these channels are processed indepen-
dently. Similarly, in a multi-resolution decomposition, the image is separated
into bands of equal bandwidth on a logarithmic scale. It can, therefore, be
expected that use of the discrete wavelet transform will allow the independent
processing of the resulting components without significant perceptible inter-
action between them, and hence, makes the process of imperceptible marking
more effective. For this reason the wavelet decomposition is commonly used
for the fusion of images.
7.7 Embedding Techniques in the DWT Domain
There have and continue to be many attempts to use the wavelet transform in
watermarking. These include the following.
Xia, et al. [248] propose a private watermarking system. The method uti-
lizes large DWT coefficients of all sub-bands excluding the approximation image
to equally embed a random Gaussian distributed watermark sequence in the whole
image. The decoding process is based on a hierarchical correlation of coefficients at
different sub-bands. First, they apply a one level DWT to the watermarked image
and then on the original image. The difference (corrupted watermark) of the DWT
coefficients in the HH band of the watermarked and the original image is then calcu-
lated. Then, the cross-correlation between the corrupted watermark and the part of
the original watermark that was added in the HH band is determined. If there is a
peak in the cross correlation, the watermark is considered to be detected, otherwise
they consider the other bands at the same level (i.e. HH and LH, then HH, LH and
HL). In case the watermark still cannot be detected, they compute a new level of
the DWT and try to detect the watermark again. This process is performed until
the watermark is detected or the last level of the DWT has been reached.
Kundur, et al. [250] embed a binary watermark into the detail wavelet co-
efficients of the host image with the use of a key. This binary randomly generated
key is used to select the exact locations in the wavelet domain (ones location) in
which to embed the watermark. First, they compute the Lth level discrete wavelet
decomposition of the host image to produce a sequence of a L3 detailed images.
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Then, for each level, the embedding modulation at any of the selected coefficients is
undertaken as follows:
• Order the horizontal, vertical and diagonal detail coefficients at this location
(high, middle, and low).
• The range of values between high and low is divided into bins of width (high−
low)/(2Q− 1) where Q is a user-defined variable. These bins represent 1 and
-1 in a periodic manner.
• To embed a watermark bit of value 1, the middle coefficients are quantized to
the nearest 1 bin. Alternatively, to embed a bit of -1, the middle coefficient is
quantized to the nearest -1 bin.
Finally, apply the inverse wavelet transform to form the watermarked image.
In Kunder, et al. [251] the host is transformed to the Lth level discrete
wavelet decomposition. Only the first level discrete wavelet decomposition of the
watermark is performed. The watermark is a random binary two-dimensional ar-
ray. It is required that the size of the watermark in relation to the host image be
small. The detailed images of the host at each resolution level are segmented into a
non-overlapping rectangle. Each rectangle has the same size as any bands of the wa-
termark. A numerical measure of perceptual importance (salience) of each of these
localized segments is computed. The watermark is embedded by a simple scaled
addition of the watermark to the particular detail component. The scaling of the
watermark is a function of the salience of the region. The greater the salience, the
stronger the presence of the watermark. Finally the corresponding Lth level inverse
wavelet transform is performed. Salience is computed based on a well-known model
given by Dooly [252], which is based on contrast sensitivity.
The original image is required in the extraction process. The extraction process is
done by applying the inverse procedure at each resolution level to obtain an estimate
of the watermark. The estimates for each resolution level are averaged to produce
an overall estimate of the watermark.
Ohnishi [253] propose an algorithm similar to the Kunder [250] technique. The
most significant difference between the two methods lies in the merging stage of the
watermark. Here the author marks the host by forcing the modulo 2 difference
between the largest and smallest wavelet coefficients for a particular position and
resolution level to be one if w(n) = 1 and to be zero if w(n) = −1.
In M. Barni, et al. [254] the authors present a public watermarking system.
A binary pseudo-random sequence is weighted with a function, which takes into
account the human visual system (orientation, brightness, and texture) and is then
added to the DWT coefficients of the three largest detail sub-bands of the image
(i.e.‘first level). For watermark detection, the correlation between the watermark
to be tested for its presence and the marked coefficients is computed. The value
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of the correlation is compared to a threshold to decide if the watermark is present
or not. Experimental results prove the imperceptibility of the watermark and the
robustness against the more common attacks. A model for estimating the sensitivity
of the eye to noise - previously proposed for compression applications [255]- is used
to adapt the watermark strength to the local content of the image.
Inoue, et al. [256] propose two public digital watermarking schemes to em-
bed a binary code. Both methods are built on a data structure called a zerotree,
which is defined in the Embedded Zerotree Wavelet (EZW) algorithm of Shapiro
[257]. Zerotree coding is based on the hypothesis that if a wavelet coefficient at a
coarse scale is insignificant with respect to a given threshold T , then all wavelet
coefficients of the same orientation in the same spatial location at a finer scale are
likely to be insignificant with respect to T . The zerotree is used to classify wavelet
coefficients as insignificant or significant as follows: given an amplitude threshold T ,
if a wavelet coefficient x and all of it descendants (i.e. coefficients corresponding to
the same spatial locations but at finer scales of similar orientation) satisfy |x| < T
then they are called insignificant with respect to a given threshold T or zerotree for
the threshold T (otherwise significant coefficients). In one method, the zerotrees are
constructed for any coarsest sub-band (except LL sub-band) for a specific threshold.
Each watermark binary digit is embedded by writing the same data in the location
of all elements of the current zerotree. Data is redundantly embedded because in-
significant coefficients are generally easy to change under the influence of common
signal processing. In the second method, the watermark can be embedded by thresh-
olding and modifying significant coefficients at the coarser levels. However, it is well
known that the modification of these components can lead to perceptual degradation
of the signal. To avoid this, they make the value of T larger than in the previous
method. As a result, the regions in which the watermark is embedded are applied to
detailed portions, i.e. edges or textures, in the coarsest scale component. Therefore,
embedding the watermark into significant coefficients is difficult for human eyes to
perceive. The watermark is detected by using the position of the zerotree’s root and
the threshold value after the wavelet decomposition of the cover image. It is shown
that the proposed method is robust against several common signal processes.
7.8 Discrete Fourier Transform
The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of a function provides a quantitative picture
of the frequency content in terms of magnitude and phase. This is important in a
wide range of physical problems and is fundamental to the processing and analysis
of signals and images. It is very important to know the properties of DFT so that
it can be exploited efficiently. Some of these properties are listed below:
Positive Symmetry. If f(n,m);n = 1, 2, ..., N,m = 1, 2, ...,M is real (which is
the case of images), its DFT is conjugate symmetric [247]; that is F (p, q) =
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F ∗(N−p,M−q). To ensure the inverse DFT is real, changes in the magnitude
must preserve positive symmetry.
Negative Symmetry. This is the same as the above with regard to the phase
component (φ ), but in this case, we have a negative symmetry compounded
in the result
φp,q = φp,q + δ
φN−p,M−q = φN−p,M−q − δ
Scaling. Scaling in the spatial domain causes inverse scaling in the Fourier do-
main (i.e. as the spatial scale expands, the frequency scale contracts and the
amplitude increases vertically in such a way as to keep the area constant), i.e.
if f(x, y) DFT−−−→ F (kx, ky) then f(axx, axy) DFT−−−→ 1
a
F (
kx
a
,
ky
a
)
Translation. The translation property of Fourier transform is defined as
if f(x, y) DFT−−−→ F (kx, ky) then
f(x+ a, y + b) DFT−−−→ F (kx, ky)e−i(akx+bky)
This indicates that the phase is altered only by a translation, i.e. the amplitude
is insensitive to the spatial shift of an image. Note that both f and F are
periodic functions so it is implicitly assumed that the translation causes the
image to be ‘wrapped around’ (circular translation) [258]. By translation, zero
padding of an image will occur if it were placed on a scanner and scanned.
Rotation. Rotating the image through an angle in the spatial domain causes the
Fourier representation to be rotated through the same angle [258], i.e.
f(x cos θ − y sin θ, x sin θ + y cos θ) DFT−−−→
F (kx cos θ − ky sin θ, kx sin θ + ky cos θ)
Log-Polar Representation. Most watermarking algorithms have problems in ex-
tracting the watermark after an affine geometric transformation on the water-
marked object. Some methods try to invert the effect of geometric distortion
using the original image. An alternative way is to build a system that can de-
tect the watermark even after a geometric distortion is applied, i.e. Rotation,
Scaling and Translation invariance (RST invariant). Most of these systems
use the properties of log-polar representation of the spectrum. In a log-polar
mapping (which is defined as x = r cos θ, y = r sin θ), the rotation and scaling
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in a Cartesian coordinate system will result in a translation in the logarithmic
coordinate system, i.e.
if f(x, y)
logh polar mapping−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ f(µ, θ) then
f(ax, ay)
log polar mapping−−−−−−−−−−−−→ f(µ+ loga, θ)
and
if f(x cos(θ + δ)− y sin(θ + δ), x sin(θ + δ) + y cos(θ + δ))
log polar mapping−−−−−−−−−−−−→ f(µ, θ + δ)
From the translation property of the Fourier transform as well as the properties
of a log-polar mapping, we can create a RST invariant domain by applying
the Fourier transform to the log-polar version of the Fourier magnitude of an
image, which is equivalent to computing the Fourier-Mellin transform.
Phase and Magnitude Modulation. The DFT is generally complex valued. This
leads to a magnitude and phase representation for the image [259]. The human
visual system is far more sensitive to phase distortion than magnitude distor-
tion and as a consequence, the DFT magnitude can be altered significantly
without affecting the perceived quality of the image. The phase modulation
can possess superior noise immunity when compared to amplitude modula-
tion. As a consequence of this, if a watermark is introduced into the phase
components with high redundancy, the attacker will cause serious damage to
the quality of the image.
7.9 Embedding Techniques in the DFT Domain
O’ Ruanaidh, et al. [259] investigate the use of DFT phase for the transformation
of information. The condition that the image is composed of real data implies that
the Fourier spectrum is symmetric, and because the human eye is more sensitive to
phase distortion, watermarking that changes the phase must preserve the negative
symmetry. The most significant components are then selected by comparing the
component magnitude squared to the total energy in the spectrum. To detect the
watermark, the marked image is simply compared with the original image.
Solachidis, et al. [260] propose a watermarking method robust to rotation
and scaling. The watermark consists of a 2-D circularly symmetric sequence taking
values 1, -1. It has zero mean value. The region in which the watermark is embedded
should be a ring covering the middle frequencies. The ring is separated in S sectors
and in homocentric circles. Each sector is assigned the same value (1, -1). The
watermark is added directly to the magnitude of the DFT domain. If the magnitude
becomes negative, it is rounded to 0. The ‘conjugate symmetry’ property for the
DFT must be preserved. The original is not required for detection. The detection is
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done by finding the correlation between the possibly watermarked coefficients and
the original watermarks, comparing the correlation against a threshold.
Kim, et al. [261] discuss the embedding of a binary image (seal image) into
another image. The entire watermark is modulated by a binary pseudo-noise matrix
(P). The pseudonoise serves for spreading the watermark evenly and is the secret key
for retrieving the watermark. The watermark is embedded into the Fourier domain of
the cover image by altering the magnitude components mij = mij+α×Pij×wij . The
amplitude factor a, is a constant determining the signature strength. The retrieval
process can be done without knowledge of the original image. This process starts
by approximating the magnitude of the Fourier coefficients of the original image.
This can be done by finding the average of the magnitude coefficients around each
point in the watermarked cover. The difference between the predicted and the actual
value in the watermarked version is divided by the pseudo-noise that was used in the
embedding process (which can be regenerated using the key). Experimental results
show that this schema gives a high robustness to the distortion such as blurring and
lossy compression.
O Ruanaidh, et al. [258] have introduced the use of the Fourier-Mellin trans-
form for watermarking to embed a watermark which is RST invariant from a digital
image. A Fourier transform is first applied which is then followed by a Fourier-
Mellin transform. The invariant coefficients are pre-selected for their robustness to
image processing and are marked using spread spectrum techniques. The inverse
mapping is computed (an inverse log-polar mapping followed by an inverse DFT).
Note, that the inverse transformation uses the phase computed during the forward
transformations. To extract the watermark, the watermarked image is transformed
into the RST invariant domain which then decodes the watermark.
In Herrigel, et al. [262], the embedding process starts by dividing the image
into adjacent blocks. They then map each block into perceptually ‘flat’ domains
by replacing the intensity of each pixel with their logarithm. This step ensures
that the intensity of the watermark is diminished in the darker regions of the image
where it would otherwise be visible (Weber-Fechner law for HVS response to change
of luminance). The Fourier transform is then computed for each block. Finally,
the watermark is modulated with magnitude components selected from the middle-
frequency bands. To detect rotation and scaling, a template T is embedded into
selected components in log polar space. To determine the rotation and scaling that
the image suffered, they calculate the normalized cross correlation between the log-
polar components and the template pattern T to find the point of best correlation.
If the image has neither been rotated nor scaled, then this point is at the origin.
Lin, et al. [263] propose a watermarking algorithm that is robust to RST
distortions. The watermark is embedded using the following steps: Find the discrete
log-polar mapping for the Fourier magnitude components of the input image (M
rows, N Columns). Sum the logs of all values in each column (angle dimension) and
add the result of summing column j to the result of summing column j+N/2 storing
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the result in a vector (v). Mix the watermark with v using a weighted average of w
and v to produce vector s. Modify all the values in column j of the log-polar Fourier
transform so their logs sum to sj instead of vj . Invert the log-polar re-sampling
of the Fourier magnitude, thus obtaining a modified Cartesian Fourier magnitude.
The complex terms of the original Fourier transform are scaled to have the new
magnitudes found in the modified Fourier transform. The inverse DFT is applied
to obtain the watermarked image. The detection process is as follows: Apply the
same signal-extraction process to the watermarked image to produce the extracted
vector v. Compute the correlation coefficient between v and input watermark vector
w. If the correlation is greater than a threshold T , then the watermark is present,
otherwise it is absent.
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8 Steganography using Stochastic Diffusion
This chapter is devoted to the study of a method called Stochastic Diffusion for
encrypting digital images and embedding the information in another host image or
image set. We introduce the theoretical background to the method and the mathe-
matical models upon which it is based. This includes a comprehensive study of the
diffusion equation and its properties leading to a convolution model for encrypting
data with a stochastic field that is fundamental to the approach considered. Two
methods of implementing the approach are then considered. The first method in-
troduces a lossy algorithm for hiding an image in a single host image which is based
on the binarization of the encrypted data. The second method considers a similar
approach which uses three host images to produce a near perfect reconstruction
from the decrypt. In both cases, details of the algorithms developed are provide and
examples given. The methods considered have applications for covert cryptography
and the authentication and self-authentication of documents and full colour images.
The relatively large amount of data contained in digital images makes them
a good medium for undertaking information hiding. Consequently digital images
can be used to hide messages in other images. A colour image typically has 8-bits
to represent the red, green and blue components for 24-bit colour images. Each
colour component is composed of 256 colour values and the modification of some
of these values in order to hide other data is undetectable by the human eye. This
modification is often undertaken by changing the least significant bit in the binary
representation of a colour or grey level value (for grey level digital images). For
example, the grey level value 128 has the binary representation 10000000. If we
change the least significant bit to give 10000001 (which corresponds to a grey level
value of 129) then the difference in the output image will not be discernable. Hence,
the least significant bit can be used to encode information other than pixel intensity.
If this is done for each colour component then a single letter can be represented using
just three pixels. The larger the host image compared with the hidden message, the
more difficult it is to detect the message. The host image represents the key to
recovering the hidden image. Rather than the key being used to generate a random
number stream using a pre-defined algorithm from which the stream can be re-
generated (for the same key), the digital image is, in effect, being used as the cipher.
The large majority of methods developed for image information hiding do not
include encryption of the hidden image. We consider an approach in which a hidden
image is encrypted by diffusion with a noise field before being embedded in the host
image. The paper provides a short survey on encrypted information hiding and
then presents a detailed account of the mathematical foundations upon which the
method, known as Stochastic Diffusion, is based. Two applications are then consider:
(i) Lossy information hiding which is based on the binarisation of the encrypted field;
(ii) Lossless information hiding which is based on using three separate host images
in which the encrypted information is embedded. The methods considered have a
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range of applications in document and full colour image authentication.
8.1 Encrypted Information Hiding
Compared with information hiding in general, there are relatively few publications
that have addressed the issue of hiding encrypted information. We now provide an
overview of some recent publications in this area.
In [264], a novel method is proposed for hiding the transmission of biometric
images based on chaos and image content. To increase the security of the watermark,
it is first encrypted using a chaotic map where the keys used for encryption are
generated from a palm print image. The pixel value distribution, illumination and
various image distortions are different for each palm print image (even if they are
for the same person) because the palm print image is different each time the image
is captured. In [264], the normalized mean value of three randomly selected pixels
from the palm print image is used as an initial condition for the chaotic map. The
logistic map is used to generate a one-dimensional sequence of real numbers which
are then mapped into a binary stream to encrypt the watermark using an XOR
operation. The encrypted watermark is then embedded into the same palm print
image used to derive the secret keys. The stego-palm print image is hidden into
the cover image using a novel content-based hidden transmission scheme. First the
cover image is segmented into different regions using a classical watershed algorithm.
Due to the over-segmentation resulting from this algorithm, a Region-based Fuzzy
C-means Clustering algorithm is used to merge similar regions. The entropy of each
region is then calculated and the stego-palm print image embedded into the cover
image according to the entropy value with more information being embedded in
highly textured regions compared to uniform regions. A threshold value T is used
to partition the two regions. If the entropy is greater than T , the binary streams of
the secret data are inserted into the 4 least significant bits of the region, and if the
entropy is smaller than T , the binary streams of the secret data are inserted into
the 2 least significant bits of the region. Colour host images are decomposed into
RGB channels before embedding.
In [265] a method of hiding the transmission of biometric images based on chaos
and image content is proposed that is similar to [264]. The secret data is a grayscale
image of size 128×128 and before encrypting it, it is converted into a binary stream
with the logistic map being used for encryption. The encryption keys used to produce
the logistic chaotic map sequence are generated randomly using any pseudo random
number generating algorithm. The authors use 256×256 color images as hosts which
are converted into grayscale images and segmented into different regions using the
watershed algorithm to eliminate over-segmentation. A Fuzzy C-means Clustering
algorithm is used to implement similar region merging. Each region is classified into
a certain cluster based on the regions of the watershed lines. A k-nearest neighbour
method is used to partition the regions needing re-segmentation. For the resultant
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image without watershed lines, the entropy is calculated and the secret image is
embedded according to the entropy values. The colour host image is decomposed
into RGB channels for embedding. Highly textured regions are used to embed more
information and a threshold value T is used to separate the two regions. If the
entropy is smaller than T the binary streams of the secret data are inserted into the
2 Least Significant Bits (LSB) of the three channels of the region. If the entropy is
greater than T , the binary streams of the secret data are inserted into the 4 LSB of
the three channels of the region.
Another steganographic method is proposed in [266] for PNG images based on
the information sharing technique. The secret image M is divided into shares using
a (k, n)-threshold secret sharing algorithm. Secret shares are then embedded into
the alpha-channel of the PNG cover image. The image M is first divided into t-
bit segments which transforms each segment into a decimal number resulting in a
decimal number sequence. A (4, 4)-threshold secret sharing algorithm is used to
generate ‘partial shares’ which are then embedded into the host image by replacing
the alpha-channel values of the host image with the values of the shares. The process
is repeated for all decimal values of the secret data resulting in a stego-image. In
general, if every four t-bit segments are transformed and embedded similarly, then
the data hiding capacity is proportional to the chosen value of t in proportion to the
dimension of the cover image. However, the larger the value of t the lower the visual
quality of the stego-image which causes a wider range of the alpha-channel values to
be altered leading to a more obvious non-uniform transparency effect appearing on
the stego-image. The value of t is therefore selected to ensure a uniform distribution
of the stego-image alpha-channel.
The principle of image scrambling and information hiding is introduced in [267]
in which a double random scrambling scheme based on image blocks is proposed. A
secret image of size M × N is divided into small sub-blocks of size 4 × 4 or 8 × 8,
for example, and a scrambling algorithm used to randomize the sub-blocks using
a given key. However, because the information in each inner sub-block remains
the same, another scrambling algorithm is used with a second key to destroy the
autocorrelation in each inner sub-block thereby increasing the difficulty of decoding
the secret image. To make the hidden secret image more invisible, its histogram is
compressed into a small range. Image hiding is then performed by simply adding
the secret image to the cover image. The hidden image is recovered by expanding
the histogram after extraction and decryption carried out for both the sub-blocks
and inner sub-blocks to obtain a final reconstruction.
8.2 Diffusion and Confusion
The purpose of this section is to introduce the reader to some of the basic math-
ematical models associated with the processes of diffusion and confusion as based
on the physical origins of these processes. This provides a theoretical framework for
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two of the principal underlying concepts of cryptology in general as used in a variety
of contexts.
In terms of plaintexts, diffusion is concerned with the issue that, at least on a
statistical basis, similar plaintexts should result in completely different ciphertexts
even when encrypted with the same key [268], [269]. This requires that any element
of the input block influences every element of the output block in an irregular fashion.
In terms of a key, diffusion ensures that similar keys result in completely different
ciphertexts even when used for encrypting the same block of plaintext. This requires
that any element of the input should influence every element of the output in an
irregular way. This property must also be valid for the decryption process because
otherwise an attacker may be able to recover parts of the input from an observed
output by a partially correct guess of the key used for encryption. The diffusion
process is a function of sensitivity to initial conditions that a cryptographic system
should have and further, the inherent topological transitivity that the system should
also exhibit causing the plaintext to be mixed through the action of the encryption
process.
Confusion ensures that the (statistical) properties of plaintext blocks are not re-
flected in the corresponding ciphertext blocks. Instead every ciphertext must have a
random appearance to any observer and be quantifiable through appropriate statis-
tical tests. Diffusion and confusion are processes that are of fundamental importance
in the design and analysis of cryptological systems, not only for the encryption of
plaintexts but for data transformation in general.
8.2.1 The Diffusion Equation
In a variety of physical problem, the process of diffusion can be modelled in terms
of certain solutions to the diffusion equation whose basic homogeneous form is given
by [270] - [273]
∇2u(r, t) = σ ∂
∂t
u(r, t), σ =
1
D
where D is the ‘Diffusivity’ and u is the diffused field which describes physical
properties such as temperature, light, particle concentration and so on; r denotes
the spatial vector and t denotes time.
The diffusion equation describes fields u that are the result of an ensemble of
incoherent random walk processes, i.e. walks whose direction changes arbitrarily
from one step to the next and where the most likely position after a time t is
proportional to
√
t. Note that if u(r, t) is a solution to the diffusion equation the
function u(r,−t) is not, i.e. it is a solution of the quite different equation,
∇2u(r,−t) = −σ ∂
∂t
u(r,−t).
Thus, the diffusion equation differentiates between past and future. This is because
the diffusing field u represents the behaviour of some average property of an ensemble
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of many elements which cannot in general go back to their original state. This
fundamental property of diffusive processes has a synergy with the use of one-way
functions in cryptology, i.e. functions that, given an input, produce an output that
is not reversible - an output from which it is not possible to compute the input.
Consider the process of diffusion in which a source of material diffuses into a sur-
rounding homogeneous medium, the material being described by some initial condi-
tion u(r, 0) say. Physically, it is to be expected that the material will increasingly
‘spread out’ as time evolves and that the concentration of the material decreases
further away from the source. The general solution to the diffusion equation yields
a result in which the spatial concentration of material is given by the convolution
of the initial condition with a Gaussian function, the time evolution of this process
being governed by the same process. This solution is determined by considering how
the process of diffusion responds to a single point source which yields the Green’s
function (in this case, a Gaussian function).
8.2.2 Green’s Function for the Diffusion Equation
We evaluate the Green’s function [273]-[275] for for the diffusion equation satisfying
the causality condition
G(r | r0, t | t0) = 0 if t < t0
where r | r0 ≡| r− r0 | and t | t0 ≡ t− t0. This can be accomplished for one-, two-
and three-dimensions simultaneously [271]. Thus with R =| r− r0 | and τ = t− t0
we require the solution of the equation(
∇2 − σ ∂
∂τ
)
G(R, τ) = −δn(R)δ(τ), τ > 0
where n is 1, 2 or 3 depending on the number of dimensions and δ is the corresponding
Dirac delta function [276] - [278]. One way of solving this equation is first to take
the Laplace transform with respect to τ , then solve for G (in Laplace space) and
then inverse Laplace transform the result [279]. This requires an initial condition
to be specified (the value of G at τ = 0). Another way to solve this equation is to
take its Fourier transform with respect to R, solve for G (in Fourier space) and then
inverse Fourier transform the result [280], [281]. Here, we adopt the latter approach.
Let
G(R, τ) =
1
(2pi)n
∞∫
−∞
G˜(k, τ) exp(ik ·R)dnk
and
δn(R) =
1
(2pi)n
∞∫
−∞
exp(ik ·R)dnk.
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Then the equation for G reduces to
σ
∂G˜
∂τ
+ k2G˜ = δ(τ)
where k =| k | which has the solution
G˜ =
1
σ
exp(−k2τ/σ)H(τ)
where H(τ) is the step function
H(τ) =
{
1, τ > 0;
0, τ < 0.
Hence, the Green’s functions are given by
G(R, τ) =
1
σ(2pi)n
H(τ)
∞∫
−∞
exp(ik ·R) exp(−k2τ/σ)dnk
=
1
σ(2pi)n
H(τ)
 ∞∫
−∞
exp(ikxRx) exp(−k2xτ/σ)dkx
 ...
By rearranging the exponent in the integral, it becomes possible to evaluate each
integral exactly. Thus, with
ikxRx − k2x
τ
σ
= −
(
kx
√
τ
σ
− iRx
2
√
σ
τ
)2
−
(
σR2x
4τ
)
= − τ
σ
ξ2 −
(
σR2x
4τ
)
where
ξ = kx − iσRx2τ .
The integral over kx becomes
∞∫
−∞
exp
[
−
( τ
σ
ξ2
)
−
(
σRx
4τ
)]
dξ
= e−(σR
2
x/4τ)
∞∫
−∞
e−(τξ
2/σ)dξ
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=
√
piσ
τ
exp
[
−
(
σR2x
4τ
)]
with similar results for the integrals over ky and kz giving the result
G(R, τ) =
1
σ
( σ
4piτ
)n
2 exp
[
−
(
σR2
4τ
)]
H(τ).
The function G satisfies an important property which is valid for all n:∫ ∞
−∞
g(R, τ)dnr =
1
σ
; τ > 0.
This is the expression for the conservation of the Green’s function associated with
the diffusion equation. For example, if we consider the diffusion of heat, then if at
a time t0 and at a point in space r0 a source of heat is introduced, then the heat
diffuses out through the medium characterized by σ in such a way that the total
flux of heat energy is unchanged.
8.2.3 Green’s Function Solution
Working in three dimensions, we consider the Green’s solution to the inhomogeneous
diffusion equation [271], [272](
∇2 − σ ∂
∂t
)
u(r, t) = −S(r, t)
where S is a source of compact support (r ∈ V ) and define the Green’s function as
the solution to the equation(
∇2 − σ ∂
∂t
)
G(r | r0, t | t0) = −δ3(r− r0)δ(t− t0).
The function S describes a source that is being diffused - a source of heat, for
example - and is taken to be localised in space.
It is convenient to first take the Laplace transform of these equations with respect
to τ = t− t0 to obtain
∇2u¯− σ[−u0 + pu¯] = −S¯
and
∇2G¯+ σ[−G0 + pG¯] = −δ3
where
u¯(r, p) =
∞∫
0
u(r | r0, τ) exp(−pτ)dτ,
8 STEGANOGRAPHY USING STOCHASTIC DIFFUSION 261
G¯(r, p) =
∞∫
0
G(r | r0, τ) exp(−pτ)dτ,
S¯(r, p) =
∞∫
0
S(r, τ) exp(−pτ)dτ,
u0 ≡ u(r, τ = 0) and G0 ≡ G(r | r0, τ = 0) = 0.
Pre-multiplying the equation for u¯ by G¯ and the equation for G¯ by u¯, subtracting
the two results and integrating over V we obtain∫
V
(G¯∇2u¯− u¯∇2G¯)d3r + σ
∫
V
u0G¯d
3r
= −
∫
V
S¯G¯d3r + u¯(r0, τ).
Using Green’s theorem [282], i.e. given that (Gauss’ theorem for any vector F)∫
V
∇ · Fd3r =
∮
S
F · nˆd2r
where S is the surface that encloses a volume V and nˆ is a unit vector perpendicular
to the surface element d2r, then, for two scalars f and g∫
V
(f∇2g − g∇2f)d3r =
∫
V
∇ · (f∇g − g∇f)d3r
=
∮
S
(f∇g − g∇f) · nˆd2r
and rearranging the result gives
u¯(r0, p) =
∫
V
S¯(r, p)G¯(r | r0, p)d3r
+σ
∫
V
u0(r)G¯(r | r, p)d3r +
∮
S
(g¯∇u¯− u¯∇g¯) · nˆd2r
Finally, taking the inverse Laplace transform and using the convolution theorem for
Laplace transforms, we can write
u(r0, τ) =
τ∫
0
∫
V
S(r, τ ′)G(r | r0, τ − τ ′)d3rdτ ′
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+σ
∫
V
u0(r)G(r | r0, τ)d3r
+
τ∫
0
∮
S
G(r | r0, τ ′)∇u(r, τ − τ ′) · nˆd2rdτ ′
−
τ∫
0
∮
S
u(r, τ ′)∇G(r | r0, τ − τ ′) · nˆd2rdτ ′.
The first two terms are convolutions of the Green’s function with the source function
S and the initial condition u(r, τ = 0), respectively.
If we consider the equation for the Green’s function(
∇2 − σ ∂
∂t
)
G(r | r0, t | t0) = −δ3(r− r0)δ(t− t0)
together with the equivalent time reversed equation(
∇2 + σ ∂
∂t
)
G(r | r1,−t | −t1) = −δ3(r− r1)δ(t− t1),
then pre-multiplying the first equation by G(r | r1,−t | −t1) and the second equation
by G(r | r0, t | t0), subtracting the results and integrate over the volume of interest
and over time t from −∞ to t0 then, using Green’s theorem, we obtain
t0∫
−∞
dt
∮
S
G(r | r1,−t | t1)∇G(r | r0, t | t0) · nˆd2r
−
t0∫
−∞
dt
∮
S
G(r | r0, t | t0)∇G(r | r1,−t | −t1) · nˆd2r
−σ
∫
V
d3r
t0∫
−∞
dtG(r | r1,−t | −t1) ∂
∂t
G(r | r0, t | t0)
−σ
∫
V
d3r
t0∫
−∞
dtG(r | r0, t | t0) ∂
∂t
G(r | r1,−t | −t1)
= G(r1 | r0, t1 | t0)−G(r0 | r1,−t0 | −t1).
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If we then consider the Green’s functions and their gradients to vanish at the surface
S (homogeneous boundary conditions) then the surface integral vanishes15. The
second integral is ∫
V
d3r [G(r | r1,−t | −t1)G(r | r0, t | t0)]t0t=−∞
and since
G(r | r0, t | t0) = 0, t < t0
then
G(r | r0, t | t0 |t=−∞= 0.
Also
G(r | r1,−t | −t1) |t=t0= 0
for t in the range of integration given. Hence,
G(r1 | r0, t1 | t0) = G(r | r1,−t0 | −t1).
This is the reciprocity theorem of the Green’s function for the diffusion equation.
8.2.4 Infinite Domain Solution
In the infinite domain, the surface integral is zero and we can work with the solution
u(r0, τ) =
τ∫
0
∫
V
S(r, τ ′)G(r | r0, τ − τ ′)d3rdτ ′
+σ
∫
V
u0(r)G(r | r0, τ)d3r
which requires that the spatial extent of the source function is infinite but can
include functions that are localised provided that S → 0 as | r |→ ∞ - a Gaussian
function for example. The solution is composed of two terms. The first term is the
convolution (in space and time) of the source function with the Green’s function
and the second term is the convolution (in space only) of the initial condition u(r, 0)
with the same Green’s function. We can write this result in the form
u(r, t) = G(| r |, t)⊗r ⊗tS(r, t) + σG(| r |, t)⊗r u(r, 0)
where ⊗r denotes the convolution over r and ⊗t denotes the convolution over t.
15This is also the case if we consider an infinite domain
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In the case where we consider the domain of interest over which the process of
diffusion occurs to be infinite in extent, the solution to the homogeneous diffusion
equation (when the source function is zero) specified as
∇2u(r, t)− σ ∂
∂t
u(r, t) = 0, u(r, 0) = u0(r)
is given by the convolution of the Green’s function with u0, i.e.
u(r0, t) = σG(| r |, t)⊗r u0(r), t > 0
Thus, in one-dimension, the solution reduces to
u(x, t) =
√
σ
4piσt
exp
[
−σx
2
4t
]
⊗x u0(x), t > 0
where ⊗x denotes the convolution integral over independent variable x and we see
that the field u at a time t > 0 is given by the convolution of the field at time t = 0
with the one-dimensional Gaussian function√
σ
4pit
exp
(
−σx
2
4t
)
.
In two-dimensions, the result is
u(x, y, t) =
σ
4pit
exp
(
− σ
4t
[x2 + y2]
)
⊗x ⊗yu0(x, y), t > 0.
Ignoring scaling by the function σ/(4pit), we can write this result in the form
u(x, y) = exp
[
− σ
4t
(x2 + y2)
]
⊗x ⊗yu0(x, y)
Thus, the field at time t > 0 is given by the field at time t = 0 convolved with the
two-dimensional Gaussian function
exp
[
− σ
4t
(x2 + y2)
]
.
This result can, for example, be used to model the diffusion of light through a diffuser
that generates multiple light scattering processes.
8.3 Diffusion from a Stochastic Source
For the case when (
∇2 − σ ∂
∂t
)
u(r, t) = −S(r, t), u(r, 0) = 0
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the solution is
u(r, t) = G(| r |, t)⊗r ⊗tS(r, t), t > 0
If a source is introduced in terms of an impulse in time, then the ‘system’ will react
accordingly and the diffuse for t > 0. This is equivalent to introducing a source
function of the form
S(r, t) = s(r)δ(t).
The solution is then given by
u(r, t) = G(| r |, t)⊗r s(r), t > 0.
Observe that this solution is of the same form as the homogeneous case with initial
condition u(r, 0) = u0(r) and the solution for initial condition u(r, 0) = u0(r) is
given by
u(r, t) = G(| r |, t)⊗r [s(r) + u0(r)]
= G(| r |, t)⊗r u0(r) + n(r, t), t > 0
where
n(r, t) = G(| r |, t)⊗r s(r)
If s is a stochastic function (i.e. a random dependent variable characterised, at least,
by a Probability Density Function (PDF) denoted by Pr[s(r)]), then n will also be
a stochastic function. Note, that for the time-independent source function S(r), we
can construct an inverse solution.
Suppose we consider the homogeneous diffusion problem defined by the equation
D∇2u(r, t)− ∂
∂t
u(r, t) = 0, u(r, 0) = u0(r)
with the solution
u(r, τ) =
1
D
G(| r |, t)⊗r u0(r), t > 0.
If we record a diffused field u after some time t = T , is it possible to reconstruct the
field at time t = 0, i.e. to solve the inverse problem or de-diffuse the field measured?
We can express u(r, 0) in terms of u(r, T ) using the Taylor series
u0(r) ≡ u(r, 0) = u(r, T ) +
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n
n!
Tn
[
∂n
∂tn
u(r, t)
]
t=T
.
Now, from the diffusion equation
∂2u
∂t2
= D∇2∂u
∂t
= D2∇4u,
∂3u
∂t3
= D∇2∂
2u
∂t2
= D3∇6u
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and so on. Thus, in general we can write[
∂n
∂tn
u(r, t)
]
t=T
= Dn∇2nu(x, y, T ).
Substituting this result into the series for u0 given above, we obtain
u0(r) = u(r, T ) +
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n
n!
(DT )n∇2nu(r, T ).
For a time-independent source function S(r) the equivalent solution to the equation
D∇2u(r, t)− ∂
∂t
u(r, t) = −− S(r), u(r, 0) = u0(r)
is then given by
u0(r) = u(r, T )
+
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n
n!
[(DT )n∇2nu(r, T ) +D−1∇2n−2S(r)]
This result shows that if S is a stochastic function, then the field u0 can not be
recovered because the functional form of S is not known. Thus, any error or noise
associated with diffusion leads to the process being irreversible - a ‘one-way’ process.
This, however, depends on the magnitude of the diffusivity D which for large values
cancels out the effect of any noise, thus making the process reversible, an effect that
is observable experimentally in the mixing of two highly viscous fluids, for example.
The inclusion of a stochastic source function provides us with a self-consistent in-
troduction to another important concept in cryptology, namely ‘confusion’. Taking,
for example, the two-dimensional case, the field u is given by (with scaling)
u(x, y) =
1
4pit
exp
[
− σ
4t
(x2 + y2)
]
⊗x ⊗yu0(x, y) + n(x, y).
We thus arrive at a basic model for the process of diffusion and confusion, namely
Output=Diffusion+Confusion.
Here, diffusion involves the ‘mixing’ of the initial condition with a Gaussian function
and confusion is compounded in the addition of a stochastic or noise function to the
diffused output. The relative magnitudes of the two terms determines the dominat-
ing effect. As the noise function n increases in amplitude relative to the diffusion
term, the output will become increasingly determined by the effect of confusion
alone. In the equation above, this will occur as t increases since the magnitude of
the diffusion term depends of the scaling factor 1/t. This is illustrated in Figure 33
which shows the combined effect of diffusion and confusion for an image of the phrase
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Confusion
+
Diffusion
as it is (from left to right and from top to bottom) progressively diffused (increasing
values of t) and increasingly confused for a stochastic function n that is uniformly
distributed.
The specific characteristics of the diffusion process considered here is determined
by an approach that is based on modelling the system in terms of the diffusion
equation; the result being determined by the convolution of the initial condition
with a Gaussian function. The process of confusion is determined by the statisti-
cal characteristics of the stochastic function n, i.e. its PDF. Stochastic functions
with different PDFs will exhibit different characteristics with regard to the level of
confusion inherent in the process as applied. In the example given in Figure 33,
uniformly distributed noise has been used. Gaussian or ‘normal’ distributed noise
is more common by virtue of fact that noise in general is the result of an additive
accumulation of many statistically independent random processes combining to form
a normal or Gaussian distributed field. Knowledge of the noise field, in particular,
Figure 33: Progressive diffusion and confusion of an image (top-left) - from left to
right and from top to bottom - for uniform distributed noise. The convolution is
undertaken using the convolution theorem and a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
its PDF, provides a statistical approach to reconstructing the data based on the
application of Bayesian estimation. For a Gaussian distributed noise field with a
standard deviation of σn and a data field u0 modelled in terms of Gaussian deviates
with a standard deviation of σu, the estimate uˆ0(x, y) of u0(x, y) is given by [283],
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[284]
uˆ0(x, y) = q(x, y)⊗x ⊗yu(x, y)
where
q(x, y) =
1
(2pi)2
∫ ∫
dkxdky exp(ikxx) exp(ikyy)
× G
∗(kx, ky)
| G(kx, ky) |2 +σ2n/σ2u
and
G(kx, ky) =
1
4pit
∫ ∫
dxdy exp(ikxx) exp(ikyy)
× exp
[
− σ
4t
(x2 + y2)
]
Figure 34 illustrates the effect of applying this result to two digital outputs (using
a Fast Fourier Transform) with low and high levels of noise, i.e. two cases for times
t1 (low) and t2 > t1 (high). This example shows the effect of increasing the level
of confusion that occurs with increasing time t on the output of the reconstruction
clearly illustrating that it is not possible to recover u0 to any degree of information
assurance. This example demonstrates that the addition of a stochastic source
function to an otherwise homogeneous diffusive process introduces a level of error
(as time increases) from which is it not possible to recover the initial condition u0.
From a physical point of view, this is indicative of the fact that diffusive process
are irreversible. From an information theoretic view point, Figure 34 illustrated
that knowledge of the statistics of the stochastic field is not generally sufficient to
recover the information we require. This is consistent with the basic principle of
data processes - Rubbish in Gives Rubbish Out, i.e. given that
p(x, y) =
1
4pit
exp
[
− σ
4t
(x2 + y2)
]
,
the (Signal-to-Noise) ratio
‖p(x, y)⊗x ⊗yu0(x, y)‖
‖n(x, y)‖
tends to zero as t increases. In other words, the longer the time taken for the
process of diffusion to occur, the more the output is dominated by confusion. This
is consistent with all cases when the level of confusion is high and when the stochastic
field used to generate this level of confusion is unknown (other than knowledge of its
PDF). However, if the stochastic function has been synthesized16 and is thus known
a priori, then we can compute
u(x, y)− n(x, y) = 1
4pit
exp
[
− σ
4t
(x2 + y2)
]
⊗x ⊗yu0(x, y)
16The synthesis of stochastic functions is a principal issue in cryptology.
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from which u0 can be computed via application of the convolution theorem to design
an appropriate inverse filter.
Figure 34: Bayesian reconstructions (right) for data (left) with low (above) and high
(below) levels of confusion.
8.4 Stochastic Fields
By considering the diffusion equation for a stochastic source, we have derived a basic
model for the ‘solution field’ or ‘output’ u(r, t) in terms of the initial condition or
input u0(r) given by
u(r) = p(r)⊗r u0(r) + n(r)
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where p is the PSF given by (with a = σ/4t)
exp
(−a | r |2)
and n - which is taken to denote noise - is a stochastic field, i.e. a random variable
[285]. We shall now consider the principal properties of stochastic fields, considering
the case where the fields are random variables that are functions of time t.
8.4.1 Independent Random Variables
Two random variables f1(t) and f2(t) are independent if their cross-correlation func-
tion is zero, i.e.
∞∫
−∞
f1(t+ τ)f2(τ)dτ = f1(t) f2(t) = 0.
From the correlation theorem [283], it then follows that
F ∗1 (ω)F2(ω) = 0
where
F1(ω) =
∞∫
−∞
f1 exp(−iωt)dt
and
F2(ω) =
∞∫
−∞
f1 exp(−iωt)dt.
If each function has a PDF Pr[f1(t)] and Pr[f2(t)] respectively, the PDF of the
function f(t) that is the sum of f1(t) and f2(t) is given by the convolution of Pr[f1(t)]
and Pr[f2(t)], i.e. the PDF of the function
f(t) = f1(t) + f2(t)
is given by [284], [285]
Pr[f(t)] = Pr[f1(t)]⊗ Pr[f2(t)].
Further, for a number of statistically independent stochastic functions f1(t), f2(t), ...,
each with a PDF Pr[f1(t)],Pr[f2(t)], ..., the PDF of the sum of these functions, i.e.
f(t) = f1(t) + f2(t) + f3(t) + ...
is given by
Pr[f(t)] = Pr[f1(t)]⊗ Pr[f2(t)]⊗t Pr[f1(t)]⊗ ...
8 STEGANOGRAPHY USING STOCHASTIC DIFFUSION 271
These results can derived using the Characteristic Function [286]. For a strictly
continuous random variable f(t) with distribution function Pf (x) = Pr[f(t)] we
define the expectation as
E(f) =
∞∫
−∞
xPf (x)dx,
which computes the mean value of the random variable, the Moment Generating
Function as
E[exp(−kf)] =
∞∫
−∞
exp(−kx)Pf (x)dx
which may not always exist and the Characteristic Function as
E[exp(−ikf)] =
∞∫
−∞
exp(−ikx)Pf (x)dx
which will always exist. Observe that the moment generating function is the Laplace
transform of Pf and the Characteristic Function is the Fourier transform of Pf .
Thus, if f(t) is a stochastic function which is the sum of N independent random
variables f1(t), f2(t), ..., fN (t) with distributions Pf1(x), Pf2(x), ..., PfN (x), then
f(t) = f1(t) + f2(t) + ...+ fN (t)
and
E[exp(−ikf)] = E[exp[−ik(f1 + f2 + ...+ fN )]
= E[exp(−ikf1)]E[exp(−ikf2)]...E[exp(−ikfN )]
= Fˆ [Pf1 ]Fˆ [Pf2 ]...Fˆ [PfN ]
where
Fˆ ≡
∞∫
−∞
dx exp(ikx).
In other words, the Characteristic Function of the random variable f(t) is the prod-
uct of the Characteristic Functions for all random variables whose sum if f(t). Using
the convolution theorem for Fourier transforms, we then obtain
Pf (x) =
N∏
n=1
⊗ Pfn(x) = Pf1(x)⊗x Pf2(x)⊗x ...⊗x PfN (x)
Further, we note that if f1, f2,... are all identically distributed then
E[exp[−ik(f1 + f2 + ...)] =
(
Fˆ [Pf1 ]
)N
and
Pf (x) = Pf1(x)⊗x Pf1(x)⊗x ...
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8.4.2 The Central Limit Theorem
The Central Limit Theorem stems from the result that the convolution of two func-
tions generally yields a function which is smoother than either of the functions that
are being convolved. Moreover, if the convolution operation is repeated, then the
result starts to look more and more like a Gaussian function - a normal distribution
- at least in an approximate sense [287]. For example, suppose we have a number of
independent random variables each of which is characterised by a distribution that
is uniform. As we add more and more of these functions together, the resulting dis-
tribution is the given by convolving more and more of these (uniform) distributions.
As the number of convolutions increases, the result tends to a Gaussian distribution.
A proof of this theorem for a uniform distribution is given in Appendix B.
Figure 35 illustrates the effect of successively adding uniformly distributed but in-
dependent random times series (each consisting of 5000 elements) and plotting the re-
sulting histograms (using 32 bins), i.e. given the discrete times series f1[i], f2[i], f3[i], f4[i]
for i=1 to 5000, Figure 35 shows the time series
s1[i] = f1[i]
s2[i] = f1[i] + f2[i]
s3[i] = f1[i] + f2[i] + f3[i]
s4[i] = f1[i] + f2[i] + f3[i] + f4[i]
and the corresponding 32-bin histograms of the signals sj , j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Clearly asj
increases, the histogram starts to ‘look’ increasing normally distributed. Here, the
uniformly distributed discrete time series fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 have been computed using
the uniform random number generator
fi+1 = fi77modP
where P = 232 − 1 is a Mersenne prime number, by using different four digit seeds
f0 in order to provide time series that are ‘independent’.
The Central Limit Theorem has been considered specifically for the case of uni-
formly distributed independent random variables. However, in general, it is ap-
proximately applicable for all independent random variables, irrespective of their
distribution. In particular, we note that for a standard normal (Gaussian) distribu-
tion given by
Gauss(x;σ, µ) =
1√
2piσ
exp
[
−1
2
(
x− µ
σ
)2]
where ∞∫
−∞
Gauss(x)dx = 1
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Figure 35: Illustration of the Central Limit Theorem. The top-left image shows
plots of a 5000 element uniformly distributed time series and its histogram using
32 bins. The top-right image shows that result of adding two uniformly distributed
and independent time series together and the 32 bin histogram. The bottom-left
image is the result after adding three uniformly distributed times series and the
bottom-right image is the result of adding four uniformly distributed times series.
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and ∞∫
−∞
Gauss(x) exp(−ikx)dx = exp(ikµ) exp
(
−σ
2k2
2
)
.
Thus, since
Gauss(x)⇐⇒ exp(ikµ) exp
(
−σ
2k2
2
)
then
N∏
n=1
⊗ Gauss(x)⇐⇒ exp(ikNµ) exp
(
−Nσ
2k2
2
)
so that
N∏
n=1
⊗ Gauss(x) =
(
1
2piNσ2
)
exp
[
− 1
2N
(
x− µ
σ
)2]
In other words, the addition of Gaussian distributed fields produces a Gaussian
distributed field.
8.5 Other ‘Diffusion’ Models
The diffusion model given by
u(r) = p(r)⊗r u0(r)
where (ignoring scaling)
p(r) = exp(−a | r |2)⊗r
is specific to the case when we consider the homogeneous diffusion equation. This is
an example of ‘Gaussian diffusion’ since the characteristic Point Spread Function is
a Gaussian function. We can consider a number of different diffusing functions by
exploring the effect of using different Point Spread Functions p. Although arbitrary
changes to the PSF are inconsistent with classical diffusion, in cryptology we can,
in principal, choose any PSF that is of value in ‘diffusing’ the data.
8.5.1 Diffusion by Noise
Given the classical diffusion/confusion model of the type
u(r) = p(r)⊗r u0(r) + n(r)
discussed above, we note that both the operator and the functional form of p are
derived from solving a physical problem (using a Green’s function solution) com-
pounded in a particular PDE - diffusion or wave equation. We can use this ba-
sic model and consider a variety of PSFs as required; this include PSFs that are
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stochastic functions. Noise diffusion involves interchanging the roles of p and n, i.e.
replacing p(r) - a deterministic PSF - with n(r) - a stochastic function. Thus, noise
diffusion is compounded in the result
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r) + p(r)
or
u(r) = n1(r)⊗r u0(r) + n2(r)
where both n1 and n2 are stochastic function which may be of the same (i.e. have
the same PDFs) or of different types (with different PDFs). This form of diffusion
is not ‘physical’ in the sense that it does not conform to a physical model as defined
by the diffusion or wave equation, for example. Here n(r) can be any stochastic
function (synthesized or otherwise).
The simplest form of noise diffusion is
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r).
The expected statistical distribution associated with the output of noise diffusion
process is Gaussian. This can be shown if we consider u0 to be a strictly deterministic
function described by a sum of delta functions, equivalent to a binary stream in 1D
or a binary image in 2D (discrete cases), for example. Thus if
u0(r) =
∑
i
δn(r− ri)
then
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r) =
N∑
i=1
n(r− ri).
Now, each function n(r − ri) is just n(r) shifted by ri and will thus be identically
distributed. Hence
Pr[u(r)] = Pr
[
N∑
i=1
n(r− ri)
]
=
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pr[n(r)]
and from the Central Limit Theorem, we can expect Pr[u(r)] to be normally dis-
tributed for large N . In particular, if
Pr[n(r)] =
{
1
X , | x |≤ X/2;
0, otherwise
then
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pr[n(r)] '
√
6
piXN
exp(−6x2/XN).
This is illustrated in Figure 36 which shows the statistical distributions associated
with a binary image, a uniformly distributed noise field and the output obtained by
convolving the two fields together.
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Figure 36: Binary image (top-left), uniformly distributed 2D noise field (top-centre),
convolution (top-right) and associated histograms (bottom-left, -centre and -right
respectively).
8.5.2 Diffusion of Noise
Given the equation
u(r) = p(r)⊗r u0(r) + n(r),
if the diffusion by noise is based on interchanging p and n, then the diffusion of noise
is based on interchanging u0 and n. In effect, this means that we consider the initial
field u0 to be a stochastic function. Note that the solution to the inhomogeneous
diffusion equation for a stochastic source S(r, t) = s(r)δ(t) is
n(r, t) = G(| r |, t)⊗r s(r)
and thus, n can be considered to be diffused noise. If we consider the model
u(r) = p(r)⊗r n(r),
then for the classical diffusion equation, the PSF is a Gaussian function. In general,
given the convolution operation, p can be regarded as only one of a number of
PSFs that can be considered in the ‘production’ of different stochastic fields u.
This includes PSFs that define self-affine stochastic fields or random scaling fractals
[290]-[292].
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8.6 Information and Entropy
Consider a simple linear array such as a deck of eight cards which contains the ace
of diamonds for example and where we are allowed to ask a series of sequential
questions as to where in the array the card is. The first question we could ask is in
which half of the array does the card occur which reduces the number of cards to
four. The second question is in which half of the remaining four cards is the ace of
diamonds to be found leaving just two cards and the final question is which card is
it. Each successive question is the same but applied to successive subdivisions of the
deck and in this way we obtain the result in three steps regardless of where the card
happens to be in the deck. Each question is a binary choice and in this example, 3 is
the minimum number of binary choices which represents the amount of information
required to locate the card in a particular arrangement. This is the same as taking
the binary logarithm of the number of possibilities, since log2 8 = 3. Another way of
appreciating this result, is to consider a binary representation of the array of cards,
i.e. 000,001,010,011,100,101,110,111, which requires three digits or bits to describe
any one card. If the deck contained 16 cards, the information would be 4 bits and if
it contained 32 cards, the information would be 5 bits and so on. Thus, in general,
for any number of possibilities N , the information I for specifying a member in such
a linear array, is given by
I = − log2N = log2
1
N
where the negative sign is introduced to denote that information has to be acquired
in order to make the correct choice, i.e. I is negative for all values of N larger than 1.
We can now generalize further by considering the case where the number of choices
N are subdivided into subsets of uniform size ni. In this case, the information
needed to specify the membership of a subset is given not by N but by N/ni and
hence, the information is given by
Ii = log2 Pi
where Pi = ni/N which is the proportion of the subsets. Finally, if we consider the
most general case, where the subsets are non-uniform in size, then the information
will no longer be the same for all subsets. In this case, we can consider the mean
information given by
I =
∑
i
Pi log2 Pi
which is the Shannon Entropy measure established in his classic works on infor-
mation theory in the 1940s [293]. Information, as defined here, is a dimensionless
quantity. However, its partner entity in physics has a dimension called ‘Entropy’
which was first introduced by Ludwig Boltzmann as a measure of the dispersal of
energy, in a sense, a measure of disorder, just as information is a measure of order. In
fact, Boltzmann’s Entropy concept has the same mathematical roots as Shannon’s
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information concept in terms of computing the probabilities of sorting objects into
bins (a set of N into subsets of size ni) and in statistical mechanics the Entropy is
defined as [294]
E = −k
∑
i
Pi lnPi
where k is Boltzmann’s constant. Shannon’s and Boltzmann’s equations are similar.
E and I have opposite signs, but otherwise differ only by their scaling factors and
they convert to one another by E = −(k ln 2)I. Thus, an Entropy unit is equal to
−k ln 2 of a bit. In Boltzmann’s equation, the probabilities Pi refer to internal energy
levels. In Shannon’s equations Pi are not a priori assigned such specific roles and
the expression can be applied to any physical system to provide a measure of order.
Thus, information becomes a concept equivalent to Entropy and any system can be
described in terms of one or the other. An increase in Entropy implies a decrease of
information and vise versa. This gives rise to the fundamental conservation law:
The sum of (macroscopic) information change and Entropy change in a given system
is zero.
8.6.1 Entropy Based Information Extraction
In signal analysis, the Entropy is a measure of the lack of information about the
exact information content of the signal, i.e. the value of fi for a given i. Thus, noisy
signals (and data in general) have a larger Entropy. The general definition for the
Entropy of a system E is
E = −
∑
i
Pi lnPi
where Pi is the probability that the system is in a state i. The negative sign is
introduced because the probability is a value between 0 and 1 and therefore, lnPi is
a value between 0 and −∞, but the Entropy is by definition, a positive value.
An Entropy based approach to the extraction of information from noise [295]
can be designed using an Entropy measure defined in terms of the data fi (rather
than the PDF). A reconstruction for fi is found such that
E = −
∑
i
fi ln fi
is a maximum which requires that fi > 0∀i. Note that the function x lnx has a single
local minimum value between 0 and 1 whereas the function −x lnx has a single local
maximum value. It is a matter of convention as to whether a criteria of the type
E =
∑
i
fi ln fi
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or
E = −
∑
i
fi ln fi
is used leading to (strictly speaking) a minimum or maximum Entropy criterion
respectively. In some ways, the term ‘Maximum Entropy’ is misleading because
it implies that we are attempting to recover information from noise with minimum
information content and the term ‘Minimum Entropy’ conveys a method that is more
consistent with the philosophy of what is being attempted, i.e. to recover useful
and unambiguous information from a signal whose information content has been
distorted or confused by (additive) noise. For example, suppose we input a binary
stream into some time invariant linear system, where f = (...010011011011101...).
Then, the input has an Entropy of zero since 0 ln 0 = 0 and 1 ln 1 = 0. We can
expect the output of such a system to generate a new array of values (via the
diffusion process) which are then perturbed (via the confusion process) through
additive noise. The output ui = pi ⊗i fi + ni (where it is assumed that ui > 0∀i
and ⊗i denotes the convolution sum over i) will therefore have an Entropy that is
greater than 0. Clearly, as the magnitude of the noise increases, so, the value of the
Entropy increases leading to greater loss of information on the exact state of the
input (in terms of fi, for some value of i being 0 or 1). With the inverse process,
we ideally want to recover the input without any bit-errors. In such a hypothetical
case, the Entropy of the restoration would be zero. In practice, we approach the
problem in terms of an inverse solution that is based a Minimum Entropy criterion,
i.e. find fi such that
E =
∑
i
fi ln fi
is a minimum or for a continuous field f(r) in n-dimensions, find f such that
E =
∫
f(r) ln f(r)dnr
is a minimum.
Given that
u(r) = p(r)⊗r f(r) + n(r)
where ⊗r is the convolution integral over r we can write
λ
∫ (
[u(r)− p(r)⊗r f(r)]2 − [n(r)]2
)
dnr = 0
an equation that holds for any constant λ (the Lagrange multiplier). We can there-
fore write the equation for E as
E = −
∫
f(r) ln f(r)dnr
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+λ
∫ (
[u(r)− p(r)⊗r f(r)]2 − [n(r)]2
)
dnr
because the second term on the right hand side is zero anyway (for all values of λ).
Given this equation, our problem is to find f such that the Entropy E is a maximum
when
∂E
∂f
= 0,
i.e. when
−1− ln f(r) + 2λ[u(r)r p(r)− p(r)⊗r f(r)r p(r)] = 0
where r denotes the correlation integral over r. Rearranging,
f(r) = exp{−1 + 2λ[u(r)r p(r)− p(r)⊗r f(r)r p(r)]}.
This equation is transcendental in f and as such, requires that f is evaluated itera-
tively, i.e.
[f(r)]n+1 = exp{−1 + 2λ[u(r)r p(r)− p(r)⊗r [f(r)]n r p(r))]}
The rate of convergence of this solution is determined by the value of the La-
grange multiplier given an initial estimate of f(r), i.e. [f(r)]0. However, the solution
can be linearized by retaining the first two terms (the linear terms) in the series rep-
resentation of the exponential function leaving us with the following result
f(r) = 2λ[u(r)r p(r)− p(r)⊗r f(r)r p(r)].
Using the convolution and correlation theorems, in Fourier space, this equation
becomes
F (k) = 2λU(k)[P (k)]∗ − 2λ | P (k) |2 F (k)
which after rearranging gives
F (k) =
U(k)[P (k)]∗
| P (k) |2 + 12λ
.
so that
f(r) =
1
(2pi)n
∞∫
−∞
[P (k)]∗U(k)
| P (k) |2 + 12λ
exp(ik · r)dnk.
The cross Entropy or Patterson Entropy uses a criterion in which the Entropy
measure
E = −
∫
dnrf(r) ln
[
f(r)
w(r)
]
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is maximized where w(r) is some weighting function based on any available a priori
information on f(r). If the calculation above is re-worked using this definition of
the cross Entropy, then we obtain the result
f(r) = w(r) exp(−1 + 2λ[u(r)r p(r)− p(r)⊗r f(r)r p(r)]).
The cross Entropy method has a synergy with the Wilkinson test in which a PDF
Pn(x) say of a stochastic field n(r) is tested against the PDF Pm(x) of a stochastic
field m(r). A standard test to quantify how close the stochastic behaviour of n is to
m (the null-hypothesis test) is to use the Chi-squared test in which we compute
χ2 =
∫ (
Pn(x)− Pm(x)
Pm(x)
)2
dx.
The Wilkinson test uses the metric
E = −
∫
Pn(x) ln
(
Pn(x)
Pm(x)
)
dx.
8.6.2 Entropy Conscious Confusion and Diffusion
From the point of view of designing an appropriate substitution cipher, the discussion
above clearly dictates that the cipher n[i] should be such that the Entropy of the
ciphertext u[i] is a maximum. This requires that a PRNG algorithm be designed
that outputs a number stream whose Entropy is maximum - as large as is possible
in practice. Since the Information Entropy of the stream is defined as
E =
N∑
i=1
Pilog2Pi
it is clear that the stream should have a PDF Pi that yields the largest possible
values for E. Figure 37 shows a uniformly distributed and a Gaussian distributed
random number stream consisting of 3000 elements and the characteristic discrete
PDFs using 64-bins (i.e. for N = 64). The Information Entropy, which is computed
directly from the PDFs using the expression for E given above, is always greater
for the uniformly distributed field. This is to be expected because, for a uniformly
distributed field, there is no bias associated with any particular numerical range and
hence, no likelihood can be associated with a particular state. Hence, one of the
underlying principals associated with the design of a cipher n[i] is that it should
output a uniformly distributed sequence of random numbers. However, this does
not mean that the ciphertext itself will be uniformly distributed since if
u(r) = u0(r) + n(r)
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Figure 37: A 3000 element uniformly distributed random number stream (top left)
and its 64-bin discrete PDF (top right) with E = 4.1825 and a 3000 element Gaus-
sian distributed random number stream (bottom left) and its 64-bin discrete PDF
(bottom right) with E = 3.2678.
then
Pr[u(r)] = Pr[u0(r)]⊗ Pr[n(r)].
This is illustrated in Figure 38 which shows 256-bin histograms for an 8-bit ASCII
plaintext (the LaTeX file associated with this Chapter) u0[i], a stream of uniformly
distributed integers n[i], 0 ≤ n ≤ 255 and the ciphertext u[i] = u0[i] + n[i]. The
spike associate with the plaintext histogram reflects the ‘character’ that is most
likely to occur in the plaintext of a natural Indo-European language, i.e. a space
with ASCII value 32. Although the distribution of the ciphertext is broader than
the plaintext it is not as broad as the cipher and certainly not uniform. Thus,
the Entropy of the ciphertext, although larger than the plaintext (in this example
Eu0 = 3.4491 and Eu = 5.3200), the Entropy of the ciphertext is still less that then
that of the cipher (in this example En = 5.5302). There are two ways in which this
problem can be solved. The first method is to construct a cipher n with a PDF such
that
Pn(x)⊗x Pu0(x) = U(x)
where U(x) = 1, ∀x. Then
Pn(x) = U(x)⊗x Q(x)
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Figure 38: 256-bin histograms for an 8-bit ASCII plaintext u0[i] (left), a stream of
uniformly distributed integers between 0 and 255 n[i] (centre) and the substitution
cipher u[i] (right).
where
Q(x) = Fˆ−1
(
1
Fˆ [Pu0(x)]
)
.
But this requires that the cipher is generated in such a way that its output conforms
to an arbitrary PDF as determined by the plaintext to be encrypted. The second
method is based on assuming that the PDF of all plaintexts will be of the form
given in Figure 43 with a characteristic dominant spike associated with the number
of spaces that occur in the plaintext17 Noting that
Pn(x)⊗x δ(x) = Pn(x)
then as the amplitude of the spike increases, the output increasingly approximates
a uniform distribution; the Entropy of the ciphertext increases as the Entropy of
the plaintext decreases. One simple way to implement this result is to pad-out the
plaintext with spaces 18 The statistical effect of this is illustrated in Figure 39 where
Eu0 = 1.1615, En = 5.5308 and Eu = 5.2537.
8.6.3 Noise Diffusion
The purpose of the material presented has been to introduce two of the most funda-
mental processes associated with cryptology, namely, diffusion and confusion. Diffu-
17This is only possible provided the plaintext is an Indo-European alpha-numeric array and is
not some other language or file format - a compressed image file, for example.
18Padding out a plaintext file with any character will provides a ciphertext with a broader distribu-
tion, the character @ (with an ASCII DEC of 64) providing a symmetric result, but space-character
padding does not impinge on legibility.
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Figure 39: 256-bin histograms for an 8-bit ASCII plaintext u0[i] (left) after space-
character padding, a stream of uniformly distributed integers between 0 and 255 n[i]
(centre) and the substitution cipher u[i] (right).
sion has been considered via the properties associated with the homogeneous (clas-
sical) diffusion equation and the general Green’s function solution. Confusion has
been considered through the application of the inhomogeneous diffusion equation
with a stochastic source function and it has been shown that
u(r) = p(r)⊗r u0(r) + n(r)
where p is a Gaussian Point Spread Function and n is a stochastic function.
Diffusion of noise involves the case when u0 is a stochastic function. Diffusion
by noise involves the use of a PSF p that is a stochastic function. If u0 is taken to
be deterministic information, then we can consider the processes of noise diffusion
and confusion to be compounded in terms of the following:
Diffusion
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r)
Confusion
u(r) = u0(r) + n(r)
Diffusion and Confusion
u(r) = n1(r)⊗r u0(r) + n2(r)
The principal effects of diffusion and confusion have been illustrated using various
test images. This has been undertaken for visual purposes only but on the un-
derstanding that such ‘effects’ apply to fields in different dimensions in a similar
way.
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The statistical properties associated with independent random variables has also
bee considered. One of the most significant results associated with random variable
theory is compounded in the Central Limit Theorem. When data is recorded, the
stochastic term n, is often the result of many independent sources of noise due to
a variety of physical, electronic and measuring errors. Each of these sources may
have a well-defined PDF but if n is the result of the addition of each of them, then
the PDF of n tends to be Gaussian distributed. Thus, Gaussian distributed noise
tends to be common in the large majority of applications in which u is a record of
a physical quantity.
In cryptology, the diffusion/confusion model is used in a variety of applications
that are based on diffusion only, confusion only and combined diffusion/confusion
models. One such example of the combined model is illustrated in Figure 42 which
shows how one data field can be embedded in another field (i.e. how one image can
be used to watermark another image using noise diffusion). In standard cryptog-
raphy, one of the most conventional methods of encrypting information is through
application of a confusion only model. This is equivalent to implementing a model
where it is assumed that the PSF is a delta function so that
u(r) = u0(r) + n(r).
If we consider the discrete case in one-dimension, then
u[i] = u0[i] + n[i]
where u0[i] is the plaintext array or just ‘plaintext’ (a stream of integer numbers, each
element representing a symbol associated with some natural language, for example),
n[i] is the ‘cipher’ and u[i] is the ‘ciphertext’. Methods are then considered for the
generation of stochastic functions n[i] that are best suited for the generation of the
ciphertext. This is the basis for the majority of substitution ciphers where each
value of each element of u0[i] is substituted for another value through the addition
of a stochastic function n[i], a function that should:
• include outputs that are zero in order that the spectrum of random numbers
is complete19
• have a uniform PDF.
The conventional approach to doing this is to design appropriate Pseudo Random
Number Generators (PRNGs) or pseudo chaotic ciphers. In either case, a cipher
should be generated with maximum Entropy which is equivalent to ensuring that
the cipher is a uniformly distributed stochastic field. However, it is important to
19The Enigma cipher, for example, suffered from a design fault with regard to this issue in that a
letter could not reproduce its self - u[i] 6= u0[i]∀i. This provided a small statistical bias which was
nevertheless significant in the decryption of Enigma ciphers.
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appreciate that the statistics of a plaintext are not the same as those of the cipher
when encryption is undertaken using a confusion only model; instead the statistics
are determined by the convolution of the PDF of the plaintext with the PDF of the
cipher. Thus, if
u(r) = u0(r) + n(r)
then
Pr[u(r)] = Pr[n(r)]⊗ Pr[u0(r)].
One way of maximising the Entropy of u is to construct u0 such that Pr[u0(r)] = δ(r).
A simple and practical method of doing this is to pad the data u0 with a single
element that increase the data size but does not intrude on the legibility of the
plaintext.
Assuming that the encryption of a plaintext u0 is undertaken using a confusion
only model, there exist the possibility of encrypting the ciphertext again. This is an
example of double encryption, a process that can be repeated an arbitrary number of
times to give triple and quadruple encrypted outputs. However, multiple encryption
procedures in which
u(r) = u0(r) + n1(r) + n2(r) + ...
where n1, n2,... are different ciphers, each consisting of uniformly distributed noise,
suffer from the fact that the resultant cipher is normally distributed because, from
the Central Limit Theorem
Pr[n1 + n2 + ...] ∼ Gauss(x).
For this reason, multiple encryption systems are generally not preferable to single en-
cryption systems. A notable example is the triple DES (Data Encryption Standard)
or DES3 system [296] that is based on a form of triple encryption and originally
introduced to increase the key length associated with the generation of a single ci-
pher n1. DES3 was endorsed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) as a temporary standard to be used until the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) was completed in 2001 [297].
The statistics of an encrypted field formed by the diffusion of u0 (assumed to be
a binary field) with noise produces an output that is Gaussian distributed, i.e. if
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r)
then
Pr[u(r)] = Pr[n(r)⊗ u0(r)] ∼ Gauss(x).
Thus, the diffusion of u0 produces an output whose statistics are not uniform but
normally distributed. The Entropy of a diffused field using uniformly distributed
noise is therefore less than the Entropy of a confused field. It is for this reason, that
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a process of diffusion should ideally be accompanied by a process of confusion when
such processes are applied to cryptology in general.
The application of noise diffusion for embedding or watermarking one infor-
mation field in another is an approach that has a range of applications including
diffusion only cryptology for applications to low resolution print security for example
which is discussed later on in this work.
Since the diffusion of noise by a deterministic PSF produces an output whose
statistics tend to be normally distributed, such fields are not best suited for en-
cryption. However, this process is important in the design of stochastic fields that
have important properties for the camouflage of encrypted data. This includes the
generation of random fractal fields and the use of methods such a fractal modulation
for covert data communications.
8.7 Watermarking using Stochastic Diffusion
In ‘image space’, we consider the plaintext to be an image p(x, y) of compact support
x ∈ [−X,X]; y ∈ [−Y, Y ]. Stochastic diffusion is then based on the following results:
Encryption
c(x, y) = m(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y)
where
m(x, y) = F−12 [M(kx, ky)]
and ∀kx, ky
M(kx, ky) =
{
N∗(kx,ky)
|N(kx,ky)|2 , | N(kx, ky) |6= 0;
N∗(kx, ky), | N(kx, ky) |= 0.
Decryption
p(x, y) = n(x, y)x yc(x, y)
Here, kx and ky are the spatial frequencies and F−12 denotes the two-dimensional
inverse Fourier transform. For digital image watermarking, we consider a discrete
array pij , i = 1, 2, ..., I; j = 1, 2, ..., J of size I × J and discrete versions of the
operators involved, i.e. application of a discrete Fourier transform and discrete
convolution and correlation sums.
If we consider a host image denoted by h(x, y), then we consider a watermarking
method based on the equation
c(x, y) = Rm(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y) + h(x, y)
where
‖m(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y)‖∞ = 1
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and
‖h(x, y)‖∞ = 1
By normalising the terms in this way, the coefficient 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 can be used to adjust
the relative magnitudes of the terms such that the diffused imagem(x, y)⊗x⊗yp(x, y)
becomes a perturbation of the ‘host image’ (covertext) h(x, y). This provides us with
a way of digital watermarking one image with another, R being referred to as the
‘watermarking ratio’, a term that is equivalent, in this application, to the standard
term ‘Signal-to-Noise’ or SNR as used in signal and image analysis. For colour im-
ages, the method can be applied by decomposing the image into its constituent Red,
Green and Blue components. Stochastic diffusion is then applied to each component
separately and the result combined to produce an colour composite image.
For applications in image watermarking, stochastic diffusion has two principal
advantages:
• a stochastic field provides uniform diffusion;
• stochastic fields can be computed using random number generators that de-
pend on a single initial value or seed (i.e. a private key).
8.7.1 Basic Algorithm: Pseudo Code
For the purpose of further quantifying the basic algorithms involved in this method
of watermarking the reader is referred to the pseudo-coded function that follows:
void function WM(cipher,plaintext,covertext,wartermark,size,R)
\\
\\ Fuction: Watermarks an image using noise diffusion
\\
\\ Input arrays: cipher - noise field image
\\ plaintext - the watermark image
\\ covertext - host image
\\ N.B. All input arrays are taken to be of type float with
\\ values ranging from 0 to 1 inclusively.
\\
\\ Parameters: size - image size (assumed to be size x size)
\\ R - watermarking ratio
\\
\\ Ouput: watermark - watermarked image
\\
\\ Internal functions: FFT - Foward Fast Fourier Transform
\\ IFFT - Inverse Fast Fourier Transform
\\ MAX - Computes the maximum value
\\ REAL - Extracts the real component
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\\ ABS - Computes the absolute value
\\
cipher=FFT(cipher);\\Compute spectrum of cipher
plaintex=FFT(plaintext); \\Compute spectrum of plaintext
powerspectrum=ABS(cipher)*ABS(cipher);\\Compute Power Spectrum
\\ Pre-condition power spectrum of cipher
FOR i=1 to size AND j=1 to size DO:
temp=pp[i,j];
IF temp==0
powerspec[i,j]=1;
ELSE
powerspec[i,j]=powerspec[i,j];
END IF
END DO
\\ Diffuse plaintext image with pre-conditioned cipher
FOR i=1 to size AND j=1 to size DO:
diffusion[i,j]=cipher[i,j]*plaintext[i,j]/powerspec[i,j];
END DO
diffusion=REAL(IFFT(diffusion));\\ Compute real part of IFFT
diffusion=diffusion/MAX(diffusion);\\ Normalise diffused field
\\ Compute the watermark
FOR i=1 to size AND j=1 to size DO:
watermark[i,j]=R*diffusion[i,j]+covertext[i,j];
END DO
watermark=watermark/MAX(watermark);\\ Normalise for output
void function RECWM(cipher,watermark,covertext,plaintext,size)
\\ Function: Recovers watermark from watermarked image
\\
\\ Input arrays: cipher - noise field image
\\ watermark - watermarked image
\\ covertext - host image
\\ N.B. All input arrays are taken to be of type float with
\\ values ranging from 0 to 1 inclusively.
\\
\\ Parameters: n - image size (assumed to be size x size)
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\\
\\ Output: plaintext - recovered watermark image
\\
\\ Internal functions: FFT - Forward Fast Fourier Transform
\\ IFFT - Inverse Fast Fourier Transform
\\ MAX - Computes the maximum value
\\ REAL - Exatracts the real component
\\ CONJ - Conjugates a complex array
\\
\\Subtract covertext from watermarked image
FOR i=1 to size AND j=1 to size DO:
diffusion=watermark-covertext;
END DO
cipher=FFT(cipher); \\Compute spectrum of cipher
diffusion=FFT(diffusion); \\Compute spectrum of diffused field
\\ Correlate diffused field with cipher
FOR i=1 to n AND j=1 to n DO:
plaintext[i,j]=CONJ(cipher[i,j])*diffusion[i,j];
END DO
plaintext=REAL(IFFT(plaintext)); \\Compute real part of IFFT
plaintext=plaintext/MAX(plaintext);\\ Normalise output
An example of using this algorithm is shown in Figure 40. Here, the covertext
is watermarked with a diffused binary image to produce an output with R = 0.01.
The relatively small perturbation of the diffused image to the host image does not
visually affect the output image.
8.7.2 Steganography and Cryptography
One of the principal components associated with the development of methods and
algorithms to ‘break’ ciphertext is the analysis of the output generated by an at-
tempted decrypt and its evaluation in terms of an expected type. The output type
is normally assumed to be plaintext, i.e. the output is assumed to be in the form of
characters, words and phrases associated with a natural language such as English or
German, for example. If a plaintext document is converted into an image file then
stochastic diffusion can be used to diffuse the plaintext image I1 using any other
covertext image I2 to produce stegotext I3. If both I3 and I2 are then encrypted,
any attack on these, data will not be able to make use of an ‘analysis cycle’ which
is based on the assumption that the decrypted output is plaintext. This approach
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Figure 40: From top to bottom and from left to right (all images are 512×512):
Watermark, host image. cipher, diffused image, host image after watermarking and
recovered watermark.
provides the user with a relatively simple method of ‘confusing’ the cryptanalyst
and invalidates attack strategies that have been designed and developed on the as-
sumption that the encrypted data have been derived from plaintext alone.
In steganography, one message is hidden inside another, without disclosing the
existence of the hidden message or making it apparent to an observer that this
message contains a hidden message. Moreover, the information hidden by a water-
marking system is always associated with the object to be protected or its owner
while steganographic systems just hide information. On the other hand, cryptog-
raphy can be defined as the study of secret writing (i.e. concealing the contents of
a secret message by transforming the original message into a form that cannot be
easily interpreted by an observer). The method considered here (diffusion and con-
fusion) can be used in both applications. The hidden message can be transformed
into a diffused form (i.e encrypted) and inserted into the background. The hidden
information might have no relation with the text (foreground). At the same time,
backgrounds are usually used with documents and so diffused data will not neces-
sarily trigger the attention of an observer. Moreover, the hidden message is also
encrypted which increases the security level of such documents.
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8.8 Covert Encryption using Digital Image Steganography
The principles discussed in the previous section can be used to design an entirely
covert encryption system. By inputing any encrypted file as binary data, we can
generate a binary image (consisting entirely of pixels with values of 0 or 1). For
example, consider the plaintext Cryptology which is encrypted to provide the ci-
phertext string ydr39bkLP9 and is equiavlent to the 7-bit ASCII bit stream
1111001110010011100100110011011100111000101101011100110010100000111001
This bit stream is converted into the 9×9 square image20 with zero padding being
used to complete the array as given below:
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The binary image is then diffused with a random noise field and the output embedded
in a covertext through addition using a suitable diffusion-to-confusion ratio (suitable
in the sense that the binary image is recovered with no bit errors for the case when
the difference between the covertext and stegotext is insignificant). The size of the
image that is required to implement this method is related to the binary length of
the ciphertext. Assuming that the ciphertext and plaintext are of the same size
(i.e. no padding is applied to the plaintext before encryption), and, given that the
average number of letters per word (in the English language) is 6 (including the
space), then a n2 binary image will provide for approximetly n2/(7× 6) words.
An example of using this approach is illustrated in Figure 41. The ‘watermark’
(top-left) is a 512×512 binary image obtained from the ciphertext of a 6000 word
document after encrypton with 7-bit ASCII bainary conversion. The reconstruc-
tion is a bit-for-bit replica of the input and can thus, be decrypted without error.
The binary image is first converted back into a bit stream (upto the point beyond
which padding is applied) and each consecutive 7-bit block, converted back into the
ciphertext which is then decrypted.
In order to enhance the cryptographic strength associated with approach, the
cipher shown in Figure 41 can be obtained from a genuine random number generator
20The image does not necesserily need to be square and is used here for illustrative purposes only
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Figure 41: From top to bottom and from left to right (all images are 512×512): Bi-
nary image of ciphertext, covertext (digital image), cipher, diffused image, stegotext
after addition of the diffused data with watermarking ratio R = 0.01), reconstruc-
tion.
such as HotBits and then encrypted (to secure the data file). Cleary, in addtion to the
receiver of the watermarked data requiring the facility to decrypt the reconstruction,
in order to obtain this reconstruction, the reciever must have the cipher and the
covertext. The covertext should be one of a database of images maintained by both
parties (sender-receiver) together with the cipher that is ideally stored in encrypted
form. Because the stegotext and covertext images look identical, the reciever can
search through the image data base to select the appropriate covertext. The whole
point of this process is that it provides a way of camouflaging the encrypted data
during transmission, the difference between sending the ciphertext and the stegotext
being illustrated in Figure 41 as digital images. However, in this process, a macro-
key is required to be exchanged which is composed of the following:
• the cipher
• the covertext database
• the decryption system
A covertext database is required for two reasons: (i) each time a transmission is
undertaken, it is safer to transmit a different stegotext in order not to alart a po-
tential attacker to multiple transmissions the same data; (ii) a database of images
should be stored rather than a single image in order that no apparant significance
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is given to a single image should the platform (i.e. PC or USB stick, for example)
be compromised.
8.9 Binary Image Watermarking
Watermarking a full grey level or colour image in another grey or colour image,
respectively, using stochastic diffusion leads to two problems: (i) it can yield a
degradation in the quality of the reconstruction especially when R is set to a low
value which is required when the host image has regions that are homogeneous; (ii)
the host image can be corrupted by the watermark leading to distortions that are
visually apparent. Points (i) and (ii) lead to an optimisation problem with regard to
the fidelity of the watermark and host images in respect of the value of the watermark
ratio that can be applied which limits the type of host images that can be used and
the fidelity of the ‘decrypts’. However, if we consider the plaintext image p(x, y) to
be of binary form, then the output of stochastic diffusion can be binarized to give a
binary ciphertext. The rationale for imposing this condition is based on considering
a system in which a user is interested in covertly communicating documents such as
confidential letters and certificates, for example.
If we consider a plaintext image p(x, y) which is a binary array, then stochastic
diffusion using a pre-conditioned cipher 0 ≤ m(x, y) ≤ 1 consisting of an array of
floating point numbers will generate a floating point output. The Shannon Informa-
tion Entropy of of any array A(xi, yi) with Probability Mass Function (PMF) p(zi)
is given by
I = −
∑
i=1
p(zi) log2 p(zi)
The information entropy of a binary plaintext image (with PMF consisting of two
components whose sum is 1) is therefore significantly less than the information en-
tropy of the ciphertext image. In other words, for a binary plaintext and a non-binary
cipher, the ciphertext is data redundant. This provides us with the opportunity of
binarizing the ciphertext by applying a threshold, i.e. if cb(x, y) is the binary ci-
phertext, then
cb(x, y) =
{
1, c(x, y) > T
0, c(x, y) ≤ T
where 0 ≤ c(x, y) ≤ 1∀x, y. A digital binary ciphertext image cb(xi, yj) where
cb(xi, yi) =
{
1, or
0, for any xi, yj
can then be used to watermark an 8-bit host image h(x, y), h ∈ [0, 255] by replacing
the lowest 1-bit layer with cb(xi, xj). To recover this information, the 1-bit layer is
extracted from the image and the result correlated with the digital cipher n(xi, yj).
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Note that the original floating point cipher n is required to recover the plaintext
image and that the binary watermark can not therefore be attacked on an exhaustive
XOR basis using trial binary ciphers. Thus, binarization of a stochastically diffused
data field is entirely irreversible.
8.9.1 Statistical Analysis
The expected statistical distribution associated with stochastic diffusion is Gaussian.
This can be shown if we consider a binary plaintext image pb(x, y) to be described
by a sum of N delta functions where each delta function describes the location of a
non-zero bit at coordinates (xi, yj). Thus if
pb(x, y) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
δ(x− xi)δ(y − yj)
then
c(x, y) = m(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y)
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
m(x− xi, y − yj).
Each function m(x − xi, y − yj) is just m(x, y) shifted by xi, yj and will thus be
identically distributed. Hence, from the Central Limit Theorem
Pr[c(x, y)] = Pr
 N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
m(x− xi, y − yj)
 =
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pr[m(x, y)] ≡ Pr[m(x, y)]⊗ Pr[m(x, y)]⊗ ...
∼ Gaussian(z), N →∞
where Pr denotes the Probability Density Function. We can thus expect Pr[c(x, y)]
to be normally distributed and for m(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]∀x, y the mode of the distribution
will be of the order of 0.5. This result provides a value for the threshold T in which
for 0 ≤ c(x, y) ≤ 1 is 0.5 (theoretically). Note that if n(x, y) is uniformly distributed
and thereby represents δ-uncorrelated noise then both the complex spectrum N∗
and power spectrum | N |2 will also be δ-uncorrelated and since
m(x, y) = F−12
[
N∗(kx, ky)
| N(kx, ky) |2
]
Pr[m(x, y)] will be uniformly distributed. Also note that the application of a thresh-
old which is given by the mode of the Gaussian distribution, guarantees that there
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is no statistical bias associated with any bit in the binary output, at least, on a
theoretical basis. On a practical basis, the needs to be computed directly by calcu-
lating the mode from the histogram of the cipher and that bit equalization can not
be guaranteed as it will depend on: (i) the size of the images used; (ii) the number
of bins used to compute the histogram.
8.9.2 Principal Algorithms
The principal algorithms associated with the application of stochastic diffusion for
watermarking with ciphers are as follows:
Algorithm I: Encryption and Watermarking Algorithm
Step 1: Read the binary plaintext image from a file and compute the size I × J of
the image.
Step 2: Compute a cipher of size I × J using a private key and pre-condition the
result.
Step 3: Convolve the binary plaintext image with the pre-conditioned cipher and
normalise the output.
Step 4: Binarize the output obtained in Step 3 using a threshold based on comput-
ing the mode of the Gaussian distributed ciphertext.
Step 5: Insert the binary output obtained in Step 4 into the lowest 1-bit layer of
the host image and write the result to a file.
The following points should be noted:
(i) The host image is taken to be an 8-bit or higher grey level image which must
ideally be the same size as the plaintext image or else resized accordingly. However,
in resembling the host image, its proportions should be the same so that the stegotext
image does not appear to be a distorted version of the covertext image. For this
purpose, a library of host images should be developed whose dimensions are set
according to a predetermined application where the dimensions of the plaintext
image are known.
(ii) Pre-conditioning the cipher and the convolution processes are undertaken using
a Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT).
(iii) The output given in Step 3 will include negative floating point numbers upon
taking the real component of a complex array. The array must be rectified by adding
the largest negative value in the output array to the same array before normalisation.
(iv) For colour host images, the binary ciphertext can be inserted in to one or all of
the RGB components. This provides the facility for watermarking the host image
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with three binary ciphertexts (obtained from three separate binary documents, for
example) into a full colour image. In each case, a different key can be used.
(v) The binary plaintext image should have homogeneous margins in order to min-
imise the effects of ringing due to ‘edge-effects’ when processing the data in the
spectral domain.
Algorithm II: Decryption Algorithm
Step 1: Read the watermarked image from a file and extract the lowest 1-bit layer
from the image.
Step 2: Regenerate the (non-preconditioned) cipher using the same key used in
Algorithm I.
Step 3: Correlate the cipher with the input obtained in Step 1 and normalise the
result.
Step 4: Quantize and format the output from Step 3 and write to a file.
The following points should be noted:
(i) The correlation operation should be undertaken using a DFT.
(ii) For colour images, the data is decomposed into each RGB component and each
1-bit layer is extracted and correlated with the appropriate cipher, i.e. the same
cipher or three ciphers relating to three private keys respectively.
(iii) The output obtained in Step 3 has a low dynamic range and therefore
requires to be quantized into an 8-bit image based on floating point numbers within
the range max(array)-min(array).
8.9.3 StegoText
StegoText is a prototype tool designed using MATLAB to examine the applications
to which stochastic diffusion can be used. A demonstration version of the system
is available at http://eleceng.dit.ie/arg/downloads/Stegocrypt which has been de-
signed with a simple Graphical User Interface as shown in Figure 42 whose use is
summarised in the following table:
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Encryption Mode Decryption Mode
Inputs: Inputs:
Plaintext image Stegotext image
Covertext image Private key (PIN)
Private Key (PIN)
Output: Output:
Watermarked image Decrypted watermark
Operation: Operation:
Encrypt by clicking on Decrypt by clicking on
buttom E (for Encrypt) button D (for Dycrypt)
The PIN (Personal Identity Number) can be an numerical string with upto 16
Figure 42: Graphical User Interface for Stegotext software system.
elements. In principal, any existing encryption algorithm, application or system
can be used to generate the cipher required by StegoText by encrypting an image
composed of random noise. The output is then needs to be converted into a decimal
integer array and the result normalised as required, i.e. depending on the format of
the output that is produced by a given system. In this way, StegoText can be used
in conjunction with any existing encryption standard.
The principal aim of StegoText is to encrypt an image and transform the ci-
phertext into a binary array which is then used to watermark a host image. This
provides a general method for hiding encrypted information in ‘image-space’.
8.9.4 e-Fraud Prevention of e-Certificates
Electronic or E-documents consisting of letters and certificates, for example, are
routinely used in EDI. EDI refers to the structured transmission of data between or-
ganizations by electronic means. It is used to transfer electronic documents from one
computer system to another; from one trading partner to another trading partner,
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for example [298], [299]. The USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
defines EDI as the computer-to-computer interchange of strictly formatted messages
that represent documents other than monetary instruments [300]. EDI remains the
data format used by the vast majority of electronic transactions in the world and EDI
documents generally contain the same information that would normally be found in
a paper document used for the same organizational function.
In terms of day-to-day applications, EDI relates to the use of transferring docu-
ments between two parties in terms of an attachment. For hardcopies, the attach-
ment is typically the result of scanning the document and generating an image which
is formatted as a JPEG or PDF (Print Device File) file, for example. This file is
then sent as an attachment to an email which typically refers to the attachment,
i.e. the email acts as a covering memorandum to the information contained in the
attachment. However, a more common approach is to print a document directly to
PDF file, for example. Thus, letters written in MicroSoft word, for example, can be
routinely printed to a PDF file for which there are a variety of systems available,
e.g. PDF suite http://pdf-format.com/suite/.
For letters and other documents that contain confidential information, encryp-
tion systems are often used to secure the document before it is attached to an email
and sent. The method discussed here provides a way of encrypting a document
using stochastic diffusion and then hiding the output in an image, thus providing a
covert method of transmitting encrypted information. However, the approach can
also be used to authenticate a document by using the original document as a ‘host
image’. In terms of the Stegotext GUI shown in Figure 42, this involves using the
same file for the Input and Host Image. An example of this is shown in Figure 43
where a hardcopy issue of a certificate has been scanned into electronic form and
the result printed to a PDF file. The properties of the image are as follows: File
size=3.31Mb; Pixel Dimensions - Width=884 pixels, Height =1312 pixels; Document
Size - Width=39.5 cm, Height=46.28cm; Resolution=28 pixels/cm. The result has
been encrypted and binarised using stochastic diffusion and the output used to wa-
termark the original document. The fidelity of the decrypt is perfectly adequate
to authenticate aspects of the certificate such as the name and qualification of the
holder, the date and signature, for example. Figure 44 shows the ‘Coat of Arms’ and
the signatures associated with this decrypt which have been cut from the original
decrypt given in Figure 43. These results illustrate that the decrypt is adequately
resolved for the authentication of the document as a whole. It also illustrates the
ability for the decrypt to retain the colour of the original plaintext image.
8.10 Lossless Watermarking Method
The method discussed in the previous section is suitable for document authentica-
tion, but the lossy nature of the reconstruction generated through binarisation of
the cipher, illustrated in Figure 43, is not suitable for full colour images. In this
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Figure 43: Certificate with binary watermark (left) and decrypt (right).
Figure 44: ‘Coat of Arms’ (left) and signatures (right) of decrypt given in Figure 43.
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section we introduce an algorithms for hiding grey scale image in a colour image and
full colour images using three host colour images. Figure 45 shows a block diagram
for hiding an encrypted 8-bit grey level image in a 24-bit colour image and Figure 46
shows the equivalent block diagram for hiding encrypted 24-bit colour image in three
24-bit colour host images. In the latter case, the same approach is used applied to
each colour component of the colour image. Referring to Figure 45, stochastic diffu-
sion is used to encrypt an 8-bit grey level image into a 24-bit colour host image with
a near perfect decrypt. In this scheme, the cipher is not binarised but is converted
into binary form. The first and second Least Significant Bits (LSBs) are ignored and
the third and fourth bits are embedded into the two LSBs of the host image’s red
channel. Similarly, the 5th and 6th bits are embedded into the two LSBs of the host
image’s green channel, and finally the 7th and 8th bits are embedded into the two
LSBs of the host image’s blue channel. The inverse process is based on extracting
the relevant bits from the associated channels with the first and second bits being
set to zero. The extracted bits are then used to re-generate the original cipher and
the reconstruction obtained by correlation with the original noise field.
Figure 47 shows an example of the method based on the block diagram given in
Figure 46 using the MATLAB code given in Appendix B. The three 24-bit colour
host images after application of the embedding process are given in Figure 48.
8.11 Discussion
This chapter has focused on the application of stochastic diffusion for transmitting
e-documents and digital images over the internet in such a way that encrypted infor-
mation can be communicated covertly and the information authenticated. The use of
the Internet to transfer documents as image attachments has and continues to grow
rapidly. It is for this ‘market’ that the approach reported here has been developed.
Inserting a binary watermark into a host image obtained by binarizing a floating
point ciphertext (as discussed in Section 9) provides a cryptographically secure so-
lution. This is because binarization is an entirely one-way process. Thus, although
the watermark may be removed from the covertext image, it can not be decrypted
without the recipient having access to the correct cryptographically secure algorithm
and key. The approach discussed in Section 9.4 and the StegoText system currently
available has a range of application for e-document authentication. For example,
many institutes such as universities still issue ‘paper certificates’ to their graduates.
These certificates are then scanned and sent as attachments along with a CV and
covering letter when applying for a job. It is at this point that the certificate may be
counterfeited and, for this reason, some establishments still demand originals to be
submitted. StegoText provides the facility to issue electronic certificates (in addition
or in substitution to a hardcopy) which can then be authenticated as discussed in
Section 9.4. By including a serial number on each certificate (a Certificate Identity
Number) which represents a ‘public key’, the document can be submitted to the
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Figure 45: Block Diagram for hiding an encrypted 8-bit grey level image in a 24-bit
colour host image.
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Figure 46: Block Diagram for hiding an encrypted 24-bit colour image in three 24-bit
colour host images.
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Figure 47: Orginal Image (above) and reconstructed image after decryption (below).
Figure 48: Host images used to hide the image given in Figure 47 after embedding
the ciphers.
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authority that issued the certificate for authentication, for which an online service
can be established as required subject to any regulation of investigatory powers e.g.
[301].
In this chapter, the method of stochastic diffusion has been extended to hide
24-bit colour images in a set of three 24-bit colour images. This provides a lossless
method of encrypting and covertly communicating 24-bit colour images over the
Internet as required and as illustrated in Section 10. The applications to which
stochastic diffusion can be applied are numerous and, coupled with appropriate
key-exchange protocols, provides a generic method of encrypting and hiding digital
image information.
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9 Hardcopy Steganography
The model
stegotext = ciphertext + covertext
can be applied for watermarking digital images associated with electronic-to-electronic
type communications in which there is no or minimal loss of information. This
method can be used to watermark digital images for the purpose of authentication
but can also be viewed as a method of covertly transmitting ciphertext when the
plaintext is converted to the form of a digital image. Steganography and watermark-
ing techniques are also of value for hardcopy ‘data’ which has a range of applications
for authenticating printed material and copyright validation, for example. However,
to be of practical value to the security printing industry the methods must be robust
to the significant distortions generated by the printing and/or scanning process. A
simple approach is to add information to a printed page that is difficult to see. For
example, some modern colour laser printers, including those manufactured by HP
and Xerox, print tiny yellow dots which are added to each page. The dots are barely
visible and contain encoded printer serial numbers, date and time stamps. This fa-
cility provides a useful forensics tool for tracking the origins of a printed document
which has only relatively recently been disclosed.
9.1 Diffusion Only Watermarking: Texture Coding
If a stegotext image is printed and scanned back into electronic form, then the
print/scan process will yield an array of pixels that will be significantly different
from the original electronic image even though it might ‘look’ the same. These
differences can include the size of the image, its orientation, brightness, contrast
and so on. Of all the processes involved in the recovery of the watermark, the
subtraction of the host image from the watermarked image is critical. If this process
is not accurate on a pixel-by-pixel basis and deregistered for any of many reasons,
then recovery of the watermark by correlation will not be effective. However, if we
make use of the diffusion process alone, then the watermark can be recovered via a
print/scan because of the compatibility of the processes involved. However, in this
case, the ‘watermark’ is not covert but overt.
Depending on the printing process applied, a number of distortions will occur
which diffuse the information being printed. Thus, in general, we can consider the
printing process to introduce an effect that can be represented by the convolution
equation
Iprint = pprint ⊗ I.
where I is the original electronic form of a diffused image, ⊗ denotes the two-
dimensional convolution operation and pprint is the point spread function of the
printer. An incoherent image of the data, obtained using a flat bed scanner, for
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example (or any other incoherent optical imaging system), will also have a charac-
teristic point spread function pscan say. Thus, we can consider a scanned image to
be given by
Iscan = pscan ⊗ Iprint
where Iscan is taken to be the digital image obtained from the scan. Now, because
convolution is commutative, we can write
Iscan = pscan ⊗ pprint ⊗ p⊗ I0 = p⊗ pscan/print ⊗ I0
where
pscan/print = pscan ⊗ pprint
which is the print/scan point spread function associated with the processing cycle of
printing the image and then scanning it back into electronic form. By applying the
method discussed earlier, we can obtain a reconstruction of the watermark whose
fidelity is determined by the scan/print PSF. However, in practice, the scanned image
needs to be re-sized to that of the original. This is due to the scaling relationship
(for a function f with Fourier transform F )
f(αx, βy)⇐⇒ 1
αβ
F
(
kx
α
,
ky
β
)
.
The size of any image captured by a scanner or other device will depend on the
resolution used. The size of the image obtained will inevitably be different from the
original because of the resolution and window size used to print the diffused image
I and the resolution used to scan the image. Since scaling in the spatial domain
causes inverse scaling in the Fourier domain, the scaling effect must be ‘inverted’
before the watermark can be recovered by correlation since correlation is not a scale
invariant process. Re-sizing the image (using an appropriate interpolation scheme
such as the bi-cubic method, for example) requires a set of two numbers a and b (i.e.
the a × b array used to generate the noise field and execute the diffusion process)
that, along with the seed required to regenerate the noise field n, provides the ‘pri-
vate keys’ needed to recover the data from the diffused image. An example of this
approach is given in Figure 49 which shows the result of reconstructing four different
images (a photograph, finger-print, signature and text) used in the design of an im-
personalized bank card. The use of ‘diffusion only’ watermarking for print security
can be undertaken in colour by applying exactly the same diffusion/reconstruction
methods to the red, green and blue components independently. This provides two
additional advantages: (i) the effect of using colour tends to yield better quality
reconstructions because of the colour combination process; (ii) for each colour com-
ponent, it is possible to apply a noise field with a different seed. In this case, three
keys are required to recover the watermark although it should be noted that, due to
the errors associated in the extraction of each colour component from a colour scan,
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Figure 49: Example of the application of ‘diffusion only’ watermarking. In this
example, four images of a face, finger-print, signature and text have been diffused
using the same cipher and printed on the front (top-left) and back (bottom-left) of an
impersonalized identity card using a 600 dpi printer. The reconstructions (top-right
and bottom-right, respectively) are obtained using a conventional flat-bed scanner
based on a 300 dpi grey-level scan.
this approach does not yield reconstructions with the same degree of robustness as
in the case when the same key/algorithm is used for each colour component.
Because this method is based on convolution alone and since
Iscan = pscan/print ⊗ I0
as discussed earlier, the recovery of the I0 will not be negated by the distortion
of the PSF associated with the print/scan process, just limited or otherwise by its
characteristics. Thus, if an image is obtained of the printed data field p⊗I0 which is
out of focus due to the characteristics of pscan/print, then the reconstruction of I0 will
be out of focus to the same degree. Decryption of images with this characteristic is
only possible using an encryption scheme that is based a diffusion only approach.
However, if a covertext image Ic is introduced so that
Iscan = pscan/print ⊗ I0 + pscan/print ⊗ Ic
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then because
Iscan − Ic 6= pscan/print ⊗ I0
recovery of the plaintext is not possible which is why we resort to a diffusion only
method approach.
Figure 50 illustrates the recovery of a diffused image printed onto a personal
identity card obtained captured using a mobile phone camera. In the latter case,
the reconstruction is not in focus because of the wide-field nature of the lens used.
However, the fact that recovery of the watermark is possible with a mobile phone
means that the scrambled data can be transmitted securely and the card holders
image (as in this example) recovered remotely and transmitted back to the same
phone for authentication. This provides the necessary physical security needed to
implement such a scheme in practice and means that specialist image capture devices
are not required on site. Applications of this technique to a mobile security spot
check environment are clearly possible.
Figure 50: Example of a security card designed to include a texture code of the
holders portrate (top). The images (i.e. portrate and texture code) have been
printed onto the identity card at 600dpi. An image of this card (bottom-left) has
been generated using a mobile phone. After cropping the texture code obtained from
this low resolution data, a reconstruction can still be obtained as shown (bottom-
right).
The diffusion process can be carried out using a variety of different noise fields
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other than the uniform noise field considered here. Changing the noise field can be
of value in two respects: first, it allows a system to be designed that, in addition to
specific keys, is based on specific algorithms which must be known a priori. These
algorithms can be based on different pseudo uniform random number generators
and/or different pseudo chaotic number generators that are post-processed to pro-
vide a uniform distribution of numbers. Second, the diffusion field depends on both
the characteristics of the watermark image and the noise field. By utilizing different
noise fields (e.g. Gaussian noise, Poisson noise), the texture of the output field can
be changed. The use of different noise fields is of value when different textures are
required that are aesthetically pleasing and can be used to create a background that
is printed over the entire document - texture maps. In this sense, variable noise
based diffusion fields can be used to replace complex print security features with the
added advantage that, by de-diffusing them, information can be recovered. Further,
these fields are very robust to data degradation created by soiling, for example. In
the case of binary watermark images, data redundancy allows reconstructions to
be generated from a binary output, i.e. after binarizing the diffusion field (with a
threshold of 50% for example). This allows the output to be transmitted in a form
that can tolerate low resolution and low contrast copying, e.g. a fax.
The tolerance of this method to printing and scanning is excellent provided the
output is cropped accurately (to within a few pixels) and oriented correctly. The
processes of cropping and orientation can be enhanced and automated by providing
a reference frame in which the diffused image is inserted. This is illustrated in
Figure 51 which, in addition shows the effect of diffusing a combination of images.
This has the effect of producing a diffused field that is very similar but nevertheless
conveys entirely different information. Details of the robustness of the method to
various ‘attacks’ are provided in the Appendix.
9.2 Covertext Addition and Removal
Because diffusion only watermarking is based on convolution/correlation operations
it is relatively insensitive to contrast stretching and compression. This provides
the opportunity to introduce covertext in the form of the addition of foreground
information (e.g. text) to a printed document that has been watermarked a pri-
ori with a grey scale (or colour) texture map whose brightness and contrast has
been adjusted to be unobtrusive with regard to the covertext (i.e. the watermark is
made bright compared to black text). Alternative, once the texture field has been
designed, it may be introduced into a text editor that provide the inclusion of water-
marks. For example, Microsoft Word has the facility to include a printed watermark
(Format→Background→Printed Watermark) that provides the option to select a
Picture Watermark (Existing Watermark) with options on scale and ‘Washout’. In
order to extract the watermark, it is then necessary to remove the text after a scan
has been undertaken under the assumption that the covertext is not available. This
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Figure 51: Example of the diffusion of composite images with the inclusion of a ref-
erence frame for enhancing and automating the processes of copping and orientation.
In each case the data fields have been printed and scanned at 300 dpi.
can be accomplished using a median filter which is effective in removing isolated
noise spikes, i.e. in this application, foreground text. However, in this case, the
median filter is not applied to the image in its entirety. Instead, it is applied only to
the neighbourhood of pixels (i.e. a user defined moving window) that exists below a
user defined threshold that is specified in order to differentiate between the water-
mark and those pixels associated with the covertext. After removal of the covertext,
the image watermark is reconstructed by correlation with the cipher.
9.3 Applications of Texture Coding
Some applications of diffusion only coding are already evident from the examples
already given to introduce the technique in previous sections. Strictly speaking,
the method is not a watermarking technique unless a covertext can be used to hide
the ciphertext. However, as discussed previously, application of a covertext is not
applicable for the authentication of printed documents due to the degradation of the
covertext when printing and scanning a document. Hence, for application to low
resolution print security, the method should be referred to as texture coding.
In this section, we consider a range of application to which the method can be
applied.
9.3.1 Authentication
Authentication of a document image should ensure that the document has not been
altered from the time it is created and signed by the author to the time it is received
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at the destination. Authentication of paper documents is an important concern
as the ability of counterfeiters has increased substantially in recent years. This is
contributed to by the dramatic improvement in the capability of high resolution
scanners and printers. Moreover, digital documents can be accessed and modified
by intruders relatively easily. This is especially true in the case of documents that
are exchanged over the Internet.
Using the model and methods discussed here, a selective authentication approach
can be applied in which only significant changes cause authentication to fail. This
can be verified by embedding information in a document that can later be verified
as to whether it has been tampered with or otherwise.
9.3.2 Photo Verification
Figure 49 and Figure 51 show examples of a photo verification application that
can be incorporated into an ID card where a photograph of the card holder is
texture coded and printed beside the original image. Substantial editing, such as
changing the original photo, will be illegitimate because it will completely change
the interpretation of the card. Thus, a photo verification system can be designed to
do the following:
1. Capture the diffused watermark using any tool (scanner, camera, etc).
2. Read the key. The key might be:
(a) Encoded using a bar code, or
(b) stored in a local Database, or
(c) stored in a database that can be accessed via the Internet.
3. Extract the watermark.
4. Verify the authenticity by comparing the original photo with the extracted
photo. This can be done either by:
(a) A subjective test using the judgment of a human (details on the scales
that have been suggested for use in evaluation of watermarking quality
being given in [302]).
(b) Quality metrics, such as the Mean Square Error or Chi-square test.
(c) Any other matching algorithm including the application of an Artificial
Neural Network as required.
Such a system can be modified to include more information in the diffused watermark
as required, such as the name of the ID card holder. Moreover, texture coding can
be used to generate a de-personalised ID card either on an individual image basis
(Figure 49) or in terms of a composite image (Figure 51).
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9.3.3 Statistical Verification
When a document is prepared using MS Word, for example, or any other major
word processing package, statistical information from the document can be gathered;
information about the author, date and time, number of characters and spaces and
so on. A verification system can use this information to check the authenticity of the
document. Any attempt at modification of the file will be reflected in its statistics.
The system can either incorporate these data in plaintext or as a diffused code into
a patch on the document which is encoded into an indecipherable image. The image
needs to be attractively packaged in an appropriate place on the document or can
be incorporated as part of a background texture.
It is assumed that the recipient of the document (scanned or electronic) will have
the appropriate software available. The encoded image is read into the decoding
software and text-recognition used to reveal the text which is then compared with
the plain-text statistics of the document. The data in the image can alternatively be
checked manually against the statistics of the file instead of using text recognition.
Each author can have a particular key for encoding the image. Upon receipt, the
recipient applies that particular key to decode the image. Alternatively, a separate
one-time PIN can be transmitted to the recipient in order to decode the image.
9.3.4 Original Copy Verification
When a document is scanned, subject to the scanner type and settings (including the
resolution, for example), the output digital image file will have a specific statistical
characteristic compounded in the histogram. If the document is copied and scanned
again then this characteristic histogram will change because of the copy process. In
general, a copied document will tend to have a smoother histogram since it is, in ef-
fect, the original document image convolved with a PSF that is characteristic of the
copier (a function of the composite scan/print process). By printing a texture code
of the histogram of the original document, typically on the back of the document,
the document can be scanned and the histogram compared with the watermark, at
least within an acceptable tolerance. This application has value in the authentica-
tion of high value documents such a Bank Bonds, an example of which is given in
Figure 52. Figure 53 shows the texture map and the reconstruction of the plain-
text, i.e. a histogram of the luminance of the original colour image together with
some basic statistical information. By specifying the type of scanner and operational
constraints, statistical information of this type (i.e. the mean, standard deviation
and median, for example) can be used to qualify whether or not the Bank Bond
or other high value documents has been copied. This statistical verification may
include measures relating to the RGB components for the case of high value colour
documents. Although each scan (using the same scanner with identical settings)
will not output an identical digital image (due to slight differences in the crop, for
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Figure 52: Example of a high value Bank Bond.
example, as well as the natural ‘jitter’ of the scanner) the statistical information
should not change significantly unless a copy has been made, acceptable tolerances
having been established a priori.
9.3.5 Component Verification
The method discussed can be extended to include a ‘specific parts’ from of the text
that must be correct, e.g. a sum of money, name of beneficiary etc. An example is
shown in figure 54.
After decoding, the results will be as given as shown in Figure 55. Clearly, the
diffused code could be placed into the background of each data field (i.e. instead of
placing it in the next empty line).
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Figure 53: Texture map (left) and reconstruction of statistical information relating
to scan of original document using Adobe Photoshop V5.
Figure 54: Coded Specific Part from a Document
Figure 55: Revealed Document after Coding Specific Parts.
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9.3.6 Transaction Tracking
Also called fingerprinting, transaction tracking involves the embedding of a different
watermark into each distributed copy. This is especially useful for identifying people
who obtain a document legally but illegally redistribute.
9.3.7 Leaked Document Monitoring
One common method to monitor and discover any ‘leak’ associated with an impor-
tant document is to use visible marks. For example, highly sensitive documents
are sometimes printed on backgrounds containing large gray digits using a different
number for each copy. Records are then kept about who has which copy. Of course,
imperceptible watermarks (or at least diffused watermark) are preferable to visible
marks. They are easy to remove/replace from a document when it is copied. Using
this model for document watermarking, the tracking number is diffused and inserted
into the background. The diffused watermark is inseparable from the document. The
adversary (a person who attempts to remove, disable, or forge a watermark for the
purpose of circumventing its original purpose) does not know the embedded number
and can not recognize the difference between copies (it is difficult for human eyes to
find a difference between two copies with different watermarks).
9.3.8 Owner Identification (Copyright)
Copyright can be undertaken by embedding the identity of a document’s copyright
holder as a watermark in order to prevent other parties from claiming the copyright
of the document. The embedded data can be a biometric characteristic (such as sig-
nature). The receiver of the document reconstructs the signature used to watermark
the document, which is then used to verify the authors claimed identity.
9.3.9 Signature Verification
Handwritten signatures are commonly used to certify the contents of a document or
to authenticate legal transactions. A handwritten signature is a well-known biomet-
ric attribute. Other biometric attributes, which are commonly used for authentica-
tion include iris, hand geometry, face, and fingerprints (e.g. [303] and [304]). While
attributes like the iris and fingerprints do not change over time, they require special
and relatively expensive hardware to capture the biometric data. An important
advantage of the signature over other biometric attributes is that it has been tradi-
tionally used in authenticating documents and hence is socially accepted. Signature
verification is usually done by visual inspection. In automatic signature verification,
a computer takes over the task of comparing two signatures to determine if the sim-
ilarity between the signatures exceeds some pre-specified threshold. There a many
similarity measures that can be used for this purpose. Figure 56 shows an example
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Figure 56: Watermarked cheque (above) and recovered signature from watermark
(below).
for this approach. The signature of the customer is diffused and inserted into the
background of the cheque. Each customer has their own key that is known only to
them and their bank. They use the key to generate the background and then print
the cheque. The bank then uses the key to extract the customer signature from the
cheque. If the extracted and the existing signatures on the cheque are matched (to
within a given tolerance), then the cheque is accepted.
9.3.10 Binary Data Authentication using Binary Coded Images
The method can be used to encode binary information by applying a threshold to the
stochastic field to produce a binary output image. Reconstruction of the information
hidden in this binary image is obtained by correlating the scanned image with the
original cipher. This provides a facility for printing ‘binary texture codes’ which have
applications a in a range of printing processes that are ‘two-tone’. For example, UV
sensitive inks can be used to print a binary cipher that encodes the serial number
of a bank note. An example of this application is given in Figure 57. The serial
number given at the top right-hand corner of a (specimen) 20 Euro note is ‘diffused’
to produce the binary output shown (centre image). This information is printed
onto the bank note with UV sensitive ink making the feature optically covert. A
reconstruction of the serial number is then obtained after UV image capture and
decryption.
9.4 Case Study: Passport Authentication
Like any other security document, ID card and so on, a passport consists of a number
of security features depending on the sophistication of the design associated with
the authority responsible for an issue. These range from the use of printing complex
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Figure 57: Example of the application of ‘binary texture coding’ used to authenticate
currency. Specimen Euro bank note (top); binary texture field after diffusing an
image of the serial number and printing the result onto the bank note using UV
sensitive ink (centre); reconstruction of serial number after capturing the binary
texture field under a UV light source (below).
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background, micro-printing, conventional paper watermarking, UV watermarking,
foil holograms, ghost images and so on. Each of these security features may be more
or less difficult to counterfeit depending on the sophistication of the feature and
the counterfeiter. In this case study, we consider the use of texture coding within
the context of authenticating a passport including the protocol associated with a
typical ‘cycle’. The method is simple and cost effective to implement in terms of
the hardware required, i.e. Standard PC, flatbed scanner and printer, all of which
are COTS. All that is required is a remote web site hub to which digital scans of
the texture code can be emailed and where a decrypt can take place, forwarding the
result back to the point of enquiry.
Figure 58: Example of the stochastic diffusion method applied to passport authen-
tication: Original image scanned from a passport at 400dpi (above), printed image
after applying stochastic diffusion (centre) and reconstruction after scanning the
printed stochastic field at 300dpi (below).
The principal idea is to take a low resolution scan (say 600dpi) of the page (or
pages) of a passport that contains the primary information, e.g. Passport number,
Name, Date of birth, Signature and Photograph of the passport holder - the plain-
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text. This plaintext is then forwarded to a designated Hub where it is diffused with
a unique noise field that is maintained at the Hub alone to produce the ciphertext.
The result is then emailed back to the user, printed and the result (permanently or
as required) inserted into the passport, a process that is similar to issuing a Visa,
for example. At any point of contact, if the passport requires authentication, the
ciphertext is scanned and the digital image emailed to the appropriate Hub where
upon it is decrypted and the result (the watermark) sent back to the point of ori-
gin. Automation of this cycle would require a new infrastructure to be established
which is both time consuming and expensive. Instead, the cycle described above
would be best suited for use with regard to spot checks at an airport terminal, for
example, especially if the holder of the passport or the passport itself is suspect.
The scanning process (using a standard flat bed scanner, for example) can then be
undertaken while the holder of the passport is waiting for it to be authenticated (or
otherwise) based on a visual comparison between the decrypt and the plaintext.
Figure 58 shows an example of the technique applied to a composite image
scanned from a passport, an application which is cheap and simple to implement with
regard to authenticating a passport holders personal information. The degradation
associated with the reconstruction is due to the low resolution of the printing and
scanning rather than the information hiding method. Unless the correct stochastic
field is used (as determined by the keys), it is not possible to reconstruct the image
making counterfeiting or forgery improbable. In this case the scan has been emailed
as a JPEG attachment where decryption can take place remotely.
9.5 Discussion
Valuable paper documents are subject to misuse by criminals. This is largely due
to the dramatic improvement in personal computer hardware and peripheral equip-
ment. Embedding watermarks into a printed document is one way to secure them.
The ability to extract the watermark from a printed copy is generally useful to help
establish ownership, authenticity, and to establish the origin of an unauthorized dis-
closure. However, finding a robust watermarking technique is a continuing challenge.
This is due to extensive amount of noise that is added when a document is printed
and scanned. Moreover, printed documents do not maintain their quality over time.
In this paper, we have presented a robust watermarking method for paper se-
curity. Unlike traditional watermarking techniques, this approach can extract the
hidden watermark after a print/scan attack which is achieved by using the convolu-
tion and correlation processes for coding and decoding respectively. This approach is
chosen because of its compatibility with the principles of the physical optics involved
in scanning a document. The watermark w is diffused (convolved) with a noise field
n and placed into the background of a covertext, typically a text document. The
watermark can be recovered by removing the covertext f using a modified median
filter. We then correlate the diffused watermark with the original noise field. This
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process (i.e. coding and decoding) is compounded in the following formula:
w′ = F

Covertext removal︷ ︸︸ ︷

Diffusion︷ ︸︸ ︷
Awe
iθwAne
iθn +f

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Confusion
−f
Ane
−iθn
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Correlation

= F−1
{
Awe
iθw |An|2
}
where w′ is the extracted watermark, Aw and An are the amplitude spectra of the
watermark and cipher respectively, θw and θn are the respective phase spectra. The
extracted watermark is a noisy version of the embedded watermark. This noise is
due to the power spectrum | An |2. In order to enhance the extracted watermark, we
have to eliminate the power spectrum term or at least minimize its effect. One way
to do this is to divide the output over the power spectrum during the diffusion step
or correlation step. To avoid singularities, we replace each and all zeros that occur
in | An |2 by 1. Alternatively, we can choose n such that it has a homogeneously
distributed power spectrum across all frequencies, (such as white noise) or pre-
process n by replacing it’s amplitude spectrum with a constant value. However,
these conditions are restrictive and the regularisation method discussed above to
avoid singularities is both simple and effective.
The method is robust to a wide variety of attacks including geometric attacks,
drawing, crumpling and print/scan attacks as discussed in the Appendix. Further
the method is relatively insensitive to lossy compression, filtering, amplitude ad-
justments, additive noise and thresholding. The principal weakness of the system
is its sensitivity to rotation and cropping. This can be minimized by orienting the
document correctly and accurately before scanning and using automatic cropping
software which is available with selected scanners (e.g. Cannon scanners). Alterna-
tively, introduction of a frame provides a reference feature from which an accurate
crop can be obtained.
The visibility of the diffused watermark and the compatibility of this system with
the physical principles of an imaging system, increase the robustness of the system
and provides a successful approach to the extraction of the watermark after scanning
at low resolution. Moreover, using correlation in the extraction phase increases the
robustness of the system to some important attacks such as translation and cropping
(most likely to occur during a scan).
The system is secure in that it can not be attacked easily. First, the feature is not
‘suspicious’ as many documents have a background texture. Second, the attacker
does not know the algorithm used to generate the diffused watermark. Even if the
9 HARDCOPY STEGANOGRAPHY 322
attacker does know the algorithm, he/she must still know a significant amount of
information before the system can be broken, such as: the correct key, the diffusion
operator type, the original image size and so on.
For interested readers, a prototype system is available for trial purposes which
can be downloaded from
http://eleceng.dit.ie/arg/downloads/Document Authentication.zip
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Appendix A: Proof by Induction of the Central Limit
Theorem
We consider the effect of applying multiple convolutions of the uniform distribution
P (x) =
{
1
X , | x |≤ X/2;
0, otherwise
and show that
N∏
n=1
⊗ Pn(x) ≡ P1(x)⊗x P2(x)⊗x ...⊗x PN (x)
'
√
6
piN
exp(−6x2/XN)
where Pn(x) = P (x), ∀n and N is large. This result is based on considering the ef-
fect of multiple convolutions in Fourier space (through application of the convolution
theorem) and then working with a series representation of the result.
The Fourier transform of P (x) is given by
P˜ (k) =
∞∫
−∞
P (x) exp(−ikx)dx
=
X/2∫
−X/2
1
X
exp(−ikx)dx = sinc(kX/2)
where sinc(x) = sin(x)/x - the ‘sinc’ function. Thus,
P (x)⇐⇒ sinc(kX/2)
where ⇐⇒ denotes transformation into Fourier space, and from the convolution
theorem in follows that
Q(x) =
N∏
n=1
⊗ Pn(x)⇐⇒ sincN (kX/2).
Using the series expansion of the sin function for an arbitrary constant α,
sinc(αk)
=
1
αk
(
αk − 1
3!
(αk)3 +
1
5!
(αk)5 − 1
7!
(αk)7 + . . .
)
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= 1− 1
3!
(αk)2 +
1
5!
(αk)4 − 1
7!
(αk)6 + . . .
The N th power of sinc(αk) can be written in terms of a binomial expansion giving
sincN (αk) =
(
1− 1
3!
(αk)2 +
1
5!
(αk)4 − 1
7!
(αk)6 + . . .
)N
= 1−N
(
1
3!
(αk)2 − 1
5!
(αk)4 +
1
7!
(αk)6 − . . .
)
+
N(N − 1)
2!
(
1
3!
(αk)2 − 1
5!
(αk)4 +
1
7!
(αk)6 − . . .
)2
−N(N − 1)(N − 2)
3!
×
(
1
3!
(αk)2 − 1
5!
(αk)4 +
1
7!
(αk)6 − . . .
)3
+ . . .
= 1−N α
2k2
3!
+N
α4k4
5!
− kα
6k6
7!
− . . .
+
N(N − 1)
2!
(
α4k4
(3!)2
− 2α
6k6
3!5!
+ . . .
)
−N(N − 1)(N − 2)
3!
(
α6k6
(3!)3
+ . . .
)
= 1− N
3!
α2k2 +
(
N
5!
α4 +
N(N − 1)
2!(3!)2
α4
)
k4
−
(
N
7!
α6 +
N(N − 1)
3!5!
α6 +
N(N − 1)(N − 2)
3!(3!)3
α6
)
k6 + . . .
Now the series representation of the exponential (for an arbitrary positive constant
c) is
exp(−ck2) = 1− ck2 + 1
2!
c2k4 − 1
3!
c3k6 + . . .
Equating terms involving k2, k4 and k6 it is clear that (evaluating the factorials),
c =
1
6
Nα2,
1
2
c2 =
(
1
120
N +
1
72
N(N − 1)
)
α4
or
c2 =
(
1
36
N2 − 1
90
N
)
α4,
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and
1
6
c3 =(
1
5040
N +
1
720
N(N − 1) + 1
1296
N(N − 1)(N − 2)
)
α6
or
c3 =
(
1
216
N3 − 1
1080
N2 +
1
2835
N
)
α6.
Thus, by deduction, we can conclude that
cn =
(
1
6
N
)n
α2n +O(Nn−1α2n).
Now, for large N , the first term in the equation above dominates to give the following
approximation for the constant c,
c ' 1
6
Nα2.
We have therefore shown that the N th power of the sinc(αk) function approximates
to a Gaussian function (for large N), i.e.
sincN (αk) ' exp
(
−1
6
Nα2k2
)
.
Thus, if α = X2 , then
Q(x)⇐⇒ exp
(
−X
24
Nk2
)
approximately. The final part of the proof is therefore to Fourier invert the function
exp(−XNk2/24), i.e. to compute the integral
I =
1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
exp
(
− 1
24
XNk2
)
exp(ikx)dk.
Now,
I =
1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
e
−
[(√
XN
24
k−
√
24
XN
ix
2
)2
− 6x2
XN
]
dk
=
1
pi
√
6
XN
e−
6x2
XN
∞+ix
√
6
XN∫
−∞+ix
√
6
XN
e−y
2
dy
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after making the substitution
y =
√
XN
6
k
2
− ix
√
6
XN
.
By Cauchy’s theorem
I =
1
pi
√
6
XN
e−
6x2
XN
∞∫
−∞
e−z
2
dz =
√
6
piXN
e−
6x2
XN
where we have use the result
∞∫
−∞
exp(−y2)dy = √pi.
Thus, we can write
Q(x) =
N∏
n=1
⊗ Pn(x) '
√
6
piXN
exp[−6x2/(XN)]
for large N .
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Appendix B: MATLAB Code for Covert Image Encryp-
tion
function [] = CIE( ImageName )
% This function - Covert Image Encryption (CIE) -
% inputs a 24-bit color image and encrypts it
% using the Stochastic Diffusion method.
% Read input image
InImage = imread(ImageName);
row = size(InImage,1);
col = size(InImage,2);
InImage = double(InImage);
%-------------------------
% Generate the noise field
% using Matlab’s rand function
NoiseImageR = rand(row,col);
NoiseImageG = rand(row,col);
NoiseImageB = rand(row,col);
NR = NoiseImageR;
NG = NoiseImageG;
NB = NoiseImageB;
% -------------------------
% Convolve the input image with the
% noise image using a 2D FFT
% with pre-conditioning
mR = PreCondition(NoiseImageR);
mG = PreCondition(NoiseImageG);
mB = PreCondition(NoiseImageB);
% -----------------------------
% Encrypt the Red Channel
CR=ifft2(fft2(mR).*fft2(InImage(:,:,1)) );
% Encrypt the Green Channel.
CG=ifft2(fft2(mG).*fft2(InImage(:,:,2)) );
% Encrypt the Blue Channel
CB=ifft2(fft2(mB).*fft2(InImage(:,:,3)) );
% Normalize Cipher Images to range 0:255.
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CR = Normalize(CR) .* 255;
CG = Normalize(CG) .* 255;
CB = Normalize(CB) .* 255;
% ------------------------
CR = uint8(CR);
CG = uint8(CG);
CB = uint8(CB);
% ------------------------
% Embed cipher images into three
% named cover images:
%
% cover1.bmp
% cover2.bmp
% cover3.bmp
% Embed red channel cipher into cover image 1
CoverImage1 = imread(’cover1.bmp’);
CoverImage1 = imresize(CoverImage1 , [row col]);
figure(1);
subplot(1,2,1), imshow(CoverImage1),
title(’Cover Image1 before embedding’);
for i = 1 : size(CoverImage1,1)
for j = 1 : size(CoverImage1,2)
CoverImage1(i,j,1) = bitand( CoverImage1(i,j,1) , 252 );
CoverImage1(i,j,1) = bitor( CoverImage1(i,j,1),
bitand(bitshift(CR(i,j),-2),3) );
CoverImage1(i,j,2) = bitand( CoverImage1(i,j,2) , 252 );
CoverImage1(i,j,2) = bitor( CoverImage1(i,j,2),
bitand(bitshift(CR(i,j),-4),3) );
CoverImage1(i,j,3) = bitand( CoverImage1(i,j,3) , 252 );
CoverImage1(i,j,3) = bitor( CoverImage1(i,j,3),
bitand(bitshift(CR(i,j),-6),3));
end
end
subplot(1,2,2), imshow(CoverImage1),
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title(’Cover Image1 after Embedding’);
% -----------------------------------
% Embed green channel cipher into Cover Image 2
CoverImage2 = imread(’cover2.bmp’);
CoverImage2 = imresize(CoverImage2 , [row col]);
figure(2);
subplot(1,2,1), imshow(CoverImage2),
title(’Cover Image2 before Embedding’);
for i = 1 : size(CoverImage2,1)
for j = 1 : size(CoverImage2,2)
CoverImage2(i,j,1) = bitand( CoverImage2(i,j,1) , 252 );
CoverImage2(i,j,1) = bitor( CoverImage2(i,j,1),
bitand(bitshift(CG(i,j),-2),3) );
CoverImage2(i,j,2) = bitand( CoverImage2(i,j,2) , 252 );
CoverImage2(i,j,2) = bitor( CoverImage2(i,j,2),
bitand(bitshift(CG(i,j),-4),3) );
CoverImage2(i,j,3) = bitand( CoverImage2(i,j,3) , 252 );
CoverImage2(i,j,3) = bitor( CoverImage2(i,j,3),
bitand(bitshift(CG(i,j),-6),3));
end
end
subplot(1,2,2), imshow(CoverImage2),
title(’Cover Image2 after Embedding’);
% ------------------------------------
% Embed blue channel cipher into Cover Image 3
CoverImage3 = imread(’cover3.bmp’);
CoverImage3 = imresize(CoverImage3 , [row col]);
figure(3);
subplot(1,2,1), imshow(CoverImage3),
title(’Cover Image3 before Embedding’);
for i = 1 : size(CoverImage3,1)
for j = 1 : size(CoverImage3,2)
CoverImage3(i,j,1) = bitand( CoverImage3(i,j,1) , 252 );
CoverImage3(i,j,1) = bitor( CoverImage3(i,j,1),
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bitand(bitshift(CB(i,j),-2),3) );
CoverImage3(i,j,2) = bitand( CoverImage3(i,j,2) , 252 );
CoverImage3(i,j,2) = bitor( CoverImage3(i,j,2),
bitand(bitshift(CB(i,j),-4),3) );
CoverImage3(i,j,3) = bitand( CoverImage3(i,j,3) , 252 );
CoverImage3(i,j,3) = bitor( CoverImage3(i,j,3),
bitand(bitshift(CB(i,j),-6),3));
end
end
subplot(1,2,2), imshow(CoverImage3),
title(’Cover Image3 after Embedding’);
% ------------------------------------
% Extract the hidden ciphers from cover images
% Extract red channel cipher from cover image 1
for i = 1 : size(CoverImage1,1)
for j = 1 : size(CoverImage1,2)
R = bitand( CoverImage1(i,j,1), 3);
G = bitand( CoverImage1(i,j,2), 3);
B = bitand( CoverImage1(i,j,3), 3);
ExImageR(i,j) = bitor( bitor(bitshift(R,2),
bitshift(G,4)),
bitshift(B,6) );
end
end
ExImageR = uint8(ExImageR);
% -------------------------
%
% Extract green channel cipher
% from cover image 2
for i = 1 : size(CoverImage2,1)
for j = 1 : size(CoverImage2,2)
R = bitand( CoverImage2(i,j,1), 3);
G = bitand( CoverImage2(i,j,2), 3);
B = bitand( CoverImage2(i,j,3), 3);
ExImageG(i,j) = bitor( bitor(bitshift(R,2),
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bitshift(G,4)),
bitshift(B,6) );
end
end
ExImageG = uint8(ExImageG);
% -------------------------
%
% Extract blue channel cipher
% from cover image 3
for i = 1 : size(CoverImage3,1)
for j = 1 : size(CoverImage3,2)
R = bitand( CoverImage3(i,j,1), 3);
G = bitand( CoverImage3(i,j,2), 3);
B = bitand( CoverImage3(i,j,3), 3);
ExImageB(i,j) = bitor( bitor(bitshift(R,2),
bitshift(G,4)),
bitshift(B,6) );
end
end
ExImageB = uint8(ExImageB);
% -------------------------
% Correlate the Extracted ciphers with the
% noise field using a 2D FFT
ExImageR = double(ExImageR);
ExImageG = double(ExImageG);
ExImageB = double(ExImageB);
PlainImR = ifft2( conj(fft2(NR)) .* fft2(ExImageR) );
PlainImG = ifft2( conj(fft2(NG)) .* fft2(ExImageG) );
PlainImB = ifft2( conj(fft2(NB)) .* fft2(ExImageB) );
% Normalize images to raneg 0:255
PlainImR = Normalize(PlainImR) .* 255;
PlainImG = Normalize(PlainImG) .* 255;
PlainImB = Normalize(PlainImB) .* 255;
%-------------------------------------
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Result(:,:,1) = PlainImR;
Result(:,:,2) = PlainImG;
Result(:,:,3) = PlainImB;
Result = uint8(Result);
imwrite(Result,’Output_Color.bmp’);
figure(4);
subplot(1,2,1), imshow(uint8(InImage)),
title(’Input Image before Encryption’);
subplot(1,2,2), imshow(Result),
title(’Output Image after Decryption’);
end
%--------------------------------------
function [ x ] = Normalize( mat )
% Function to normalise images
MAX = max(mat(:)); MIN = min(mat(:));
for i = 1:size(mat,1)
for j = 1:size(mat,2)
x(i,j) = ((mat(i,j) - MIN )/(MAX - MIN));
end
end
return;
end
%-----------------------------------
function [ m ] = PreCondition( arr )
% Pre-conditioning function
arrF = fft2(arr);
for i = 1:size(arrF,1)
for j = 1:size(arrF,2)
if abs(arrF(i,j)) == 0
M(i,j) = arrF(i,j);
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else
M(i,j) = arrF(i,j)/(abs(arrF(i,j))*abs(arrF(i,j)));
end
end
end
m = ifft2(M);
return;
end
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